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**Towards Multiculturalism? Identity, Difference
and Citizenship in Cultural Policy in Taiwan
(1949--2002)**

By

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Abstract

This study examines the theoretical and practical tensions and contradictions of multiculturalism in Taiwan. It combines cultural theory, cultural studies, and cultural policy to explore how western theories of multiculturalism can be practised in Taiwan's experience, and discuss the development of cultural policy in Taiwan.

Based on its unique history, Taiwanese society is struggling with two problems. One is the lack of common national identity. The clash between Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity has led to other conflicts within the whole society. The other problem is related to inequality among the various cultural communities, which has created a crisis in political legitimacy and social justice. In response to these challenges multiculturalism has become an important influence in cultural policy in Taiwan, and 'multicultural Taiwan' is constructed as a new national identity.

Because of the contradictory aspirations of homogeneous national identity and recognition of cultural differences three major challenges are posed by the emergence of multiculturalism in Taiwan. The first is related to national identity. Under the name of 'multicultural Taiwan', the government is seeking to construct a more complex, multifaceted and sustainable version of Taiwanese culture capable of mediating between the diversity and conflicts arising from ethnicity. However, multiculturalism, which is based on the recognition of various ethnic identities, also leads to tension between an integrative national identity and separate ethnic identities. The second challenge is related to cultural policy, which shows the tensions between integration and separation, between individual rights and collective rights in cultural policy. The third challenge is related to citizenship in Taiwan. The new concept of multicultural citizenship demands the acknowledgement of more rights, such as collective rights, cultural rights, minority rights and global citizenship, in defiance of the traditional views of citizenship based on civil, political and social rights, and national boundaries. Three case studies have been selected to reflect each issue: the Taiwanese aborigines, the Hakkas and migrant workers.

By considering these three challenges, I try to redefine multiculturalism and cultural policy in the Taiwanese experience. Firstly, I seek to redefine multiculturalism as 'multicultural citizenship' in the case of Taiwan. Multicultural citizenship is seen as a new balance between 'integration' and 'diversity' in the development of multiculturalism

in Taiwan. On the one hand, multicultural citizenship is related to the construction of a common public sphere and nation; on the other hand, it is also related to respect for cultural diversity and special communities in the private sphere. Secondly, I try to redefine cultural policy in Taiwan in terms of cultural rights and multicultural citizenship, which embody the link between people and the state. Cultural policy should protect cultural rights and strengthen the relationship between people and cultural policy. Similarly, multicultural policy should be based upon cultural rights and multicultural citizenship. When implemented, it should then improve multiculturalism. Thirdly, I conclude that the problems of national identity and cultural differences should be considered on the basis of multicultural citizenship.

Abbreviations

ATA: Association of Taiwanese Aborigines

CAA: Committee of Aboriginal Affairs

CCA: Committee of Cultural Affairs

CCP: Chinese Communist Party

CH: Committee of the Hakkas

CLA: Committee of Labour Affairs

DPP: Democratic Progressive Party

GNP: Gross national product

HAPA: Hakka Affairs Public Association

ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil Political Rights

ICESCR: International Covenant one Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

ILO: International Labour Organisation

KMT: Koumintang Party

NGO: Non government organisation

PRC: People's Republic of China (the name of government in mainland China)

ROC: Republic of China (the name of government in Taiwan)

UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UN: United Nations

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

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Chapter 1: Introduction

This study examines the theoretical and practical tensions and contradictions of multiculturalism in Taiwan. Multiculturalism here refers to the demands to recognise cultural differences, to challenge a homogeneous national identity, and to protect the rights of minority groups, such as ethnic groups, women, gays and lesbians. Multiculturalism can be seen as a challenge to a unified, singular and central national identity. A national government depends for its legitimacy on such a coherent national identity. By contrast, multiculturalism emphasises the various identities of ethnic communities, and demands that cultural differences should be recognised in the public sphere. In other word, it rejects a homogeneous national culture. In this sense, multiculturalism seems to be opposed to national identity.

However, multiculturalism has become an important influence in cultural policy in Taiwan. Since 1997, the government has claimed that Taiwan is a multicultural country. From then on, the government has begun to build a multicultural cultural policy and promote ideas of multiculturalism. Is the government undermining its own legitimacy? Can we trust its version of multiculturalism, or does that rhetoric simply disguise an attempt to reintegrate cultural diversity within a singular national identity and reconfirm the hegemony of national Taiwanese identity?

There are three major challenges posed by the emergence of multiculturalism in Taiwan. The first challenge is related to national identity. Multiculturalism is viewed by the government as a way to construct a new national identity. Under the name of 'multicultural Taiwan', the government is seeking to construct a more complex, multifaceted and sustainable version of Taiwanese culture in order to mediate between the diversity and conflicts arising from ethnicity. However, multiculturalism, which is based on the recognition of various ethnic identities, also leads to tensions between an integrative national identity and separate ethnic identities. In the end, will ethnic differences be dissipated and marginalised in a new, broad national identity? Or will they be improved by the new rights of citizenship?

The second challenge is related to cultural policy. In western societies multiculturalism has had a major impact on cultural policy, for example through the redefinition of social

values, the decline of authority and a shift in ideology¹. In Taiwan, multiculturalism has posed a challenge to traditional cultural policy, which is based on Han culture and national identity. Under the influence of multiculturalism, some new values have begun to be considered in cultural policy, for example the redistribution of public resources based on equal access, anti-Han centralism, and the protection of minority cultural development.

The third challenge is related to citizenship in Taiwan. The new concept of multicultural citizenship is developing both in theory and policy, and this challenges the traditional views of citizenship based on civil, political and social rights, and national boundaries. Multicultural citizenship demands the acknowledgement of more rights, such as cultural rights, minority rights and global citizenship. Inevitably, this leads to tensions between the government and minority groups.

By considering these three challenges, we shall seek to redefine multiculturalism as 'multicultural citizenship' in the case of Taiwan. In other words, this research discusses the prospects for a cultural policy in Taiwan based on 'multicultural citizenship'. It considers whether 'multicultural citizenship' can be promoted through cultural policy with particular reference to the experience of Taiwan, and it subjects the concept of 'multicultural citizenship' to critical examination.

Therefore, this research relates to two major scholarly areas. The first is 'citizenship studies'. In recent years, the classical idea of citizenship has faced many challenges, such as: the failure of the state to combat social exclusion; the transnational successes and circulation of the discourse of human rights (in particular aboriginal rights and minority rights); and global economic processes, which lead to more people crossing national boundaries to work and live in other countries. Many scholars have highlighted the emergence of new trends of citizenship and the need for a redefinition of the core concept of 'citizenship'. For example, there is a widespread view that we need to shift attention from 'individual rights' to 'collective rights', emphasise the importance of 'cultural rights' after the development of civil rights, political rights, and social and economic rights in citizenship, discuss the possibility of 'global citizenship' or 'post-national citizenship', and provide more new perspectives on citizenship, for example, through feminist and

¹ Daniel Bell, 'Ethnicity and Social Change' in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds.), *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp.145—50.

gay/lesbian approaches. 'Multicultural citizenship' can be viewed as a new construction of citizenship that seeks to respond to these new demands.

The second area to which this research relates is 'cultural policy'. Cultural policy is one of the zones of social governance through which the work of forming citizens takes place. Studies of cultural policy are concerned with such modes of neo-liberal governance, which work between public institutions and private lives at both the national and international levels, and which shape civil habits, tastes and dispositions in ways that are all the more effective for not being experienced as obtrusive². At the same time, as a strand of public debate, cultural policy is related to discussions on the politics of difference and the politics of entitlement, which tend to be articulated mostly in terms of cultural rights.

Furthermore, citizenship has been an important issue in cultural policy studies. For example, Tony Bennett and Colin Mercer have identified cultural policies as having a 'crucial role to play in securing the development of democratic cultural rights', and argue that research related to the promotion of such rights will need to concern itself with the following:

- The capacity of publicly-funded cultural institutions to recognise and promote the cultural rights of culturally diverse citizenries will depend on the extent to which they are open to inputs from different constituencies, communities and interest groups.
- Governments have a role to play to ensure the production and circulation of a diversity of cultural products reflecting the different values and meanings comprising the make up of civil society.
- Future research is needed into the role played by the institutions of civil society (such as NGOs) in promoting people's cultural and broader civic rights³.

Therefore, the present research can be viewed as overlapping the areas of citizenship and cultural policy through the concept of multicultural citizenship.

² Denise Meredyth and Jeffery Minson, 'Resourcing Citizenries', in *Citizenship and Cultural Policy* (London: SAGE Publications, 2001), p.xi.

³ Tony Bennett and Colin Mercer, 'Improving Research and International Cooperation for Cultural Policy', from the website of: <http://www.unesco-sweden.org/conference/Papers/Paper6.htm>.

1.1 Background to This Research

1.1.1. Why Multiculturalism? Is it a Valid Category of Analysis?

Since the 1990s, multiculturalism has been viewed as a significant issue in both theoretical and practical policy terms. At the theoretical level, multiculturalism challenges some traditional views, such as those of 'universal citizenship' and 'liberal equality', and emphasises the 'politics of difference'. In terms of practical policy, Canada and Australia began to pursue an active multicultural policy in the 1970s. Subsequently, many countries also took account of 'cultural difference' in relation to ethnic groups, immigrants, and gender or sexual divisions – in formulating cultural policy.

Today, multiculturalism has a far-reaching impact on debates concerning difference, identity and citizenship. Daniel Bell identifies four trends of multiculturalism in modern society. The first trend is a shift from marketplace to political decisions. Bell contends that, increasingly, decisions previously left to the marketplace are coming under the purview of politics, involving government bodies at local, state and federal levels. A wide array of decisions is now negotiated in the political arena by various interest groups. Ethnic groups are among these groups seeking to achieve their purpose through political negotiation or community action. The second trend is the redefinition of social values. Considering the concept of equality, he argues for a shift from talk of 'equality of opportunity' to enhance fair competition in society towards an emphasis on 'equality of result', entailing a redistribution of public resources. The third trend is the decline of authority. He contends that in many spheres of American life and its institutions, traditional authority structures and bases of authority are being challenged and eroded by the influences of multiculturalism. The fourth trend is a shift in ideology. Anti-imperialism is the chief ideological passion in contemporary thought and politics. Alternative values challenge the dominant paradigms in US⁴.

Multiculturalism is especially important in Taiwan. In 1997, Taiwan's government stated in the constitution, that Taiwan is a multicultural country. It did so for two main reasons. First, the conflict and confusion surrounding national identity – represented in the choice between unification and independence from mainland China – had led to a serious crisis. In Taiwan, differences concerning national identity are always related to ethnic differences. Thus, multiculturalism is viewed as a new way to achieve political integration.

⁴ Daniel Bell (1975), pp. 145--50.

Secondly, inequality among various ethnic groups, seen especially in the subservient position of the Taiwanese aborigines, has become a major obstacle to the development of democracy in Taiwan. Multiculturalism is seen as a good way to protect the rights of ethnic groups, especially ethnic minorities. Multiculturalism thus seeks to confront the tension between political integration and separation.

In addition, there is some disagreement on the issue of whether 'multicultural citizenship' is a valid category of analysis. Some critics argue that the term is too ambiguous to be useful. However, Delgado-Moreira holds a different view. He suggests that 'multicultural citizenship' does at least identify the root of the problem in liberal democracies: the existence of many cultures in one polity, regardless of their origins. Furthermore, it points to the centrality of tradition, culture and identity in relation to citizenship. It allows for spillover and reciprocal influences from developments in one field or group of multicultural policies to others. It is related to how the claims are made, addressed and how they reinforce each other empirically⁵.

1.1.2 Why Taiwan? What is Special about the Case of Taiwan?

In Taiwan, there are many surveys every year asking people: 'Are you Taiwanese, Chinese, or Taiwanese and Chinese?' Taiwan is unusual in affording so many optional identities for people. My own experience is interesting in this respect. My grandfather grew up under Japanese rule and studied for a degree in Tokyo. For him, his official national identity and language were Japanese, while his mother language was the Fulo language. My father was born in Japan and went to Taiwan at the age of ten, when the KMT (Kuomintang) government had just begun to take control. Thus he experienced the process of transformation from 'Japanese' to 'Chinese'. However, he identifies himself as 'Taiwanese'. I in turn grew up under a strong Chinese nationalism, and my parents and schools never tried to teach me to speak the Fulo language. Until I was 20 years old, on the basis of my education, I thought that I was 'Chinese'. Afterwards, I 'chose' to be 'Taiwanese', but I have lost my mother language--the Fulo language. I recall that it was very difficult for me to communicate with my grandparents. There is a wide cultural gap between my grandparents, my parents and myself. Even in a small family like mine, there is a mixture of many different identities and cultures, which are constantly interacting and shifting.

⁵ Juan M Delgado-Moreira, *Multicultural Citizenship of the European Union* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing limited, 2000), p.5.

The situation of my aboriginal friends is even more complex. For example, the grandfather of one of them was a hunter under Japanese rule, his father is a Christian pastor, and he himself is a Doctor of Chinese literature. Thus aboriginal kinship, Christian religion and Chinese culture create three worlds in his life, which result in a confusing, hybrid identity.

Identity is viewed as the most difficult problem facing Taiwanese society. This was true in the age of Chinese nationalism, from the 1940s to the 1980s, and after the 1980s, with the rising conflict between Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese consciousness. While western countries have tended to view citizenship and the democratic system as the bases of national identity, the problem of national identity in Taiwanese society still revolves around the struggle for cultural identity, as expressed in ethnicity, same-blood relations, shared culture and history.

The confusion between national identity and cultural identity led to the government trying to set up a unified 'cultural identity' in opposition to any possibility of different cultural identities (e.g. gender identity, class consciousness, or the identity of minority groups) and in support of a unified 'national identity'. However, this experience, from the 1940s until the 1970s, revealed that the attempt to limit other cultural identities could not in practice lead to a unified national identity. On the contrary, it caused many conflicts and much inequality among the various ethnic groups, thereby increasing the fragmentation of national identity.

Afterwards, the influences of political democratisation and ethnic empowerment forced the government to turn to the construction of 'multicultural Taiwan'. The new issues of ethnic rights, cultural differences and equality are embraced by the term 'multicultural Taiwan'. At the same time, the discourse of 'multiculturalism' is viewed as offering a new basis for the integration of national identity. However, we need to ask whether this new discourse will lead to a new national identity or simply more diversity. Will it bring about new rights and cultural development for minority groups?

There are some especially significant aspects of the development of multiculturalism in Taiwan. First, the multicultural policy of Taiwan is still at an early stage since it has only been practised since 1997. Before the 1990s, the government used a policy of assimilation to deal with cultural differences. Thus, the multicultural approach is quite new as a policy and viewpoint in Taiwan.

Secondly, the instability and conflicts surrounding national identity provide a special background for the development of multiculturalism in Taiwan. This special background may benefit the practice of multiculturalism, or it may cause major difficulties for multiculturalism. The development of multiculturalism in Taiwan may be very different compared to western countries.

Thirdly, Taiwan experienced its first presidential election in 1996, and in 2000, for the first time, there was a change of ruling party, from the KMT to the DPP government. We can thus say that Taiwan is still a beginner as far as running a democratic system is concerned. There is a lack of development of citizenship, civil society, and civil participation. Without strong support from civil society and citizenship, it is extremely difficult to develop multiculturalism in Taiwan as a recognition of fundamental cultural differences while at the same time promoting the importance of equality.

The experience of multiculturalism in Taiwan will almost certainly present a development different from western theories and practices, because Taiwan's own historical and social background is in many respects unique.

1.1.3 The Introduction to Ethnic Groups in Taiwan

There are four main ethnic groups in Taiwan. 'Four Ethnic Groups' refers to Taiwanese aborigines, the mainlanders, the Hakkas and the Fulos in Taiwan.

Taiwanese aborigines:

Taiwanese aborigines are native to the island of Taiwan. They are Austronesian and are of Malayo-Polynesian descent. They share a very close blood relationship and appearance with other aboriginal people in Malaysia, the Philippines and some islands around the Pacific Ocean. They have over eleven different groups, each with its own language, culture, social system, life style and distinct physical appearance⁶. Because of this diversity and the huge difference between Taiwanese aborigines and the other Han people, the Fulos, the Hakkas and the mainlanders, some people believe that the difference between the Han people and the aboriginal people is not simply an 'ethnic difference' but is a 'national difference' or 'racial difference'. Their population is about 2-3% of the whole population of Taiwan.

⁶ Up to 2003, the government recognised ten groups of Taiwanese aborigines: the Amis, Puyuma, Sau, Zuo, Saisiat, Bunun, Paiwan, Tayal, Rukai, Yami and Gamalan.

The Mainlanders:

The mainlanders were those people who came to Taiwan with the KMT government around 1945--1949. They included administrators of the KMT party, government members, military men and their families, and people who wanted to run away from war. These people came from all over mainland China. In ethnic terms, they included Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Tibetans and other minorities in the south-western provinces. They included members of the ruling class in the KMT government, uneducated military men and ordinary people. Although they were very diverse in their composition, they were a very large 'group' or 'community' in relation to the population of Taiwan – about 6,600,000. They were called the 'Wai-Sheng people', which meant that they were external to Taiwan. The other people, including the Fulos and the Hakkas, called themselves 'Ben-Sheng people' or 'Taiwanese', which meant that they were internal or native to Taiwan. The common language of the mainlanders is Mandarin. And their population is 12--15% of the whole population in Taiwan. That is less than the Fulos and the Hakkas.

The mainlanders controlled the KMT government from 1949 to the late 1980s, and thus they are viewed as 'the dominant group' in political, cultural, economic and social terms. Their language is set up as the 'official language', their traditional cultural forms are defined as 'national culture', such as 'national theatre', 'national music', 'national painting' and so on. Not until the late 1970s, did the development of Taiwanese consciousness begin to challenge the status of the 'national culture'.

The Hakkas:

The Hakka is a special ethnic group with a long history in mainland China. In academic circles there are different views of the Hakkas' origins. Most people believe the following about the Hakkas: they come from the northern part of mainland China; they moved on more than five occasions on a large scale to the south. In the Ching Dynasty, many Hakkas lived in Canton Province. Afterwards, some Hakkas moved to Taiwan, some moved to SouthEast Asia (e.g. Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia) and some continued to live in mainland China⁷. The Hakkas arrived in Taiwan about 300 years ago, later than the Fulos. Their population is 15--18% of Taiwan, making it the second largest group. There are no clear differences in appearance among the mainlanders, the Hakkas and the Fulos. The main differences are related to languages, traditional culture and life styles.

⁷ Today, there are about 100 million Hakkas in the world, including in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. They still share the same language and a very close culture. Many Taiwanese Hakkas still have a strong identity with their ethnic members.

Thus the Hakka language is seen as the most important way to maintain the Hakka identity.

The Hakkas are viewed as a 'minority group' for two reasons. Firstly, their population is not as large as the Fulos. Secondly, their political, social and cultural status is not as high as the mainlanders--who dominated the development of Taiwan for over thirty years.

The Fulos:

The Fulos are the largest ethnic group in Taiwan, around 65% of the total population. Their ancestors emigrated from Fu-Jian province in the south-eastern part of mainland China in the seventeenth century (four hundred years ago). Before then, the Fulos were divided into two groups: 'Zhang Zhou Fulo' and 'Quan Zhou Fulo' (because they came from these two places), and they had no common identity. Most of them still kept a close relationship with mainland China. However, after the experience of rule by the Japanese government between 1895 and 1945, the Fulos began to develop an identity as 'islanders', which meant that they were different from the Japanese. This marked the beginning of the Fulos' efforts to form a common identity.

However, The Fulos do not have strong ethnic identity since they always define themselves and their language as 'Taiwanese'. Thus other ethnic groups feel uncomfortable with their 'Fulo-centralism'. Conflicts between the Fulos and the mainlanders have influenced the whole Taiwanese society for a long time.

1.1.4 Western Theory in Taiwan's Experience

Among the various theories of multiculturalism, two trends are especially important (see Chapter 2). The influence of liberalism and postmodernism has led to different trends for multiculturalism. 'Liberal multiculturalism' tries to search for a good balance between difference and equality, freedom and culture, and focuses on the discussion of citizenship, rights and policy. 'Postmodern multiculturalism' emphasises more possibilities for difference, and the changeable relationship between people and their identity and culture, which is particularly difficult to integrate into policy. On the face of it, these two trends of multiculturalism are conflicting and opposing. However, in the present study we seek to maintain a balance between them. On the one hand, liberal multiculturalism tries to provide a space of protection for various groups to maintain their freedom, equality, rights and citizenship in order to define their relationships with the state or government. On the other hand, postmodern multiculturalism seeks to remind us that there are more possibilities in the diversity of people, culture and identity. We will apply these western

theories to Taiwan's actual experience to see if either or both of the two major trends described above are manifest in the development of multiculturalism in Taiwan. In the course of this analysis we will try to identify some of the differences between western theories and Taiwan's experience.

1.1.5 National Identity and Cultural Policy in Taiwan

Cultural policy always plays an important role in national identity in Taiwan. In the earlier period of Chinese nationalism, cultural policy was used to integrate the mass media, national culture, national heritage and national languages, and to improve Chinese historical consciousness in order to construct a Chinese identity in Taiwan. After the rise of Taiwanese consciousness in the 1970s, cultural policy responded to this challenge in two ways. One approach to cultural policy was to see Taiwanese consciousness as one part of Chinese culture; the other approach was to define Taiwanese consciousness in a way which is beneficial to the KMT government.

However, the discourse of multiculturalism not only challenges a homogeneous national identity, but also calls into question the legitimacy of cultural policy. In particular, the following issues arise:

- Should cultural policy seek to acknowledge ethnic cultural differences and their associated rights (see chapter 5)? Or should cultural policy seek to merge ethnic diversity into national identity? (See chapter 4)

- How can cultural policy deal with cultural differences in postmodern society, where culture is hybrid, and identity is always multiple, shifting and mixed? (See chapter 8 for the case of the Hakkas)

- Multiculturalism is also driven by the challenge of globalisation. Can cultural policy deal with cultural differences in today's global age? (See chapter 9 for the case of migrant workers)

1.1.6 The Development of Taiwanese Cultural Policy Studies

'Cultural policy' was not a common term in Taiwan before the 1990s. The government's cultural policy was always called 'cultural construction' and 'cultural promotion' and was viewed as a kind of tool to raise political consciousness. This is the reason why most research into cultural policy concentrated on political propaganda and policy explanation.

It thus provided useful sources for understanding cultural policy but it did so from an official point of view.

However, Taiwanese cultural policy studies have become more diverse and popular since the 1990s. Different types of research have emerged⁸:

First, some research explores the relationship between culture and politics. This includes an interest in how the state intervenes in culture and the arts; how the state uses culture as a political tool to control people's thoughts; and how the state constructs political legitimacy through culture⁹.

Secondly, there is research concerned with the development and change of cultural policy. For example, Kuo (1989) tries to define the rules of general cultural policy formation and to identify Taiwan's position under these rules. The emphasis is on Taiwan's policy environment, its cultural policy operation and development process, as well as changes in policy strategies. The author suggests that Taiwan has succeeded in eventually achieving a compromise between political and cultural goals by redistributing the power of different interest groups¹⁰.

The third kind of cultural policy research focuses on the evaluation of one single cultural policy, such as funding policy, dance policy, visual arts policy, museum policy or heritage policy. For example, Shen reviews developments in heritage policy in Taiwan¹¹. Chen, Yi-Fu analyses the influences of museums on the local cultural industry¹². Hsieh,

⁸ 'Research' here refers to Chinese and English works. Studies in other languages are excluded.

⁹ For example, Zhou (1995) discusses the relationship between Chinese opera, nationalism and cultural policy, and shows how strong promotional efforts by the KMT government led to the decline of Chinese opera. Xiao (1991), in his research on 'The cultural and moral discourse of the KMT government, 1934—1991' also relates the nature of KMT power to cultural discourse and action in order to explore the changes in the cultural policy of the KMT government. Yang's (1992) research concentrates on 'sinolisation' in cultural policy from 1949. Zhou, Hui-Ling, 'Chinese Opera, Nationalism and Cultural Policy', in *Contemporary*, Vol.107 (1995), p.55. Xiao, A-Qin, *The Cultural and Moral Discourse of the KMT Government (1934-1991)*. MA Thesis, Sociology Department (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1991), p.129. Yang, Cong-Jung, *Cultural Construction and National Identity: Sinofication in Post-War Taiwan*. MA Thesis, Sociology and Anthropology (Xin-Zhu: National Chung-Hwa University, 1992), pp.11-30. (All are in Chinese).

¹⁰ Kuo, Su-Hua, *Dilemmas of Cultural Policy Formation in A Transitional Society: The Case of Taiwan, Republic of China* (Michigan: University of Michigan, 1989), p. II.

¹¹ Shen, Cai-Ying, *The Present and Future of Heritage Policy*. MA thesis, Department of Law, (Taipei: National Taipei University, 2002). (Chinese)

¹² Chen, Yi-Fu, *The Influences of Museum on the Development of Local Cultural Industry*, MA Thesis,

Ying-Chieh evaluates the mechanism for art subsidies in Taiwan based on organisation, operation and financial funding¹³. Lai, Pei-Shan discusses drama policy with reference to modern theatres groups in Taiwan¹⁴.

Fourthly, some research studies concentrate on local cultural policy and Community Renaissance in Taiwan. Since 1980, localisation and community development have become important principles for the development of culture. Community Renaissance offers a new foundation for local culture. Up to 2002, there were about 200 thesis and dissertations on the subject of community renaissance in various fields¹⁵.

In addition, there are two new trends in cultural policy studies in Taiwan. The first trend is influenced by cultural studies in western societies, and tries to combine cultural studies and policy analysis. The concepts of Gramsci, Adorno and Foucault are used in these research studies. For example, in Sue's (2001) *Cultural Discourse and Cultural Policy: the Logic of Transformation of Cultural Policy in Postwar Taiwan*, the concept of 'putting policy into cultural studies' is used to analyse the various discourses in Taiwanese cultural policies¹⁶.

Another new trend is to emphasise cultural economics, i.e. the impact of economic factors and influences on 'Creative Industry' in Taiwan. For example, Hu (2002) discusses the development of the music industry and the role of the state in Taiwan¹⁷.

However, the issues of cultural citizenship and cultural rights are still generally ignored in Taiwan's cultural policy studies. On the one hand, the issue of citizenship remains underdeveloped in Taiwanese society. On the other hand, Taiwanese cultural policy does

Graduate School of architecture, (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 2002). (Chinese)

¹³ Hsieh, Ying-Chieh, *An Evaluation of The Mechanism for Art Subsidising in Taiwan--Based on Organisation, Operation, and Financial Funding*, MA Thesis, Department of Politics, (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 2002). (Chinese)

¹⁴ Lai, Pei-Shan, *Discussing Cultural Policy from the Groups of Modern Theatres in Taiwan*. MA Thesis, Graduate School of Theatre, (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 2002). (Chinese)

¹⁵ Yu, Kuo-Hua, *Basic Idea of 'Community Renaissance' in Taiwan: A Local Cultural Movement in Response to the Trend of Globalisation*, MA thesis in Graduate School of Folk Culture & Art, (Taipei: Taipei National University of Art, 2002), p.13 (Chinese).

¹⁶ Sue, Zhao-Ying, *Cultural Discourse and Cultural Policy: the Logic of Transformation of Taiwanese Cultural Policy in Postwar*, MA thesis in Graduate School of Folk Culture & Art, (Taipei: Taipei National University of Art, 2001), (Chinese).

¹⁷ Hu, Cai-Pin, *The Political-Economic Analysis of Taiwan's Classical Music Industry—The Process of Construction and Governmental Cultural Policy*. MA Thesis, Graduate School of Journalism (Taipei: National University of Cheng-Zhi, 2002). (Chinese)

not provide enough material for researchers. One of the main purposes of the present research is to make up for the lack of attention to cultural citizenship and cultural rights.

The specific aims of the research are as follows:

- To explore what 'multiculturalism' means in cultural policy in Taiwan. How has it developed? What kinds of policies are related to multiculturalism?
- To discuss how multiculturalism is represented in the various cultural policies from 1949.
- To discuss the relationship between multiculturalism and national identity, and the place of multiculturalism in national discourse.
- To analyse the influences of multiculturalism in the reconstruction of ethnicity in Taiwan.
- To explore the problems and limitations of multiculturalism in Taiwan through the concept of multicultural citizenship.
- To discuss whether multiculturalism and multicultural citizenship can be achieved through cultural policy on the basis of Taiwan's experience.

1.2 Methodology

1.2.1 What Is 'Cultural Policy Studies'?

'Cultural policy studies' is a new academic field and is still in the process of being developed. Researchers have provided many different views and perspectives on the subject of what 'cultural policy studies' is. Oliver Bennett sees cultural policy studies as 'what is being produced, by whom, for whom and why? And how should these processes be supported, controlled or regulated?'¹⁸. Nobuko Kawashima states that cultural policy studies 'examines how, why and to what effect government and the public sector but also the commercial sector and private individuals are involved with the production, distribution and consumption of cultural products.' Accordingly, it 'therefore investigates not only public policy contexts in which arts and cultural activities take place but also the

¹⁸ Oliver Bennett, 'Introduction', in *European Journal of Cultural Policy*, Vol. 1, No.1, 1994, p.1.

policies, strategies and organisation of cultural institutions'¹⁹. Michael Volkerling considers this problem from the viewpoint of theory, and argues that an adequate theoretical account of cultural policy should be based on a theory of the state, a theory of culture and a theory of policy²⁰. Clive Gray suggests that cultural policy studies should include the content of cultural policy, the policy process, policy change, cultural economics, and structures of power²¹.

Virginia R. Dominguez identifies four different conceptualisations of the possible object of cultural policy studies. First, there are the clearly articulated official policies issued by government institutions and deemed by these institutions to be about the nation's or the region's culture. Secondly, there are practices and patterns not explicitly targeted by any official cultural policy but that researchers identify as the socio-cultural consequences of government policies. Thirdly, there is public discourse about culture, the range of agreement and disagreement about it and its significance, and the social and political circumstances in which that public discourse exists. Finally, there are the discursive and non-discursive practices outside government circles that researchers identify as forms of cultural accommodation, innovation, or resistance because their very existence at a particular time and in a particular place provides an indication of established institutions and hierarchies of power in the country at large²².

It is clear that 'cultural policy studies' is still a very diverse field. In the present research, we will emphasise the importance of cultural studies in cultural policy studies. Firstly, cultural studies provide a useful methodology to discuss cultural policy. Much of the literature associated with cultural studies can be interpreted as policy analysis. For example, Tom O'Regan states:

Cultural studies has been centrally concerned with the exploration and criticism of various strategies and programmes of action and obligation, organised both discursively and institutionally. The forms of power are exercised by state and private institutions, the forms of conduct they proscribe and the accommodations

¹⁹ Nobuko Kawashima, *Cultural Policy Research: An Emerging Discipline between Theory and Practice* (Centre for Cultural Policy Studies, University of Warwick, 1999), p.3.

²⁰ Michael Volkerling, 'Deconstructing the Difference-Engine: A Theory of Cultural Policy', *European Journal of Cultural Policy*, Vol.2, No.2, 1996, pp.190-191.

²¹ Clive Gray, 'Comparing Cultural Policy: A Reformulation', *European Journal of Cultural Policy*, Vol.1, No.2, 1996, pp.216-219.

²² Virginia R Dominguez, 'Invoking Culture: The Messy Side of "Cultural Politics"'. In Gigi Bradford, Michael Gary and Glenn Wallach (eds.), *The Politics of Culture: Policy Perspectives for Individuals, Institutions and Communities*. (New York: The New Press, 2000),p.25.

and resistance they meet are part and parcel of cultural studies' very orientation. That orientation almost constitutes a policy in itself. In this context policy tends to be understood in terms of its consequences and outcomes, and in terms of the actions of those affected by it, as they exert some measures of influence upon the process²³.

These issues are illustrated by the case of the debate on cultural policy studies in Australia in the 1990s. Participants called for the double reconstitution of policy, both as an object of study in its own right and as a political site for activity and analysis. They argued that the policy process as understood by governmental and private agencies should also be the centrepiece of cultural studies itself²⁴. In addition, policy becomes the motor that drives cultural criticism, making it congruent with policy by impressing upon it 'appropriate adjustments of a theoretical and practical nature'²⁵.

Secondly, as in cultural studies, in cultural policy studies there is a concern with the relationship between culture and power. Tony Bennett's 'Putting Policy into Cultural Studies' may be seen as the first step toward this attempt. On the basis of Foucault's views, he emphasises the importance of culture and power in cultural studies. He identifies the following challenges for cultural studies:

First, the need to include policy considerations in the definition of culture in viewing it as a particular field of government; second, the need to distinguish different regions of culture within this overall field in terms of the objects, targets, and techniques of government peculiar to them; third, the need to identify the political relations specific to different regions of culture so defined and to develop appropriately specific ways of engaging with and within them; fourth, the need for intellectual work to be conducted in a manner such that, in both its substance and its style, it can be calculated to influence or service the conduct of identifiable agents within the region of culture concerned²⁶.

Subsequently, some researchers put forward alternative views to those of Bennett. Most of them believe that it is not enough to see 'cultural policy studies' as 'cultural studies'. For example, Stuart Cunningham points out that to treat cultural policy from a critical

²³ Tom O'Regan, '(Mis)Taking Policy: Notes on the Cultural Policy Debate', *Cultural Studies*, Vol.6, No. 3, 1992, p. 409.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.411.

²⁵ Tony Bennett, 'Useful Culture', in *Cultural Studies*, Vol.6, No.3, 1992,p.395.

²⁶ Tony Bennett, 'Putting Policy into Cultural Studies', in Grossberg, L., Nelson, C, and Treicher, P. (eds.), *Cultural Studies* (London: Routledge, 1992), p.23.

perspective, it is necessary to combine the impact of economics, administrative law, cultural history, entertainment financing, and government and parliamentary procedures on the development of public policy. For him, critical policy research would 'shift its "command metaphors" away from rhetorics of resistance, oppositionalism and anti-commercialism on the one hand, and populism on the other, toward those of access, equity, empowerment and the divination of opportunities to exercise appropriate cultural leadership'²⁷.

For O'Regan, the main problem with Bennett's analysis, and that of the Australian policy debate more generally, is that cultural criticism could become cultural policy if it used different and more appropriate phrases and words -- if it acquired a policy language and reformist orientation. For him, policy and cultural criticism are contiguous styles of reasoning involving shared discursive resources and reasoning procedures, but they deploy the shared resources in different ways:

Policy is interlocked with adjacent fields of cultural criticism, intellectual debate, administration and lobbying. But I don't think policy, seen as particular intellectual programmes for machining the social, is the structural engine room which powers everything else. Policy is a particular kind of informational practice with its own limitations, potentialities and linkages to other kinds of public discourse, including cultural criticism and journalism, over which it holds no necessary pre-eminence²⁸.

Accordingly, he believes that policy needs to be understood alongside a range of other activities, including cultural criticism, journalism, cultural production, and capital politics²⁹.

Jim McGuigan also does not believe that cultural policy can be treated satisfactorily in isolation from the wider economic and political determinants operating upon culture and society³⁰. For him, to achieve a policy-oriented perspective in cultural policy, the angle of vision should be shifted from attention to the cultural text and its meaningfulness in order to open up questions concerning the 'conditions of culture'. This has a close affinity with the political economy perspective on communications and culture:

²⁷ Stuart Cunningham, 'Cultural Studies from the Points of View of Cultural Policy', in Turner, G. (eds.), *Nation Culture, Text--Australian Cultural and Media Studies* (London: Routledge, 1993), pp.137-8.

²⁸ Tom O'Regan, (1992), p.416.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.417.

³⁰ Jim McGuigan, *Culture and the Public Sphere* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 2

The study of cultural policy and the practical intent of contribution to the framing of policies does not deny the importance of criticism and textual interpretation but rather puts issues concerning how texts are made and circulated socially into the foreground³¹.

In addition, McGuigan emphasises the importance of being critical. From the perspective of a 'radical democratic public sphere' in media studies, he aims to contribute to the radical-democratic perspective on the debate of cultural policy. His strategy is:

To deploy the critical ideal of the public sphere as a normative reference point in its plural and context-specific forms, rather than a single and abstracted entity, and in relation to a conception of culture and the cultural field which includes art, popular media, everyday forms of pleasure and identity³².

Therefore, we will treat cultural policy studies in this research as having the following focus. First, broadly speaking, policy and governmental conditions and processes should be thought of as different forms and fields of culture. Policy should be viewed as the 'object of analysis' together with the related forms of discourse. Furthermore, the methodology of cultural studies can be applied to the various cultural productions in order to explore, evaluate and clarify the aims of policy.

In addition, cultural policy studies also need a political-economic analysis. In the present research we aim to discuss cultural policy through a combination of cultural-textual and political-economic analysis. The politics and critical practice of cultural studies focus heavily upon textual analysis, since texts can be read from perspectives that seek to reveal how textual processes construct meaning, position reading subjects, and how these positions are adopted, negotiated and resisted³³. At the same time, the political-economic analysis is also needed to reveal how and why the texts are made, and what the relationship between text and social power is.

Therefore, my intention in this research is to combine the various methods of analysis across disciplines. The concepts of identity, multiculturalism, citizenship, civil society in cultural studies are considered in the practical contexts of public policies and social reality. At the same time, public policies are seen as the various 'texts', and are explored based on political-economic analysis. Combining cultural studies, political theory, policy analysis

³¹ Ibid, p. 22.

³² Ibid, p. 28.

³³ Ibid, p. 15.

and political-economic analysis as my cultural policy studies. I discuss the relationship between cultural policies and cultural difference, the response to the demands for cultural rights, and the achievement of cultural citizenship.

1.2.2 What Is Cultural Policy?

There are many different definitions of 'cultural policy'. For Dominguez, cultural policy should presuppose three things; (1) the objectification of 'the cultural'; (2) clarity in the reference to culture; (3) the belief that government has a say in the shape of a country's culture and that nations are valued and identified by their cultural characteristics³⁴. Jim McGuigan distinguishes between two approaches. One is the narrow view: cultural policy is about the administration of the arts. The broader answer is that cultural policy is about the politics of culture in the most general sense. It is about 'the clash of ideas, institutional struggles and power relations in the production and circulation of symbolic meanings'³⁵.

In this research, we will adopt the second of McGuigan's strategies. In other words, I will see cultural policy in a broader view. Accordingly, cultural policy should include the following components:

First, it means the government's operational principles and values in relation to arts affairs, including the administrative process, the budget, measures, purposes, laws and rules. For example, 'The Plan of Aboriginal Cultural Development' is a cultural policy with a clear purpose, values, measures and a budget.

Secondly, cultural policy is part of a broader social policy agenda, such as cultural and moral education. In this context, cultural policy is not only related to arts affairs, but extends to people's behaviours and the social values of the whole society, all of which influence social development. For example, multiculturalism is a cultural policy that seeks to affect people's attitudes to cultural difference.

Thirdly, cultural policy is not restricted to individual countries but cuts across national boundaries, and is linked to cultural production, distribution and consumption, international cultural exchanges, and cultural flows in the global age. For example, governmental attitudes towards migrant workers are influenced by international

³⁴ Dominguez(2000),p.23.

³⁵ Ibid, p. 1.

relationships.

Fourthly, cultural policy can be viewed as 'the politics of culture'. Many aspects of power, politics, ideology, symbolic meanings, representations, texts and discourses can be viewed as cultural policy. In other words, cultural policy is related to the various productions of words, images, sounds and thoughts which influence people's recognition of the various identity. For example, the Taiwanese President may wear traditional aboriginal clothing, and political leaders may claim that they are from Hakka descent.

1.2.3 Discourse Analysis

In this research discourse analysis is implemented to explore and discuss cultural policy. The term 'discourse' has become common currency in a variety of disciplines: critical theory, sociology, linguistics, philosophy, social psychology and many other fields. It is used widely in analysing literary and non-literary texts and it is often employed to signal a certain theoretical sophistication. At the same time, the broad usage of the term 'discourse' also leads to diverse usage. For example, David Crystal points out:

Discourse analysis focuses on the structure of naturally occurring spoken language, as found in such 'discourses' as conversations, interviews, commentaries, and speeches. Text analysis focuses on the structure of written language, as found in such 'text' as essays, notices, road signs and chapters. But this distinction is not clear-cut, and there have been many other uses of these labels. In particular, 'discourse' and 'text' can be used in a much broader sense to include all language units with a definable communicative function, whether spoken or written³⁶.

Sawyer also provides the various ways to understand 'discourse'. For example, in post-colonial theory, discourse is a system of domination, like Said's Orientalism, which is viewed as a Western style for domination, restructuring and having authority over the Orient. In Anthropology, discourse is a culture or an ideology. For feminist theory, discourse is viewed as a type of subject³⁷.

Why is discourse analysis important in modern society? As Teun A van Dijk points out, discourse analysis provides us with rather powerful, while subtle and precise, insights to pinpoint the everyday manifestations and displays of social problems in communication

³⁶ David Crystal, quoted from Sara Mills, *Discourse*. (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p.3.

³⁷ R. Keith Sawyer, 'A Discourse on Discourse: An Archeological History of An Intellectual Concept', *Cultural Studies*, 16(3), 2002, pp.434--5.

and interaction³⁸. It is here that we witness the realisation of the macrosociological patterns that characterise our societies. Discourse maybe manifest at symptoms or fragmentary enactment of larger problems; inequality, class differences, sexism, racism, power, and dominance of course involve more than text and talk. In other words, discourse plays a crucial role in their ideological formulation, in their communicative reproduction, in the social and political decision procedures, and in the institutional management and representation of such issues³⁹.

Therefore, in this research, we will use policy discourse to analyse the representation of multiculturalism and cultural policy. Policy discourse involves the use of language and symbols for structuring areas of knowledge and social practice. In addition, there are many functions of policy discourse. It represents an instrument of hegemony and a means through which different authority claims are contested. It also offers alternative ideological constructs drawn from a discursive field containing 'conflicting, overlapping, or intersecting currents or formations'⁴⁰.

Thus, in this study I use various sources of policy discourse analysis, including the texts of policies, laws, regulations, official documents, the statements of politicians, and the texts of interviews. From these various discourses, we can understand how the relationship between the sayable and the visible focuses on those sets of statements and arrangements in order to explore the meanings behind discourses.

1.2.4 Historical Framework

This research discusses cultural policy from 1949 to 2002. In 1949, the KMT government moved from mainland China to Taiwan, and assumed ruling power in Taiwan. Although the KMT had taken over from the Japanese government in 1945, until 1949 it was preoccupied with the war against the Chinese Communist Party. Thus during these years there was no clear cultural policy. Moreover, this research cannot discuss cultural policy before 1945, since multiculturalism and other ideas about cultural difference and cultural policy were not considered at this time. Historical documents show that the main aims of Japanese cultural policy in Taiwan were assimilation and modernisation. Thus we

³⁸ Teun A van. Dijk, 'Introduction: The Role of Discourse Analysis in Society', in Teun A van. Dijk (eds), *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Volume 4, Discourse Analysis in Society, (London: Academic Press Inc, 1985), p.1--2.

³⁹ Ibid, p.7.

⁴⁰ Michael Volkerling, (1996), pp.191-3.

use 1949 as the starting-point for this research⁴¹.

From 1949, the KMT government used a serious assimilation policy to construct a representative China in Taiwan. Only in the late 1980s and 1990s did the view of multiculturalism begin to be considered in cultural policy. Thus, most of the multicultural policies discussed in this research were formulated after the 1990s, although these are compared with cultural policy up to the 1990s. In addition, the Democratic Progress Party gained power from the KMT government in 2000. Therefore it is also interesting to discuss and explore any new trends of multicultural policy since this change of government.

1.2.5 Case Studies

Reasons for Using Case Studies in this Research:

Case studies have become one of the most common ways of doing qualitative research. They can be used analytically, holistically, organically or culturally, and with mixed methods. Robert E. Stake identifies three types of case study as *intrinsic case study*, *instrumental case study* and *collective case study*, based on their different functions. An intrinsic case study is undertaken when the researcher wants better understanding of a particular case. In contrast, an instrumental case study is examined mainly to provide insight into an issue or to redraw a generalization. The case still is looked at in depth, its contexts scrutinized, its ordinary activities detailed, but all because this helps the research to pursue the external interest. Collective case study is instrumental study extended to several cases. They are chosen because it is believed that understanding them will lead to better understanding of a larger collection of cases⁴². From this perspective, I use three case studies both as intrinsic case study and instrumental case study. On the one hand, I am interested in the particular development of these cases; on the other hand, I need to use them to generalize the problems of multiculturalism in Taiwan.

The Three Case Studies in this Research:

In this research, we choose three groups as case studies: Taiwanese aborigines, the

⁴¹ Zhang, Ming-Lee, 'The Development, Influence and Evaluation of Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Policy', in Zhang, Ming-Lee (eds.), *Politics and Contemporary Taiwanese Literature*, (Taipei: China times, 1994), pp.22.

⁴² Robert E. Stake, 'Case studies', in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds), *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, (London: Sage Publications, 2000), p.437.

Hakkas, and migrant workers. There are several reasons for this choice.

First, there are many cultural differences in Taiwanese society, such as those based on gender, gay/lesbian culture, and working-class culture. However, these are not taken into account by governmental cultural policy. They do not have a place in the national discourse, including the discourse of 'multicultural Taiwan'. Originally, it was intended to deal with gender culture and gay/lesbian culture in this research, but no cultural policy related to these two cultural differences could be found. In other words, the multicultural policy of Taiwan, according to the official policy, is only related to ethnic differences. This problem also shows the limitation of the idea of 'multicultural Taiwan', which is only concerned with ethnic differences.

Secondly, Taiwanese aborigines and the Hakkas are 'recognised' by the government as the main targets of multicultural policy in Taiwan. The establishment of the Committee of Aboriginal Affairs and the Committee of the Hakkas in central government indicates the status of these institutions at the national level. At the same time, their existence also means that the Taiwanese aborigines and the Hakkas have legitimate grounds for obtaining budgets and resources from the government to 'protect their cultural differences'.

Although Taiwanese aborigines and the Hakkas were selected as case studies, the Fulos and the mainlanders were not. The reasons are various. Firstly, the issues of the Fulos and the mainlanders are always related to the conflicts between Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese consciousness, which will also be discussed in Chapter 4. Secondly, the Fulos and the mainlanders will also be discussed in Chapter 5 in order to clarify the development of ethnicity in Taiwan. Therefore, while the experiences of the Fulos and the mainlanders are not viewed as case studies, they are not absent in this research.

The case of migrant workers is totally different from the cases of the Taiwanese aborigines and the Hakkas, since the former originate from outside the national boundaries, and they are not viewed as 'citizens' in Taiwanese society. However, their experiences in Taiwan provide a direct challenge to the concept of 'citizenship', which is based on national boundaries. In other words, migrant workers provide a new test of the idea of 'multicultural Taiwan'.

Case Studies and Theory:

Robert K. Yin discusses the relationship between case studies and theory in the

successive phases. In the beginning, theory development as part of the design phase is essential, whether the ensuing case study's purpose is to develop or test theory⁴³. The researcher should try to prepare for the case study by doing such things as reviewing the literature related to the study⁴⁴. Furthermore, the researcher should be aware of the full range of theories that might be relevant to his/her study, such as individual theories, group theories, organisational theories and societal theories—they are called 'illustrative types of theories' by Yin. Finally, case studies will generalise from case studies to theory—generalising a theory⁴⁵.

In this research, various theories are used to 'illustrate' and to 'be generalised' from the case studies. For example, the theories of diasporic experiences and hybrid culture are implemented to discuss the development and construction of the Hakka identity in Taiwan. They are 'illustrative theories' in the case studies of the Hakkas. At the final stage, the Hakka's case is generalised to support the postmodern approach of multiculturalism. At the same time, it also generalised to show that the liberal approach of multiculturalism is not really practised in Taiwan society.

1.2.6 Interviews

We have conducted interviews for two main purposes. First, interviews with the officers of the Taiwan government (present or past) help us to understand the background to the formation of cultural policy, and explore the various motivations behind cultural policy. Secondly, interviews with representatives of cultural organisations and with artists help us to evaluate the influences on cultural policy. Thus we have sought to understand cultural policy from the viewpoints of both institutional insiders and outsiders.

There are thirty- two interviewees in this research, ten of whom are the officers in the government departments concerned with cultural policy and ethnic policy--such as the staff in CAA and CH. The other twenty-two interviewees are artists, cultural workers, community workers in non-government organisations, which relate to cultural and ethnic issues. I chose the second group of interviewees of the non-government section in order to explore the different perspectives for multiculturalism in Taiwan. Interviewees were selected to represent different cultural forms and perspectives. For example, the

⁴³ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, (London: Sage Publication, 2003), p.28.

⁴⁴ Ibid: p.30.

⁴⁵ Ibid: pp.31—2.

interviewees related to aboriginal cultural policy include aboriginal musicians, dancers, historians, community workers, writers and individuals from the aboriginal movements. All have outstanding achievements in their field; and they are viewed as 'opinion leaders' in the ethnic issues in Taiwanese society.

The language used during the interviews was Mandarin. All interviews were conducted in person, lasting from one to two hours. They took place between February 2001 and August 2001. In addition, the people were interviewed for a second time in May 2002. All of the interviews were recorded, and written as reports in Chinese. Most of them were happy to have the interviews.

However, some difficulties remained, in particular with finding migrant workers. I would not interview the groups of migrant workers since I could not speak their languages, such as Thai or Indonesian; and most of them cannot speak Chinese or English. This made it difficult to access their communities. See Appendix 2 for the interviewees.

1.3 The Structure of the Thesis

In Chapter 2, we begin with a discussion of the various meanings and understandings of multiculturalism, and try to clarify the differences between multiculturalism and other similar concepts of cultural pluralism and cultural diversity. Thinking about multiculturalism has been especially influenced by two theories -- liberalism and postmodernism. On the one hand, the dialogue between liberalism and multiculturalism has led to the construction of 'liberal multiculturalism', which emphasises the importance of equality and citizenship in multiculturalism. On the other hand, the influence of postmodernism has resulted in a sense of unstable, unfixed, and non-fundamental cultural difference in the thinking of multiculturalism. In the end, I argue a new way to see multiculturalism is from the perspective of 'multicultural citizenship', which argues that it is necessary to consider cultural differences in the concept of citizenship, and emphasises the importance of citizenship in the discourse of multiculturalism.

Further discussion of 'multicultural citizenship' is elaborated in Chapter 3. A new trend has recently emerged, namely the idea of 'multicultural citizenship', in both theory and practice. This is the focus of Chapter 3. We begin with a discussion of the issue of citizenship, especially 'pluralist citizenship' and 'differentiated citizenship'. The aim here is to expand the concept of citizenship. In this chapter, we consider three trends in the

development of multicultural citizenship. First, the recognition of 'collective rights' appears to be the new common consciousness in the discussion of multicultural citizenship. Secondly, after civil rights, political rights, social rights and economic rights in the concept of citizenship, cultural rights have become a key factor in multicultural citizenship. Thirdly, the shift from 'national' citizenship to 'global' citizenship raises important new issues of citizenship in the contemporary world. The chapter proceeds to explain how the concept of 'multicultural citizenship' is used as a basic framework for the subsequent analysis in this thesis.

Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are primarily concerned with theoretical discussion. In Chapter 4, we turn to practical developments in Taiwan. As the first chapter which discusses the development of Taiwan, it provides the historical background needed to explain why and how multiculturalism has emerged in Taiwanese society. Furthermore, it also analyses the representation of multiculturalism in various cultural policies, and highlights some of the main critiques of those policies. After the discussion of the various theories of multiculturalism in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, Chapter 4 indicates the similarities and differences between Taiwan's case and the western experience of developing multiculturalism: the distinctions between theory and practice are drawn.

At the same time, we draw out the relationship between multiculturalism and national identity in Taiwan. Chapter 4 focuses on the challenges posed by multiculturalism for national identity and cultural policy. From the postmodern perspective, hybrid cultures and multiple identities in Taiwan will lead to problems in trying to establish a homogenous national identity. From the liberal perspective, multicultural rights are still limited in the new national identity of multicultural Taiwan.

Chapter 5 deals with the challenge and influence of multiculturalism in the arena of ethnic problems, since multicultural Taiwan is based on 'Four Ethnic Groups'. Under the influences and challenges of multiculturalism, the new ethnic relationships in Taiwan have been reconstructed in three ways: the reconstruction of ethnic groups, the reconstruction of ethnic policy, and the reconstruction of ethnic rights. A discussion of these various reconstructions also helps us to clarify the possibility of a genuine multicultural citizenship in Taiwan.

However, there is another view to take into account when considering the identity crisis in Taiwan. Some people believe that the construction of civil identity and civil society

based on democratic political systems and universal human rights will resolve the conflicts of national identity in Taiwan. In other words, national identity should be based on civil identity, not on ethnic identity. Cultural policy therefore has an important role to play in improving civil identity. In Chapter 6, I will discuss this approach of cultural policy in Taiwan. This chapter explores the important issue of civil identity in relation to 'Community Renaissance'. This provides a useful perspective for discussing multiculturalism. Based on the model of republicanism and communitarianism, Community Renaissance seems at first to be opposed to multiculturalism, which is based on ethnicity. However, some western experience shows that local civil identity and the public sphere are useful in providing a multicultural and intercultural space. The experience of Community Renaissance, we will argue, also supports this argument. Thus, this chapter discusses how citizenship is considered in cultural policy, and examines the influence of 'Community Renaissance' on 'multicultural citizenship'.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 discuss the general cultural policy of Taiwan. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 present three case studies of the situations of Taiwanese aborigines, the Hakkas, and migrant workers. Through these case studies, we discuss the challenges of multiculturalism on identity (national identity and ethnic identity), cultural policy and on improving citizenship. We also consider how the government recognises cultural difference under 'multiculturalism'. The aim is to see whether 'multicultural citizenship' can actually be achieved in each of the case studies.

Taiwanese aborigines are viewed as an important symbol in the new national discourse -- 'multicultural Taiwan'. Their cultures are also viewed as a national culture, and the aborigines have succeeded in gaining significant funding from the government. However, there are some tensions between the government and the aborigines in cultural policy. For example, aborigines have lost cultural autonomy under the government. At the same time, aborigines' multicultural citizenship is not really achieved through governmental support. In Chapter 7, we use the case of the Taiwanese aborigines to illustrate the tensions between the government and minority groups, and to explore the development of one effort to achieve 'multicultural citizenship'. Using the case of the Taiwanese aborigines, we identify three challenges posed by multiculturalism for national identity, cultural policy and citizenship. For national identity, aboriginal identity is promoted in the name of multicultural Taiwan. However, in practice there is a development towards separation from a united national identity. For cultural policy, the development of aboriginal cultural policy is towards decentralisation in cultural policy -- from the model of the CCA

(Committee of Cultural Affairs) to the model of the CAA (Committee of Aboriginal Affairs). For citizenship, aboriginal rights shift the basis of citizenship from individual rights to collective rights. More new aboriginal rights are now being considered, and these are of benefit to the development of multicultural citizenship in Taiwan.

The history of Hakka policy is very short. Before 2001, with the establishment of the Committee of the Hakkas, policy was limited and fragmented. In Chapter 8, we discuss the process of how the Hakkas became a focus for public policy, and how the Hakkas reconstructed their ethnicity in order to take their place in 'multicultural Taiwan'. In order to become 'one' ethnicity, the Hakkas have to present themselves as a single homogenous culture. But Hakka culture is in fact a 'hybrid' culture. Therefore, this chapter examines how the government, in this case, has sought to interact with – and protect -- a hybrid culture, and whether, as a result, 'multicultural citizenship' can be achieved. However, in this chapter, we will argue, the experience of the Hakkas demonstrates that multiculturalism also challenges national identity, cultural policy and citizenship through its hybrid culture and multiple identities.

Chapter 9 deals with the case of migrant workers in Taiwan in order to evaluate the limitations of 'multicultural Taiwan'. The chapter discusses the position of migrant workers in the new national discourse, and how they are constructed. However, multiculturalism also brings about new challenges in the case of migrant workers, in particular in terms of cultural policy and citizenship. The government has been forced to provide a new migrant workers' cultural policy in order to protect these workers' cultural rights through NGOs and the development of global citizenship. At the same time, multiculturalism also challenges the traditional view of citizenship, which is based on national boundaries. The new trend of 'global citizenship' or 'post-national citizenship' has influenced the understanding of 'multicultural citizenship'. The issue of migrant workers is thus an important catalyst for the movement towards 'global multicultural citizenship'.

Conclusion

This chapter introduces the research as a whole. First, I indicate the main purpose of this research—to examine the theoretical and practical tensions and contradictions of multiculturalism in Taiwan. I argue that the three challenges of multiculturalism, which are related to national identity, cultural policy and the development of citizenship influence interactively the development, representation and achievement of multiculturalism in Taiwan.

Furthermore, I provide some background for this research, explain the reasons why I choose multiculturalism as my research topic, why I want to discuss Taiwan, and how western theories can be considered in the context of Taiwan. Afterwards, I also discuss the development of cultural policy studies, and point out the lack of the attention to cultural citizenship and cultural rights in cultural policy studies in Taiwan. From there, I define the position of my research as an attempt to improve this area.

In relation to my methodology, I try to define what cultural policy studies are, and what cultural policy is, selecting from the various approaches and theorists. After the definitions, I explain how my research is related to discourse analysis, the choices of interviewees, the choice of case studies, and the historical framework.

Finally, the structure of the whole research provides a basis to understand what follows.

Chapter 2: Difference, Identity and Multiculturalism

This chapter examines various theories of cultural difference and identity with particular reference to multiculturalism. Section 2.1 introduces the concept of multiculturalism and its discourses. Section 2.2 explores the development of multiculturalism from 'cultural pluralism', which is viewed as a precursor of multiculturalism, to 'cultural diversity', which tries to amend some parts of multiculturalism. The dialogue between the two main theories of multiculturalism -- liberalism and postmodernism -- is then discussed. Section 2.3 considers the interaction between multiculturalism and liberalism. Finally, Section 2.4 discusses the problems of recognising multiculturalism in the post-modern condition.

2.1. What Does Multiculturalism Mean?

'Multiculturalism' is a confusing term. As Kymlicka points out, both roots of the word ('multi' and 'culture') cause difficulties. In seeking to explain 'multi', Kymlicka focuses on two patterns of cultural diversity. The first is 'multination', which means that cultural diversity arises from the incorporation of a previously self-governing, territorially concentrated culture into a larger state. Such incorporated cultures ('national minorities') typically wish to maintain themselves as distinct societies alongside the major culture, and demand various forms of autonomous self-government to ensure their survival. Other forms of cultural diversity arise from individual and familial immigration. Such immigrants coalesce into loose associations ('ethnic groups') which prefer to integrate into the larger society. Thus Kymlicka uses the terms 'multination state' and 'Polyethnic State' and suggests that 'multicultural' is an ambiguous concept hovering between these two terms¹.

Another problem for Kymlicka is the definition of 'culture'. He distinguishes between culture as 'customs' and culture as 'civilisation'. If culture refers to the 'customs' of a group, then the various lifestyle enclaves, social movements, and voluntary associations which are to be found in any modern society all have their own 'culture', as expressed in such terms as 'gay culture', 'London culture' or 'bureaucratic culture'. According to this definition, even the most ethnically homogeneous state (e.g. Iceland) is also a 'multicultural state'. If culture

¹Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 14—7.

refers to the 'civilisation' of a people, then virtually all modern western societies share the same culture. Defined in this way, even the most multinational country (e.g. Switzerland) or the most polyethnic country (e.g. Australia) is not very 'multicultural' in so far as the various national and ethnic groups all participate in the same modern industrialised form of social life². Let us take the example of a monoethnic country with a wide range of cultural influences from western countries. It seems very difficult to answer the question: is this country 'multicultural' or not? The blur and ambiguity of both 'multi' and 'culture' thus lead to confusions about the precise meaning of 'multiculturalism'.

In order to try to overcome this barrier, we shall consider the most common ways in which the term 'multiculturalism' is used to refer to a kind of social phenomenon or a particular set of values, a political theory or a policy orientation.

2.1.1. Multiculturalism as a Social Phenomenon

One prominent discourse invoking the term 'multicultural' is that describing a condition of ethnic diversity, usually following a recent historical period of mass immigration. Here, the presence of people whose origins are in another place is often said to make this or that country a 'multicultural society'. A conflation of 'culture' and 'race' is often obvious in this discourse.

According to Hall, it is useful to draw a distinction between 'multicultural' and 'multiculturalism'. 'Multicultural' is used adjectivally to describe the social characteristics and problems of governance posed by any society in which different cultural communities live together and attempt to build a common life while retaining something of their 'original' identity. But 'multiculturalism' is substantive and refers to the strategies and policies adopted to govern or manage the problems of diversity and multiplicity which multicultural societies throw up. In practice, the two terms are now more or less interdependent, so that it is virtually impossible to disentangle them³.

For Parekh, multiculturalism signifies cultural diversity or culturally embedded differences. Not all advocates of the politics of recognition need be or, as a matter of

² Ibid., p.18.

³ Stuart Hall, 'The Multicultural Question', in Barnor Hesse (eds.), *Un/Settled Multiculturalism: Diasporas, Entanglements, Transruptions* (London: Zen Books, 2000), p. 209.

historical fact, are sympathetic to multiculturalism⁴. However, both 'multicultural society' and 'multiculturalism' are used to refer to the social phenomenon of cultural difference.

We can see, therefore, from these various theoretical perspectives that the terms 'multicultural society' and 'multiculturalism' are generally used to refer to a society which exhibits cultural diversity. 'Multicultural society' is used adjectivally, and 'multiculturalism' is used substantively. Their precise meanings will depend on the specific type(s) of cultural diversity that are involved.

2.1.2. Multiculturalism is Political Ideology

Multiculturalism may also be viewed as a political ideology. For example, Hall points out:

Multiculturalism stands for 'a wide range of social articulations, ideals and practices. The problem is that the '-ism' tends to convert multiculturalism into a political doctrine and reduces it to a formal singularity, fixing it into a cemented condition...Thus converted...the heterogeneity characteristic of multicultural conditions is reduced to a pat and pedestrian doctrine. But multiculturalism is not a single doctrine, does not characterise one political strategy, and does not represent an already achieved state of affairs. It describes a 'variety of political strategies and processes which are everywhere incomplete'. Just as there are different multicultural societies so there are different multiculturalisms⁵.

The increasingly effective political mobilisation of groups based around the ascribed characteristics of shared values involves another discourse, in which 'multiculturalism' is a key notion. In recent years, these activities have been deemed the 'politics of recognition', the 'politics of identity' or the 'politics of difference'⁶. Furthermore, the discourse of multiculturalism as a struggle or social movement is framed by a postmodernist paradigm⁷. As with postmodernism generally, multiculturalism comes to stand for a new relativism, the endorsement of different truths, alternate ways of knowing and being, fractured realities, challenges to 'grand narratives', polycentrism in contrast to 'Eurocentrism', and

⁴Bhikhu Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory* (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp.2--3.

⁵Ibid., p.210.

⁶See further Section 2.3 below.

⁷Steven Vertovec, 'Multi-multiculturalisms', in Marco Martiniello (eds.), *Multicultural Policies and the State: A Comparison of Two European Societies*. (Utrecht, European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations, 1998), p.33.

the recognition of multiple, non-essentialised, situated selves. In this way, the discourses of multiculturalism have led to a broader discourse of multiplicity. For example, Iris Marion Young advocates the creation of a 'heterogeneous public' to take the place of the traditional 'homogeneous public', and thereby to give recognition to people's differences in terms of geography, ethnicity, gender, occupation, etc⁸. Hall shares this perspective and calls for 'the politics of living identity through difference'. He goes on:

'[W]e are all complexly constructed through different categories, of different antagonisms, and these may have the effect of locating us socially in multiple positions of marginality and subordination, but which do not operate on us in exactly the same way'⁹.

To sum up, the discourse of multiculturalism is a new creation of political theory, and may be seen as a challenge to traditional liberalism, 'grand narratives', and centralism.

2.1.3 Multiculturalism as Public Policy

Multiculturalism gives rise to a range of policy concerns, especially the need to identify the structural factors which contribute to discrimination, disadvantage and exclusion; and to formulate and implement policies that facilitate equality of opportunity and outcome¹⁰. But the different uses of 'multiculturalism' cause much confusion even in the policy field. For example, McGuigan points out that there are different meanings of 'multiculturalism' in the USA and the UK. In the USA, the term is closely associated with a radical 'cultural politics of difference' and 'political correctness', but in the UK it tends to denote liberalism and especially 'anti-racism'¹¹. According to David Bennett, the term 'multiculturalism' can seem a rhetorical necessity, an expression of privilege, or a betrayal, depending on both where and who you are¹². For example, in Australia, multiculturalism has figured as part of the rhetoric of government for more than two decades before coming under virulent, public attack from a new brand of white populism in the late 1990s. But in the USA multiculturalism is typically addressed as an oppositional, minority-driven demand for the recognition of difference and the social advancement of radicalised groups. In Canada

⁸ Iris M. Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. (New jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p.116.

⁹ Stuart Hall, 'Old and New Identity, Old and New Ethnicities', in A. D. King (eds.), *Culture, Globalization and the World-System* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), p.57.

¹⁰ Vertovec (1998), p.29.

¹¹ Jim McGuigan, (1996), p.195.

¹² David Bennett (eds.), *Multicultural States: Rethinking Difference and Identity*, (London: Routledge, 1998), p.3.

multiculturalism is practised by the law, but in Britain it became all but a dead issue during the decades of Thatcherite Conservatism. These diverse applications of 'multiculturalism' testify to the increasing difficulty of fixing the meaning of the term.

The case of Australia demonstrates very well the complexities of multiculturalism from a policy perspective. Multicultural policies were first introduced in 1973 by the ALP government led by Gough Whitlam, which created a new policy direction for social and cultural development in Australia. However, the meaning of multicultural policy in Australia shifted between 1973 and 1996. Castles identifies several distinctive stages of this evolution. In the first phase of the early 1970s, multiculturalism was based on a rejection of assimilationism and on policies for improving welfare and educational provision, especially for working-class migrants of European origin. In the second phase, from 1975 to 1982, multicultural policies were modified to emphasise the importance of cultural pluralism, the role of ethnic organisations in the provision of welfare services, and the value of multiculturalism for achieving social cohesion in an ethnically diverse society. The focus was on the role of ethnic groups, which were seen to have relatively fixed and homogeneous cultural identities. Australian society was viewed as a collection of ethnic communities united around a set of 'core values' and not a homogeneous 'white identity'. At the same time, multiculturalism made a new statement on substantial citizenship: that it was no longer necessary to be culturally assimilated to be an Australian citizen¹³. In the third phase, from 1983 to 1996, the government redefined multiculturalism again in order to maintain the social safety net and integrate Australia into the Asia-Pacific region. This new multiculturalism moved away from the 'ethnic group approach' and developed what may be called a citizenship model of multiculturalism. This was defined as a system of rights and freedoms, combined with such obligations as commitment to the nation, a duty to accept the Constitution and the rule of law, and the acceptance of basic principles such as tolerance and equality, the role of English as the national language, and equality of the sexes¹⁴. After 1996, multiculturalism faced a challenge (which some people have called 'the Hanson phenomenon'), and government leaders and media commentators started to attack aboriginal and migrant rights. Major cuts were quickly introduced in the immigration and multicultural policy areas¹⁵.

¹³ Stephen Castles, 'Multicultural Citizenship: The Australian Experience', in Veit Bader (eds.), *Citizenship and Exclusion*. (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1997), pp. 125--6.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 126--7.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

2.1.4. Towards Multicultural Citizenship?

As we have seen in the previous section, the new multiculturalism moved away from the ethnic group approach and developed what may be called a citizenship model of multiculturalism. However, 'citizenship' is also a highly contested concept.

Young, Taylor and Kymlicka agree that liberalism demonstrates an ignorance of the politics of difference, and they try to overcome this limitation. The same problem appears with the concept of citizenship¹⁶. Hall, for example, argues that older European ideas of citizenship assumed a more culturally homogeneous population within the framework of a strong and unitary national state. It therefore seemed appropriate to believe that all citizens would naturally enlarge the freedoms, rights and liberties of everyone¹⁷. Isin and Wood stress that it is important to recognise that postmodernisation and globalisation have imposed severe upward and downward limits¹⁸ on modern citizenship, not only as a form of political and national identity, but also as a legal status capable of mobilising and accommodating the fragmented identities and groups of the late modern condition¹⁹.

In addition, Kymlicka suggests the term 'multicultural citizenship' and elaborates this in terms of three forms of group differentiated rights: *self-government rights*, *polyethnic rights* and *special representation rights*²⁰. Parekh emphasises that 'a politics of citizenship which both promotes the rights of communities with regard to each other, as well as the obligations of communities to each other is an essential precondition of the pluralist vision'²¹. He suggests ways to strengthen cultural difference in citizenship, such as giving cultural diversity public status and dignity, and the acceptance by minorities of the obligations of British citizenship (but at their own pace and in a direction of their own choosing). He also feels that the government should promote conditions in which minorities can be sure that the wider society is not hostile to them, and can play their full

¹⁶ More details are provided in Section 2.3.

¹⁷ Stuart Hall and David Held, 'Citizens and Citizenship', in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (eds.), *New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s* (London: Lawrence & Wishart in Association with Marxism Today, 1990), p.187.

¹⁸ The meanings of 'upward' and 'downward' limits on modern citizenship are related to the influences of postmodernism and globalization. The former is dependent on political and national identity. The latter refers to the difficulty of mobilizing and accommodating the fragmented identities and groups of the late modern condition.

¹⁹ Engin F. Isin and Patricia K. Wood, *Citizenship & Identity* (London: Sage, 1999), p. 155.

²⁰ Kymlicka (1995), pp.26-33. More details will be provided in Chapter 3.

²¹ Bhikhu Parekh, 'British Citizenship and Cultural Difference', in Geoff Andrews (eds.), *Citizenship* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991), p. 197.

part in the decision-making process at all levels²².

There is, therefore, an enormous diversity of ways of discussing multiculturalism, such as social phenomena, cultural identity, public policy and a new concept of citizenship. These are interrelated and interactive at some levels. Multiculturalism can be viewed as an umbrella for a range of issues surrounding fairness, equality and the plurality of identities, values and practices in contemporary societies. Instead, concepts, frameworks, programmes and initiatives within the discourse must be sharpened, expanded and related.

In this thesis I see multiculturalism from the perspectives of identity, policy and citizenship for several reasons. At first, the discourse of multiculturalism influences the development of cultural identity, and provides a new view to cultural identity in Taiwan. Secondly, I will explore the representation of multiculturalism in Taiwan, which focuses on the official policy and discourse in the following chapters. Furthermore, in the present research we consider multiculturalism as a new model of citizenship. In the following sections and Chapter 3 we will elaborate this perspective.

2.2 The Development of Multiculturalism Past and Present

In addition to 'multiculturalism', some other terms have also been used to refer to various ways of dealing with cultural difference. Before 'multiculturalism' gained currency, 'cultural pluralism' was used by liberals to highlight the need for tolerance of cultural differences. After the appearance of 'multiculturalism', there were those who felt the term was imprecise and who preferred to use 'cultural diversity' as a basis for policies of managing cultural differences. We will now discuss these two theoretical approaches to cultural difference in order to compare their views with those of multiculturalism.

2.2.1 Cultural Pluralism

'Pluralism' means 'several' or 'many' in a numerical line of 'isms' starting with 'monism', and 'dualism'. As a concept, it includes all other expressions along this line²³. With the development of western colonialism, 'pluralism' was used to describe the situation in which different social, economic and cultural systems existed together in one colonised society. For example, Furnivall applies the concept to tropical societies, where a Western

²² Ibid., pp. 197-9.

²³ Rupert Breitling, 'The Concept of Pluralism', in Stanislaw Ehrlich and Graham Wootton (eds.), *Three Faces of Pluralism: Political, Ethnic and Religious* (Westmead: Gower, 1980), p. 1. According to Breitling, 'pluralism' was introduced around 1720 by the German philosopher Christian Wolff.

superstructure of business and administration was imposed on the native world, and there was a forced union of different sections of the population²⁴. Newman uses the concept to explain the different models of cultural development in the early United States, such as assimilation, amalgamation and cultural pluralism. For him, the meaning of 'cultural pluralism' may be expressed in the formula $A+B+C=A+B+C$, where A, B and C represent different social groups which, over time, maintain their own unique identities. 'Cultural pluralism' is often taken to mean 'peaceful coexistence' between groups. The theory contends that after some period of adjustment, different groups will make their peace with one another and live side by side²⁵.

A wide range of theories in politics, sociology and anthropology utilise 'pluralism'. Kuper categorises these discussions into two broad traditions: one is much older and offers a conception of the pluralistic society in which the pluralism of the varied groups and interests is integrated in a balanced, stable democratic government; the second is relatively recent and views the stability of plural societies as uncertain and threatened by sharp cleavages between different plural sections whose relations to each other are characterised by inequality²⁶. Kuper combines these two traditions with two different social philosophies -- the equilibrium model of society and the conflict model of society -- to present the development of pluralism in theoretical terms.

The equilibrium model tends to associate democracy with pluralism²⁷. There are several aspects of pluralism in this model. First, it sees society as constructed of a set of spheres and systems, such as the domestic and the kinship system, the political system, the economic system, the cultural system and so on. Different types of societies are characterised by the preponderance of one of the systems or spheres over the others²⁸. Secondly, there are interest groups or associations intermediate between the individual and the state. They provide the basis of a system of social checks and balances, a dispersion of power contributing to the maintenance of political pluralism. Thirdly, the equilibrium model emphasises common values as the basis of integration between different interest groups. For Shils, the key common values are: sentiments of communal affinity among the

²⁴ Leo Kuper, 'Plural Societies', in Montserrat Guibernau and John Rex (eds.), *The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), p. 222.

²⁵ William N. Newman, William N., *American Pluralism: A Study of Minority Groups and Social Theory* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 67.

²⁶ Kuper (1997), p. 220.

²⁷ Kuper (1997), p. 220.

²⁸ Shils (1956), pp. 153--4.

elites, respect for the rule of law and belief in its sanctity, moderation in political involvement, commitment to gradual change, and the recognition of the dignity of other values and activities within the society²⁹. Finally, this model of society is based on political pluralism, with a corresponding social pluralism in which the units are bound together by 'cross-cutting' loyalties and by common values or a competitive balance of power. It expresses an optimistic view of the relationship between social groups³⁰.

In contrast, the conflict model focuses on pluralism from a more pessimistic point of view with the emphasis on political and economic factors. Furnivall and Smith apply this concept in the analysis of colonial domination in tropical societies. Kuper tries to construct his own view of pluralism on the basis of their work, highlighting certain core arguments. First, societies composed of status groups or estates that are distinguished, have different positions in the economic order, and are differentially incorporated into the political structure, are to be called plural societies and distinguished from class societies³¹. In plural societies political relations influence relations to the means of production more than any influence in the reverse direction. Secondly, when conflicts develop in plural societies, they follow the lines of racial cleavage more closely than those of class. Thirdly, racial categories in plural societies are historically conditional; they are shaped by inter-group competition and conflict³².

The term 'cultural pluralism' was used as long ago as the early twentieth century. Kallen introduced the term in 1924 for two purposes. On the one hand, it was aimed at the majority ideology of assimilationism and 'pure' Americanism. On the other hand, Kallen wished to refute the doctrine of the 'melting pot', which had gained great currency, especially among the liberal intellectuals of the day³³. For Kallen, the ideal society is a 'federal, multilingual republic, a democracy of nationalities, co-operating voluntarily and autonomously through common institutions in the enterprise of self-realisation through the perfection of men according to their kind'. He also envisaged a society 'consisting of congeries of status groups entered by birth, conjoined into a federated stage by contractual union'. English

²⁹ Ibid., p.74.

³⁰ Kuper (1997), p. 222.

³¹ 'Plural society' is described as a society which is classified by ethnic or racial differences. Each ethnic and racial group has its own system, such as the forms of family, education, politics and social organisations. 'Class society' on the other hand is classified by the various classes of capitalism, such as the working class and the bourgeois.

³² John Rex, *Race and Ethnicity* (England: Open University Press, 1986), p.34.

³³ Newman (1973), p. 68.

would provide a common language, but 'each nationality would have for its emotional and involuntary life its own individual and inevitable aesthetic and intellectual forms.'³⁴

According to Newman, there are three central propositions in Kallen's arguments about cultural pluralism. First, Kallen argues that while there are many kinds of social membership and identities that man may choose voluntarily, no one can choose his ancestry. Thus assimilation is not realistic since it is impossible for people to forget that their families were (for example) German, Italian or Irish. The second part of Kallen's argument is that each of the minority cultures has something positive, something of value, to contribute to American society. Finally, Kallen maintains that the idea of democracy, of 'all men being created equal', implies that there are ostensible difference between people and groups. Without the presumption that difference existed, the statement in the Constitution about all men being equal *in spite of their difference* would be meaningless³⁵. In the face of the majority ideology of assimilation, Kallen seeks to prove that 'cultural pluralism' – freedom and unity through diversity – is the real meaning of American society.

The emergence of the Black civil rights movement in the 1960s, and the appearance of 'new ethnicity' voiced the demand for a more substantial form of cultural pluralism, in particular in the field of education. For example, the National Coalition of Cultural Pluralism defined cultural pluralism as:

A state of equal coexistence in a mutually supportive relationship within the boundaries or framework of one nation of people of diverse cultures with significantly different patterns of belief, behavior, color, and in many cases with different languages. To achieve cultural pluralism, there must be unity with diversity. Each person must be aware of and secure in his own identity, and be willing to extend to others the same respect and rights that he expects to enjoy himself³⁶.

The Ethnic Heritage Studies Program Act (1972) and the Commission on Multicultural Education, established by the American Association of Colleges of Teacher Education in 1972, were viewed as further developments of the idea of cultural pluralism. Both of them stressed the importance of cultural difference and demanded more tolerance of cultural

³⁴ R. D. Grillo, *Pluralism and the Politics of Difference: State, Culture and Ethnicity in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p.191.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 68-9.

³⁶ Cited in B. Bullivant, *The Pluralist Dilemma in Education: Six Case Studies* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 114.

pluralism and cultural diversity, since these are a fact of life in American society³⁷.

Another example of cultural pluralism is the system of 'pillarisation' in the Netherlands. Because of a long tradition of migration and colonialism, there are many different cultural, ethnic, political and regional groups in the Netherlands, thus it can be considered 'pluralist' in a modern sense since at least beginning of the seventeenth century³⁸. The Dutch reserve the term 'pluralism' to describe cultural diversity originating in religious and political difference, and primarily associate cultural pluralism with 'pillarisation', which has two functions, one is keeping the different identity for each group, the other one is integration of the pillarised groups³⁹. Furthermore, cultural policy has been geared toward creating the space for the expression of cultural and ideological differences, and has guarded the principle of respect and appreciation of diversity. In common with an observation of M. G. Smith on Indonesia, the Netherlands has created a society under which there are different small sub-societies, pillar groups, each one of which has its own political party, educational, broadcasting, sports, and welfare organisations⁴⁰. The role of the 'pillar group' is double; on the one hand, it provides a home base for members to acquire a position, they can use the perspective of pillar to think about anything. On the other hand, it leads Netherlands to become a tolerant, diverse, open and pluralist society.

However, the main problem is whether 'pillarisation' promotes or guards cultural difference. The interesting point is that in order to keep their own identity, integration becomes an important mission for each group. Although the system of pillarisation encourages cultural pluralism, it is grounded in a relatively homogenous culture⁴¹. Furthermore, pillarisation leads to less and more isolated interaction between different groups; they co-exist, but do not interact. In fact, with the development of mass communication and popular culture, it becomes more and more difficult to maintain a homogeneous culture; thus pillar groups gradually lose their influence.

To sum up, cultural pluralism is viewed as an alternative to assimilation, and allows all

³⁷ Grillo (1998), p. 193.

³⁸ J. De Jong, 'Cultural Diversity and Cultural Policy in the Netherlands. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, Vol. 4, No.2, 1998, p.362.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 363.

⁴⁰ P. Fenger, P. 'Government and the Arts: The Netherlands.' In Milton C. Cummings, Jr. and Richard S Kate (eds.) *The Patron State: Government and the Arts in Europe, North America, and Japan*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.105.

⁴¹ De Jong, (1998),p.365.

ethnic and cultural groups to demand the right not to assimilate. However, its focus is on participation plus diversity, and it may thus be seen as an expression of liberal pluralism⁴².

2.2.2 Cultural Diversity

Cultural diversity aims to rectify the problems of multiculturalism in cultural policy. As in the case of multiculturalism, it addresses two main problems. The first is to encourage the diversity of culture, living, imagination and creativity among individuals. For example, UNESCO's statement on 'Our Creative Diversity' stresses the crucial importance of cultural self-definition and the value given to the individual voice⁴³. The second problem is concerned with the equal cultural opportunity of all people regardless of their social background⁴⁴, as in the conception of multicultural citizenship. This section will discuss the new concepts of cultural diversity and cultural difference, and their practical application to cultural policy in the UK.

What does 'cultural diversity' mean in cultural policy? According to the cultural terminology of East Midlands Arts (in the UK), cultural diversity 'encompasses representation and participation at all levels, with support from both established and new organisations and projects in hereditary disenfranchised sectors'. Cultural diversity has replaced multiculturalism and become a key concept in cultural policy because 'it does not necessarily link culture to sexual origin, race or ethnicity, and thereby avoids the danger of ghettoisation lurking in some versions of multiculturalism and ethnic arts'⁴⁵. According to this definition, the first point of difference between cultural diversity and multiculturalism is that cultural diversity refers to different forms of ethnically-based expression⁴⁶. Secondly, it rejects 'ethnic arts' as a meaningless term, because it implies a form of homogeneity that has little bearing in reality. But the next problem for cultural diversity concerns the 'diverse cultures' to which it refers. What exactly are the different connotations of culture in 'cultural diversity' and 'multiculturalism'? The official report of The Arts Council of England indicates several cultural classifications, such as disability

⁴² Ibid., p.193.

⁴³ The Arts Council of England, *Cultural Diversity Action Plan* (London: The Arts Council of England, 1998), p.11.

⁴⁴ The Arts Council of England, *The Landscape of Fact: Towards a Policy for Cultural Diversity for the English Funding System: African, Caribbean, Asian and Chinese Arts* (London: The Arts Council of England, 1997), p.19.

⁴⁵ East Midlands Arts, *Cultural Terminology* (East Midlands Arts, 1996).

⁴⁶ The Arts Council of England (1997), p.33.

culture, women's culture, youth culture, gay or lesbian culture, and hybrid culture. Hybrid culture is an important creation of cultural diversity because it highlights the direction of cultural development in a global age: culture is always formed by interaction across a boundary, not only a national boundary but also an ethnic or subcultural boundary. In addition, the principle of cultural diversity has been taken to refer particularly to the less represented cultures, such as those of prisoners, lesbians or gays⁴⁷. As Bennett shows, cultural diversity is desirable not only for its own sake but as a means of achieving social cohesion, and it is a necessary means of overcoming social exclusion⁴⁸.

It is probably too early to evaluate cultural diversity policy. What needs to be stressed is that the trend towards culturally diverse arts is not a static phenomenon; rather it mirrors the changing relationships in society and especially the changing patterns of difference. The concept of cultural diversity still meets some problems. First, it tries to define African, Caribbean, Asian and Chinese arts as its main concerns, while at the same time supporting hybrid culture. So, if there is to be such a hybrid culture, is there still an African or Asian culture?

Another problem, as stated by Tony Bennett, is as follows:

The result (of cultural diversity), it will be argued, is often a 'diversity stew' in which different forms of diversity get misleadingly connected to one another, in which difference is invested with an impossible common value across different fields of social relations, and in which diversity and distributive issues confusingly collide.⁴⁹

To sum up, cultural diversity tends to emphasise the intersections and intermixing of, and crossovers between, different cultural perspectives and traditions that produces the social dynamics for forms of cultural diversity that constantly interpenetrate one another with new and unpredictable consequences.

We can thus see that the relationship between cultural pluralism, multiculturalism and cultural diversity exhibits some changing patterns. The relationship is complex, with both overlaps and conflicts, and similar but opposing meanings. 'Cultural pluralism' was originally used to describe cultural differences in a colonial society such as Indonesia. It highlighted the fact that a society was constituted by different political and social systems,

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.33.

⁴⁸ Tony Bennett, 'Culture, Policy, Diversities', presentation at the 3rd International Crossroads in Cultural Studies Conference (Birmingham, 23 June 2000).

⁴⁹ Ibid.

but under this society these systems kept their own culture and identity without any interaction. The private and communal worlds were separated from the world of the market place. Furthermore, cultural pluralism could be viewed as a special arrangement or model for cultural difference, such as 'pillarisation' in the Netherlands, where social groups have their own educational systems, media and political parties to maintain their own culture and identity. In addition, cultural pluralism was also part of liberal discourse in the early twentieth century, as shown in the writings of Kallen in the USA. But it must be stressed that the aim of cultural pluralism is not to maintain 'cultural difference'; rather, this model is always used to integrate small groups into a larger society, as in the case of immigrants in the Netherlands.

'Multiculturalism' is used to support claims for equal rights, namely the same rights in law and the political system, and the right to represent a collective or community culture. Different from cultural pluralism, multiculturalism emphasises *that cultural difference should be 'recognised' by the public, and should not only be 'tolerated' in private*. Thus multiculturalism resists two important ideas of the modern nation state: liberalism and nationalism. The former is challenged by the notion of separate collective cultures, and the latter is challenged by 'other' cultures which are different from national culture. Multiculturalism has an especially important meaning in today's global age, where capital, ethnicity, technology, finance and media flows across national boundaries cause 'deterritorialisation'⁵⁰. Most importantly, multiculturalism supports the collective dimensions of identity and provides people with a narrative of personhood. At the same time, some multiculturalisms presuppose a kind of homogeneous, fixed, shared identity or culture, which is very far from the reality of global or postmodern society.

'Cultural diversity' is a new concept which seeks to correct the problems involved in using the term 'multiculturalism', and is now widely used in discussions of cultural policy. It resists the maintenance of personhood in multiculturalism, and advocates a new 'hybrid culture' on the grounds that there is no longer any such thing as a homogeneous culture. Because 'cultural diversity' is viewed as a policy concept, its theoretical meaning is elusive.

The comparisons among these three terms are illustrated in Table 2.1.

⁵⁰ Arjun Appadurai, 'Disjuncture and Difference in Global Cultural Economy', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 7 (1990), p. 297.

	Identity	Difference	Related Theory
Cultural Pluralism	Different identities should be integrated into national identity	Difference should be 'tolerated' in the private sphere	Liberalism
Multiculturalism	Emphasis on group difference, as in ethnic identity, gender identity	Difference should be 'recognised' in the public sphere	Multiculturalism
Cultural diversity	Hybrid identity	Everyone, everything is difference	Postmodernism

Table 2.1. The comparisons between Cultural Pluralism, Multiculturalism and Cultural Diversity.

2.3. The Dialogue between Liberalism and Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism offers many criticisms of liberalism's view of citizenship. However, on the basis of arguments between liberalism and multiculturalism, some liberals have begun to revise their views. In this section, we will focus on three points of contention: the politics of difference, the politics of recognition, and the new construction of 'liberal multiculturalism'.

2.3.1 The Politics of Difference

Traditional liberalism has always emphasised individual freedom and equality as the most important principles for maintaining a fair, equal society. Thus it believes that individuals should be viewed as equivalent regardless of their ethnic group, gender, sexual preference or religious affiliation. However, Iris Marion Young, whose theory is used to support many theories of multiculturalism, points out, using a 'politics of difference' perspective, that liberalism makes two highly questionable assumptions about 'universal citizenship' and 'a homogeneous public'⁵¹.

Even though the concept of 'universal citizenship' was articulated to help many people to gain freedom and equality in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, new social movements of oppressed and excluded groups have asked why – despite the recognition of universal citizenship -- they are still excluded and treated as 'second-class'. For Young, part of the answer is straightforwardly Marxist: the processes and divisions of economic life

⁵¹ Iris Marion Young , 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship', in Ronald Beiner (eds.), *Theorizing Citizenship* (New York: State University of New York, 1995), p184.

generate inequalities of social class and groups. Because class/group specificity is ignored, the assimilationist strategy is adopted. But in fact, because universal citizenship is not really full citizenship, the needs of difference are overlooked.

Young develops her theory, which focuses on cultural difference and group rights, and their relationship with political practice from a feminist perspective. At first, she emphasises the importance of social groups and their different identities in modern society. Groups do not exist apart from individuals; they are socially prior to individuals, because people's identities are partly constituted by their group affinities. Social groups reflect the ways in which people identify themselves and others, and this leads them to associate with some people more than others, and to treat others as different. Groups are identified in relation to one another. Their existence is fluid and often shifting, but nevertheless real⁵².

Furthermore, Young points out that ignoring group difference has oppressive consequences in three respects. First, blindness to difference disadvantages groups whose experience, culture and socialised capacities differ from those of privileged groups. This is despite the fact that the strategy of assimilation aims to bring formerly excluded groups into the mainstream. The second aspect is that the ideal of a universal humanity without social group differences allows privileged groups to ignore their own group specificity. Blindness to difference perpetuates cultural imperialism by allowing norms expressing the point of view and experience of privileged groups to appear neutral and universal. The third consequence is that this denigration of groups that deviate from an allegedly neutral standard often produces an internalised devaluation by members of those groups themselves. When participation is taken to imply assimilation, the opposed person is caught in a dilemma: to participate means to accept and adopt an identity that is alien, and to try to participate means to be reminded by oneself and others of one's actual identity.⁵³

To sum up, Young believes that an emphasis on difference, as in the ideas of differentiated citizenship and group difference, is essential in order to maintain real equality. Traditional liberalism cannot in practice provide practical protection for minority groups. Undoubtedly, Young's views provide a powerful base on which to develop a theory of multiculturalism.

⁵² Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 11.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp.164--5.

2.3.2 The Politics of Recognition

In the concept of 'the Politics of Recognition', Charles Taylor points out that traditional liberalism concentrates on individual civil rights but ignores the importance of group rights. For him, the liberal tradition articulates two basic principles. First, it defines a set of individual rights that are very similar to those protected in other charters and bills of rights in Western democracies, such as those of the USA and Europe. Secondly, it guarantees equal treatment of citizens in a variety of respects and protects against discriminatory treatment on a number of irrelevant grounds, such as race or sex⁵⁴. However, Taylor identifies some problems of these two principles with reference to the experience of Quebec (in Canada).

Quebec has passed a number of laws relating to language: it has sought to regulate who can send their children to English-language schools; to require that businesses with more than 50 employees use the French language; and to outlaw commercial signage in any language other than French⁵⁵. This has challenged the two basic principles of liberalism. For the first principle, the collective goal, the preservation of French culture has overridden the individual right to choose whether one supports traditional culture or not, and has defined what is good for people in Quebec. Secondly, the new policies challenge the concept of 'equal treatment', i.e. the 'universalism' principle, which, according to liberal theory means that everyone is viewed as similar regardless of his/her sex or race. According to the principle of the politics of difference, everyone is viewed as different relative to his/her social group. Liberalism believes that the politics of difference will cause discrimination, but multiculturalism believes that the liberal concept of 'equal treatment' is an expression of Eurocentrism and ignores different cultural traditions.

Thus, Taylor thinks that the demands of minority groups, such as the Quebecers, stem from the need for 'recognition': they need to be recognised as a special group, not only as 'citizens' of Canada. It is not only Quebecers, but also African-Americans, Asian-Americans, Indians, Muslims and even women and gays who ask for this recognition. Thus Taylor believes that it is necessary to reconsider the relationship between personal identity and political practices.

With reference to the views of Taylor, Gutmann points out that two forms of respect for

⁵⁴ Charles Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', in Amy Gutmann (eds.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp.53--4.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp.57--60.

equal citizens may be required: the respect for the unique identities of each individual regardless of gender, race, or ethnicity; and the respect for those activities, practices and ways of viewing the world that are associated with members of special groups, including women, Asian-Americans or a multitude of other groups in society⁵⁶. Walzer also develops two forms of liberalism from Taylor's views, and compares the difference between them. The first liberalism 'demands the strongest possible commitment to individual rights and, almost as a deduction from this, to a rigorously neutral state, that is, a state without cultural or religious projects or, indeed, any sort of collective goals beyond the personal freedom and the physical security, welfare and safety of its citizens'. The second liberalism 'allows for a state committed to the survival and flourishing of a particular nation, culture or religion, or of a set of nations, cultures, and religions, so long as the basic rights of citizens who have different commitments or no such commitments at all are protected'.⁵⁷

2.3.3 Liberal Multiculturalism

From arguments about 'the politics of difference', and 'the politics of recognition', some liberals have also considered the problems of cultural difference. Kymlicka believes that there is no insurmountable contradiction between group difference and liberalism. Unlike contemporary liberal theorists, he argues that liberal theory can solve the problems of group difference or minority rights. He acknowledges that liberalism is based on freedom of choice and personal autonomy. Since individual choice is dependent on culture, on the existence of one's culture as a meaningful context of choice, it follows not only that liberalism is not in contradiction with cultures, but that it must protect them through a defence of human rights and minority rights. The key link is that between freedom and culture. Individuals not only need the freedom to choose, but also need a culture to grow into so that they can learn the meaning and values of their choice. In addition, cultural membership provides support for self-identity and dignity, belonging and mutual responsibility. Kymlicka realises that our own culture is the crucial context of choice -- the only one to which we are attached and in relation to which we are in a position of need. In addition, he assumes that people are born and are expected to lead a complete life within the same society and culture⁵⁸. In addition, Delgado-Moreira points out that liberal

⁵⁶ Amy Gutmann, 'Introduction', in Amy Gutmann (ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 3--24.

⁵⁷ Michael Walzer, 'Comment', in Amy Gutmann (eds.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 99.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.89.

multiculturalism supports cultures not because they are valuable in themselves, but because it believes that only through having access to culture do people have access to a range of meaningful options so that they can exercise their personal autonomy⁵⁹.

In order to preserve diversity and to promote integration in a state, Kymlicka points out that we need a dual set of rights: 'universal rights assigned to individuals regardless of group membership and certain group differentiated rights or special status for minority culture'⁶⁰. He explains that a liberal conception of multiculturalism requires that membership of these groups must not be imposed by the state, but rather be a matter of self-identity; that individual members must be free to question and reject any inherited or previously adopted identity, if they so choose, and have an effective right of exit from any identity groups; that these groups must not violate the basic civil or political rights of their members; and that multicultural accommodations must seek to reduce inequalities in power between groups, rather than allowing one group to exercise dominance over other groups⁶¹.

The 'politics of difference' and 'politics of recognition' provide a powerful base for the critique of liberalism and the construction of multiculturalism. However, liberals themselves have also responded to these problems and have sought to create a new 'liberal multiculturalism' to balance the arguments between liberalism and multiculturalism.

2.4 Multiculturalism and the Postmodern Condition

Even though multiculturalism is viewed as a close relation of the theory of postmodernism, the latter also provides challenges to the idea of multiculturalism. For example, globalisation is already making it more and more difficult to construct a 'pure'

⁵⁹ Juan M Delgado-Moreira, (2001), he summarizes the content of liberal multiculturalism as follows:

- (1) in favour of exemptions from laws which penalise or burden cultural practice;
- (2) in favour of assistance to do those things the majority can do unassisted;
- (3) in favour of self-government for national minorities, preferably by a federal system;
- (4) in favour of external rules restricting the non-member's liberty to protect the members' culture if they are national groups, but not for immigrants;
- (5) against internal rules for members' conduct enforced by ostracism, excommunication, and disowning children who marry outside the group;
- (6) in favour of the recognition of a traditional legal code of nations by the dominant legal system, but not for immigrants;
- (7) in favour of guaranteed representation rights in government bodies and symbolic claims for both collectives. pp.89--91.

⁶⁰ Kymlicka (1995), p.6.

⁶¹ Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.42.

national culture and identity or ethnic identity. In this section, we will discuss the new influences from postmodern identity and hybrid culture on the theory of multiculturalism.

2.4.1 Postmodern Identity

Many authors stress the crisis of identities in the postmodern condition. For example, according to Hall, first of all, identities are contradictory; they cross-cut or dislocate each other. Secondly, the contradictions operate both outside, in society, cutting across settled constituencies, and inside the heads of each individual. Thirdly, no single identity can align all the different identities into one; there is no overarching master identity on which a politics can be securely grounded. Fourthly, increasingly the political landscapes of the postmodern world are fractured in this way by competing and dislocating identifications, arising especially from the erosion of the master identity of class and the emerging identities belonging to the new political ground defined by the new social movements. Finally, identity shifts according to how the subject is addressed or represented; identification is not automatic, but can be won or lost. It has become politicised. This is sometimes described as a shift from a politics of identity to a politics of difference⁶². Similarly, Kellner points out that popular culture is now a site of the implosion of identity and the fragmentation of the subject in postmodern society. Subjects have imploded into masses; a fragmented, disjointed, and discontinuous mode of experience is a fundamental characteristic of postmodern culture, in both its subjective experience and texts⁶³.

According to these and other authors, a new identity of the postmodern condition has come to challenge traditional identity based on national or ethnic identity. Hall observes:

As a tentative conclusion it would appear that globalisation does have the effect of contesting and dislocating the centred and closed identities of a national culture. It does have a pluralising impact on identities, producing a variety of possibilities and new positions of identification, and making identities more positional, more political, more plural and diverse⁶⁴.

The new view of postmodern identity changes our definition of multiculturalism. For example, Turner indicates two kinds of multiculturalism: 'difference' multiculturalism and

⁶² Ibid., p.280.

⁶³ Douglas Kellner, 'Popular Culture and the Construction of Postmodern Identities', in Scott Lash and Jonathan Friedman (eds.), *Modernity and Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 144.

⁶⁴ Stuart Hall, 'The Question of Cultural Identity', in S. Hall, D. Held and T. McGrew (eds.), *Modernity and its Future* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 309.

'critical' or 'polycentric' multiculturalism. 'Difference' multiculturalism refers to the idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group or race, so that it overemphasises the internal homogeneity of an ethnic or group cultures. On the other hand, 'critical' or 'polycentric' multiculturalism tries to define 'the self' as 'polycentric, multiple, unstable and unsituated', and gives culture a new meaning. It becomes dynamic and open instead of being the fixed property of particular ethnic groups. Furthermore, it is open to the formation of new cultural groups. Thus, polycentric or critical multiculturalism claims to avoid an identity politics that merges culture with ethnic origin⁶⁵.

However, multicultural policies and discourse have failed to break away from the symbolism of multiculturalism, tending instead to maintain and reproduce spatialised cultures and communities. Can 'polycentric multiculturalism' challenge and overcome the implicitly taken-for-granted immutable relationship between territory, culture and identity? One possible answer is that a new 'hybrid culture' is emerging.

2.4.2 'Hybrid culture' and the Postmodern Condition

The influences of migration and globalisation mean that more people live within and between cultures. They must, metaphorically and usually practically, be multilingual and multicultural. The result is the emergence of 'hybridity'.

Homi Bhabha uses an *international* culture as a starting point, based not on the exoticism of multiculturalism or the diversity of cultures, but on the inscription and articulation of culture's hybridity. Culture is seen as a dynamic force, an 'enactive, enunciatory site', and 'to that extent all cultures are hybrid', either the hybridity which occurred in the colonial period or the hybridity of a post-colonial world.⁶⁶

In the postmodern condition and in contemporary social life, people are often obliged to adopt shifting multiple or hyphenated positions of identification. Hall uses the data of the *Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities* in the UK to investigate whether respondents thought of themselves as 'British' and if, for example, they considered being British *and* Pakistani as compatible or conflicting. It would seem, in fact, that all people are to some extent 'hybridised' through their different experiences of education, leisure time, everyday life, and work. They are all negotiating culturally somewhere along the spectrum of

⁶⁵ Terence Turner, 'Anthropology and Multiculturalism: What is Anthropology the Multiculturalists Should be Mindful of It?' *Cultural Anthropology*, 8 (4), p.412.

⁶⁶ Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), p.178.

difference, in which disjunctures of time, generation, spatialisation and dissemination refuse to be neatly aligned.⁶⁷

For Bhabha, hybrid culture rejects the possibility of multiculturalism, which is based on fixed cultural differences. The problem of multiculturalism is that of still more separatism, which is underpinned by a static view of culture and cultural production and by cultural essentialism. There is an underlying sense of cultural difference as the 'fixed, solid almost biological properties of human relations'. The result has been to promote a 'pseudo-pluralism' in which 'a culturally defined ethnic particularity has become the basis of political association'.⁶⁸ Gilroy also pays attention to this danger in the case of black identity, and finds an 'Afro-centricity', a form of separatism which operates with an essentialist view of black culture and identity⁶⁹. Ethnicity, says Gilroy, is an 'infinite process of identity construction', and the reification of culture through both multiculturalism and separatism seeks to impose an unacceptable block on that process⁷⁰.

The ideas of multiculturalism are challenged by the theory of new identity and culture in the postmodern condition. However, in response, multiculturalism has also been developed, changed, shifted, and negotiated. These 'diverse multiculturalisms' have been described as the new 'fragmented paradigm' in a postmodern global age⁷¹. But how should we recognise and define 'multiculturalism' in the postmodern condition?

Paina Werbner provides some challenging responses to this question. First, multiculturalism without anti-racism does not make sense as a radical political programme. As Blum argues, the need is to stage a dual struggle for the universal and the particular: 'We value each other both because of our commonalities and because of our differences'⁷². Multiculturalism without anti-racism or anti-racism without multiculturalism cannot withstand the forces of repression or regression. Furthermore, the aims of multiculturalism are not only to allow national, ethnic and immigrant minorities a voice, but to protect them

⁶⁷ Hall (2000), p.227.

⁶⁸ Grillo (1998), p.233.

⁶⁹ Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (London: Verso, 1993), p.122.

⁷⁰ Paul Gilroy, *Small Acts: Thoughts on the Politics of Black Culture* (London: Serpent's Tail, 1993), p.223.

⁷¹ Yunas Samad, 'The Plural Guises of Multiculturalism: Conceptualising a Fragmented Paradigm', in Tariq Modood and Paina Werbner (eds.), *The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Community* (London: Zed Books, 1997), p.240.

⁷² Lawrence Blum, 'Multiculturalism, Racial Justice and Community: Reflections on Charles Taylor's 'Politics of Recognition'', in Lawrence Forster and Patricia Herzon (eds.), *Defending Diversity* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994), p.190.

from offensive symbolic as well as civic and material exclusions and violations. This comes with an insistence, however, that individual human rights must be observed by these minorities. A critical multiculturalism recognises the rights of minorities to demand restitution for historical racialisations which disempowered them and suppressed their voice in the national sphere⁷³.

The second response, theoretically grounded in the work of Bhabha, is continuously to remind ourselves that many countries face their 'internal difference', a postcolonial locus of multiple diasporas, and by doing so they aim to 'interrupt' or 'disrupt' singular narratives of nation and supranation, to demand 'the decentring of culture from the political system...and deny the idea of a unitary hegemonic culture as the indispensable consensual basis of national political institutions'⁷⁴.

Thirdly, majoritarian democracies need protection from themselves. Here the right of the individual to take action against the state in the name of, and protected by, overarching principles of justice is crucial. A new balance is needed between the individual and social dimensions of citizenship rights, and between narrow universalism and narrow particularism⁷⁵.

For Werbner, multiculturalism is not a matter of theory, but of real politics. There are as many multiculturalisms as there are political arenas for collective actions. They are relative to different levels: the local, the national, the supranational and different domains from the orientalist construction of Eastern Europe to racism, migration, ethnicity, hyphenated identities, religion, local politics, education, affirmative action, and citizenship⁷⁶. A theory of 'deep diversity' is needed as a basis for further exploration of what is happening to identity in postmodern society and the global age.

Even though the views of liberalism and postmodernism are quite different, we can still find some overlapping views. In particular, both consider the equality and rights of minority groups to be vitally important.

⁷³ Paina Werbner, 'Afterword: Writing Multiculturalism and Politics in the New Europe', in Tariq Modood and Paina Werbner (eds.), *The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Community* (London: Zed Books, 1997), p.263.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p.263.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p.264.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p.264.

Conclusion: Multiculturalism as a New Practice of Citizenship?

Multiculturalism is a still very controversial issue, as we have seen in the above discussion of a range of contending perspectives. However, it is possible to identify a number of particularly important trends in the field of multiculturalism.

First, the discussion of multiculturalism is quite diverse, including views of multiculturalism as a social phenomenon, a value, a kind of political struggle, policy or form of citizenship. Recently, more and more discussions have concentrated on the development of 'multicultural citizenship' and have highlighted issues of minority rights.

Secondly, through the development from cultural pluralism to multiculturalism to cultural diversity, we can see that it has become more and more complex to define cultural difference and identity. 'Cultural pluralism' expresses the liberal attitude to cultural difference and 'tolerance' based on individual rights and freedom. However, from the perspective of 'multiculturalism', individual freedom cannot provide enough protection for cultural difference and identity; thus some group rights are needed to protect against damage to groups from external society. However, 'cultural diversity' highlights the difficulty of recognising cultural difference and determining what particular groups should gain group rights, since difference and identity are so fuzzy and fragmented. These problems need more consideration and discussion at both the theoretical and practical levels.

Thirdly, the influence of liberalism and postmodernism has led to different trends for multiculturalism. 'Liberal multiculturalism' tries to search for a good balance between difference and equality, freedom and culture, and focuses on the discussion of citizenship, rights and policy. 'Postmodern multiculturalism' emphasises more possibilities for difference, and the changeable relationship between people and their identity and culture, which is particularly difficult to integrate into policy. In addition, Liberalism thus proposes an institutional framework of 'dual citizenship' on practical focus, however, postmodern approach is more critical to policy frameworks. On the face of it, these two trends of multiculturalism are conflicting and opposing. However, in the present study we seek to maintain a balance between them. On the one hand, liberal multiculturalism emphasises the protection for various groups to maintain their freedom, equality, rights and citizenship in order to define their relationships with the state or government. On the other hand, postmodern multiculturalism reminds us that there are more possibilities in the diversity of

people, culture and identity.

These two trends may seem to conflict with each other. However, they can both be integrated into cultural policy at the same time. From the viewpoints of liberalism and postmodernism, we can identify two major suggestions for cultural policy: thinking about cultural difference should be more flexible and fluid, and there should be 'deep diversity' in policy; and the problems of equality, rights and citizenship should be taken into account in cultural policy.

The researcher's own view is that cultural identity and difference are becoming more variable; they are not always related to ethnic status, gender or class. It is therefore important to consider what kinds of cultural policy will be best for cultural difference and identity. Certainly, multiculturalism needs to be practised by way of a new discussion of rights and citizenship. In the next chapter we will consider the development of the idea and practice of 'multicultural citizenship' in more detail.

Chapter 3: Multicultural Citizenship and Cultural Policy

The arguments around collective rights and the cultural difference between liberalism and multiculturalism, such as 'the politics of difference' and 'the politics of recognition', have led to new thinking on citizenship. On the one hand, the perspective of multiculturalism reveals the problems and limitations of the traditional liberal view of citizenship, which is rooted in individualism. On the other hand, the influence of liberalism has caused multiculturalism to develop its own new model of citizenship: 'multicultural citizenship'.

In this chapter, I will argue that multicultural citizenship should have two essential functions in modern society: the unity of the democratic state and respect for cultural differences within the autonomous collectivities and units that may be established. These two functions cause a tension between unity and autonomy in the concept of citizenship. Multicultural citizenship is viewed as a new creation to maintain a balance between unity and autonomy based on collective rights and cultural differences. Therefore, collective rights and cultural rights have become significant new factors in the concept of multicultural citizenship.

However, multicultural citizenship is still underdeveloped at the present time. It seems to be difficult to provide a clear definition of the concept. Furthermore, various countries adopt different attitudes to multicultural citizenship when confronted with the tension between unity and autonomy.

In Section 3.1 below we will use the arguments of various theorists to highlight important trends in the development of multicultural citizenship. Moreover, as cultural rights are viewed as new and significant issues in the concept of citizenship, after civil, political, economic and social rights, we will consider the development of cultural rights in Section 3.2. Finally, the practice of multicultural citizenship is discussed in Section 3.3 with particular reference to its interaction with cultural policy.

3.1 Towards 'Multicultural Citizenship'?

Citizenship is related to identity. As Kymlicka and Norman point out, citizenship is not only a status, defined by a set of rights and responsibilities, it is also an identity which expresses one's membership of a political community. Both Kymlicka and Norman adopt

Marshall's view of citizenship as a shared identity that integrates previously excluded groups with society and provides a source of national unity. This integration is based on a 'common culture' which should be seen as a 'common possession and heritage'¹. However, it is clear that many groups feel excluded from the 'common culture', not only because of their socio-economic status but also because of their socio-cultural identity -- their *difference* is not recognised. These groups, such as ethnic minorities, women and gays, demand their own identity and special rights within new social movements. At the same time, at the theoretical level, these problems have been of concern in the ongoing debates on the construction of citizenship.

Attempts to change and challenge the traditional theory of citizenship are evident in the new terminology, such as 'differentiated citizenship', 'group rights', 'multicultural citizenship', 'diaspora and aboriginal citizenship' and 'radical democratic citizenship'. Much of the orientation of these new ideas is towards liberalism, since liberalism provides the most important base for the construction of traditional citizenship. The emphasis on individualism, universalism and the distinction between the public and private spheres, which has been central to traditional concepts of citizenship, is derived from liberal theory. But today, faced by these new challenges, liberal theorists have also begun to rethink their traditional assumptions. In this section, we will examine some key theoretical issues arising from the new debate on citizenship, which try to search for a new balance between 'common culture' and cultural differences.

Therefore, there are two main concerns related to the discussion of citizenship in a culturally diverse society. The first is whether cultural difference should or should not be considered in the conception of citizenship. On the grounds of equality, traditional liberalism views every one as having the same universal worth, and it ignores differences based on personal background. The second problem is related to the question of 'collective rights'. If the individual is considered in terms of his/her group or community, should his/her rights be related to the rights of that group or community? In this section, I discuss the various theorists and their opinions on the debate of 'multicultural citizenship' based on these two concerns-- cultural difference and collective rights.

¹ Will Kymlicka, and Wayne Norman, 'Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship', in Ronald Beiner (eds.), *Theorizing Citizenship* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 302.

3.1.1. Iris Marion Young and 'Differentiated Citizenship'

Among theorists who deal with these problems, Iris Marion Young is important as a 'cultural pluralist'. She argues that citizenship must take account of cultural difference. She also believes that the common rights of citizenship, invariably defined by and for white men, cannot accommodate the special needs of minorities. In other words, Iris Young emphasises the importance of cultural differences and collective rights in what Young calls a conception of 'differentiated citizenship'². According to this view, members of groups should be incorporated into the political community not only as individuals but also through their groups, and their rights will depend on their group membership.

Young gives two reasons why equality needs to affirm rather than ignore group difference. First, the excluded groups are at a disadvantage in the political process, and 'the solution lies at least in part in providing institutionalised means for the explicit recognition and representation of oppressed groups'³. These procedural measures should include public funds for advocacy groups, guaranteed representation in political bodies, and veto rights over specific policies that affect a group directly. Secondly, the excluded groups often have distinctive needs, which can only be met through group-differentiated policies, such as language rights, land rights for aboriginal groups or reproductive rights for women⁴. For Young, these demands for rights invoke broader theories of justice and democracy; at the same time, she defends them as a response to 'oppression', which she sees as assuming five forms: exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and 'random violence and harassment motivated by group hatred or fear'⁵.

Differentiated citizenship should be practised on the basis of three concepts: a special system of group-conscious policies and rights, group representation and a heterogeneous public.

First, Young points out that the concept of 'special rights' is needed to balance the problems arising from the idea of 'universal rights'. For Young, equal treatment requires everyone to be measured according to the same norms, but in fact there are no neutral norms of behaviour and performance. Oppressed groups actually encounter discrimination under these so-called 'equal treatments'. Thus it is necessary to provide 'special rights' for

² Young (1989), p.258.

³ Young (1989), p.259.

⁴ Young (1990), pp.175-83.

⁵ Young (1989), p.261.

the oppressed in order to counter this danger of oppression. Furthermore, Young emphasises that 'special rights' are not only a tool to achieve equality; in addition they confirm that society acknowledges the existence and importance of group difference⁶. 'Special rights' should be considered from the viewpoint of the subjectivity of the oppressed groups, who should decide what kinds of special rights meet their needs.

Secondly, Young sees 'group representation' as another crucial element of 'differentiated citizenship'. This implies the need for institutional mechanisms and public resources which support three things: the self-organisation of group members so that they achieve collective empowerment and a reflective understanding of their collective experience and interests in the context of the society; group analysis and group generation of policy proposals in an institutionalised context where decision-makers are obliged to show that their deliberations have taken group perspectives into consideration; and group veto power regarding specific policies that affect a group directly⁷.

In addition, Young points out that a 'heterogeneous public' will encourage group difference and group representation. Traditional liberalism believes that group difference should be considered as a problem in the private sphere but not the public sphere.

With these three concepts—special rights, groups representation and heterogeneous public, Young creates her 'differentiated citizenship'. Thus 'Differentiated citizenship' can be viewed as a new concept of citizenship based on cultural difference and collective rights.

3.1.2. Chantal Mouffe and 'Radical Democratic Citizenship'

Chantal Mouffe advocates a 'radical democratic citizenship' to challenge traditional citizenship. Like Young's notion of 'differentiated citizenship', 'radical democratic citizenship' depends on a collective form of identification among the democratic demands found in a variety of social and oppositional movements, e.g. women, blacks, gays and ecologists. At the same time, Mouffe also emphasises the importance of cultural differences in citizenship, which she sees within the framework of postmodernism. She advocates developing a non-essentialist conception of the subject and regards identity as identification with groups rather than something defined by essential properties of the

⁶ Young (1990), p. 174.

⁷ Young (1990), p. 184.

subject⁸.

In a post-modern world, the emergence of new political subjects, and the creation of new forms of identity and new types of community lead to the rediscovery of citizenship. Mouffe argues for an anti-essentialist theoretical framework according to which the social agent can never be totally fixed in a closed system of difference. Cultural difference is not fixed and closed. On the contrary, it is constructed by a diversity of discourses, among which there is no necessary relation but a constant movement of displacement. At the same time, the identity of multiple and contradictory subjects is therefore 'always contingent and precarious, temporarily fixed at the intersection of those subject positions and dependent on specific forms of identification'⁹.

Furthermore, Mouffe justifiably does not see group rights in conflict with citizenship. Her conception of citizenship aims to construct a 'we', a chain of equivalence among various demands to articulate them through the principle of democratic equivalence without eliminating difference¹⁰. In addition, she views citizenship as 'an articulating principle that affects the different subject positions of the social agent...while allowing for a plurality of specific allegiances and for the respect of individual liberty'¹¹. In this idea of citizenship the social agent is 'not a unitary subject but ... the articulation of an ensemble of subject positions, constructed within specific discourses and always precariously and temporarily sutured at the intersection of those subject positions'¹². These multiple subject positions have evolved in the last few years in social movements demanding democratic rights. Radical democratic citizenship does not simply extend the sphere of rights in order to include these groups but allows for the radical and mutual restructuring of these identities and the polity. It becomes the common political identity of these multiple subject positions.

Young provides the concept of the 'politics of difference', which is seen as an important part of the postmodern condition. For Mouffe also, fragmentation, differentiation, dispersal and the decentring of meaning and experience are recurring themes in our lives.

⁸ Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*. (London: Verso, 1993), p.71.

⁹ Chantal Mouffe, 'Democratic Politics and the Question of Identity' in John Rajchman (eds.) *The Identity in Question*. (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p.33.

¹⁰ Engin F. Isin, and Patricia K. Wood, *Citizenship and Identity*. (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1999), p.11.

¹¹ Chantal Mouffe, *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community* (London: Verso, 1992), pp.235.

¹² Ibid: p.235.

As Isin and Wood point out, two key issues are overlooked in contemporary social and cultural experience: first, whether condoning or condemning such fragmentation in social and cultural experience, many neglect to recognise that these experiences are not universal but distinctive to particular groups or class; secondly, these experiences have also engendered their own counter-tendencies in a search for origins and unitary identities¹³. The views of 'radical citizenship' can conceivably contribute to a clarification of these issues.

3.1.3. Will Kymlicka and 'Multicultural Citizenship'

By contrast, as a liberal theorist, Kymlicka confronts the challenges to liberalism and rethinks the problems of the citizenship concept in the liberal tradition. In other words, Kymlicka also premises the concepts of cultural differences and collective rights in liberalism. First, he reminds us that the liberal tradition does not really ignore ethno-cultural difference or group difference. Indeed, he stresses that minority rights were an important part of liberal theory and practice in the nineteenth century and between the two world wars. Kymlicka points to two major claims which underlie a liberal defence of minority rights. One is that individual freedom is tied in some important ways to membership of one's national group; the other is that group-specific rights can promote equality between the minority and majority¹⁴.

However, Kymlicka still believes that the emphasis on freedom and equality in liberalism will provide a good space for the development of collective rights. Rather than a full-scale endorsement of the sovereignty of the individual, he begins his discussion with the assertion that individual rights are essential for the protection of group difference. These rights enable individuals to form and maintain the various groups and associations which constitute civil society¹⁵. Kymlicka remains committed to the idea that 'a liberal democracy's most basic commitment is to the freedom and equality of its individual citizens'¹⁶. He believes that 'the protection afforded by these common rights of citizenship is sufficient for many of the legitimate forms of diversity in society'¹⁷, and that 'many forms of group-differentiated citizenship are consistent with liberal principles of freedom and

¹³ Isin and Wood (1999), p.154.

¹⁴ Will Kymlicka, 'Ethnicity in the USA', in Montserrat Guibernau and John Rex (eds.), *The Ethnicity Reader Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1997), p.231.

¹⁵ Kymlicka (1995), p.26.

¹⁶ Ibid., p.34.

¹⁷ Ibid., p.26.

equality¹⁸. Thus, the practice of liberal democracy is compatible with collective rights.

Even though Kymlicka argues that liberalism can accommodate collective rights, at the same time he also needs to respond to the worry of some liberals that collective rights will damage individual rights. He cites two claims that an ethnic or national group might make. The first involves the claim of a group against its own members, the second involves the claim of a group against the larger society. The first claim is 'internal restriction'. It involves intra-group relations: 'the ethnic or national group may seek the use of state power to restrict the liberty of its own members in the name of group solidarity'¹⁹. The second claim is proposed to protect the group from the impact of external influence; thus Kymlicka calls it 'external protection'. It involves inter-group relations; that is, the ethnic or national group may seek to protect its distinct existence and identity by limiting the impact of the decisions of the larger society²⁰. These two claims provide a basic protection and balance between individual rights and collective rights.

For Kymlicka, the term 'multicultural citizenship' involves three forms of group-differentiated rights: self-government rights, polyethnic rights and special representation right²¹. Self-government rights are given recognition in international law. According to the United Nation's Charter, 'all people have the right to self-determination' and are at liberty to ensure the full and free development of minority cultures and their interests. For Kymlicka, claims of self-government mean devolving political power to a political unit substantially controlled by the members of the national minority, and substantially corresponding to their historical homeland or territory. It is important to note that these responses are not temporary measures or a remedy for a form of oppression that will be eliminated. These rights are often described as permanent²².

Polyethnic rights are intended to help ethnic groups and religious minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without hampering their success in the economic and political institutions of the dominant society. The demand for polyethnic rights has several dimensions. For example, some ethnic groups and religious minorities have demanded various forms of public funding of their cultural practices²³.

¹⁸ Ibid., p.34.

¹⁹ Ibid., p.36.

²⁰ Ibid., p.36.

²¹ Kymlicka (1995), pp. 26-33. Also see Chapter 2, page 6.

²² Ibid., p.30.

²³ Ibid., p.31.

Special representation rights have attracted increasing attention in western societies, since legislatures in most of these countries are dominated by middle-class, able-bodied, white males. A more representative process would include members of ethnic and racial minorities, women, the poor and the disabled. Thus more and more countries have provided special representation rights for particular groups, such as women, indigenous people or racial minorities. At the same time, the debate on special representation rights suggests two areas of reform: one is to make political parties more inclusive by reducing the barriers which inhibit women, ethnic minorities and the poor from becoming party candidates or party leaders; the other is to adopt some form of proportional representation, which has historically been associated with greater inclusiveness of candidates²⁴.

To sum up, the traditional liberal view of citizenship has been seen as inadequate, because it has difficulty in dealing with collective difference. In order to increase democracy, many new debates on citizenship stress the need for greater equality, as in the case of citizenship for indigenous and immigrant minorities. At the same time, some liberals have provided a defence and new interpretation of the traditional liberal view of citizenship. In the next section, we will begin to discuss these new developments and in particular the issue of rights from the viewpoint of multicultural citizenship.

3.1.4. The Strong/Weak versions of Multicultural Citizenship

Ayelet Shachar indicates that the new concept of multicultural citizenship emphasises the links between culture, identity and group membership. Under this new understanding, 'persons would stand forth with their differences acknowledged and respected', and 'could participate in the public sphere without shedding their distinct identities'²⁵. Compared with the traditional concept of citizenship, this new model stresses the interaction among three components -- individuals, identity groups and the state, whereas the traditional model recognises only the first and third of these. This new understanding of citizenship departs from the perception of all citizens as individuals who are merely members of a larger political community, and instead views them as simultaneously having equal rights as individuals and differentiated rights as members of identity groups²⁶.

²⁴ Ibid., p.33.

²⁵ Ayelet Shachar, 'Multicultural Vulnerability: Individual Rights, Identity Groups and the State', in Christian Joppke and Steve Lukes (eds.), *Multicultural Questions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 89.

²⁶ Ibid., p.89.

Furthermore, Shachar also provides strong and weak versions of the multicultural citizenship model. The former calls for a fundamental shift in our understanding of citizenship. This shift grants identity groups strong formal, legal and constitutional recognition and permits them to govern their members in accord with their customs and views. The strong multicultural model is based on the notion of 'an imperial yoke, galling the necks of the culturally diverse citizenry'. Thus the state should free identity groups from the injustice of an alien form of rule by two means: first, by creating islands of self-governance for identity groups; and secondly, by officially including the diverse voices of identity groups within the constitutional framework and within public discourse. For Shachar, this means that the traditional view of citizenship, whose central components are individuals and the state, must be replaced by recognition of the relationship between identity groups and the state²⁷.

The weak version of multicultural citizenship addresses more effectively the intra-group impacts of multicultural accommodation: it acknowledges the potential tension between recognising different cultures and protecting the rights of group members as citizens. It seeks to 'explain how minority rights coexist with human rights, and how minority rights are limited by principles of individual liberty, democracy, and social justice'²⁸.

To sum up, the construction of 'multicultural citizenship' tries to provide a new model of citizenship, focusing on the relationship between individuals, identity groups or communities, and the state. It changes the relationship between individuals and the state, and emphasises that actual democracy, freedom and equality should embrace a concern for people's identity groups. Multicultural citizenship can be seen as the new balance between common culture and cultural differences. It has two functions: the unity of the democratic state, and respect for cultural differences.

In addition, three new kinds of rights should be included in the new model of multicultural citizenship. The first of these is the rise of collective or group rights as discussed in this section; the second is the development of cultural rights related to the importance of cultural differences. Thirdly, the idea of 'global citizenship' further extends the rights of multicultural citizenship²⁹. These three sets of rights will help to support the

²⁷ Ibid., p.90.

²⁸ Ibid.,p.90.

²⁹ The debate on global citizenship will be discussed in Chapter 9.

real practice and substance of multicultural citizenship. In the next section, I will discuss the development of cultural rights in citizenship.

3.2 The Development of Cultural Rights

3.2.1. Cultural Rights in International Law

The concept of cultural rights needs to be explored within the context of 'multicultural citizenship'. T. H. Marshall's classical analysis of citizenship explains that traditional citizenship involves only three sets of rights: civil, political and social³⁰. However, the new citizenship model emphasises the importance of cultural rights in order to protect special identities.

The discussion of cultural rights has developed in international instruments since the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* was adopted by the member states of the United Nations in 1948. Article 27 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR) states that:

Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefit.

In Article 22, the UDHR recognises that

Everyone, as a member of society...is entitled to realisation, through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organisation and resources of each State, to the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Furthermore, of particular importance is Article 15 of the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (ICESCR, 1966), which specifically protects the right of everyone to take part in cultural life, to enjoy the benefit of scientific progress and its application, and to benefit from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author³¹. Under the Covenant, most European countries are legally obliged to guarantee that the rights recognised in the Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind based on race, colour, property, birth or other status.

³⁰ Castles (1997), p.126.

³¹ Rod Fisher et al., *Human Rights and Cultural Policies in Changing Europe: The Rights to Participate in Cultural Life* (Helsinki: University Press, 1994), p.43.

In 1992, the revision of Article 15 in ICESCR identified various cultural rights:

Respect for one's culture, its integrity and its nature as a dynamic reality; equality of access and respect for the principle of non-discrimination; opportunity for participation by all both in the creation and in the enjoyment of the majority culture and minority cultures; freedom indispensable for creative activity, *indulging* freedom of expression, and intellectual property rights; the protection and development of cultures in which to participate, including preservation of the national and international cultural heritage, relating to both majority culture and the cultures of minorities³².

From the international point of view, the subject of cultural rights is a field of particular concern to United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), which has played a significant role in promoting the legal protection of cultural rights and the development of appropriate cultural policies. For example, the UNESCO meeting in Paris 1968 considered the evolution of cultural rights and concluded:

The rights to culture include the possibility for each man to obtain the means of developing his personality, through his direct participation in the creation of human values, and of becoming, in this way, responsible for his situation, whether local or on a world scale.

UNESCO also recognises that cultural rights are still inadequately developed and that the definition and contents of these rights must be clarified. It provides many meetings, actions, programmes, activities, and laws in order to improve cultural rights. The Swiss National Commission for UNESCO in 1991 examined cultural rights as an underdeveloped category of human rights, both in practice and in doctrine³³. Afterwards, a working group was created with UNESCO's support for the elaboration of a draft declaration on cultural rights. A draft declaration of cultural rights was drawn up in 1997. The recognition and exercise of cultural rights is considered vital with a view to protecting and promoting cultural identities and fostering the expression of different cultures and intercultural dialogue in democratic societies³⁴.

³² Quoted from *Human Rights and Cultural Politics in Changing Europe: the Right to Participate in Cultural Life*, p.124.

³³ Kishore Singh, 'UNESCO and Cultural Rights' in Halina Nieć (eds.), *Cultural Rights and Wrongs*, (Paris: UNESCO, 1998), pp.149-50.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.150.

3.2.2. The Debate on Cultural Rights

Even though cultural rights are emphasised in international law, there are some arguments on the scope of cultural rights for several reasons. Halina Nie'c suggests two main reasons for the underdevelopment of cultural rights, in particular in states. The first problem is the conflict between individual rights and collective rights. Such conflict includes cases when an individual cultural identity conflicts with a collective or national identity, or when a group claims that the full realisation of its cultural identity supersedes the recognised frame of cultural autonomy. The second factor is the conflict between the universality of human rights and the concept of cultural relativism. For example, if individuals seek the preservation of the group culture, as expressed in traditional practices, and this is harmful for human rights, is it the individual who has the right to declare that the group's cultural identity is a violation of his/her human rights, or does the group have the right to maintain its practice in the name of cultural identity?³⁵

Another reason why the concept of cultural rights is also an underdeveloped branch of human rights is due mainly to the difficulties of identifying the scope of these rights and the corresponding obligations, which are themselves linked to the problems of definition, particularly of the term 'culture'. As Symonides states, UNESCO has chosen to adopt a broader approach to culture, underlining that it 'is not restricted to the sense of belles lettres, the fine arts, literature and philosophy', but reflects 'day-to-day social relations, the totality of human activities, knowledge and practice -- indeed everything that makes humans different from nature'. Cultural rights include, therefore, 'the right to education, including compulsory primary education, as well as the rights protected by Article 15 and the rights linked to international co-operation'³⁶. Some of these rights have been protected by 'hard law', that is by conventions which are legally binding on states, whilst others are included in 'soft law' in the form of recommendations to states.

Although cultural rights are blurred and controversial, however, with the increase of claims for minority rights and the development of human rights from 'the first generation' to 'the third generation'³⁷ the importance of cultural rights has come to be appreciated. In other words, with the development of collective rights, cultural rights are recognised. For

³⁵ Halina Nie'c, 'Cultural Rights: At the End of the World Decade for Cultural Development', in the web site of: <http://www.unesco-sweden.org/conference/Papers/Paper2.htm>.

³⁶ Fisher, Rod (1994), p.45.

³⁷ This means the different stages of development of human rights. The first generation is relative to individual freedom, freedom to opinion, civil rights and political rights. The second generation is about social and economic rights. The third generation is about aboriginal rights, cultural rights and minority rights.

example, Prott states that cultural rights have been present implicitly in thinking about human rights from the start. Freedom to express one's view, freedom to adhere to one's religion, and freedom to associate with others for peaceful purposes are all essential to the maintenance and development of any culture³⁸. But now, cultural rights are extended from the individual, or specified minorities protected by detailed and concrete treaty provisions, to a broad general formulation as 'rights of people'. The combination between cultural rights and people's rights provides the new interpretation for cultural rights.

Moreover, Rosaldo points out that the new social movements stress the 'politics of difference' and take gender, class, ethnicity, ecology, sexuality and age into consideration when formulating rights of citizenship. But this is only a quantitative shift in citizenship. Rosaldo then uses a new 'qualitative influence' -- cultural rights -- to explain the importance of the redistribution of resources, and the change of recognition and responsiveness in citizenship³⁹. Aihwa Ong tries to improve Rosaldo's concept and points out that Rosaldo only pays attention to one side of the argument -- cultural citizenship as the demand of disadvantaged subjects for full citizenship in spite of their cultural differences from mainstream society. Ong argues that there is another side to the argument: cultural citizenship should be viewed as cultural practice and belief that is produced out of negotiating the often ambivalent and contested relations within the state. Cultural citizenship is a dual process of self-making and being-made within the webs of power, much like the making of a nation-state and its civil society⁴⁰.

The tensions between collective rights and individual rights, between human rights and the concept of cultural relativism have led to many disagreements on the issues of cultural rights. But cultural rights are attracting more attention in the context of citizenship with the development of collective rights and the emphasis on cultural differences. The next problem is to define what we mean by cultural rights.

³⁸ Lyndel V. Prott, 'Cultural Rights as People's Rights in International Law' in James Crawford (eds.), *The Rights of Peoples* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). p.95.

³⁹ Renato Rosaldo, 'Cultural Citizenship, Inequality, and Multiculturalism', in Rodolfo D. Torres, Louis F. Miron and Jonathan Xavier Inda (eds.), *Race, Identity and Citizenship: A Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp.251-61.

⁴⁰ Aihwa Ong, 'Cultural Citizenship as Subject Making: Immigrants Negotiate Racial and Cultural Boundaries in the United States', in Rodolfo D. Torres, Louis F. Miron and Jonathan Xavier Inda (eds.), *Race, Identity and Citizenship: A Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). pp. 262-94.

3.2.3. What are Cultural Rights?

Many international documents discuss cultural rights, which are viewed as an 'inventory' by Halina Nie'c for example. Nie'c analyses the various discussions and provides fundamental guiding principles to the core elements of cultural rights. The most basic is 'the obligation to respect and preserve the inherent dignity of every human being'. The next vital principle, is 'that of equality which is often pronounced in non-discriminatory and equal opportunity clause'. Furthermore, the most basic element of this is 'the right to have access to a cultural life' and 'the right of participation in cultural life'. In the process of making the right of access to a cultural life and the right to participate in cultural life more concrete, the application of the above stated principles is combined with a wealth of normative instruments to develop a catalogue for identifying components of these rights⁴¹.

Many cultural rights are listed, such as 50 different cultural rights classified according to 11 categories by the Culture and Development Co-ordination Office at UNESCO⁴². For Nie'c, the general cultural rights include the right to: respect for cultural identity, identification with a cultural community, participation in cultural life, education and training, information, freedom of access to heritages, protection of research, creative activity and intellectual property, and to participate in cultural policies. Prott also identifies 11 items of cultural rights, such as the right to freedom of expression; the right to education; the right of parents to choose the kind of education given to their children; the right of every person to participate in the cultural life of the community; the right to protection of artistic, literary and scientific works; the right to develop a culture; the right to respect for cultural identity; the right of minority peoples to respect for identity, traditions, language and cultural heritage; the right of a people to its own artistic, historical and cultural wealth; the right of a people not to have an alien culture imposed on it; and the right to the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind⁴³.

⁴¹ Nie'c, (1998), on the same web site of above.

⁴² The categories include Rights to physical and cultural survival, Rights to association and identification with cultural community, Rights to and respect for cultural identity, Rights to physical and intangible heritages, Rights to religious belief and practice, Rights to freedom of opinion, expression and information, Rights to choice of education and training, Rights to participation in elaboration of cultural policies, Rights to participation in cultural life and rights to create, Rights to choice of endogenous development, and Rights to people's own physical and cultural environment. From Nie'c.

⁴³ Prott, (1992), pp.96-7.

We need to analyse the further meanings of the various cultural rights. I will focus on several particular cultural rights and discuss them in the following chapters. These include the right to cultural identity, the right to access and participate in cultural life, the right to develop a culture, the right to represent, and to be represented by, culture, and the right to cultural policy.

The right to cultural identity, we will suggest, includes the right to respect for one's culture, the right to respect cultural identity and identification with a cultural community. The right to cultural identity should be based on many factors, including a distinctive culture, or a cultural community, with which people can identify. This arises from the interaction between the whole society, the cultural community and individuals.

At the same time, the right to access and participate in cultural life also raises several problems. First, it should include two components: the freedom to gain equal access to, and the opportunity to participate in, cultural life. Secondly, cultural life should include both the mainstream culture and the appropriate minority culture. This point is important since cultural rights based on minority culture are sometimes ignored. The tension between cultural rights based on majority culture and cultural rights based on minority culture should be considered as part of the right to access and participate in cultural life.

The right to develop a culture is an important issue for the protection of cultural rights. Members of a cultural community cannot have their cultural rights if they lose their culture. Therefore, the right to develop a culture enables people to protect their cultural rights.

The right to represent, or be represented by, culture is related to the question of whether cultural difference can be recognised by the public sphere, i.e. through the mass media, laws or government. However, 'to represent' and 'to be represented by' are quite different. The former emphasises the power of people to represent themselves; and the second refers to the extent to which they are represented by others. In other words, this is a problem of cultural interpretation.

The right to cultural policy is related to the interaction between the government and the cultural community, and the distribution of cultural resources. It reflects the attitudes of the government in dealing with cultural communities.

To sum up, the development of citizenship, from civil rights, political rights and social

rights to cultural rights, always means the enlargement of equality, human rights and democracy. Cultural rights express the new needs for cultural equality and the importance of difference in identity groups. Furthermore, the needs should be recognised in the relationship between the individual and the state, and should be treated as basic rights in the context of citizenship. These various cultural rights will be used to analyse the practice of multicultural citizenship in Chapter 7, 8, and 9.

3.3 Multicultural Citizenship and Cultural Policy

'Multicultural citizenship' involves a new definition of the relationship between individuals, identity groups and the state. However, we need to consider whether in practice it has actually influenced states and governments. This is important, since both collective rights and cultural rights have to be protected by government policies. It is therefore necessary to discuss the development of multicultural citizenship and the role of cultural policy.

Different countries have addressed this issue in various ways. The first example is related to the UK. Bhikhu Parekh discusses the UK's case from the perspective of the needs of minority communities, arguing that 'a politics of citizenship which both promotes the *rights* of communities with regard to each other, as well as the *obligations* of communities to each other is an essential precondition of the pluralist vision'⁴⁴. From the experience of UK, Parekh shows that this 'politics of citizenship' can be created for minority communities and their members in several ways in cultural policy. First, cultural diversity should be given public status and dignity, so that minority communities are able to accept their identity without a sense of embarrassment or unease. In particular, schools can play an important role in teaching minority languages and recognising minority customs in matters of dress, sports, arts and music⁴⁵. Secondly, minorities can hardly expect to be taken seriously and play their part unless they accept the full obligation of British citizenship. This involves allegiance and loyalty to British society, and sensitivity to its values, fears and dilemmas. At the same time, it also implies that they must master English and acquire a detailed knowledge of British history, society, traditions, customs, and political and economic systems. Thirdly, the minority communities must be allowed to develop at their own pace and in a direction of their own choosing. Those minority practices and values that offend the basic values of the mainstream society must be

⁴⁴ Parekh,(1991), p. 197.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p.197.

changed; if minorities do not do so voluntarily, the law may need to intervene⁴⁶. Fourthly, like individuals, communities can only flourish under propitious conditions. They need a sense of their own worth, role models, the confidence that the wider society is not hostile to them, the feeling of being socially valued and welcomed, and opportunities to gain positions commensurate with their abilities and to play their part in the decision-making process at all levels⁴⁷. Finally, the distinct character of ethnic communities needs to be recognised by our legal system⁴⁸.

Castles points out that the aim of 'multicultural citizenship' must be to achieve full citizenship for everybody, not only for migrants, but also for members of hitherto disempowered groups, such as women, indigenous people, people with disabilities, gays and lesbians. Recognition of group difference implies departing from the idea of all citizens as equal individuals and instead seeing them simultaneously as having equal rights as others⁴⁹.

Furthermore, Castles examines the development of Australian experience and formulates the principles of 'multicultural citizenship' in cultural policy as follows:

- (1) Taking equality of citizenship rights as a starting point, it is essential to ensure that all members of society are formally included as citizens, and enjoy equal rights before the law.
- (2) Recognising that formal equality of rights does not necessarily lead to equality of respect, resources, opportunities or welfare means that multicultural citizenship must be based on accepting difference as legitimate, and not as a disability or deviance.
- (3) Establishing mechanisms for group representation and participation secures the full participation and development of minority cultures and their interests.
- (4) Differential treatment for people with different characteristics, needs and wants will provide laws, programmes and services to combat barriers based on gender, disability, origins and ethnicity⁵⁰.

Another case is Canada, which has the longest history of multiculturalism, as an example of a clear shift toward multicultural citizenship (since 1982). Juteau describes the process as 'the horizontal and vertical extension of citizenship rights'. The horizontal

⁴⁶ Ibid., p.198.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.199.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.199.

⁴⁹ Stephen Castles, 'Multicultural Citizenship: The Australian Experience', in Veir Bader (eds.), *Citizenship and Exclusion* (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 124-5.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p.125.

dimension involves the acquisition of citizenship status and its extension to new populations -- slaves, women, non-property owners, immigrants, etc. The vertical dimension refers to the institutionalisation of the legal, political and social components of citizenship -- citizenship is multilayered and multiple⁵¹. Multiculturalism and equality rights were enshrined in the 1982 Constitution Act as part of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Subsequently, the Canadian Multiculturalism Act was passed by unanimous consent in the House of Commons in 1988. It incorporates a new multiculturalism policy based on three principles: 'multiculturalism is a central feature of Canadian citizenship; every Canadian has the freedom to choose to enjoy, enhance and share his/her heritage; and the federal government has the responsibility to promote multiculturalism throughout its departments and agencies'⁵². Multiculturalism as ideology and policy thus reached its peak, and a separate Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship was established in 1991.

In Canada, the policy has extended beyond cultural recognition, embracing a more constructivist approach to ethnic identities and to combating economic, political and social inequalities. The institutionalisation of citizenship rights is no longer reduced to the recognition of cultural pluralism, and includes multiple forms of structural pluralism, which often result from demands formulated by minority groups seeking control over their own institutions, and moving the country further in the direction of inclusion⁵³.

Castles points out that the 'citizenship model of multiculturalism' was laid down in the *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia* (1989). Multiculturalism was here defined as 'a system of rights and freedoms, combined with such obligations as commitment to the nation, a duty to accept the Constitution and the rule of law, and the acceptance of basic principles such as tolerance and equality, English as the national language and equality of the sexes'⁵⁴. Thus multiculturalism was not characterized as cultural pluralism or minority rights, but in terms of the rights of all citizens in a democratic state. This agenda stresses the recognition of difference as part of the state's responsibility in ensuring universality in resource contribution. The programme was based on the recognition that some groups are disadvantaged by lack of language proficiency and education, together with discrimination

⁵¹ Danielle Juteau, 'Multicultural Citizenship: The Challenge of Pluralism in Canada', in Veit Bader (eds.), *Citizenship and Exclusion* (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 97.

⁵² Ibid., p. 106.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 110.

⁵⁴ Castles (1997), p. 126.

based on race, ethnicity and gender. It was seen as the duty of the state to combat such disadvantage. There was an underlying understanding that cultural rights could not be fully realised unless they were linked to the politics of social justice⁵⁵.

Castles also compares the different approaches of multicultural citizenship between Canada and Australia. First, he indicates that multiculturalism and equality rights are integrated into the definition of citizenship through the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This means recognition of the collective identities and collective rights of specific groups as part of citizenship in Canada. However, the Australian approach is much more on the level of social policy: the special needs of ethnic groups are recognised, but the measures taken to deal with them are essentially concerned with welfare, education or services for individuals. The Australian approach is based on the administration of social issues by the state, rather than active citizenship through collective participation in decision-making processes⁵⁶.

Another interesting case for the development of multicultural citizenship is the European Union. As Delgado-Moreira points out, cultural policy has long been a nation-building instrument and a political aspiration. At the same time, cultural policy is also connected with citizenship in various ways, since it relates directly to identity and participation in civil society⁵⁷. However, Delgado-Moreira provides two opposing cases to express the development of multicultural citizenship in EU cultural policy. These two cases are the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions. The Commission seems to aspire to a form of citizenship which is attached to European identity based on the pan-European cultural heritage. It sees the economic benefits of co-operation in terms of reinforcing the transnational awareness of the European cultural heritage, which would provide a civic, liberal nationalism to support a form of liberal European citizenship⁵⁸. By contrast, the Committee of the Regions speaks of multiculturalism and a cultural citizenship of the European Union that will be entrenched in European sub-national languages and other self-government rights. This follows a more culturalist form of citizenship, in which civic nationalism is developed by traditional nationalism at the civil and cultural levels. Furthermore, the use of multiculturalism in the COR appears to indicate that such a nationalist citizenship would be liberal and protective of minority rights. The

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.127.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.128.

⁵⁷ Delgado-Moreira (2000), p.15.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp.157-8.

discourse of the value of culture, language and the regional level defends the idea of a federal Europe in which sub-state nations and regions are legitimate self-government units in control of the common goods of membership and economic development⁵⁹.

To sum up, cultural policy should play an important role in the practice of multicultural citizenship. The various experiences of the UK, Canada, Australia and EU show some considerations in the practising of multicultural citizenship within cultural policy. Firstly, multicultural citizenship should be recognised in the public sphere as one component of citizenship. And then, multicultural citizenship should be provided in mechanisms such as laws or public service. Thirdly, multicultural citizenship is not only related to minority groups, but everyone should be involved.

In addition, the cases of the UK, Canada, Australia and the EU illustrate the various developments of multicultural citizenship in cultural policy. The UK's experience shows more concern for the unity of political culture and democratic state. And the approach of Canada emphasises the institutionalisation of multicultural citizenship and seeks further inclusion by means of structural pluralism. 'Multicultural citizenship' is defined and protected in law and is practised for everyone. The approach of Australia is based on social policy and welfare, but not autonomy within various communities, such as active participation or the development of communities. In addition, the development of the EU presents a struggle between the strengthening of EU citizenship and the value of multicultural citizenship. Facing the tension between unity of the democratic state and respect for cultural differences within the autonomous collectivities and units, the various attitudes are manifest in the cultural policies of the states concerned. And these cases all contribute their own special experience to allow us to consider the practice of multicultural citizenship in cultural policy.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I argue that multicultural citizenship can be viewed as the new balance between common culture and cultural difference. Thus it can contribute to the unity of states and respect for cultural difference. At the same time, we have analysed the development of multicultural citizenship and its main demand for rights. In the first section, the views of various theorists on the subject of citizenship were examined. Some theorists have created new concepts, for example 'differentiated citizenship' and 'radical

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp.162-163.

citizenship', as a basis for improving traditional liberal citizenship. Some of them believe that traditional liberal values such as tolerance can solve the problems of difference. A new concept, 'multicultural citizenship', has been formed during these various arguments. In the concept of 'multicultural citizenship', some new trends are especially important, such as the development from individual rights to collective rights and the importance of cultural rights.

We have sought to explore the meaning of multicultural citizenship from the perspectives of cultural rights. Cultural rights are a major development in citizenship, after civic, political and social rights. The new invention of cultural rights is now viewed as the main issue in cultural policy studies and citizenship studies. In our discussion we introduced various ways to consider cultural rights. We also identified specific cultural rights for further examination in subsequent chapters.

Finally, the different models of the UK, Canada, Australia and EU show the different attitudes to deal with the tension between 'unitary' and 'autonomy' in the construction of multicultural citizenship. The contrasting experiences of UK, Canada, Australia and EU in the field of cultural policy and multicultural citizenship were examined to stimulate new thinking about the situation in Taiwan. Their experiences lead us to conclude that multicultural citizenship should be considered as integral to cultural policy.

Chapter 4: From Nationalism to Multiculturalism? The Cultural Policy of National Identity in Taiwan

This chapter is concerned primarily with the relationship between multiculturalism and national identity. Because of its special history, few people share a common national identity in Taiwan. The strong tensions between diversity (such as ethnic, gender and class differences, hybrid culture and multiple identities) and homogenisation (the construction of national identity) has continued through the various phases in Taiwanese history, and also have tainted the Taiwanese version of 'multiculturalism'. Since the 1940s, the conflict between Chinese Nationalism and Taiwanese consciousness has led to a continuing crisis in Taiwanese society. For a long time, cultural policy was used to promote Chinese nationalism. The rise of Taiwanese consciousness challenged the dominance of Chinese nationalism in the 1970s, and this *inevitably had an impact on cultural development*. Since the 1990s, multiculturalism has been viewed as a new way to solve this conflict, and to embrace the various cultural identities in the new name of 'multicultural Taiwan'. However, what does 'multicultural Taiwan' mean? How is it represented?

This chapter has several aims. First, it seeks to provide an outline of Taiwan's historical background. Secondly, it uses the concept of 'national identity', which has played an important role in the development of Taiwan, as a basis for discussing changes in Taiwan's cultural policy. Thirdly, it argues that despite the shift from nationalism to multiculturalism, cultural policy in Taiwan continues to relate to the construction of a new national identity. Fourthly, it examines how multicultural policy deals with issues of cultural difference, identity and citizenship.

The chapter also considers the development of cultural policy in three stages. The first stage is from 1949 to the late 1970s, when Chinese nationalism was dominant in cultural policy. In the second stage, from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, cultural policy had to respond to the demands of Taiwanese consciousness. This marked a shift from centralisation to localisation in cultural policy. In the third stage, since the mid-1990s, the government has been concerned with multiculturalism and ethnic cultural difference, and the CCA (Committee of Cultural Affairs) has begun to emphasise the importance of a multicultural society in Taiwan.

Finally, we will argue that multiculturalism provides a way to integrate a new national identity, and to change cultural policy in Taiwan. At the same time, multiculturalism also justifies collective rights, such as aboriginal rights, in Taiwan, which expand the concept of citizenship. However, the official definition of multicultural Taiwan in turn faces many challenges from the views of identity and citizenship expressed in the postmodern and post-colonial era.

4.1 Chinese Nationalism in Taiwan: from 1949 to the Late 1970s

From the 1940s to the early 1970s can be seen as the phase of Chinese nationalism in Taiwan. The special history of Taiwan and the KMT government leads to a particularly strong emphasis on national identity. The KMT government was bidding to be 'more Chinese than China'—the exiles keeping alive the authentic cultural traditions. When layered on top of Taiwan's history of colonisation and ethnic diversity, it created greater tension. I argue therefore that this tension between diversity and homogenisation still underlay the strong Chinese nationalism in the first phase.

For the KMT government, it was necessary to set up a strong Chinese identity in Taiwan. The threat from the Chinese Communist Party persisted, forcing the KMT government to seek two key aims in order to maintain its power: it must achieve strong international support, and it must establish the legitimacy of its rule of Taiwan. On the basis of its Cold War ideology of anti-Communism, the United States was eager to support the KMT government as the 'representative of China' in the United Nations, and this did much to strengthen the KMT's international position. As a key strategy for consolidating its legitimacy, the KMT government was determined to compel the people in Taiwan to become 'Chinese', which involved a rigorous programme of thought censorship and a fundamental change in the people's national identity. This priority underpinned the KMT's direction in cultural policy ('sinolisation') from 1949 to 1971.

However, before 1949, there was no clear 'common' national identity in Taiwan. This was due to several factors. To begin with, the idea of 'nationalism' does not exist in Chinese history; rather it is a product of western societies since the eighteenth century. The Father of the 'Republic of China' (ROC)-- Dr. Sun Yat-Sen -- 'pirated'¹ the ideal of western nationalism to create a 'Chinese identity', but Taiwanese society was not included in this

¹ This term is used by Benedict Anderson. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

Chinese nationalism, because at that time the Japanese government ruled Taiwan. During the occupation the people in Taiwan² were forced to learn Japanese as a common language, acquire Japanese names, and identify themselves as Japanese people. This established a Japanese identity in Taiwanese society. Hence, in 1949, when the KMT government came to Taiwan, the Taiwanese people did not have a strong Chinese identity. Accordingly, 1949 marked the beginning of the KMT government's effort to construct a new Chinese nationalism. Most of Taiwan's cultural policies served this purpose until the late 1970s.

Benedict Anderson and Anthony D. Smith have both investigated the formation of national identity in modern states³. Anderson's 'imagined community' describes a national identity constructed by the state, with several characteristics. First, identity is *imagined*, because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 'communion'. In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact are imagined in this way. Secondly, the nation is imagined as limited because even the largest nation, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries. Thirdly, the nation is imagined as sovereign. Finally, the nation is imagined as a community because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that has made it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people to be willing to die for such limited imaginings⁴. In contrast, Smith believes that nationalism is not really 'constructed', but national identity does contain certain fundamental features as follows: an historical territory or homeland; common myths and historical memories; a common, mass public culture; common legal rights and duties to all members; a common economy with territorial mobility for members⁵. The challenge is for us to consider how we can apply the approaches of Anderson and Smith to the case of Taiwan, which previously had no common identity.

² The 'Taiwanese people' were referred to as the 'Fulo people' for a long time. This designation did not include other ethnic groups, especially the mainlanders and Aborigines. From the 1990s, the 'Taiwanese people' were seen as all people who identify themselves as Taiwanese. However, the 'people in Taiwan' means the people who lived in Taiwan, including the Fulo, Hakka and the Aborigines, before the coming of the KMT government in 1949.

³ See, for example, Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, and Anthony D. Smith's *National Identity*. (London: Penguin, 1991).

⁴ Benedict Anderson, (1983), pp.15-6.

⁵ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin, 1991), p.14.

We will argue that Chinese nationalism in Taiwan was constructed by the state, i.e. the KMT government. It was originally 'imagined' in order to reduce the Japanese influence in Taiwan, and to provide a new political legitimacy for the KMT government's rule. In addition, it is 'imagined' since most of the population in Taiwan, except for mainlanders⁶, has never been to mainland China. Hence, the basic components of Chinese nationalism, such as Chinese history, geography, languages, customs and culture, are all beyond their experience. Chinese nationalism in Taiwan is 'imagined' by the KMT government and imposed through cultural policy.

4.1.1 The Cultural Policy of 'Sinolisation'

Hobsbawm sees the construction of national identity through 'the invention of tradition', including historical tradition, national language, and various kinds of national festivals. For Hobsbawm and Ranger, 'invented tradition' means a set of practices normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition. This is an attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past and to respond to novel situations by referring to former situations. The main processes of inventing traditions are formalisation and ritualisation⁷. Hobsbawm and Ranger identify three overlapping types of 'invented tradition':

those establishing or symbolising social cohesion or the membership of groups, and real or artificial communities; those establishing or legitimising institutions, status or relations of authority; and those whose main purpose is socialisation, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour⁸.

Going back to the case of Chinese nationalism, 'invented tradition' also plays an important role in constructing the collective national identity, establishing the legitimacy of political power, and linking individuals and the state. These inventions, expressed for example in festival pavilions, display flags and temples, always come from political institutions, ideological movements and groups. These initiatives fall into two broad categories. Firstly, through the invention of 'historical tradition' they improve the sense of identity with Chinese history, and secondly, through the invention of 'national language',

⁶ 'The mainlander' is the name given to the people who came from the mainland China to Taiwan with the KMT government around 1949. Their children who were born in Taiwan are also called as 'the mainlanders'.

⁷ Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.1.

⁸ Ibid., p.9.

'national music', 'national opera' and 'national painting'⁹ they increase the common consciousness of the whole Taiwanese society. These developments fit with Hobsbawm and Ranger's description of national identity as an 'invention of tradition'.

The Reconstruction of Historical Tradition

In terms of the KMT's cultural policy, the construction of 'nation building' has involved the invention of historical consciousness, which has increased people's identity with Chinese history. A number of cultural institutions were founded for this purpose, including: the National Central Library (1954), the National Museum of History (1955), and the National Taiwan Arts Education Institute (1957). These institutions have expressed a twofold cultural purpose. On the one hand, they have simplified and defined what national culture is; on the other hand, they have offered more opportunities for people to gain access to Chinese culture and to develop their awareness of Chinese history. For the same purpose, the National Palace Museum was set up in 1965 to exhibit Chinese antiquities from mainland China. These 'historical remains' were used to intensify people's attachment to Chinese culture.

Furthermore, political symbols have been used to strengthen social cohesion and the membership of groups in everyday life. For instance, most of the streets in Taipei, the capital city of Taiwan, are named after cities or provinces in mainland China. The residents of Taipei feel that they live in 'China' because for example they work in 'Song-Jiang'¹⁰ Road during the day and sleep in 'Nan-Jing'¹¹ East Road at night. At the same time, many universities in Taiwan share the same names as the universities of mainland China, such as the Universities of Qing-Hua and Jiao-Tong. Accordingly, students feel that their universities come from mainland China. School students still sing the 'National Song' and 'National Flag Song' every morning, and these songs proclaim that the students are Chinese people who are the descendants of Yan-Huang¹² and who share the same blood relationships and cultural traditions with the people who live in mainland China. In addition, official holidays and important official festivals are always related to Chinese history and nationalism. The official Chinese nationalism of the KMT government penetrates deeply into the everyday life of citizens through the construction of historical

⁹ 'National' music, painting and theatre are also called 'Chinese music', 'Chinese painting' and 'Chinese opera'. As important forms, they have become symbolic of 'KMT China' and have dominated cultural development for over 40 years.

¹⁰ 'Song-Jiang' is the name of a province in the North-Eastern part of China.

¹¹ 'Nan-Jing' was the old capital city during the period of the KMT's rule in mainland China.

¹² Yan and Huang were the earliest Chinese Emperors in ancient times.

tradition and strengthens the importance of their national identity.

The Unification of National Language

Language can be seen as the principal medium for thinking, identity, cultural values and historical culture. Hence, language policy is usually represented as the main tool of the state to influence and construct people's values. In Taiwan, the unification of language has been seen as the starting point for constructing a modern, integrative and national country since the period of Japanese rule. The Japanese language was the earliest common language in Taiwan among different ethnic groups. Afterwards, the KMT government also set up the 'national language' -- Mandarin -- as another common language to replace Japanese.

In 1945, the rule of the Japanese government in Taiwan came to an end with Japan's defeat in the Second World War, and the KMT government set up the 'Outline for Taking Over Taiwan' as the main policy framework. According to this outline,

Item 7: Official documents, textbooks and newspapers cannot be written in the Japanese language.

Item 44: The government should set up a national-language educational project as soon as possible, and the project should be put into practice within a limited time. Education in the national language will require courses in primary and high schools, and government officials will have to use the national language. The original 'Japanese Language Research Centres' should be changed to 'National Language Research Centres', and should begin to train teachers of the national language.

These items became the basis of the KMT's language policy in Taiwan¹³. Accordingly, the KMT government set up the 'Committee for the Promotion of National Language' in Taiwan, as well as 13 'National Language Research Centres' in every city and county, for training, education and supervision of the 'national language'. At the same time, language policy focused on the educational system and the administrative system in order to push 'national language' (Mandarin) as the 'public' or 'higher' language, and to ensure that other languages remained 'private' or 'lower' languages.

¹³ Xie, Li-Jun, *The Political Analysis of Language Policy from 1945 to 1997*, MA Thesis, Department of Politics, (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1997), pp.38-40. (Chinese)

In the educational system, different policies were announced to promote the national language and forbid other languages. For example, teachers at all levels in the schools should use the national language in class, and the high schools should provide national-language courses for students, teachers and the common people (1946); and the Educational Office in Taiwan Province issued 'measures for the improvement of national language in the various levels of schools'. It ordered that teachers who could not speak the national language well had to meet new national criteria, and it required all students in teaching training colleges to pass exams in the national language (1949). New measures were issued to improve national education in schools; these required school governors to supervise, direct and assess the results of national-language policy (1952). The Educational Office in Taiwan Province amended the regulations for the primary and high schools, and decided that students who could not speak the national language would be awarded a 'demerit' or be punished (1955)¹⁴.

In the administrative system, several language policies were applied. The government ordered that all levels of administrative officers had to learn the national language, and their national language ability would be taken into account for promotion (1946). Only the national language could be used in parliaments (at all levels) and all representatives should speak in the national language. All staff in official institutions had to pass exams in the national language. They would not be promoted if they failed their language exams (1953)¹⁵.

This powerful construction of national language represented a strong degree of state control of Taiwanese society. The national language became a vital qualification for all people who wanted to study, get a government job, and achieve a high status in society. It also constructed cultural standards: people who spoke the national language well were seen as more 'cultured' and 'well-educated' than people who could not speak the national language. In other words, the unification of national language was regarded as the foundation of a national culture and identity.

The Incorporation of Culture as 'National Culture'

The KMT used various methods to incorporate culture as 'national culture'. First, political leaders established guidelines for culture and cultural work. They also established

¹⁴ Ibid., pp.45-7.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp.50-3.

specialised institutions for cultural affairs in the government (in the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Education) and in the KMT party (e.g. the Committee of Cultural Works). Thus the KMT government could control cultural affairs at different levels. It also helped those people who were close to the KMT party to establish artistic and cultural organisations which could influence the cultural development of the whole society.

In practice, the KMT government constructed its 'national culture' according to some basic policies from 1950 onwards:

- 1950: The Chief of the Political Section in the Ministry of Defence, Chiang Ching Kuo (the son of Chiang Kai-Shek) issued 'The Letter to Artists and Writers', which presented a policy to promote 'literature in the army' and to encourage cultural creation for the development of nationalism. 'Army literature' was created by the army and focused on issues such as patriotism, Chinese nationalism, and a diaspora for mainland China. The Ministry of Defence was the main institution to support this initiative¹⁶.

- 1953: Chiang Kai-Shek promulgated the 'Two Papers on Education and Entertainment in The Three Principles of the Peoples', which confirmed the direction of cultural policy. He sought to combine the Taiwanese and Chinese cultural traditions, and emphasised the importance of maintaining Chinese culture, whereas the Chinese Communists had tried to transplant Russian culture to mainland China. This strengthened his legitimacy in Chinese history¹⁷.

- 1954: The 'Cultural Elimination Movement' was inaugurated with the intention of eliminating three 'viruses': the red (Communism), the yellow (pornography) and the black (violence). This goal would be achieved by the strict exercise of censorship of cultural works¹⁸.

- 1967: Chiang Kai-Shek announced the 'Chinese Culture Renaissance Movement' to resist the Cultural Revolution in mainland China. He considered this movement to be equivalent to an anti-Communist strategy. The revival of Chinese culture was

¹⁶ Zhang, Ming-Lee, 'The Development, Influence and Evaluation of Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Policy', in Zhang, Ming-Lee (eds.), *Politics and Contemporary Taiwanese Literature* (Taipei, China Times, 1994), p. 24. (Chinese)

¹⁷ Ibid: pp.25--8.

¹⁸ Ibid: pp.30--32.

anti-Communist and all anti-Communists should seek to revive Chinese culture¹⁹. Thus all concepts of the Chinese Culture Renaissance Movement developed under the goal of anti-Communism, and cultural affairs were forced into the service of the anti-Communist business. Furthermore, the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (CCRM) played a vital role in the construction of a 'national culture'. The purpose of the CCRM was three-fold: to integrate Taiwanese culture with Chinese culture; to slow down the 'Westernisation' of Taiwan; and to maintain the regime's legitimacy in the world²⁰. The CCRM was promoted by the government and civil society.

In addition, the KMT government also selected appropriate symbols of 'national culture' in the various artistic and cultural areas. For example, before the 1950s, the most popular traditional forms of theatre were 'marionette plays' and 'GeZaXi', both of which had come from mainland China with the Han immigration in the eighteenth century. In the period of Japanese rule, the government tried to destroy these theatrical forms, but since it could not do so, it sought to modify them through an injection of Japanese nationalist thinking and culture. In turn, the subsequent KMT government then set up the Committee for the Guidance of Local Theatres in order to change and de-Japanise these theatrical forms. However, language limitations meant that 'marionette plays' and 'GeZaXi' both declined, because they used the Fulo dialect. Thus the KMT government decided to promote the Ping Opera²¹ as Taiwan's 'national opera'. In 1953, the Ministry of Defence took over the 'Gu-Theatre', one of the Ping Opera theatres in Taiwan, and changed its system to set up 'Lu-Quang' and 'Hai-Qaung' theatre schools. In 1966, the Ministry of Education took over the management of the Fu-Xing theatre school -- a school for training in Ping Opera -- and hence the Ministries of Defence and Education became the most important institutions for the promotion of Ping Opera, which the KMT government viewed as 'National Opera'²². They also made sure that the content of the Ping Opera followed the official ideology of strengthening nationalism, reinforcing the power of Chinese culture and opposing Chinese communists²³. Thus, the KMT government successfully incorporated the development of traditional theatre in their efforts to control cultural affairs. Similar trends emerged in

¹⁹ Xiao, A-Qin, *The Cultural and Moral Discourse of the KMT Regime*, MA Thesis, (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1991), p. 92. (Chinese)

²⁰ Kuo, Su-Hua, *Dilemmas of Cultural Policy Formation in a Transitional Society: The Case of Taiwan, Republic of China* (Michigan: Michigan University, 1989), p.58.

²¹ 'Ping Opera' was the dominant theatre in Beijing (previously known as Beiping) and was constructed as 'national opera' by the KMT government before it moved to Taiwan.

²² Zhou, Hui-Ling, 'Chinese Opera, Nationalism and Cultural Policy', *Contemporary*, Vol. 107 (1995), pp.56-9. (Chinese)

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 58

painting, music, literature, photography and other arts.

The Control of the Mass Media

The KMT government constructed a 'state-media' system incorporating newspapers, film companies, radio and TV. This system assumed responsibility for producing the political propaganda of Chinese nationalism. For example, the main mission of the Chinese Film Company (Ministry of Defence), the Central Film Company (the KMT party) and the Taiwanese Film Company (the Taiwanese Provincial Government) was to produce political propaganda films. As Ming Ji, the general manager of the Central Film Company, observed:

For the Central Film Company, most films had to follow the official policy, and the official policy had different stages. For example, because the Chinese Communists said that they had had a great achievement in the war with Japan in the Second World War, we shot the films 'Eight Hundred Heroes' and 'The Story of Jian Bridge's Heroes' to emphasise the achievement of the KMT party... Some people had a false consciousness of the Chinese Communists; so we shot films such as 'Emperor Sky and Queen Earth' and 'Suffering Love' to reveal their true face. Addressing the Taiwanese Independence discourse, we shot the films 'Roots' and 'Worshipping' to strengthen the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China.²⁴

Using these powerful systems, which connected with the KMT party, the military, the administrative system of the government, the educational systems, and the organisations in Taiwanese society, the KMT government 'invented' an 'imagined Chinese nationalism' in Taiwan. This included an historical tradition, cultural tradition, and a language tradition. This 'imagined Chinese nationalism' resulted in a confusion of national and cultural identity, and the beginning of the conflict between independence and unification in Taiwan. In this phase, the tension between diversity and unification was repressed, but it never disappeared. The cultural diversity of Taiwan was suppressed and marginalised under the powerful government and Chinese national identity. Therefore, this phase was viewed as 'the time of no-difference'.

4.1.2 The Time of 'No-Difference'?

The development of other social cleavages such as gender and class was very limited, since Chinese nationalism was constructed as the most important identity in Taiwan. The

²⁴ Hung Ren (1994), *Film and Political Propaganda* (Taipei, Wan-Xiang Publishers), pp. 434-5. (Chinese)

KMT believed that people should be 'unified' as a 'nation' under the ROC (Republic of China), and ignored the differences among the people.

Gender differences provide a good example of this situation. In Taiwan, the differences between men and women were traditionally viewed only in biological terms. Gender issues were not significant until the 1980s, when the Taiwan women's movement was formed to challenge the KMT government.

From the 1940s, Mei-Ling, Song, Chiang Kai-Shek's wife, was the most powerful woman in the arena of women's issues in Taiwan. Her policy was to use 'women's work' as a means to replace the 'women's movement'. She pointed out that the women's movement was temporary, but women's work was long term. Thus Taiwanese women should work to gain greater importance in society. Mei-Ling, Song built the 'Committee of Women's Work' within the KMT party, and the 'Unified Meeting of Women', which was the largest organisation in Taiwan. With these two organisations, the KMT government was able to control and carefully regulate the women's movement from 1945 to the 1980s.

The KMT made sure that the women's movement was closely associated with national identity. In particular, the KMT emphasised that the purpose of the women's movement was not to seek equality between men and women. Men and women were considered equal under the KMT regime. Therefore women did not actually need to ask for equality; rather they needed to be more concerned – like men -- with their duties to the country. These duties included promoting the national policy; accomplishing goals of the KMT government; improving social morality and family values, and caring for the military.

In summary, the KMT government clearly chose to give women a large role in society, a role that best served the KMT and the national identity. In so doing, however, women suffered the loss of their own identity as women.

The manner in which the KMT incorporated class into national identity was similar to the way it dealt with gender differences. Xu, Zheng-Guang's research shows that the Taiwanese working class was unaware of class difference and identified itself as the 'bourgeoisie'. This was considered as a type of 'false consciousness'. Xu explains that the KMT used its control of political and cultural systems to produce this 'false consciousness'

in its working people.²⁵ Thus, the KMT introduced labour laws in the interests of the KMT, limiting the basic rights of the working class. In addition, the KMT directed its own labour organisations, with members of the KMT appointed to lead them. These KMT appointees were to influence the leaders of independent labour organisations and make them follow KMT policies²⁶.

Yeh, Qi-Zheng's research on the middle class reveals the general lack of awareness in Taiwanese society of class differences. Yeh explains that this awareness could be attributed to the KMT's powerful ideological control of the people. Because of its experience in mainland China, the KMT prohibited any left-wing philosophies, killed left-wing intellectuals, and used the mass media and educational systems to further restrict the people's awareness of class differences.²⁷

Strong Chinese nationalism thus created a time of 'non-difference'. Everyone was therefore viewed as a 'national' but was unassociated with other social groups based on ethnicity, gender or class. 'Social difference' was ignored and regarded as unimportant compared with one's national identity. Only national identity, i.e. Chinese identity, was allowed to exist in cultural policy. Other identities, such as gender, class and ethnic identity, were forbidden. The separate identity of Taiwan was also banned.

Furthermore, the authoritarian KMT government did not deal with its people as 'citizens' but only as 'nationals'. The concept of 'citizenship' comes from the liberal tradition, and it defines a stable relationship between individuals and the state. At the same time, a 'citizen' means that the individual identifies with the political system, whereas 'national' means that identity is based on nationalism²⁸. Bases of identity other than nationalism were dismissed.

Thus, from 1949 to 1971, Chinese nationalism held a dominant position in cultural policy. During this time, people could identify only with Chinese nationalism and there was no other legitimate basis on which identity could be constricted. In addition, this

²⁵ Xu, Zheng-Guang (1989), 'From Alien to Independence: The Basic Characters and Trends in Taiwanese Labor Movement' in, in Xu, Zheng-Guang' and Song, Wen-Li (eds.) *The New Social Movement in Taiwan*, (Taipei, Gu-Lui Publishing Company), p.103. (Chinese)

²⁶ Ibid., p.109.

²⁷ Yeh., Qi-Zheng (1989), 'The Cultural Myth in Taiwanese Middle Class', in Xiao, Xin-Huang (eds.) *The Middle Class in the Changing Taiwanese Society*, (Taipei, Ju-Liu Publisher), p.115. (Chinese)

²⁸ Jiang, Yi-Hua, *Liberalism, Nationalism and National Identity* (Taipei, Yang-Zhi Publisher), pp.189-94.

strong nationalism was constructed and promoted by the KMT government. Only in the late 1970s did 'Taiwanese consciousness' seek to challenge Chinese nationalism and the philosophy of 'non-difference'.

4.2 The Challenges from 'Taiwanese Consciousness'

In the 1970s, the KMT government faced new problems from Taiwanese society and international societies²⁹. Even though 'the KMT China' still tried to maintain its authoritarian power, it had to face two major challenges. The first challenge was increasing resistance to the autocratic rule of the government, the KMT party and the army. The second challenge was the rise of Taiwanese consciousness, which had been suppressed by the powerful Chinese nationalism.

In this section, I focus on the challenge of Taiwanese consciousness to the KMT government and Chinese nationalism through culture. On the one hand, the challenge of Taiwanese consciousness broke up 'the time with no-difference', and caused more cultural diversity in Taiwan. Its influences were presented in music, arts, dance, films, literature and theatre. On the other hand, the ongoing tension between diversity and unity still appeared in the development of Taiwanese consciousness. Taiwanese consciousness became a new form of 'tyranny of the majority', with genuine cultural diversity taking second place to a 'homogenised' idea of Taiwanese consciousness. Minority cultural differences are still very marginal in the discourse of Taiwanese consciousness. Therefore, some minority groups rejected 'Taiwanese consciousness' as a new common identity in Taiwan. It has proved difficult to reconcile unity and diversity in Taiwanese history.

Taiwanese consciousness is a new demand to share a common culture, experience and history based on the island of Taiwan. For example, Shi, Ming-Hui asks: How can a

(Chinese)

²⁹ We need to understand some historical background in the 1970s. In the 1960s and 1970s, Taiwan experienced fundamental change in two important respects: the population increased by 1.6 times (from 1960 to 1977), and the Gross National Product (GNP) increased by 12 times. As society became more affluent and more challenges arose from both domestic civil society and the international arena, the need to change the basic structure and operation of the KMT government became more apparent. In 1971, three major events occurred which were to be of particular significance for Taiwan and which began to challenge the rule of the KMT government. In April, the problem of Diaoyu Island led to a demonstration by college students and a certain degree of intellectual support for Communist China. In October, the KMT government announced its withdrawal from the United Nations because Communist China had been admitted to that organisation as the representative of the whole of 'China'. In September, the Taiwanese Presbyterianate stated that 'Taiwan must become a new and independent country'.

Taiwanese youth who has experienced the 'Two Two Eight Event'³⁰ share the same consciousness as a Chinese youth who has experienced the Cultural Revolution in mainland China? The development of a person's consciousness depends on his/her society. When a Taiwanese youth faces the problem of international isolation, he shares the same crisis with other people who live in Taiwan. But this crisis is not understood by a Chinese youth³¹. The development of Taiwanese consciousness may also be seen as a kind of Taiwanese Nationalism, and we shall seek to assess the influence of this new 'nationalism' on the shaping of cultural policy³².

4.2.1 The Development of Taiwanese Consciousness

Historically, Taiwan did not have a common identity before 1895, when the Japanese government arrived. According to the theory of Benedict Anderson, the same language or system of 'print-capitalism' did not exist to provide the basis for an 'imagined community' before then. The immigrants from mainland China had their own group identity according to their home town on the mainland, i.e. the towns of Zhang Zhou or Quan Zhou. The Taiwanese aborigines identified themselves according to their tribes. There were major quarrels about land and trading rights among the Zhang Zhou and Quan Zhou people. Therefore the people did not have a 'common' identity like the 'Fulo' identity or the aboriginal identity.

The development of Taiwanese consciousness is very complex. The first time there was a call for Taiwanese independence was in 1895, when the Chinese government ceded Taiwan to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. At that time, the Taiwanese hoped they could become an independent country and reject Japan's rule before returning to China's rule. During this period, 'Taiwanese consciousness' was clearly tied up with Chinese identity. However, Taiwan could not gain independence from Japan. After 50 years of Japanese rule, the Taiwanese had a different identity experience from that of the mainland Chinese-- Taiwanese people were confused about their identity³³. The Taiwanese were

³⁰ This was a serious conflict between the KMT government and Taiwanese in 1947. Over 20,000 people were killed in this conflict.

³¹ Shi, Ming-Hui, *The Selection of Taiwanese Consciousness: The Final Accounting Between the Chinese Tie and Taiwanese Tie* (Taipei: Qian-wei Publisher, 1988), p.4. (Chinese)

³² Xiao, A-Qin, 'The Development of Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism from the 1980s: The Analysis of Taiwanese Literature', in *Taiwanese Sociological Review*, Vol.3 (1999), p. 2. (Chinese)

³³ It was related to the experience of the Japanese rule. From 1895, the Japanese government began to modernize Taiwan by setting up railways, schools and Japanese newspapers. These changes had some major impacts on Taiwan. This was the first time that all the people learned the 'same' language -- Japanese. Thus the different ethnic groups could now communicate. Additionally, colonial oppression under the Japanese government aroused for the first time a Taiwanese consciousness. Also, after the long period of colonial rule, from 1895 to

assimilated to Japanese culture but were viewed as second-class citizens of Japan. At the same time, they were ostracised by mainland Chinese because they were considered as not 'pure' Chinese. The book *The Orphan of Asia*, written by Wu, Zhou-Liu in the 1940s, depicts this confusion through the perspective of a fictional Taiwanese man. The character identifies himself as a 'Chinese' under Japan's rule. However, when he visits mainland China for the first time, he discovers that mainlanders do not consider him to be Chinese. This book presented Taiwan as an 'orphan' in Asia, and gave voice to the true feelings of the majority of the Taiwanese. Afterwards, the problem of 'who am I?' remained confusing for the Taiwanese. Isolation and the consciousness of being an 'orphan' became a significant characteristic of Taiwanese culture and spirit³⁴.

The 1970s were a key period for the development of Taiwanese consciousness³⁵. During the 1970s, Taiwanese consciousness developed in order to resist Chinese identity. The 'Argument of Native Literature'³⁶ of 1976 presented the conflict between Chinese and Taiwanese literature. It asked whether Chinese or Taiwanese literature should play a more prominent role in Taiwanese society. This argument resulted in criticism from the official or national literary institutions, such as newspapers and magazines. The official point of view was that the rise of Taiwanese consciousness would lead to the possible 'separation' of Taiwan from mainland China. Then, in 1979, 'The Event of Formosa'³⁷ brought about long-term dissatisfaction with the KMT and further strengthened 'Taiwanese

1945, there were some Taiwanese people who identified themselves as 'Japanese'. For example, the former president of Taiwan, Lee Tang-Hui, even said in the public that he identified with the Japanese until he was 22 years old.

³⁴ These characteristics are repeated in much literature and cultural expression. Another famous writer, Zhong Li-He, wrote *The Spirit of White Sweet Potato* to describe a Taiwanese youth's experience in mainland China. After 1949, some Taiwanese youths identified with Communist China and left Taiwan for the mainland. Most of them endured a terrible fate under Chinese Communist rule. One celebrated case is that of Jiang Wen-ye, widely regarded as the first musician in Taiwan.

³⁵ In the 1950s and 1960s, the KMT government tried to impose Chinese identity on the Taiwanese, but this did not mean that 'Taiwanese consciousness' disappeared; on the contrary, it remained hidden from public view. The development of Taiwanese literature is a good example of this. In 1957, the old writer Zhong Zhao-Zheng organised the 'Communication for Literary Friends' to keep in touch with other Taiwanese writers and to 'continue the Taiwanese literary tradition from the Japanese time and build a new mission for Taiwanese literature. From then, though Chinese literature occupied the highest status in Taiwan, many Taiwanese writers joined in establishing two literary organisations: 'Taiwanese Literature' and 'Leaf Hats'.

³⁶ The 'Argument of Native Literature' is the name given to the conflict between the advocates of 'Chinese literature' and those of 'Taiwanese literature'. The writers from the first group (from mainland China) preferred to write about China and wars between the KMT and the Chinese Communists. The latter group believed that Taiwanese writers should write about Taiwan.

³⁷ *Formosa* was the name of a political magazine that called for political democracy, equal elections at every administrative level, and the abolition of martial law, which limited freedom of speech and assembly. The KMT government arrested important people who worked for this magazine. Their arrest resulted in 'the Event of Formosa'.

consciousness'. Restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly, and the unequal political participation of the 'Ben-Shen people' (Taiwanese, including the Fulo and the Hakka) and the 'Wei-Shen people' (mainlanders) reminded the Taiwanese of the hard suffering of being 'colonised' and ruled. They began to reject the 'Chinese identity' constructed by the KMT. This in turn forced the KMT to become more democratic than before. It also allowed a new 'Taiwanese consciousness' to emerge.

In the 1980s, Taiwanese consciousness was used to reject the KMT Chinese nationalism. The differences between Taiwanese consciousness and Chinese consciousness or nationalism were the subject of constant argument. Those who supported Taiwanese consciousness stressed three main points. First, they emphasised that Taiwanese society had developed a 'common consciousness', opposed to mainland China. They argued that this 'common consciousness' arose from Taiwan's unique political, economic, and social systems, that were historically and culturally isolated from mainland China for about 100 years. This 'common' consciousness was Taiwanese consciousness and was different from Chinese consciousness. The second major point dealt with the relationship between the two types of consciousness. Advocates of Taiwanese consciousness believed that this was quite separate from and not subordinate to 'Chinese consciousness'. The two were equal and parallel. The third point concerned 'de-sinolisation' or 'localisation', which involved challenging the Chinese nationalism created by the KMT and rejecting the discussion of Taiwanese history and literature as a 'local culture' or 'local literature'.

After 1987 (the abolition of martial law), the arguments about independence or unification and between Chinese identity and 'Taiwanese consciousness' became the most important issues in Taiwan. Taiwanese consciousness became a new Taiwanese nationalism constructed in several ways. First, it emphasised Taiwan's experience of being colonised since the seventeenth century by (in succession) the Netherlands, Spain, China, Japan and the KMT government. It defined the latter as a colonial regime in Taiwan, and it looked to a future in which the Taiwanese people would be their own masters. It stressed that if Taiwan unified with mainland China, the Taiwanese people would be colonised by the Chinese people again. Moreover, the desire of the Taiwanese people to control their own destiny implied that Taiwanese independence would be a better choice than unification with the mainland. Secondly, Taiwanese consciousness constructed a Taiwanese nation, including the Han people and the aborigines, which was different from the Chinese nation in terms of culture and blood. A different 'community' (the Taiwanese people) – despite the fact that the Fulo and Hakka people were immigrants from mainland

China – had emerged through the experience of 400 years of colonisation and of different cultures and social, political and economic systems.

The development of Taiwanese consciousness was also seen to be dependent on the development of Taiwanese cultural nationalism³⁸. Initially, traditional Chinese opera, music and theatre declined in popularity, and local/native cultures, such as Taiwanese opera, Taiwanese soap opera, folk culture, Fulo and aboriginal music, became more popular with the development of Taiwanese consciousness. Furthermore, Taiwanese consciousness or native consciousness influenced a variety of cultural forms, such as Taiwanese literature, 'Taiwanese New Films', the 'Folk Music Movement', the appearance of 'Yun-Men Dancing Collection', and Taiwanese Native Painting. Artists used Taiwanese experience and culture as the inspiration for their work, and created their own new cultural or artistic style. Finally, the National Theatre and national academic institutions began to accept the performances of Taiwanese theatre companies and Taiwanese opera. These national institutions also set up the 'Traditional Cultural and Artistic Centre' to improve Taiwanese native culture at the national level. Also, the Institute of Central Research set up a research centre for the study of Taiwanese history.

The influence of Taiwanese consciousness represented a major challenge to Chinese nationalism, but it still met with some criticism. Some people felt that just as Chinese nationalism had caused a lot of problems, the new Taiwanese consciousness would be another disruptive form of strong nationalism which would continue to ignore different levels of social inequality and would bring about new social pressures. Many scholars offered western theoretical analyses that pointed to the dangers of nationalism. For example, Chen Guang-Xing used post-colonial theory to point out that, after World War Two, most new countries gained their independence from old empires through the force of nationalism. However, when the new countries were established, the new rulers did not change the nature of oppression. Minorities, workers and women remained under 'internal colonialism'.³⁹ Nationalism has also led in many cases to war and the danger of a conflict between Taiwan and mainland China, or even between different ethnic groups in Taiwan, could not be underestimated. In addition, Taiwanese consciousness has been criticised as a form of 'Fulo-centralism'⁴⁰. Other ethnic groups, such as the aborigines and the Hakka

³⁸ Hsiao, A-Chin (1999), pp.4--50.

³⁹ Chen, Guang-Xing, 'The Eye of Empire: the 'Sub-Empire' and Nation -- the Cultural Imagination of Country', in *Journal of Taiwanese Sociology*, Vol. 17 (1994), p.202. (Chinese)

⁴⁰ The construction of 'Taiwanese consciousness' depended on the cultural and historical material of Fulo

eventually complained of their marginal status in the discourse of Taiwanese consciousness.

The struggles between Chinese identity and Taiwanese consciousness have had a huge influence on cultural identity. Furthermore, they also influenced the development of cultural policy. In the next section, we will discuss the new turning to localisation in cultural policy.

4.2.2 The Turning to 'Localisation' in Cultural Policy

'Taiwanese consciousness' broke up the mono-culture of Taiwan and forced the KMT to amend its cultural policy. Even though the KMT government still saw Chinese nationalism as a core identity, it also needed to respect Taiwanese culture in its policy in order to fit in with the demands of Taiwanese society. In other words, the new cultural policy accommodated the new challenge of Taiwanese consciousness, while still maintaining the old order of Chinese nationalism. For example, following the 'Arguments of Native Literature' in the 1970s, at a conference on 'Combative Literature' in 1978 the Political Campaign Chief, Wang, Sheng, delivered a speech to respond to the critique of 'sinolisation' in cultural policy:

Native or local literature has to be a kind of 'nationalist literature' which is patriotic, nationalist, anti-imperialist and anti-Communist. It is correct to develop native culture....But people must be aware that someone may use 'native affection' to support 'Taiwan's independence'. This is very dangerous and will cause a division which will destroy Taiwan society ...⁴¹.

This speech marked the beginning of the KMT's government concern with Taiwanese culture in its cultural policy. The KMT defined Chinese culture as 'central culture' and Taiwanese culture as 'local culture': Chinese culture is very important, but Taiwanese culture cannot be ignored⁴². In 1977, President Chiang, Ching Kuo presented a list of 'Twelve Constructions'. The government decided to establish a cultural centre in every city and county in order to improve local culture. In 1983, The CCA promulgated the 'Essential Points of Cultural Centres' to improve the functioning of cultural centres.

experience. The Fulo people account for about 65% of the whole population. Other ethnic groups, such as the Hakka or Aborigines, felt that their cultural or historical experience was ignored in the 'Taiwanese consciousness' discourse, just as they were unable to find their own cultural experience in the KMT's Chinese nationalism.

⁴¹ Speech quoted from Zhang, Ming-Lee (1994), pp. 41-3.

⁴² On this point, more detail will be provided in the next section.

In addition, the third chairman of the CCA, Shen, Xue-yong, provided a new concept for cultural policy – a shift 'from central to local' in 1993.⁴³ These policies are basically a response to the need of society for a genuinely Taiwanese local culture. Furthermore, the KMT government has also tried to regain the power to interpret Taiwanese culture⁴⁴; thus it emphasises the importance of 'community consciousness'. The KMT government uses 'community consciousness' but not 'Taiwanese consciousness' in order to avoid strengthening Taiwanese nationalism. We will provide a more detailed analysis of these discussions in Chapter 6, which will focus on the cultural policy of 'community renaissance'.

The expansion of Taiwanese consciousness was related to two developments in Taiwan. The first one was a 'political-democratic' shift towards Taiwanese consciousness. For example, a democratic system, and more equal political and social rights between

⁴³ Su, Zhao-Ying, *The Development of Culture and Arts in the Counties of Taiwan -- Conceptions and Practice* (Taipei: CCA, 1999), p.27. (Chinese) According to her, there are some important cultural policies in the development 'from central to local': Su, Zhao-Ying identifies the main cultural policies during this shift: (1)The Start of 'Cultural Seasons': 'Cultural Seasons' was the most important local cultural activity every year. However, before 1993, the activities of 'cultural seasons' were decided by the CCA, and these same activities were performed in the various cultural centres. In 1993, the CCA issued a new policy for cultural seasons: the local cultural centres had to provide their cultural activities according to their own local culture, history and industry. This marked a beginning for the development of local culture

(2)The pushing of cultural communalism: After the success of 'cultural seasons', the CCA began to push two policies: emphasizing the role of local cultural centres as 'local CCAs', and 'cultural communalism'. The CCA hoped that the local cultural centres would be not only a 'space of cultural activities', but also serve as 'local CCAs' to develop local culture. The purpose of 'cultural communalism' is to improve the power and ability of local cultural centres, and to provide their independence and autonomy in order to develop culture.

(3)The formation of 'community renaissance': In 1993, Shen stressed the importance of cultural and social reconstruction in Taiwan, since the development of the economy and society had led to a loss of social value and cohesion. For Shen, Taiwan had become a weak country without a common consciousness or common values and norms. Thus she suggested a new policy of 'communal renaissance' to restructure communal identity and consciousness as the basis of a common identity in Taiwan.

(4)The development of native and local workshops: In order to develop local culture, the CCA encouraged local people to participate in cultural activity and historical research. This led to the emergence of native and local workshops. Since 1993, there have been over 400 workshops in Taiwan. They have improved the ability of local cultural centres and also led to the development of Taiwanese cultural activities and historical research. This effort has become the main source for Taiwanese research.

(5)The localization of international performance activities: Before the 1990s, only Taipei had the power to hold or import international cultural activities. However, the CCA believes that it is important for local cultures and communities to have an opportunity for cultural exchange. Thus the CCA has produced its 'Plans to Help Countries to Hold International Cultural Activity'. On the one hand, this will improve the development of local culture through international cultural exchange. On the other hand, it will also develop the international views of local people.

⁴⁴ According to the report of the Chief of the CCA, Shen, Xue-yong, the KMT government had to strengthen the management of Taiwanese local culture in order not to let the opposition party dominate the whole discourse of Taiwanese consciousness. In other words, the KMT government had to become more 'local' in order to maintain its power and legitimacy.

Ben-sheng people (such as the Fulos, the Hakkas) and Wei-sheng people (the mainlanders) were demanded in this development. Thus Taiwanese consciousness and the political-democratic movement combined together at that movement. The second development was a 'decentralisation' shift towards Taiwanese local culture. This was viewed as a strategy by the KMT government to both accommodate yet also contain forms of cultural diversity while still holding on to power. However, in both cases, the minority cultures remained marginal and tradition power structures remained in place. Therefore, many minority movements appeared to challenge the KMT government in the late 1980s, which led to a new view of 'multicultural Taiwan' in cultural policy.

4.3 Multiculturalism: A New National Identity?

The conflicts between 'Chinese nationalism' and 'Taiwanese consciousness' are seen to be based primarily on the positions of two ethnic groups: the mainlanders and the Fulos. The former, accounting for about 13% of Taiwan's total population, controlled the ruling power in the name of Chinese nationalism from the 1940s to the late 1980s. The latter was the majority group, accounting for about 65% of the population, and became the main support for Taiwanese consciousness. Other minority groups, such as the Hakkas and Taiwanese aborigines, felt isolated from their conflicts.

The rise of new social movements in the 1980s and 1990s, in particular ethnic movements, such as the Taiwanese aborigines and the Hakkas, led people to search for a wider common identity. You, Sheng-Guan points out that the development of social movements has opened a new door to diverse cultures in Taiwan. The problems of 'multi-ethnicity' have been emphasised since the 1990s, under the impetus of these social movements⁴⁵. Zhang, Yan-Xian uses a 'multi-ethnic historical view' to emphasise that the Fulo, the Hakkas, the Aborigines and the mainlanders are all 'hosts' or 'masters' in Taiwanese. Taiwan thus needs to become an 'ethnic equality' society⁴⁶. Lee, Ming-Yong believes that each ethnic group should keep and develop its own ethnic identity, and at the same time these various ethnic identities can be incorporated into a common national identity⁴⁷. As Zhang, Mao-Qui points out, Taiwanese society is facing a dilemma: on the one hand, Taiwan needs a 'common' national identity; on the other hand, differences among

⁴⁵ You, Sheng-Guan, *The Raising and Development of Taiwanese Native Literature* (Taipei, Qian-Wei Publishers, 1997), pp.271-2. (Chinese)

⁴⁶ Ibid., p.272.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.273.

ethnic groups still need to be respected and emphasised⁴⁸. In other words, attempts to achieve integration and to articulate the value of difference have produced the discourse of 'Multicultural Taiwan' as a new national identity, in particular the new discourse of 'Four Ethnic Groups' in Taiwan.

'Four Ethnic Groups' is the core of the discourse of 'Multicultural Taiwan'. Generally speaking, Multicultural Taiwan is based on 'Four Ethnic Groups'--the Fulos, the Hakkas, the Mainlanders, and Taiwanese aborigines. Because of the existence of four ethnic groups, Taiwan is a multicultural society. Thus, these four ethnic groups should share equal status in Taiwan, and their cultures also should be respected in Taiwan. The government should respect and provide public resources to promote their cultures in cultural policy. For example, the government set up various ethnic committees to develop multicultural policy based on the principle of 'Four Ethnic Groups'.

'Multicultural Taiwan' seems to be a better and wider way to achieve cultural identity in Taiwan. However, the same fundamental tension between diversity and unity also leads to a critique of 'Multicultural Taiwan' and 'Four Ethnic Groups'. In this section, we will argue that multiculturalism in Taiwan is related to the problem of national identity, and we will discuss its development and representation. Then we will explore the problems of 'Multicultural Taiwan' from two perspectives set out in the previous chapter: postmodern culture and liberal citizenship.

4.3.1 A Cultural Policy towards Multiculturalism?

The development of multiculturalism in Taiwan is related to the problems of national identity. This becomes clear if we examine the discourses of multiculturalism as expressed in government and party statements and policies:

●1987: The Party Programme of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is the main opposition party to the KMT, stated that the government should be concerned about both modern culture and native culture. It should provide 'bilingual' education, emphasise Taiwanese history, culture and status, and withdraw restrictions on other ethnic languages. It should also respect the aboriginal culture. This programme acknowledged multi-ethnicity in Taiwan and placed an emphasis on the different ethnic cultures and the

⁴⁸ Zhang, Mao-qui, 'The Process of The Political Transfer and Political Ethnicisation in Taiwan', in Shi, Zheng-feng, (eds.), *Ethnic Politics and Policy*, (Taipei, Qian-Wei Publisher, 1997), p. 64. (Chinese)

native culture. Furthermore, the programme argued that different ethnic cultures and local cultures should fuse into one 'Taiwanese culture'. In other words, all ethnic cultures were equal, but the Taiwanese culture should be seen as more important than others.

This programme reveals the influence of Taiwanese consciousness and emphasises the importance of 'Taiwanese culture'. In other words, it still seeks to widen Taiwanese consciousness in order to embrace more cultural differences.

●1988: A speech by Quo, Wei-Fang (the Second Chief of the CCA) on 'The Picture of Cultural Policy Today' stated that

Taiwan is a beautiful garden with different flowers, such as the mainstream culture (Chinese culture), the tributary culture -- local culture (Hakka and Fulo culture) -- and the minority culture (the Aboriginal, Mongolian and Tibetan cultures)⁴⁹.

According to Quo, the multicultural situation in Taiwan should be supported, but there is a 'hierarchy' among the cultures. Chinese culture is 'mainstream', Taiwanese cultures are 'tributary', and the aboriginal culture should be incorporated in order to 'improve' the minority cultures.

At this time, it was easy to see the differences between the views of the KMT and the DPP, which were based on the different national identities. At the same time, there were many similarities. Both parties believed that there was a national culture in Taiwan. For the KMT this was Chinese culture, and for the DPP it was Taiwanese culture. For the KMT, Taiwanese culture was one of the 'local' cultures within Chinese culture. For the DPP, Taiwanese culture was a 'native culture', 'parallel' to Chinese culture. Furthermore, Taiwanese culture sought to replace the status of Chinese culture in Taiwan. In addition, both the KMT and the DPP supported the idea of other ethnic cultures 'fusing' into one culture -- either the Chinese culture or Taiwanese culture. But this idea was the subject of widespread criticism by other ethnic groups, who preferred to keep their cultures 'pure'.

●1992: The DPP proposed an 'Ethnicity and Cultural Policy' containing two important points. First, one country is not always constructed by 'one' nation or people. The government should encourage and maintain the multicultural development of different ethnic groups. No single ethnic group can discriminate against or degrade the cultural

⁴⁹ The Speech of Quo, Wei-Fang, 'The Picture of Cultural Policy', 1988. (Chinese)

value of the other ethnic groups in order to gain a higher status. Secondly, the combination of different ethnic groups in one country must be organised as the core of 'modern citizenship'. This will bring about a 'common' consciousness in the country⁵⁰.

This policy provided some new ideas in Taiwan. It stressed that the formation of one country should be dependent on 'the system of modern citizenship', but not on a shared, common culture or blood relationship. This provided more growing space and freedom for the different ethnic groups, and reduced the importance of national culture. The suggestion was that it was not necessary to develop one 'national' or 'shared' culture in Taiwan as before. Another idea was that all ethnic cultures should be equal, i.e. no single ethnic culture (either Taiwanese or Chinese or any other ethnic culture) is higher than others. It is not necessary to think about which one is mainstream, or which one is 'local'.

Compared with discussions within the DPP in 1987, this showed a huge change. The new policy was based on the concept of multicultural citizenship, which sought to accommodate both difference and citizenship at the same time. It also sees citizenship as a beginning for the protection of cultural difference, in particular for minority groups. However, the DPP was not the ruling party at this time, and so the policy did not gain much attention.

● 1993: Shen, Xue-Yong (the third Chief in the CCA) gave a presentation at a meeting of the KMT. She pointed out that diversity in Taiwan is due to the island's unique geographical location. She did not mention any hierarchy between the different cultures. She also discussed the identity crisis in Taiwan, and concluded that Taiwan should build a 'common consciousness' in its society. For Shen, 'community culture' is the best way to develop a common consciousness that avoids the conflicts between ethnic groups. 'Community Renaissance' became the most important cultural policy in Taiwan after Shen's presentation.

● In 1995, the government claimed that Taiwan was a country seeking to encourage multicultural difference through the amendment of the constitution. This claim was related particularly to the development of aboriginal rights.

⁵⁰ Democratic Progress Party, 'Multi-Ethnic Relationship and Multi-Cultures--the Ethnic and Cultural Policy of DPP' (Taipei, DPP, 1992), pp.77-9.

- From 1996 to 1999, Zheng, Shu-Min and Lin, Chen-Zhi (the fourth and fifth Chiefs in the CCA) began to sponsor aboriginal culture and art and tried to combine aboriginal culture and communal culture. After 1996, the CCA began to expand its promotion of ethnic cultures, such as the promotion of Hakka drama and aboriginal broadcasting.

- In 2000, The new DPP government listed ethnic cultural policy as the major mission for 2000. The new chief in the CCA, Chen, Yu-Xiu, indicated that ethnic culture is useful for improving social harmony and competition in the country. Thus, it is important to protect ethnic culture, especially that of minority groups. Policies were planned to develop ethnic cultures and to aid local authorities in the performance of this task.⁵¹

From these discourses, it is clear that Taiwan exhibits a trend towards more diversity. Multiculturalism has become a common value across the various political parties. However, there are some important points in the representation of multiculturalism in Taiwan.

First, even if 'multiculturalism' becomes a 'common' value in Taiwan, people continue to use this same term to mean different things in terms of cultural policy. The model of multiculturalism for the KMT government is always related to the idea of hierarchy. For example, Quo, Wei-Fang in 1988 described cultural development in Taiwan as a 'garden with different flowers' in a kind of hierarchy: mainstream culture, tributary culture and minority culture. For Quo, the government should support the different cultures, but also promote them according to their hierarchical value. Chinese culture is the most important, Taiwanese culture is second, and minority culture is of least importance.

The model of multiculturalism employed by the DPP government also implies a hierarchy between a national culture and other different cultures. For example, the new Chief of the National Palace Museum from 2000, Du, Zheng-Sheng, proposes a model of multiculturalism as a circle with three levels. The first level is native culture, the second is Chinese culture, and the third is global culture⁵². However, Chen Shui-Bian, the new President of the DPP, presents his multiculturalism in another way. His conception includes Aboriginal culture, Fulo and Hakka cultures, western culture from the Netherlands and Spain, Japanese culture, Chinese culture from the mainland, American and European culture, and, lastly, the South East Asian culture from immigrant workers.

⁵¹ The policy of the CCA in 2001 from the web site of the CCA: <http://www.cca.gov.tw>.

⁵² Cao, Ming-Zong, 'Du, Zheng-Sheng: Setting up the Humanity Education based on the Structure of native--China--World', *Unite* newspaper, 30 March, 2000. (Chinese)

Chen, Shui-Bian describes multiculturalism as a symphony, with each culture playing its own music to create a beautiful harmonious song⁵³. This description is quite similar to the 'mosaic' model of multiculturalism, and is a significant shift away from the hierarchical model identified previously.

Furthermore, the common value of 'multiculturalism' is based on the need for political integration. At first, as we have argued above, neither Chinese nationalism nor Taiwanese nationalism could be accepted by all Taiwanese. Ethnic differences are most important, since different groups have different experiences. For mainlanders, mainland China is their 'hometown', but for other ethnic groups mainland China is a country in books. Similarly, the Hakkas and the aborigines feel isolated by the construction of 'Taiwanese nationalism'. The problem of national identity in Taiwan is confusing and diverse. In this situation, a discussion of multiculturalism is useful to create an integrated, common identity: Taiwan is presented here as a 'Four Ethnic Groups' society. For example, in national festivals the various ethnic cultures will be displayed together to represent Taiwan.

In addition, another purpose of 'multicultural Taiwan' and 'Four Ethnic Groups' is to reassert the distinction between Taiwan and mainland China. In particular, the aboriginal culture plays an important role in this respect. Since the cultures of mainlanders, the Hakkas and the Fulo, all came originally from mainland China, only the aboriginal culture can be said to be 'native' to the island of Taiwan. Thus the aboriginal culture is a vital reference point for distinguishing between Chinese culture and Taiwanese culture. As the section chief of cultural education in the CAA (the Committee of Aboriginal Affairs), Lin, Giang-Yi, pointed out, without aboriginal culture, Taiwanese culture is equal to Chinese culture⁵⁴. Therefore, the development of multiculturalism becomes another way to show that Taiwanese culture is different from Chinese culture.

From these discussions, we can see that 'multicultural Taiwan' refers to ethnic cultures, Taiwanese and Chinese cultures, regional/communal cultures, local/native cultures, and foreign/global culture, but it does not include gender, class or gay/lesbian cultures. This clearly suggests that 'multicultural Taiwan' is based on the primacy of national identity. Gender or gay/lesbian cultures are not used to draw up the national boundaries; thus they are excluded from 'multicultural Taiwan'.

⁵³ Cao, Ming-Zhong, 'How to Protect and Develop the Ethnic Cultures in Taiwan?' *Unite* newspaper, 5 March 2000. (Chinese)

⁵⁴ Interview with Lin, Giang-Yi.

The absence of gender, sexual and class difference from multiculturalism is also discussed in western theories. As Nira Yuval-Davies points out, ethnicity relates to the politics of collective boundaries, which, by using identity narratives, divide the world into 'us' and 'them'. Ethnicity, according to this definition, is therefore primarily a political process that constructs the collectivity and its interest. However, gender, class or other differences play central roles in intense, competitive diverse struggles for hegemonic positions⁵⁵. Thus, for example, many cultural traditions are frequently used as ways of legitimising the control and oppression of women.

Furthermore, 'multicultural Taiwan', with its focus on 'fundamental cultural difference', views ethnic difference as a kind of 'fixed, unified' culture. For example, the Hakka culture also belongs to the Han culture and the cultural difference between the Hakkas and the Fulos or mainlanders are not very clear. But in order to present the Hakka cultural difference, the definition of Hakka culture becomes strict and limited so that the Hakka's special culture is protected⁵⁶. At the same time, the aboriginal culture of Taiwan is always viewed according to the traditional aboriginal culture. For some modern aboriginal cultural or artistic events, which are seen as 'not very aboriginal', it is difficult to gain sponsorship from the government⁵⁷. The emphasis on fixed ethnic differences here leads to a form of cultural distortion.

To sum up, the thinking about multiculturalism in Taiwan has not yet developed very far. At this stage, the discourse of 'multicultural Taiwan' still concentrates on ethnic difference, but ignores other cultural differences, such as gender or class. At the same time, it sees cultural difference in a 'fixed, stable' way, an approach which encounters many difficulties in a postmodern society. It also maintains a hierarchical relationship between different cultures.

4.3.2 'Multicultural Taiwan', Cultural Difference and Identity from a Post-colonialist and Postmodern Perspective

Even though multiculturalism tries to cover or integrate more diverse identities, the

⁵⁵ Yuval-Davies, Nira, 'Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Women', in Marco Martiniello (eds), *Multicultural Policies and the State: A Comparison of Two European Societies* (Utrecht: Utrecht University, 1998), p.67.

⁵⁶ This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.

⁵⁷ More detail in Chapter 7.

development of multiculturalism and its emphasis on ethnic identity have also been criticised. In particular, the influences of post-colonialism and post-modernism provide many new ideas about identity.

To begin with, post-colonialism emphasises the influence and control of colonialism and attempts to resist cultural colonialism. For example, Chen Guang-Xing, provides a new view of the 'New International Localism', which wants to abandon the argument between Taiwan and China, and search for the real power of people -- women, workers, the Aboriginal people or gays -- to resist the state and capitalism so that the colonial problem can be solved. Furthermore, his post-colonialism is premised on a kind of 'post-nation'. In a 'post-nation', identity is not contained by any boundary, but drifts across different countries and is complicated by other factors such as gender or class. The foundation of identity is 'becoming others':

'Becoming others' means to transfer the subjectivity/self of the colonised into others, becoming women, workers, black people, homosexuals, Aborigines and so on.... Putting different cultural factors into one subjectivity, ignoring any kind of classification, abandoning the positions of identity, such as class, nation, country, and eliminating the 'colonial relation' in the dominance of the state, patriarchy, heterosexuality, and national chauvinism. Thus, 'becoming others' is the strategy of cultural identity for the colonised people⁵⁸.

Unlike Chen's 'mixed identity', Liao Chao-Yang uses poststructuralism to de-structure all cultural identity, leaving only an 'empty subjectivity'. For him, in the process of cultural identity, subjectivity is 'empty' without practical content. Any content is moved from outside the subject in order to fill out the essentially contentless subjectivity⁵⁹. According to this view, identity is a process of moving some symbolic structure from outside, and forming a special way to identify reality. Liao rejects any notion of a 'fixed' identity and believes that there is no unchanged nature. Everything in 'empty subjectivity' is temporary, and cultural identity is also in a state of constant flux. People can move out of old identities and construct new identities continuously. According to Liao's theory, the possibility of cultural identity is diverse and limitless: the Chinese, Taiwanese and Japanese are all symbols of an 'empty subjectivity' that is temporary.

⁵⁸ Chen, Guang-Xing, 'The Cultural Studies of Decolonialism', in *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies*, Vol.21 (1996), p. 107. (Chinese)

⁵⁹ Liao, Chao-Yang, 'Rethinking about 'Empty Subjectivity'', in *Chung -Wai Literature Monthly*, Vol. 276 (1995), pp.105-9. (Chinese)

Furthermore, the discourse of post-modernism provides alternative ways of thinking about cultural identity in Taiwanese society. For example, the magazine 'the Margins of Island'⁶⁰ uses 'false Taiwanese' as 'the fifth ethnic group' to oppose the national discourse of 'Four ethnic groups' in Taiwan. For them, the meaning of 'false Taiwanese' is that they are 'illusory', 'imagined', 'mimic' or 'hybrid' Taiwanese. As in the construction of four ethnic groups, the authors construct a category of 'false Taiwanese' to avoid the emphasis on classification and similarity among people, and to resist a situation where people are limited to one identity (ethnic or national status), thus restricting the possibility of diverse thinking. Thus they use post-modernism as a game to speak out:

We are 'false Taiwanese', no nature, no subjectivity; we cannot be central, and cannot be represented. This is a post-modern ethnic group without any history or tradition, but only with the fractured, mixed, hybrid, confused symbols and experience. Who are you? Hakka? Aborigines? Fulo or the mainlanders in Taiwan? Don't be so stupid, why not be a 'false Taiwanese' like us?⁶¹

All these theories of post-colonialism, post-modernism and post-structuralism provide a sharp analysis to reveal the illusion and inequality in the construction of national and ethnic identity, and to emphasise the fractured, hybrid, discontinuous, ambiguous character of cultural identity. From the viewpoint of these theories, 'multicultural Taiwan' cannot leave enough room for a 'shifting, hybrid, unstable, multiple' identity and cultural difference. On the contrary, 'multicultural Taiwan' will certainly strengthen the fundamental cultural differences based on ethnicity. In fact, ethnicity in Taiwan is especially likely to be 'hybrid' because of the complex history of colonisation, and blurred ethnic boundaries. It is very difficult to say what 'pure' Hakka culture is or what 'aboriginal culture' is, since their cultures are influenced by European cultures (e.g. Netherlands and Spain), Chinese culture, Japanese culture and modern American culture⁶².

Thus, from the 1990s, the development of identity moved towards 'diversity'. At the same time, this has been the most confusing time for people in Taiwan. Any 'difference' issue – e.g. that of women or workers -- is always related to the identity problem. The development of multiculturalism and ethnic identity in Taiwan has brought about some new possibilities and flexibility for identity, but still cannot deal with the new arguments

⁶⁰ The title of 'The Marginal of Island' means to provide the views from the periphery of Taiwan.

⁶¹ 'Taiwanese', 'The False Taiwanese: the Fifth Ethnic Group', in 'the Margins of Island', Vol. 8 (1993), p.45. (Chinese)

⁶² More detail about 'hybridity' in ethnic cultures will be given in Chapter 8.

about cultural identity and cultural policy. Nevertheless, multiculturalism still provides more possibility for diversity among people, in particular with a view to increasing rights in the development of citizenship.

4.3.3 Multiculturalism and Citizenship in Taiwan

According to T.H. Marshall, the meaning of 'citizenship' has changed with historical developments: from the requests for 'civil rights', equality and freedom, in the eighteenth century to the struggle for 'political rights', political participation and the right to vote, in the nineteenth century, and the fight for 'social rights', the protection of minority people and their civil and political rights in the economy, such as labour rights, welfare rights and environmental rights in the twentieth century⁶³. Barbalet also points out that the meaning of 'citizenship' varies from country to country. This means that the rights of 'citizenship' are dependent on the social, political and economic systems of each country⁶⁴.

At first, Taiwanese were not allowed to claim their 'citizenship', since they had not yet gained basic civil rights. In terms of the development of citizenship in Taiwan, before the 1980s, people were considered as 'nationals'. The authoritarian KMT government used Martial Law to limit freedom of opinion, freedom of assembly and the right to demonstrate. Therefore, the KMT government liked to emphasise people's duty or responsibility to the country; it called on people to sacrifice themselves for the country, thus avoiding any discussion of an equal relationship between the state and people. Only in 1986, with the abolition of Martial Law and the establishment of the DPP, the first opposition party in Taiwan, were civil rights protected by law.

Calls for equal citizenship came late in Taiwan. The new social movements, in particular those concerned with gender issues, ethnicity and the working class, which appeared in the late 1980s and 1990s, began to demand equality and freedom in Taiwan's society. 'The Constitution of the ROC (Republic of China)'⁶⁵ declares that all people are equal regardless of their gender, religion, race, class and party (Article 7). The Constitution also protects equal rights between different social groups (Article 8), the freedom to dwell or move out (Article 10), and the various protections of one's safety, property, work and political participation. However, inequalities have also appeared in other laws, leading to the oppression of minority groups, especially for the Taiwanese aborigines. Because of the

⁶³ J. M. Barbalet, *Citizenship* (Buckingham, Open University Press, 1988), pp.26-7.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Even though the Constitution provides civil rights, under Martial Law, civil rights were still damaged.

government's policy of assimilation, it was indifferent to discrimination in the system towards aborigines. It was not concerned about the loss of traditional aboriginal culture, nor about the low standard of education in aboriginal tribes. These examples reveal the inequalities of the law, and clearly violated the protections stated in the Constitution for all individuals. These obvious legislative inequalities were one of the first reasons for the formation of new social movements striving for equality with other dominant groups.

The aboriginal movement uses the idea that 'all citizens should be equal' in order to resist the government's aboriginal policy. It requests that the government resolve the inequalities and discriminations facing aborigines at work and in schools. However, the aborigines are aware that there are limitations on individual rights in order to improve their situation, and have found that they have to solve their problems with the help of 'collective rights' -- such as the rights of minorities or aboriginal rights.

Lin Shu-Ya points out that the people's ignorance of their 'collective rights' prevented the aborigines from gaining equal rights. Thus, they suffered the prohibition of their mother language, the loss of their own name, and the loss of traditional festivals in their respective tribes. They were forced to identify themselves (as the Hans viewed them) as people who needed to become cultured. Not only did the government's policies influence individual rights, but they also destroyed the people's sense of belonging to a whole ethnic identity, and their individuals and collective dignity⁶⁶. The Han people (the Fulos, the Hakkas, and the Mainlanders) did not face the same limitations and prohibitions as the aborigines did. Thus, this collective oppression is a clear example of the injury caused by the dominant groups to the minority group. Faced with these demands, the KMT government sought to improve the rights of the Taiwanese aborigines in the Constitution, and to recognise their 'aboriginal rights' in law from 1997.

In 1997, the expansion of Article 10 of the Constitution claimed that Taiwan is a multicultural society, and recognised the rights of aborigines. This can be viewed as an important landmark in the development of multicultural citizenship in Taiwan. First, collective rights are recognised in the Constitution, in particular the rights of Taiwanese aborigines. According to the revised article in the Constitution, many new aboriginal rights can be protected by means of new laws and regulations, such as the Aboriginal Education

⁶⁶ Lin, Shu-Ya, *The First Nation: The Constitutional Meaning of the Taiwanese Aboriginal Movement* (Taipei: Qian-Wei, 2000), pp. 48-9. (Chinese)

Act, the Aboriginal Development Act, the Draft of the Aboriginal Self-government Act, and the establishment of the Committee of Aboriginal Affairs and the Committee of the Hakkas.

Secondly, cultural rights have become new and important issues in the concept of citizenship in Taiwan. Taiwanese aborigines and the Hakkas use cultural issues to draw attention to inequality among the various ethnic groups. Many new laws and policies are made in order to improve the cultural rights of minority groups, such as 'the Plan to Improve the Aboriginal Cultures in Six Years', 'the Plan to Promote the Hakka Language' and so on.

However, compared with western theories on 'multicultural citizenship', the new thinking on postmodern culture and global citizenship is still ignored by 'multicultural Taiwan'. In particular, the migrant workers in Taiwan, who are not viewed as 'citizens', cannot share in such multicultural citizenship nor continue their special cultural practices in Taiwan.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I discuss the relationship between multiculturalism and national identity in Taiwan. Taiwan's experience shows that the tension between diversity and unity exists during the various phases in the development of national identity, from Chinese nationalism, Taiwanese consciousness to 'multicultural Taiwan'. 'Multicultural Taiwan' has led to the development of multiculturalism, and continues to challenge the government's multicultural policy in Taiwan.

In terms of the development of cultural policy, we will bring together some of the key points:

First, national identity still has an important role in the development or change of cultural policy. Cultural policy always encounters a dilemma between the integration of identity and the value of difference. In the age of Chinese nationalism, the KMT government chose to ignore the differences between people and copied the nationalism of mainland China. But finally Chinese nationalism failed. 'Taiwanese consciousness' also tries to be a 'common' consciousness; however, its 'common experience' is criticised and viewed as a kind of 'Fulo-centralism'. The new thinking – multiculturalism – promises to provide a good balance between political integration and ethnic difference, but we need to

explore this further in the following chapters.

Secondly, the representation of 'multicultural Taiwan' shows a close relationship with the discourse of 'Four Ethnic Groups', and emphasises ethnic cultural difference but ignores the cultural differences stemming from gender, class and gay/lesbian identity. These differences cannot be used to reconstruct a new national identity, and have therefore become marginal or invisible in the cultural policy in Taiwan.

Thirdly, Taiwan is moving toward a postmodern society in which cultural differences and identity are more likely to shift and to be changeable, fractured and ambiguous. Until now, the cultural policy of multiculturalism has not been able to reach a satisfactory conclusion on these new debates in Taiwan.

Fourthly, 'multicultural Taiwan' *provides the possibility of developing multicultural citizenship* in Taiwan. Compared with the western experience, collective rights and cultural rights are viewed as important, but postmodern and global citizenship are not taken into account in policy in Taiwan's case.

Moreover, the new construction of national identity—multicultural Taiwan -- remains weak. In the following two chapters, we will discuss how the two identities—ethnic identity and civil identity -- which are related to the broader national identity, are influenced by, and influence, the discourse of multicultural Taiwan.

Chapter 5: The Reconstruction of Ethnicity, Policy and Rights

'Multicultural Taiwan' is viewed as a means of achieving political integration where there are conflicts of national identity. As we saw in Chapter 4, the representation of multicultural Taiwan is based on the idea of 'Four Ethnic Groups'. Undoubtedly, ethnicity is the key issue for multicultural Taiwan. Other cultural differences, such as those of gender, class and sexuality, are excluded from this discourse.

In terms of the-political development of Taiwan, gaps in different attitudes to national identity are based almost entirely on ethnic differences. As Xiao, Xin-Huang points out, there are no clear differences on social, economic or cultural grounds among the four ethnic groups. However, they have very different attitudes to national identity¹. You, Ying-lung's research shows that among the Fulos, 35% of them identify themselves as 'Taiwanese', 26% as 'Chinese' and 39% as 'Taiwanese and Chinese'. Among the Hakkas, 26% identify themselves as 'Taiwanese', 42% as 'Chinese' and 32% as 'Taiwanese and Chinese'. But among the mainlanders, only 2% identify themselves as 'Taiwanese', 75% as 'Chinese' and 24% as 'Taiwanese and Chinese'². For Xiao, the differences in national identity in Taiwan are based on immigrant experiences. The Fulos immigrated to Taiwan over 400 years ago, but the mainlanders have been in Taiwan for only about 50 years. Inevitably, this difference has led to contrasting identities in relation to 'homeland'--mainland China³.

Therefore, 'multicultural Taiwan' not only enhances the political integration of national identity but also redefines the ways in which ethnic identity is constructed. Three specific dimensions are related to this reconstruction. First, multicultural Taiwan identifies 'Four Ethnic Groups', which challenges the traditional view of ethnic classification -- Ben-Sheng/Wai-Sheng. For some people, this change is an improvement, since it allows the recognition of more ethnic differences, and it also has the potential to reduce serious conflicts⁴. The minority groups, such as the Taiwanese aborigines and the Hakkas, have the opportunity to develop their ethnic identities and ethnic cultures under the name of

¹ Xiao, Xin-Huang, *The Transfer of Social Paragon in Taiwan: The Record for the History of Taiwan's Transfer* (Taipei: Li-xu, 2002), p.24. (Chinese)

² You, Ying-Lung, 'Ethnic Identity and Political Cognition: An Analysis of Taiwanese Voters', *Taiwanese Political Science Review*, No. 1, July 1996, p.55. (Chinese)

³ Xiao (2002), p.24.

⁴ Xiao (2002), p.24.

'multicultural Taiwan' and then reconstruct a new 'ethnicity'. The second dimension is that, the government has to change its ethnic policy. Before the 1990s, policy was based on the aim of assimilation, and it ignored ethnic differences in the public sphere. However, the government has to consider ethnic differences and provide resources and rights in order to develop ethnicity. Thus, multicultural Taiwan is also related to the reconstruction of ethnic policy. The final dimension is the reconstruction of ethnic rights after the new ethnic policy. Is it possible in practice to move towards a multicultural citizenship? Would such a move enhance equality between the various ethnic groups?

There are three-proposed reconstructions here: in cultural identity, cultural policy and citizenship in Taiwan. For identity, the reconstruction of ethnicity leads to the formation of a 'pan-aboriginal', 'pan-Hakka' consciousness and other new ethnic identities. These new unitary identities ignore other more specific forms of identity and may threaten to lead to new fundamentalisms or ethnic nationalisms. At the same time, the reconstruction of ethnic policy also changes cultural policy—from the assimilation model to the multicultural model. Finally, the reconstruction of ethnic rights expands the concept of citizenship in Taiwan by incorporating the idea of minority rights.

5.1 The Reconstruction of Ethnicity under 'Multicultural Taiwan'

The uses of the terms 'race' and 'ethnicity' vary widely in popular discourse. However, the definitions of these terms are usually not very explicit. For example, John Rex points out that the Jews used to be seen as a race, but subsequently most writers suggested that they were 'only' an ethnic group. In the United States, earlier practice referred to *ethnic* differences between new European immigrants, but the difference between Blacks and Whites was regarded as *racial*⁵.

Many scholars argue that racial differences are phenotypical or genotypical, i.e. they are rooted in biology, whereas most ethnic differences are derived from culture, history and experience⁶. However, according to biological research from UNESCO, the human species has a single origin, and the so-called races of mankind are no more than statistically distinguishable groups. Thus the explanation of race is left to sociologists rather than biologists⁷.

⁵ John Rex, *Race and Ethnicity* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986), p.18.

⁶ Shih, Cheng-Feng, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: The Political Analysis of Collective Identity* (Taipei: Qian Wei Publisher), p.2. (Chinese)

⁷ Rex (1986), p.19. According to Rex, there are three ways in which sociologists deal with these problems:

There is still confusion about the relationship between race and ethnicity in Taiwan. For example, is the difference between the Taiwanese aborigines and the Han people racial or ethnic? Are the aborigines an ethnic group or a race or a people? No clear answers to these questions have been formed and accepted in Taiwanese academic circles. In this thesis we will view the development of Taiwanese aborigines and other groups as ethnic phenomena but not racial phenomena. This is because these groups' identities have been formed through cultural and historical experience.

Several different approaches to understanding the formation of ethnic identity are available in the literature. First, *primordialism* believes that ethnic identity is a 'basic group identity' that 'consists of the ready-made set of endowments and identifications that every individual shares with others from the moment of birth by the chance of the family into which he is born at the given time in the given place'⁸. For example, Clifford Geertz points out that the 'primordial ties' of people are often seen by those who share them 'to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves.'⁹ According to Geertz, these ties seem to flow more from a sense of natural (some would say spiritual) affinity than from social interaction. These ties are experienced by many people as among the most basic elements of human life. It is no small wonder that some people are willing to fight and even die in their defence¹⁰. Harold Isaacs also points out that such endowments and identifications as 'primordial attachments' stem from 'the assumed given' of social existence. This notion of primordial attachments gave birth to primordialism, the idea that ethnicity is fixed, fundamental and rooted in the unchangeable circumstances of birth¹¹.

Secondly, the view of *circumstantialism* stresses the importance of the strategic use of ethnicity for practical ends, especially in relation to the circumstances and contexts in which ethnic and racial groups find themselves¹². According to this account, individuals

the first approach is to assimilate all so-called racial problems into the category of ethnic problems. The second is to recognise that racial differences do exist and often act as makers for the differential apportionment of rights, but to limit the range of application of the term 'race' and to deny that it has any justificatory significance. The third way is to use the term 'race relations situation' to refer to situations marked by racism.

⁸ Harold R. Isaacs, *Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 1975), p. 38.

⁹ Clifford Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States', in *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 109.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

¹¹ Isaacs (1975), p.40.

¹² Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann, *Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World*

and groups emphasise their own ethnic or racial identities when such identities are in some way advantageous to them. They emphasise the ethnic and racial identities of others when it is advantageous to set those others apart or to establish a boundary between those viewed as eligible for certain goods and those viewed as ineligible¹³. According to this view, ethnic identity is not fixed and unchanging but is fluid and contingent, responding opportunistically to the needs of the situation or the moment.

Similar to circumstantialism is the *constructionist* approach. This sees ethnic identities 'as highly variable and contingent products of an ongoing interaction between, on the one hand, the circumstances groups encounter -- including the conceptions and actions of outsiders -- and, on the other, the actions and conceptions of group members -- of insiders'¹⁴. This means that ethnic groups are active agents in the making and remaking of their own identities, and identity-construction is not a one-time event but is continuous and historical. The construction of ethnic identity has no end point unless it is the disappearance of the identity altogether; and the construction of ethnic identity is always related to 'shared interests', 'shared institutions' and 'shared culture'¹⁵.

Anthony D. Smith's theory provides an example of this view. He uses the term 'situational ethnicity', in which the growth of a sense of the collective self is treated as an important part of group identity and solidarity. Then, the sense of self is viewed through symbols and mythologies of the community's heritage. The need for identification with a community in order to achieve individual identity and self-respect is in part a function of socialisation experiences in the historic culture-community¹⁶. Thus, for Anthony D. Smith, the core of ethnicity is self-consciously constructed using a number of 'circumstantial' components: it 'resides in the quarter of myths, memories, values and symbols, and in the characteristic forms or style and genres of certain historical configurations of populations'¹⁷. Smith points out that the dimensions of ethnic groups include a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity.¹⁸

(California: Pine Forge Press, 1998), p.56.

¹³ Ibid., p.58.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 85.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.86.

¹⁶ Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 14.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp.22-31.

How do these approaches relate to the situation in Taiwan? Is the development of ethnic groups in Taiwan closer to 'primordialism', 'constructionalism' or 'circumstantialism'? In this section, I try to identify the variables through which ethnic identity is constructed: internal factors (common characteristics, heritage, culture, tradition, language etc.), external factors (treatment by other groups, political pressure including discrimination and hardship), and self-identification. Therefore, I argue that the formation of ethnicity in Taiwan corresponds to the constructionalist and circumstantialist paradigm.

In addition, I wish to argue that the idea of 'multicultural Taiwan', or 'Four Ethnic Groups', has influenced the ways in which these groups construct their new ethnicity. There is a tendency towards a unified homogenous identity rather than to separate sub-groups. The tendency to construct four 'homogenous' ethnic identities also meets the challenge of 'circumstantial' ethnic identities in Taiwan. The tensions demonstrate the contradiction in the concept of 'multicultural Taiwan' and 'Four Ethnic Groups'.

5.1.1 Taiwanese Aborigines

Taiwanese aborigines are Austronesian and are of Malayo-Polynesian descent. They share a very close blood relationship with other aboriginal people in Malaysia, the Philippines, and some islands around the Pacific Ocean. They have over ten different groups, each with its own language, culture, social system, life style and distinct physical appearance¹⁹. Because of this diversity and the huge difference between Taiwanese aborigines and the other Han people, the Fulos, the Hakkas and the mainlanders, some people believe that the difference between the Han people and the aboriginal people is not simply an 'ethnic difference' but is a 'national difference' or 'racial difference'. Taiwan should be viewed as a society with two peoples: one is the Han people²⁰ and the other is the aboriginal people. Among the Hans and the aborigines, there are also different ethnic groups. Among the Hans there are the Fulos, the Hakkas and mainlanders, and among the aboriginal people, there are the Amis, Paiwan, and the seven or eight other small ethnic groups. Thus reality does not fit the classification of 'Four Ethnic Groups in Taiwan'²¹.

¹⁹ Up to 2002, the government recognised ten groups of Taiwanese aborigines: the Amis, Puyuma, Sau, Zuo, Saisiat, Bunun, Paiwan, Tayal, Rukai and Yami.

²⁰ This discourse still has some problems, because research has shown that the Fulo and the Hakka people are Yue people, not Han people.

²¹ 'Four Ethnic Groups in Taiwan' is a discourse that divides the Taiwan people into four ethnic groups: the Fulo, the Hakka, the Aborigines and the Mainlanders. This discourse is criticised because it ignores the differences among the Aborigines. However, the discourse is widely used, so it will be employed in this study to indicate the basic division of Taiwanese ethnicity.

Aboriginal identity is a new construction since the 1980s. There was no 'aboriginal identity' before the 1980s, when the aboriginal movements first appeared. Up to then, the aborigines stressed their distinct tribal identities, e.g. the Amis and the Puyuma. In the past there were often wars between the various groups. However, after the invasion of the Han people in the seventeenth century, they lost their land and moved to the mountains, so the various groups began to share a similar fate. For example, the various colonial powers killed their people, eliminated their culture, occupied their lands, and they became 'second-class' people in Taiwan. They were called 'Fan', which means 'animals', and were not treated as civilised 'human beings'. Until the 1980s, the situation of the Taiwanese Aborigines was terrible²². Aboriginal cultures and languages were viewed as low-level, so they hated to admit their 'stigmatic identity'²³.

When in the 1980s, aboriginal movements emerged to demand their rights and articulate their needs, at the same time they also strengthened their common identity²⁴ and resisted the assimilation policy which had caused them to slowly lose their own language and culture²⁵. In addition, they asked the government to correct or formulate laws to protect their citizenship, for instance by providing self-government systems, political participation, and rights to land. 'Aboriginal culture' has been used as a powerful tool to demonstrate the differences between the Hans and the aborigines, and this strategy has gained support from Taiwanese society.

In 1997, the KMT government increased the number of provisions relating to aboriginal rights in the Constitution, changed their name to 'aborigines' and set up a Committee of Aboriginal Affairs. 'Aborigines' is viewed as a new name and common identity, and also as an ethnic group with special rights. In other words, Taiwanese aborigines can be viewed as

²² They had a high rate of unemployment, and most aboriginal children had no education, since they were forced to work for their families. At the same time, many girls were forced to work as prostitutes in cities, and the young generation tended to leave their tribes for the cities in order to find work

²³ Xie, Shi-Zhong uses the term 'stigmatic identity' to describe the common experience of Taiwanese Aborigines, in *Stigma Identity: The Change of Taiwanese Aborigines* (Taipei: Zi-Li Publisher, 1984). (Chinese)

²⁴ For example, the movement of 'Renaming Aborigines' demanded a change in their collective name from 'San-bao', which means 'the people who live in the mountains', to 'aborigines', which means that they are 'native' to this land and acknowledges that they have special land rights. 'Renaming Aborigines' is both a movement to make demands of the government, but is also a process of 're-identification' of themselves and their relationship with other groups. Through co-operation in the aboriginal movements, a 'pan-aboriginal' identity has been constructed and formed.

²⁵ For example, in the movements of 'Recovering our Names', 'Renaming Aborigines', 'Deleting Wu-Feng's Story in the Textbook', and other cultural movements, the aborigines have demanded more rights to develop their own culture.

a new construction as part of a broader change in the construction of a national identity based on 'Multicultural Taiwan'.

Indeed, Taiwanese aborigines can be seen as a construction based on a collective, political need and a shared history. There are different sub-groups among Taiwanese aborigines, with their own languages, cultures and social systems; however, they are viewed as the 'same' by the dominant groups. They were called 'Fan' -- not human beings -- by the Hans in the earlier stage. Under Japanese rule, they were the 'Gao-sha Race', which means the people living in high areas. Afterwards, they were called 'Shan-Bao', which means the people living in the mountains, by the KMT government. They thus shared a 'stigma' name and miserable experiences under the various colonial regimes until they renamed themselves 'aborigines' in the 1990s. At the same time, their cultures, languages and traditions were destroyed by years of colonial rule. They encountered four different assimilation policies. First, there was 'Catholicisation' during the rule of the Dutch and Spanish in the seventeenth century. Secondly, there was the first experience of 'sinolisation' under the Qing Dynasty. Thirdly, 'royalism' prevailed under the Japanese government. Fourthly, there was the second experience of 'sinolisation' under the KMT government. These policies of assimilation led to cultural breakdown, the loss of language, and the loss of honour among the aborigines. All these situations were a serious threat to their existence.

This evidence shows that Taiwanese aborigines are a 'constructed ethnicity' based on some internal and external factors. They have to unify as 'one group' to resist the whole Han people, since their population is only about 3% of the total in Taiwan. In other words, the formation of 'pan-aboriginal consciousness' aims to resist external forces. However, the aborigines' internal connections are quite weak, since they do not share the same cultures. For example, the various groups have tended to set up their own 'assemblies' in order to strengthen their own identity, but there has been no 'pan-aboriginal assembly'. Thus, aboriginal identity can also be viewed as a 'situational identity', which changes according to the external and internal factors.

5.1.2 Mainlanders (the Wai-Sheng People)²⁶

In 1949, about 1,200,000 people moved with the KMT government, including

²⁶ The Ben Sheng/Wai Sheng divide has been the basis of difference in Taiwan since 1949. The Ben Sheng people lived in Taiwan before 1949, including most of the Fulo, Hakka and Aboriginal groups. The Wai-Sheng people moved to Taiwan from mainland China in 1949. They are also called 'Mainlanders'.

administrators of the KMT party, government members, military men and their families, and people who wanted to run away from war. These people came from all over mainland China. In ethnic terms, they included Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Tibetans and other minorities in the south-western provinces. They included members of the ruling class in the KMT government, uneducated military men and ordinary people. Although they were very diverse in their composition, they were a very large 'group' or 'community' in relation to the population of Taiwan – about 6,600,000. They were called the 'Wai-Sheng people', which meant that they were external to Taiwan. The other people, including the Fulos and the Hakkas, called themselves 'Ben-Sheng people' or 'Taiwanese', which meant that they were internal or native to Taiwan²⁷. It is not easy, however, to define the Wai-Sheng or their culture precisely.²⁸ The group of 'mainlanders' is very diverse. Until now, the academic community of Taiwan has not reached agreement on a definition of the Wai-Sheng as 'external settlers', 'migrants', 'immigrants', 'refugees', 'people in exile' or 'a diaspora'²⁹. Similarly, is the KMT government in Taiwan a 'colonial government' or a 'government in exile'?

Mainlander culture came to be viewed as a representative of Chinese culture and the official culture in Taiwan. Many Ben-Sheng people criticised the KMT government for constructing a strong national culture, Chinese culture, to oppose other cultures, such as those of the Fulos and the Hakkas. However, the diverse Wai-Sheng culture was unified, limited and controlled at the same time, and became representative of Chinese culture in Taiwan³⁰. The dominant policy for the construction of a national culture brought about different results for the Ben-Sheng and Wai-Sheng people: the Wai-Sheng people had only one culture -- national culture -- but the Ben-Sheng people were forced to give up their culture until 1970. The national culture was not their culture, but was a source of oppression for them. Thus, the Wei-Sheng culture became the official or national culture,

²⁷ The Taiwanese Aborigines were called 'Sanbao' and were not really viewed as 'Taiwanese' in Taiwan society.

²⁸ Wai-Sheng and Ben-Sheng are two opposite concepts. Since the development of the Hakka and Taiwanese Aborigines, the term 'Ben-Sheng' has been used less and less. At the same time, the term 'Wai-Sheng' has been replaced by 'Mainlanders'.

²⁹ Chen, Quang-Xing (2001), 'Why is "great reconciliation" im/possible? De-Cold War/Decolonization, or Modernity and Its Tears', *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies*, No. 43, September, 2001. P.85. (Chinese)

³⁰ For example, the 'Combative Literature Movement' was supported by the KMT government to promote the experience of war, anti-Communism and nostalgia for mainland China in the 1950s. Most Wai-Sheng writers were forced to produce appropriate work, while the Ben-Sheng writers could not write anything since they could not use Chinese and did not have relevant experiences.

and its diversity was ignored and limited³¹. At the same time, it was viewed as a dominant culture to oppose other cultures.

After the 1980s, it was very difficult for mainlanders to redefine themselves between Taiwan and China. The development of localisation and Taiwanese consciousness sought to challenge the official Chinese culture, and further resistance emanated from the calls for the collective cultures of, for example, the aborigines and the Hakkas. As a result, the official Chinese culture gradually declined.³² In addition, the KMT government made it possible for the mainlanders to return to mainland China in 1984, and this allowed mainlanders to see directly the difference between Taiwan and mainland China. In Taiwan, these people were 'mainlanders', but in mainland China they were 'Taiwanese'³³. These new changes in national identity, ethnic consciousness, and the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China caused huge shocks for the mainlanders' self-definition and cultural identity.

At this critical time the discourse of 'multicultural Taiwan' provided a new position for mainlanders -- being an ethnic group among 'Four Ethnic Groups'. Thus the mainlanders began to be constructed as an ethnic group in Taiwan. The discourses of 'New Taiwanese' and 'New Settlers' are good examples to explore the construction of mainlanders in 'Four Ethnic Groups'.

'New Taiwanese':

Lee, Teng-hui used the term 'New Taiwanese' in 1998 during the election for the Taipei Mayor. The candidate of the KMT, Ma, Ying-Jiu, is a mainland, but Lee, Teng-hui called him a 'New Taiwanese' to attract the votes of the Fulos. After that, 'New Taiwanese' became a way for some mainlanders to define themselves in Taiwan.

What is 'New Taiwanese'? In short, the Ben-Sheng people, such as the Fulos and the Hakkas were viewed as Taiwanese before the 1990s. And the mainlanders were viewed as 'Chinese' but not 'Taiwanese'. Thus, Lee, Teng-hui pointed out that the mainlanders could

³¹ For example, Zhu, Tian-Xin, who is viewed as a representative writer of the Wai-Sheng, points out that there are some internal conflicts within the Wai-Sheng group, but these are rarely acknowledged openly.

³² But this does not mean that Chinese culture is unimportant in Taiwan; indeed, it still has an important influence on most Taiwanese people.

³³ They have to apply for certification as 'Taiwanese' to visit mainland China.

choose to be 'New Taiwanese' if they identified with Taiwan.

'New Settlers' and Minority Culture?

The DPP gained political power in 2000. The new chief of the CCA publicised a new multicultural policy: 'The plan to Develop a Minority Culture' listed the mainlander culture as one 'minority culture'³⁴, like the cultures of the Hakkas and the Taiwanese aborigines. At the same time, the chief of the CCA used the term 'New Settlers' to refer to the mainlanders.

The mainlanders are uncomfortable with this term, since it seems that they are viewed as a 'minority'. If the culture of the mainlanders is a 'minority' culture, then what is the 'majority culture'? they ask. In fact, the KMT government defined Chinese culture as the 'mainstream culture' and Taiwanese culture as a 'branch culture' before the 1990s, and this caused political pressure for the development of Taiwanese culture. Now it is hoped that the new DPP government will not make the same mistake again by distinguishing between 'minority culture' and 'majority culture'³⁵.

These two examples illustrate the tension between the mainlanders and the discourse of 'multicultural Taiwan' and 'Four Ethnic Groups'. It seems that the mainlanders are being forced to be an ethnic group in the new national discourse. They are expected to adopt an identity based on 'ethnicity'³⁶.

Let us consider whether this view makes sense. First, the mainlanders all came from mainland China with the same official language, Mandarin. This means that they had a predisposition towards *Chinese culture*. By comparison, the people already in Taiwan in the 1940s (including the Fulos, the Hakkas and the Aborigines) had Japanese as their common language, and their cultural identity was a mixture of ethnic culture and Japanese culture. Thus, in 1949, the cultural difference between the Wai-Sheng and the Ben-Sheng was not only a kind of ethnic difference but also a national difference between the Chinese and the Japanese. After 40 years in Taiwan, the mainlanders also developed a new culture,

³⁴ From the essentials of this plan, the mainlanders have not been included. However, in the press release of CCA, it shows that the 'Minority cultures' are Aborigines, the Hakkas and the Mainlanders.

³⁵ From Liao, Xian-Hao's interview in 'The Term of 'New Settlers' can not be used Irrationally', in *Chinatimes*, 2001,8,23. (Chinese)

³⁶ There is a special situation in Taiwan. For the mainlanders, 'ethnic policy' includes the Fulos, the Hakkas and the Taiwanese aborigines, but it does not include the mainlanders. For the Fulos, 'ethnic policy' includes the mainlanders, the Hakkas and the Taiwanese aborigines, but does not include the Fulos. Only the Hakkas and Taiwanese aborigines like to see themselves as 'ethnic groups'.

which may be called a 'military family village culture'³⁷.

Secondly, the mainlanders share a common myth of descent as 'Chinese people'. The mainlanders had experience of the Chinese Nationalism constructed by Dr Sun Yat-sen. In other words, they had a strong 'national identity' as 'Chinese people'. By contrast, the Japanese government tried to assimilate the Ben-Sheng people as 'Japanese'. However, their consciousness was rooted in the idea of being Taiwanese, Han, Fulo or Hakka; it was a mixture of ethnic and local consciousness. They had no experience of Chinese Nationalism before 1949. The Ben-Sheng people learned nationalism from the Japanese, not from the Chinese. Therefore, the mainlanders had a clearer national identity than others.

Thirdly, the mainlanders shared a common history of the 'Sino-Japanese War' and the civil war between the KMT and the CCP, and then they fled from mainland China. After they arrived in Taiwan, they were viewed as 'outsiders'. The experience of war and calamity, and their nostalgia made them identify themselves as a 'group', and this became a common culture or memory, which appeared in their literature, music and arts. The Ben-Sheng people had no such experience.

Therefore, taking the case of the mainlanders, both external and internal factors have influenced their ethnic identity. In terms of external factors, the mainlanders are viewed as

³⁷ Military family villages are a special feature of Taiwan. When the Mainlanders moved to Taiwan in 1949, the KMT government had to search for suitable places of settlement. It constructed many villages around military camps for this purpose. The new military family villages became independent, isolated, small communities or societies for the Mainlanders, so that the latter did not need to communicate with other Taiwan people very often. The Mainlanders could keep their own culture, loyalty and life style in military family villages, where they were isolated from the broader society of Taiwan. According to Yaung, the culture of military family villages has certain key characteristics:

First, the people of the military family villages shared the same experience with the KMT government and the ROC; thus they had a strong identity with the KMT government. At the same time, they also had very strong nostalgia for mainland China.

Secondly, they were viewed as 'external' to Taiwanese society, and had very different life styles, languages and values compared with other Taiwanese ethnicity. Thus they chose to live far from other people in order to retain their sense of a united, close-knit and highly condensed community.

Thirdly, military family villages had a very hierarchical society, and people always complied with their leaders. At the same time, it was not easy for people to be critical of their community, such as the KMT government or their family.

Fourthly, the new generation of military family villages also found it difficult to 'melt into' Taiwanese society; thus most of them chose to be military men or migrate to other countries.

Because of their isolation from Taiwan and mainland China, people in the villages felt 'rootless' and confused about their identity. This experience appeared in their arts and literature and became a striking characteristic of their culture.

'outsiders', since they came from mainland China, and they are isolated from Taiwanese folk society because of the government's policy, which has led them to develop their own identity. In terms of internal factors, they share the same national identity, official language, Chinese culture and diasporic experience. These factors also provide useful material for setting up a common identity. If the mainlanders, who came from various areas of mainland China with different dialects and life styles, can become 'one ethnicity' in Taiwan, this must also be viewed as a 'situational ethnicity'.

5.1.3 The Hakkas

The Hakkas are an ethnic group with a long history in mainland China. In academic circles there are different views of the Hakkas' origins. Most people hold the following opinions about the Hakkas: they come from the northern part of mainland China; they moved on more than five occasions on a large scale to the south. In the Ching Dynasty, many Hakkas lived in Canton Province. Afterwards, some Hakkas moved to Taiwan, some moved to SouthEast Asia (e.g. Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia) and some continued to live in mainland China³⁸. The Hakkas arrived in Taiwan about 300 years ago, later than the Fulos³⁹. Their population was much smaller than that of the Fulos; thus they had to fight the Fulos in order to exist in Taiwan. Since they liked to move, they were always newcomers and formed minority groups. Thus they were called 'Hakkas', which in their language meant 'guests'. At the same time, their experience resulted in a strong sense of identity in relation to their own tradition, language, ancestry and history. Thus the Hakkas have developed a strong ethnic identity in order to maintain their group.

Like Taiwanese aborigines and the Fulos, the Hakkas' culture was limited by a strong Chinese nationalism before the 1980s. The first example is the policy of having Mandarin as the national language, since this meant that many of the new generation of Hakkas lost their mother language and culture. The young generation cannot understand the Hakka language, and they do not listen to Hakka music or watch performances of Hakka theatres. Therefore they do not identify with Hakka culture. In addition, the rise of Taiwanese consciousness also heightened the influence of the Fulo culture. Some of the young generations prefer to learn the Fulo language but not the Hakka language. The loss of

³⁸ Today, there are about 100 million Hakkas in the world, including in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. They still share the same language and a very close culture. Many Taiwanese Hakkas still have a strong identity with their ethnic members.

³⁹ The Fulo is the largest ethnic group in Taiwan, with about 65% of the whole population, and the Hakka is the second largest, with about 15%. The mainlander is about 12%.

language led to the Hakkas becoming more 'invisible' in Taiwan. In the late 1980s, the Hakka movement developed to save the Hakka culture⁴⁰.

However, the Hakkas have gained the legitimacy to develop their ethnicity and identity under the discourse of multicultural Taiwan and 'Four Ethnic Groups' in the 1990s. For a long time, the Hakkas were viewed as part of the 'Ben Sheng people' together with the Fulos. The new discourse provides a new position of 'dependence' on the Fulos. Thus the Hakkas also need to reconstruct themselves in order to distinguish themselves from the Fulos. At the same time, as one ethnic group in the discourse of 'Four Ethnic Groups' in Taiwan, the Hakkas have begun to strengthen their identity with Taiwan, but not with their homeland -- mainland China. 'New Hakkas' and 'Taiwanese Hakkas'⁴¹ are good examples of discourses which seek to reconstruct and redefine the position of the Hakkas in Taiwan today.

Thus, the Hakkas can be viewed as a new construction in multicultural Taiwan. This is based on a common name⁴²; language; myth of descent⁴³; a shared history⁴⁴, and a distinctive shared culture, which are the key internal factors of their identity. However, external factors have also presented challenges for the reconstruction of their ethnic identity. For example, the relationship between Taiwan and China is always a big issue for Hakka identity. Moreover, they have tended to use a more open definition of the Hakkas since the 1990s, because ethnic boundaries are now more blurred. In other words, the

⁴⁰ In order to save the Hakka culture, the Hakkas initiated the Hakka movement, as expressed in 'Returning the Mother Language to Me' in 1988, like the aboriginal movement. In 1991, the Hakkas conducted the 'Meeting for Hakka Research'. This was the first time that the Hakkas had been seen as an ethnic group in the public sphere. They subsequently stressed Hakka policy in the elections from 1994. In 1996, the first Hakka radio station -- 'Formosa Hakka' -- was set up with the aim of improving Hakka identity, helping to construct 'the New Hakkas' in Taiwan, and emphasising the importance of Hakka culture. Accordingly, the Hakkas became more active in the public sphere. For example, Hakka policies were given more emphasis in elections, a centre for Hakka research was set up in a university, and the Hakka language was used in public, e.g. in mass transportation announcements. In 2001, the new DPP government set up a 'Committee of the Hakkas' as a main institution to make Hakka policy and deal with Hakka affairs in order to maintain and develop the Hakka culture in Taiwan. More detail will be discussed in Chapter 8.

⁴¹ For more detail see Chapter 8.

⁴² They shared the name 'Hakka' during several hundred years of immigration. 'Hakka' is the name used by themselves and other ethnic groups moving from China to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.

⁴³ There are several versions of the Hakkas' origins. It is generally believed that their ancestors are the 'pure, Han nobles'. This means that the Hakkas are very concerned about their family traditions and history.

⁴⁴ The long history of immigration and the experiences of 'being guests' provide the basis for the shared history of the Hakkas. Before the 1980s, they paid more attention to their connections with mainland China. However, they then began to emphasize their common experience in Taiwan in order to construct a new identity.

Hakka identity is neither fixed nor stable.

5.1.4 The Fulos

The Fulos are the largest ethnic group in Taiwan. Their ancestors emigrated from Fu-Jian province in the south-eastern part of mainland China in the seventeenth century. Before then, the Fulos were divided into two groups: 'Zhang Zhou Fulo' and 'Quan Zhou Fulo' (because they came from these two places), and they had no common identity. Most of them still kept a close relationship with mainland China. However, after the experience of rule by the Japanese government between 1895 and 1945, the Fulos began to develop an identity as 'islanders', which meant that they were different from the Japanese. This marked the beginning of the Fulos' efforts to form a common identity.

However, the ethnic consciousness of the Fulos was more fuzzy and ambiguous, because the ethnic identity of the Fulos was associated with the national identity -- Taiwanese consciousness. Like the majority of the population, the Fulos had not developed a clear identity for their own ethnicity; on the contrary, they were viewed as 'representative' of Taiwanese consciousness⁴⁵. The arguments about ethnicity between the Fulos and the mainlanders were always viewed as conflicts between Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism. It is difficult to determine whether the appearance of 'Taiwanese consciousness' preceded the development of the ethnic identity of the Fulos or not. But eventually the Fulos became the main supporters of the construction of Taiwanese consciousness in opposition to the KMT's Chinese nationalism during the 1980s and 1990s.

After the 1990s, other ethnic groups, such as the Hakkas and mainlanders, pointed out that the Fulos had become susceptible to a kind of 'Fulo-centralism'. The Hakkas also criticised the Fulos for always seeing themselves as 'Taiwanese' and their language as the 'Taiwanese language', which meant that other ethnic groups are not 'Taiwanese' and other languages are not 'Taiwanese languages'⁴⁶. In this situation, the Fulos began to consider these problems seriously, and they claimed that their language was the 'Fulo language' and that they were 'the Fulos' at the ethnic level. Nevertheless, the Fulo identity is still not as

⁴⁵ For example, the Fulo language was called 'Taiwanese' and their culture was viewed as 'native culture'. At the same time, their demands for their own language, culture, literature and arts were seen as 'Taiwanese nationalism'.

⁴⁶ Zhang, Mao-Wei, 'Taiwan's Political Transfer and the Process of Political Ethnicization', in Shi, Zheng-Feng (eds.) *Ethnic Politics and Policy* (Taipei: Qian-Wei Publisher, 1997), pp. 43. (Chinese)

strong as other ethnic identities.

Like the mainlanders, it seems that the Fulos are being forced to be one group in the new national discourse of multicultural Taiwan and 'Four Ethnic Groups'. However, this reconstruction of the Fulos is quite weak. For example, most of the Fulos call themselves 'Taiwanese' or 'Ben-sheng People' but not 'Fulos'. At the same time, as a majority, the Fulos do not need to define 'Fulo' or 'Fulo culture'.

Generally speaking, the Hakkas and aborigines have always felt a crisis of existence, they have developed stronger ethnic identities. By contrast, the mainlanders did not see themselves as 'one ethnicity' when they were the dominant group before the 1990s. Fulo also do not have an ethnic identity. The Fulos and the mainlanders represent a majority and a dominant group respectively which means that they do not need to identify themselves ethnically and do not see themselves as 'ethnic groups'. For the dominant groups, there is no reason to construct themselves as an ethnic identity. From this argument, we can see that the development of Taiwanese ethnicity follows the 'circumstantialism' model.

At the same time, on the basis of an analysis of the various formations of ethnic identity in Taiwan, I agree with Smith that ethnicity is a 'construction' based on key dimensions, including a collective name, a shared history, and a distinctive shared culture. These constructions are not stable or fixed forever. For example, the discourse of 'Four Ethnic Groups' in Taiwan remains a 'construction' or 'invention', and this new construction has taken the place of the old 'invention' -- 'Ben-Sheng / Wei-Sheng'. Not only did 'Four Ethnic Groups' relate to the policy of national integration, this discourse also influenced the reconstruction of ethnicity in Taiwan.

Thus, we find an apparent tension between the constructed, homogenous 'Four Ethnic Groups' and 'circumstantial, shifted ethnicity'. The tension represents a challenge for 'multicultural Taiwan'. The experience of the Hakka is an important example of this challenge, and will be discussed further in Chapter 8.

5.2 The Reconstruction of Ethnic Policy

The second influence of multicultural Taiwan is on the reconstruction of the country's ethnic policy in Taiwan. In this section, we will discuss the reconstruction of ethnic policy based on western theories about the state and ethnic difference. In particular, I will use John Rex's model of multiculturalism as the framework to consider the development of ethnic policy in Taiwan. According to Rex, basically multiculturalism requires a unitary public domain and a diverse private domain.

5.2.1 The State and Ethnic Difference

Large-scale migration since 1945 has led to a major change in the ethnic composition of many countries⁴⁷. In response, according to Stephen Castle, there are three basic models of policy choice for countries facing these challenges: the differential exclusion model, the assimilation model, and the pluralism model⁴⁸. Castle points to two main variants of pluralism. In the 'laissez-faire' approach typical of the USA, difference is 'tolerated', but it is not seen as the role of the state to support the maintenance of ethnic cultures. The second variant is 'multiculturalism', which implies the willingness of the majority group to accept cultural difference, and to change social behaviour and institutional structures accordingly. Multiculturalism is usually linked to state-interventionist approaches to social policy⁴⁹.

The comparisons between these variants are as shown in Table 5.1.

⁴⁷ Stephen Castle, 'How Nation-States Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity', in *New Community* 21 (3), July 1995, pp.293--301. The differential exclusion model may be characterised as a situation in which immigrants are incorporated into certain areas of society (such as the labour market) but are denied access to other areas (such as welfare systems, citizenship and political participation). In such a situation, immigrants become ethnic minorities, which are part of civil society, but are excluded from full participation in economic, social, cultural and political relations. This seems most appropriate for former 'guest-worker'-recruiting countries, such as Germany, Switzerland or Austria, or the Gulf oil states since the 1970s. The assimilationist model is usually defined as the policy of incorporating migrants into society through a one-sided process of adaptation: ethnic minorities are expected to give up their distinctive linguistic, cultural or social characteristics and become similar to the majority population. The role of the state in assimilation is to create conditions favourable to individual adaptation and the transfer of majority culture and values through an insistence on the use of the dominant language and attendance at normal schools for minority children. The most important cases of the assimilationist model are France, the USA, Britain and Canada before the 1960s. The final model is the pluralist model, which may be characterised as the acceptance of the immigrant population as ethnic communities which remain distinguishable from the majority population with regard to language, culture, social behaviour and associations over several generations. This also implies that immigrants should be granted equal rights in all spheres of society, without being expected to give up their diversity.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.294.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p.301.

	Exclusion	Inclusion
Non-Difference	Total exclusion	Assimilationist model
Difference	Differential Exclusion	Pluralism model: 'laissez-faire' (tolerance) multiculturalism (encouragement)

Table 5.1. Comparison of models of ethnic difference (S. Castles, 'How Nation-States Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity', *New Community* 21 (3), July 1995)

John Rex also provides four possible ways in which societies can deal with ethnic difference:

- (1) One might envisage a society which is unitary in the public domain but which encourages diversity in what are thought of as private or communal matters.
- (2) A society might be unitary in the public domain and also enforce or at least encourage unitary cultural practice in private or communal matters.
- (3) A society might allow diversity and differential rights for groups in the public domain and also encourage or insist upon diversity of cultural practice by different groups.
- (4) A society might have diversity and differential rights in the public domain even though there is considerable unity of cultural practice between groups.

For Rex, the ideal of multiculturalism is represented by (1); (2) possibly represents the French ideal of assimilation of minority groups; (3) is common under all forms of colonialism, such as a plural society in Indonesia under the rule of the Netherlands, or the South African apartheid system; (4) applies to all kinds of slavery system, like the Deep South of the United States before the Civil Rights programme took effect⁵⁰.

His model is illustrated in Table 5.2.

⁵⁰ John Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State*, Working Papers in the Theory of Multiculturalism and Political Integration (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 16.

Public Private	Unitary	Diversity
	Unitary	Diversity
Unitary	Assimilation model	Slavery system
Diversity	Multicultural model	Pluralism model of colonialism or apartheid

Table 5.2: Models of cultural difference (John Rex)

(*Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State*, Working Papers in the Theory of Multiculturalism and Political Integration, p. 16.)

Using these basic models, which are created by the public and the private domains, Rex constructs his view of 'democratic multiculturalism'. For him, multiculturalism should 'combine the notion of cultural diversity with that of individual equality for all and *per contra*, suggests that the emphasis upon equality does not preclude the recognition and encouragement of diverse cultural forms'⁵¹. He also argues that two separate cultural domains are needed in multiculturalism: one is a shared political culture in the public domains, centring on the idea of equality, which is binding on every member of the society. The other is private or communal culture, which involves separate languages, religions, and family and other cultural practices⁵². The essentials of a multicultural model for Rex include:

- (1) A multicultural society should distinguish between the public domain, in which there is a single culture based upon the notion of equality between individuals, and the private domain.
- (2) The public domain includes the world of law, politics and economics. It also includes education insofar as this is concerned with the transmission of skills and the perpetuation of the civil culture.
- (3) The private domain includes moral education, primary socialisation and the inculcation of religious belief, and immigrant minority communities.
- (4) Nonetheless, minority communities at any one time may conflict with, and challenge, the existing order based. The new social order of the multicultural society is an emergent one which will result from the dialogue and the conflict between cultures⁵³.

Rex's model of multiculturalism is based on the construction of public/private domains.

⁵¹ Ibid., p.56.

⁵² Ibid., p.56.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 29.

It argues that such a concept rests on the recognition of two cultural or value domains, one a shared political culture of the public domain based on the idea of equality, the other a private one based upon differences of language, religion and family customs. For Rex, in the public domain, certain requirements are necessary to defend equality: a national language, a national culture and religion, law, the ethical limits to cultural diversity, schools and multicultural education, and literary, aesthetic or high culture⁵⁴. In the private domain, even though it will be a diverse area, some limits should be established in order to maintain diversity. Thus, dangerous ethnic mobilisation and ethnic cleansing, apartheid and secession, the political loyalty of minority groups, and the regressiveness of minority cultures are to be avoided⁵⁵.

Furthermore, the public domain aims to provide equality for everyone based on civil culture and citizenship, which are related to political, social, economic and cultural rights. Cultural rights are also related to the practice of cultural diversity in the private domain. At the same time, it is necessary to formulate laws in order to protect cultural diversity in the private domain; however, law is viewed as the public domain. Therefore, the distinction between the public domain and the private domain is very complex at some levels. Rex also uses education as an example to explain the overlapping of the public/private domains since education can be viewed both in the public/private domain⁵⁶.

For the following section, I will use Rex's model to discuss the development and reconstruction of ethnic policy in Taiwan. At the same time, I use Taiwanese experience to respond to the model.

5.2.2 The Basic Principles of the Ethnic Policy in the KMT Government

The KMT government ruled Taiwan from 1949 to 2000 and thus dominated ethnic policy for a long time. The Constitution of Republic of China (ROC) and Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's 'The Three Principles of the People'⁵⁷ provide the basis for the ethnic policy of the KMT government⁵⁸. In this section, I argue that the basic principles of ethnic policy of the KMT

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 60--7.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp.68--70.

⁵⁶ Ibid.,pp.21--2.

⁵⁷ Dr Sun Yat-sen set up the KMT party and the Republic of China; thus he was viewed as 'the Father of the Nation'. 'The Three Principles of The People' is his theory to improve the 'Republic of China' as a democratic, national and rich country.

⁵⁸ Before discussing Dr. Sun's theory, it is important to understand the background to the formation of 'The Three Principles of The People'. Dr. Sun led the revolution to overthrow the Ching Dynasty and established the 'Republic of China' in 1911. The Ching Dynasty was set up by the 'Manchus' -- a minority ethnic group in

government are close to a 'unitary' public domain and a 'unitary' private domain, following Rex's model.

Firstly, the public domain is unitary based on Dr. Sun's theory and the Constitution of Republic of China. Of particular importance is Dr. Sun's idea of 'the Republic of Five Nations': In the Ching Dynasty, the Manchu people ruled over other ethnic groups -- the Hans, Mongolians, Tibetans, and Moslems. The Manchus were the 'Masters' in China, and other racial groups were 'slaves', which was similar to the model of slavery discussed by Rex. Dr. Sun decided to promote the equality of all racial groups: he desired the Hans, Manchus, Mongolians, Tibetans and Moslems to build up a country together so that every nation could enjoy freedom and equality after a successful revolution. Furthermore, Dr. Sun hoped to reduce the cultural, economic and social differences between these nations in order to maintain 'equality'. He believed that the Han people should help other 'weak racial groups' in order to improve equity and economic and political rights. According to his view of 'the Republic of Five Nations', the various nations could gain equal status in the public domains, but the equal status depended on the decrease of cultural, economic and social difference.

Another main influence on nations and ethnicity was based on specific laws within the Constitution of the ROC⁵⁹. Firstly, Article 7 protects the principle of equality: 'All nations are equal in the ROC'. Secondly, there was the principle of 'protection for the minority nations': this gave them political participation. For example, the 'protective quota' for minority nations was designed for central elections; thus it could protect their opinions in central policy. Thirdly, the protection of special rights, in particular educational, cultural and public health improvements, was designed to help the life of the minority nations. Therefore, the basic principle of ethnic policy in the KMT government shows that it tends to be unitary in the public domain based on equal rights and common national culture.

For the private domain, it tends to be unitary as well. Dr. Sun emphasised 'national fusion' and 'national assimilation' in order to set up a new nationalism -- Chinese

northern China. Thus, other ethnic groups were ruled by the Manchus. This means that this revolution was related to the 'racial' problem, since the largest ethnic group, the Han people, attempted to regain power. Furthermore, after the nineteenth century, China faced division at the hands of the western powers. Much like other Asian countries, China did not have the power to resist the domination of western countries. Thus, Dr. Sun's theories about nationalism continually revolved around these two problems.

⁵⁹ This Constitution was established when the KMT government was in mainland China. When the KMT government moved to Taiwan, it also used this Constitution in Taiwan.

nationalism -- based on the various nations. At that moment (around 1900--1910), these nations were dependent on other countries⁶⁰. Therefore, Dr. Sun advocated that all nations become a new Chinese nation, fused together by these different individual nations, which was based on the experience of the United States. Thus the way to become a 'melting pot' was through the policy of 'assimilation'.

To sum up, the basic principles of ethnic policy of the KMT government are a unity public domain and a unitary private domain. But these principles were designed to serve the multi-nations (multi-races) in mainland China. After the KMT moved to Taiwan, it did not implement these principles. The first reason for this was the practice of martial law: the Constitution of the 'Republic of China' was not seen as very important under the autocratic KMT government. In addition, the KMT government did not clearly distinguish between the various peoples of Taiwan, e.g. the Fulos or the Hakkas. On the contrary, they assumed that the majority were the Han people. At the same time, for the KMT government, the most important thing was to construct a 'China' in Taiwan on the basis of integration; thus it had to reduce the Japanese influence on the Taiwanese people and help them to identify with Chinese culture. National identity and assimilation policies became the same thing for the various ethnic groups in Taiwan.

5.2.3 The Development of Ethnic Policy in Taiwan: from 1949 to 2002

As I discussed above, the basic principles of ethnic policy of the KMT government tends to be unitary both in public and private domains, however, the real development of ethnic policy is another story. In this section, I will analyse the development of ethnic policy in Taiwan in two phases. The first phase is from 1949 to 1986, and the second phase is from 1986 to 2002. I will argue that from 1949 to 1986, when martial law was abolished, the model of ethnic policy used by the autocratic KMT government was 'diversity in the public domain but unitary in the private domain'. In other words, the government's policy was unequal, and also ignored cultural difference. After 1986, the reconstruction of ethnic policy develops towards a unitary public domain and a diverse private domain, in Rex's model. However, the development towards a multiculturalism model still comes up against many problems and difficulties in this phase.

⁶⁰ For example, the Manchus were dependent on Japan, the Mongolians were tied to Russia, and the Tibetans were dependent on the UK.

Ethnic policy from 1949 to 1986:

Two arguments are offered to support the view of 'diversity in the public domain but unitary in the private domain' in the first phase, from 1949 to 1986. First, we will explain the inequality between the various groups in the public domain, which are related to political, economic and cultural rights. Secondly, we will use some evidence from aboriginal policy to show that the KMT government tried to construct a 'unitary private domain'.

For the first argument, Chang, Mao-Qui analyses the inequality between the Ben-Sheng group and the Wei-Sheng group in the political, cultural and economic fields. In the political field, the 'Event of Two Two Eight' in 1947⁶¹, which was the most serious conflict between the two groups, had two important influences on political development. On the one hand, the KMT government could not trust the Ben-Sheng people, so the latter could not share the same political rights as the Wei-Sheng people. The central government, the KMT party and the military were controlled by the Wei-Sheng people. On the other hand, many Ben-Sheng people, such as intellectuals and officers, were killed in the 'Event of Two Two Eight', and most of the people who survived this event became isolated from politics or moved to other countries. Consequently, the Wei-Sheng could control political power, and others were simply 'ruled' for a long time⁶².

In the economic field, most of the Ben-Sheng people belonged to the farming industry in the 1940s and 1950s, but many Wei-Sheng people, who came with the KMT government, were officers, soldiers or capitalists in mainland China. In general, most of the Wei-Sheng people were middle class, and at the same time they could use their political dominance to further their economic interests. Thus most of the bigger syndicates belonged to the Wei-Sheng. However, the majority of the Ben-Sheng began to develop smaller enterprises without state support⁶³. Since the KMT government could not control the whole economic market, the inequality between the Wei-Sheng and the Ben-Sheng was not as serious as the issue of political rights.

In the cultural field, the Chinese nationalism policy led to other cultures being oppressed in Taiwan from the 1940s to the 1970s. The Wei-Sheng culture was viewed as a

⁶¹ It was the first conflict between the KMT government and Ben-Sheng people. Many Ben-Sheng people were killed in this conflict.

⁶² Chang (1997), pp.46-8.

⁶³ Ibid., p.49.

'high' level of culture, and the Ben-Sheng culture was viewed as a 'low, uneducated' culture⁶⁴. Thus the Wei-Sheng and Ben-Sheng also shared unequal cultural rights.

Turning to the second argument, that the KMT tried to construct a 'unity private domain', the aboriginal policy provides an example of how the government sought to unify the private domain in Taiwan. For example, 'the Administrative Programme of the Mountainous Region'⁶⁵ (1951) was a key component of the development of aboriginal policy. According to the introduction to this programme, 'its purpose is to promote the intelligence of aboriginal people, improve the progress of livelihood for aboriginal people with the principle-of the administration of Taiwan Province, and finally, to reach the goal of equal rights'⁶⁶. The main policies tried to change the traditional aboriginal cultures and customs in order to 'improve' their life⁶⁷. After two years, 'the Plan to Improve the Administration of the Mountainous Region' stressed that the main purpose of aboriginal policy was 'making the mountainous region into plains', with the aim of strengthening the modernisation of the aborigines. The policies sought to enhance the standard of aboriginal culture; to improve the economy of the mountainous region; and to raise the level of public health in the mountainous region⁶⁸.

Through these policies, the KMT government used the assimilation policy to 'unify' the private domain of Taiwanese aborigines. In other words, the aborigines were forced to give up being aborigines in order to become Han people or Chinese. Their traditional values, moral, culture, and social systems were destroyed.

These two arguments suggest that before the abolition of martial law, people could not share equal rights, such as political, cultural and economic rights, in the public domain. At the same time, the powerful state also tried to influence the private domain in order to construct a unified culture. The aborigines were subjected to the most serious harm by

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.48.

⁶⁵ Because the aboriginal people were forced to move to a mountainous region, the government used the term 'mountainous region' to refer to Aboriginal policy.

⁶⁶ Zhang, Jia-Lin, (1994) p. 28.

⁶⁷ The main policies are:(1)Change the customs and habits of aboriginal culture, and advocate the habit of saving money and working hard. (This suggests that the Aboriginal people were a wasteful and lazy people, so they had to change their customs.) (2) Develop social education, and promote Mandarin as a unified language in the mountainous region. (3)Encourage the aboriginal people to live together. (4) Teach aborigines to work agriculture, and increase production. (5) Instill economic ideas among the aboriginal people.(6) Improve the health environment in the mountainous region.

⁶⁸ The Department of Domestic Affairs in the Government of Taiwan Province, 1971.

these policies.

Towards the Multiculturalism Model? The development after 1986

The ethnic policy after 1986 developed towards a unitary public domain and a diverse private domain. In 1986, after the abolition of martial law, Taiwan underwent a process of democratisation and liberation. The process of democratisation and liberation has led to important influences in the public domain and private domain. At first, civil rights, political rights and social rights were developed to protect the freedom and equality of people in the public domain under the democratic system. Secondly, the democratic system also ensures that people could enjoy freedom and diversity and reject the control from the government in the private domain. It provides the basic framework for the multicultural model during 1986 to the earlier 1990s.

However, in the late 1980s, many new social movements appeared to demand more equality for various groups, such as aboriginal groups, working people, and women. Their demands showed that Taiwanese society was still far from being a multicultural society. In the public domain, Taiwanese aborigines did not share the same political, economic and social rights as the Hans, and inequality between Taiwanese aborigines and the Hans indeed existed. In the private domain, the massive loss of traditional ethnic cultures really needed government support in order to maintain a diverse cultural life. In other words, the government had to do more in order to sustain equality common in civil culture in the public domain, and to practice cultural diversity in the private domain.

Many new ethnic policies were formulated in the 1990s under the name of 'multicultural Taiwan' and 'Four Ethnic Groups'. In 1991, the modification of Article 18 of the Constitution sought to guarantee political participation and the improvement of education and culture for Taiwanese aborigines. Furthermore, Article 10 (1997) was designed to express an emphasis on the status and rights of the aboriginal people, e.g. in terms of concern for multiculturalism, the development of aboriginal culture and language, and the protection of political participation. The main purpose of Article 10 is to give recognition to multiculturalism and the collective rights of the aboriginal people, especially the rights to culture and self-government. Of course, collective rights are a big challenge to the sovereignty of the Taiwan government. According to Article 10, 'the Law for the Education of the Aboriginal People'(1998), 'the Law for the Development of the Aboriginal' (2000), and 'the Draft of Self-government' (2000) provided a new status for the aboriginal people to create a different system, e.g. through aboriginal schools. In addition,

Hakka policy also began to develop after 1994, and the Committee for the Hakkas was set up in 2001.

From the development of ethnic policy, I want to highlight two key points. Firstly, the connection between the basic principles of ethnic policy in the KMT government based on the theory of Dr. Sun, Yat-sen and the Constitution of Republic of China is complex. From 1949 to 1986, these basic principles were not implemented in Taiwan because of martial law. At the same time, the KMT government emphasised only 'assimilation' ignoring the 'self-government' aspect advocated by Dr. Sun's theory. After 1986, the KMT government abolished martial-law and 'returned' to the Constitution. However, Dr. Sun's theory was still ignored since that Taiwanese ethnicity was different from the situation of 'multi-races' in China.

Secondly, the development of ethnic policy shows a trend towards Rex's multicultural model. But there are still many problems and conflicts. In the public domain, it is difficult to reach real equality in ethnic policy. For example, there are more than ten sub-groups among Taiwanese aborigines. It is very difficult for smaller groups to obtain representation against larger ones. Therefore, the smaller groups of aborigines ask that each sub-group should have one representative in order to protect their political rights no matter how small their population is⁶⁹. This argument shows the difficulty in judging what real equality is, and in balancing difference and equality in the public domain. In addition, as Rex points out, the government needs to formulate policy in order to maintain cultural diversity in the private domain⁷⁰. In Taiwan, the government not only formulates the various policies, but also provides the main resources to support aboriginal culture. The problem here is that the government becomes the dominant power influencing the development of aboriginal culture. Therefore, are the influences from the government useful to maintain a diverse private domain, or on contrary, do they damage it as before?

These problems influence the development of ethnic policy in Taiwan, and most of them are related to the debate of minority rights. In the next section, I will discuss the reconstruction of minority rights under 'multicultural Taiwan' and 'Four Ethnic Groups'.

⁶⁹ As a result, for example, the bigger group in aborigines (about 13,000 peoples) has one representative, as has the smaller group (800 people). It will create another new equal principle of equality in law—every one should have the same political participation.

⁷⁰ John Rex, (1996), p.22.

5.3 The Reconstruction of Minority Rights

The development of minority rights can be viewed as a new and important influence on multicultural Taiwan. In this section, I will argue that minority rights should be based on different levels of citizenship, such as 'basic' rights for all groups and individuals and 'group-specific' rights; rights in relation to the nation and rights in relation to the specific community. These rights emerge from the debate on minority rights and practical developments in Taiwan.

5.3.1 The Expansion of Minority Rights of Citizenship

The protection of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups is one of the oldest concerns of international law. According to Thornberry, the rise of the state system in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was accompanied by the emergence of an international law reflecting that system, and a concern for minority rights⁷¹. But the development of minority rights was limited, since most states were devoted to nation-building⁷². After the 1970s, more scholars felt that minorities could enrich human rights through developing the language of existence and identity and principles of participation in cultural, social, economic and public life⁷³. The minority rights international law programme was in the process of development, spurred by Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political rights⁷⁴.

However, there are different views on the nature and scope of minority rights. For example, Thornberry analyses the development of minority rights in international law in terms of the right to existence, the right to identity, the right not to be discriminated against, and the rights of indigenous peoples. First, 'the right to existence' of a minority is the basic right to the physical existence of members of minority groups. Secondly, 'the right to identity' seeks to avoid any kind of 'cultural genocide' by protecting the cultural identity of a minority⁷⁵. The concept of 'the right to identity' also covers three rights: the right to culture, the right to religion and the right to language. Thirdly, 'the right not to be discriminated against' provides another balance between the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities. Thornberry stresses the wishes of minority groups to

⁷¹ Patrick Thornberry, *International Law and the Rights of Minorities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 1

⁷² Patrick Thornberry, 'Introduction: In the Strongroom of Vocabulary', in Peter Cumper and Steven Wheatley (eds.) *Minority Rights in the 'New' Europe*. (Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999), p.1.

⁷³ *Ibid.*; p.5.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*; p.2.

⁷⁵ Thornberry, (1991), p.141.

maintain their distinctive cultures, languages or religions and the need for a guarantee of non-discrimination so that their integration into the wider national society is always based on their inter-relationships. Thus 'the right to identity' and 'the right not to be discriminated against' become the two important rights for the protection of minority groups.

According to Thornberry's views, the construction of minority rights is related to different levels of rights--basic rights and special rights. 'The right to exist' and 'the right not to be discriminated against' can be viewed as a basic right for all groups and individuals. 'The right to identity' is close to specific rights.

Other theorists also try to classify the content of minority rights, although they use different terms to refer to those rights. For example, Pogge points out that the expression 'group rights' may cover at least three different kinds of legal rights. First, there are group rights proper. These are rights that a group can be viewed as a group-- they can exercise these rights as a group through group-specific decision mechanisms. Secondly, there are group-specific rights. These are rights possessed only by members of a certain group rather than by all. For example, blacks may have the active right to receive favorable consideration in university admissions. Finally, there are group-statistical rights -- rights that protect or enhance the aggregate status of the members of a group⁷⁶.

In addition, Pogge formulates conventional group rights at both the theoretical and practical levels. To begin with, he thinks that two things should be considered. First, western societies are very strongly committed to freedom of association and freedom of contract. This commitment requires and justifies legal group rights, such as the rights of the owners of a corporation, and the rights of members of a political party or club. Secondly, every democratic society assigns to the group of its active citizens group-special rights to political participation. These citizens may run for various political offices and may also participate in the exercise of their group right to determine the national government through nationwide elections⁷⁷. Therefore, Pogge provides a useful distinction between 'basic' rights--freedom to associate and freedom to contract, and 'special' rights--such as special political rights. Minority rights should include both these types of rights.

Kymlicka also reinforces the similar view in the practice of minority rights. According

⁷⁶ Thomas W. Pogge, 'Group Rights and Ethnicity', Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro (eds.), *Ethnicity and Group Rights* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), p.198.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p.196.

to Kymlicka, minority rights share two important features. First, they go beyond the familiar set of common civil and political rights of individual citizenship, which are protected in all liberal democracies. Secondly, they are adopted with the intention of recognising and accommodating the distinctive identities and needs of ethno-cultural groups⁷⁸. These two features are struggling in the development and the meaning of minority rights in multicultural citizenship.

Kymlicka explores the development of minority rights in terms of three stages. The first stage involves the debate between liberalism and communitarianism before 1989. This debate is an old and venerable one within political philosophy. Liberals insist that individuals should be free to decide on their own conception of the good life, and applaud the liberation of individuals from any ascribed or inherited status. However, communitarians dispute this conception of the 'autonomous individual', and they view people as 'embedded' in particular social roles and relationships. Thus, communitarians see individuals as the product of social practices, and their communities provide a good balance between individual choice and protection of the communal way of life⁷⁹.

Consequently, in this first stage, the assumption is that one's position on minority rights is dependent on, and derivative of, one's position on the liberal-communitarian debate. Liberals see minority rights as useless; furthermore, they also feel that minority rights will damage individual rights. By contrast, communitarians believe that minority rights are a good way of protecting communities from the eroding effects of individual autonomy, and of affirming the value of community⁸⁰. In short, minority rights are viewed as a 'protection' for ethno-cultural communities.

In the second stage, the arguments on minority rights develop within liberalism. The key issue for liberals is: what is the possible scope for minority rights within liberal theory? The issue is no longer how to protect communitarian minorities from liberalism, but whether minorities that share basic liberal principles nonetheless need minority rights. If groups are indeed liberal, why do their members want minority rights? Why are they not satisfied with the traditional common rights of citizenship⁸¹? Kymlicka answers these problems by recourse to Joseph Raz's theory. Raz insists that the autonomy of

⁷⁸ Will Kymlicka, 'Introduction' in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds.), 'Citizenship in Diverse Societies' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 2.

⁷⁹ Kymlicka (2001), pp.18-9.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p.19.

⁸¹ Ibid., p.21.

individuals — their ability to make good choices amongst good lives — is intimately tied up with access to their culture, with the prosperity and flourishing of their culture, and with the respect accorded their culture by others. Minority rights help ensure this cultural flourishing and mutual respect⁸². Other liberals, such as David Miller and Yael Tamir, also share the same attitude to the importance of cultural membership or national identity to modern citizenship. They argue that there are compelling interests related to culture and identity which are fully consistent with liberal principles of freedom and equality, and which justify granting special rights to minorities⁸³.

However, critics of liberal culturalism have raised many objections to these arguments. For example, some deny that we can intelligibly distinguish between individuated cultures or cultural groups. Others deny that we can make sense of the claim that people are 'members' of a culture. Furthermore, some think that we have no reason to assume that the wellbeing or freedom of the individual is tied in any way to the flourishing of their culture. In the second stage of the debate, therefore, the question of minority rights is reformulated as a question within liberal theory, and the aim is to show that some minority rights claims enhance liberal values. The claims of ethno-cultural groups have been made in liberal theory, and a more accurate understanding of the normative issues involved is raised not only in the liberal theory, but also in the practice of western democratic systems.

In the third stage, Kymlicka thinks that minority rights are not viewed as a deviation from ethno-cultural neutrality, but as a response to majority nation-building. This new model raises two important questions: What are permissible forms of nation-building? What are fair terms of integration for immigrants?⁸⁴

Taking into account the various debates on minority rights, we will argue that minority rights should be seen as a part of citizenship. However, a minority group has two different statuses: one is as citizens of a country; the other is as members of the minority group. Thus there are two kinds of 'minority rights'. First, there are basic human rights such as equal rights (non-discrimination) -- minority groups should share these equal rights with other groups in the political, economic, social and cultural fields -- and freedoms -- minority groups share the same freedoms with others, e.g. freedoms of opinion, assembly, belief and movement.

⁸² Ibid., p.21.

⁸³ Ibid, p.21.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p.38.

Secondly, there are special rights such as the right to collective identity, autonomy (self-government, self-determination and special group representation), and cultural rights. These rights can help the advancement of individual rights and liberties, and the advancement of a national model of participation and citizenship.

5.3.2 The Development of Minority Rights in Taiwan

Following the above discussion, I will argue that these different levels of rights are in fact complementary in the development of 'multicultural Taiwan'. For example, special rights are necessary if the aboriginal people are to acquire 'basic' human rights. Without such special measures and acknowledgement of 'groups rights', the universal, basic rights will only be available in theory, not implemented in practice. Furthermore, the acknowledgement of 'special rights' is partly pragmatic--it is a response to the real circumstances a Taiwan's experience rather than a fixed principle.

The Development of Basic Rights

(1) Non-Discrimination

Based on the Tenth Article of the Constitution, the Aboriginal Development Act claims states that the government will protect the aborigines to ensure that they have the same rights and dignity as other people. In particular, the aborigines will have the right to non-discrimination.

(2) Equal Rights:

There are various dimensions in the concept of citizenship, such as civil rights, political rights, economic rights, social rights and cultural rights. We need to consider whether the different ethnic groups enjoy equality of these rights or not.

As far as political rights are concerned, the aborigines gained the status of representatives before 1997, but this was based on their population, which was very small. In 1997, the amendment of the Constitution provided a special quota for them in order to protect their political rights⁸⁵. According to Gao, De-yi, the rate of aboriginal representation is about 3.2%, i.e. more than or similar to the rate of their population.

⁸⁵ The population of Taiwanese aborigines was only 3--5% of the whole population. Thus it was very difficult to gain any representative status. In order to protect their political participation, the Constitution expanded the Article to provide a 'protective quota' in 1995. Now, Taiwanese aborigines can have representatives in the assemblies at various levels.

However, 71.7% of aborigines still feel that their political participation is not equal to that of the Hans⁸⁶. For example, there are several sub-groups of aborigines, some of which have only 2,000 or 3,000 members. Thus it is very difficult for them to gain a representative status as significant as that of bigger groups, like the Amis, whose population is about 140,000. These smaller groups now demand that the government should provide at least one quota for each group of aborigines. For other groups, about 100,000 people can gain one representative. However, if each group of aborigines has one representative, this could be seen to lead to 'inequality'⁸⁷. And this also raises the problems of whether the Taiwanese aborigines should be treated as a unified ethnic group, or as an aggregate of sub-groups.

Turning to economic rights, some research shows that there is no clear economic difference between the three groups among the Hans⁸⁸. However, aborigines are certainly an 'economically oppressed groups'. According to the new data for 2002 from the CAA, the average income for one aborigine is 11,000 New Taiwan Dollars per month compared with 28,939 NTD for the whole of Taiwan. The average rate of unemployment is 5.26% in Taiwan, but is 14.86% for aborigines⁸⁹. This shows that the economic rights of aborigines are not yet being implemented. Thus, the CAA has provided policies to improve their economic rights, such as 'the Laws to Protect the Right to Work for Aborigines'.

There are still many problems for aboriginal social rights. For example, 90% of all areas in Taiwan have access to tap water, but only 53.48% of aboriginal and tribal areas have such access. Moreover, the average of life span is 75.3 years in Taiwan, but is only 67.4 years for aborigines.

In terms of cultural rights, 45% of aborigines have education higher than junior high school compared with 60% of the whole population. 12% of aborigines have education higher than college or university, but for the whole population the figure is 26%⁹⁰.

According to these data, it is clear that the starting-point for multicultural citizenship --

⁸⁶ Gao, De-yi, 'The Theory and Practice of The Rights of The Peoples: The Evaluation of Taiwanese Aboriginal Rights', *Taiwan Law Report*, Vol.20, December 1998, p.84.

⁸⁷ Interview with Lin, Jiang-yi.

⁸⁸ According to data for 1991, average family incomes were: for mainlanders about 39,605 NTD; for the Hakkas 36,233 NTD; for the Fulos 33,636 NTD; and for Taiwanese aborigines 27,800 NTD. Huang, Xuan-Fan (1995), pp. 44--5.

⁸⁹ The data are from the CAA (May 2002).

⁹⁰ The data are from the CAA (May 2002).

equality of citizenship – is not yet practised in Taiwan. However, several policies of the CAA are intended to protect the equality of aboriginal citizenship.

(3) Freedom:

The principle of freedom of association means that members of ethnic groups would be free to organise ethnic associations, such as firms, churches, hospitals, political parties, and private educational institutions. Also of great importance are freedom of contract and freedom to choose beliefs, culture, and language. With the basic civil rights, the minority groups can share freedom in Taiwan.

The government has encouraged the setting up of aboriginal associations. According to Gao, there are about 42 aboriginal associations at the national level, and about 464 at the local level⁹¹. In addition, some new laws, such as the 'Aboriginal Education Act' and the 'Aboriginal Development Act' also provide aborigines with the freedom to choose and develop their culture, language and beliefs, and to set up aboriginal schools.

The Development of Special Rights:

The Draft for 'The Aboriginal Autonomy Act' is still being discussed by the government. However, according to 'The Aboriginal Development Act', the government has to protect the self-government rights of aborigines.

Polyethnic rights are dealt with through assistance policy, exemption from laws which penalise or burden cultural practices, and the recognition of traditions. There are many policies related to polyethnic rights. In terms of assistance policy, the government provides sponsorship for cultural activities and programmes of the mass media of benefit to the Hakkas and the aborigines. It has helped them to set up Hakka and aboriginal radio and TV channels. In 2000, the CCA issued a cultural policy to help minority groups preserve their culture. For example, the rules on 'Aboriginal Special Culture and Hunting' relaxed restrictions on hunting in National Parks in order to maintain the aborigines' traditional culture.

The CAA and the Committee of the Hakkas have been set up to protect the special representation rights of these two groups. In addition, some local governments have set up similar committees to deal with their affairs at the local level. Taiwanese aborigines also

⁹¹ Gao, (1998), p.84.

share special representation rights in elections. However, the Hakkas do not have this right, since their political participation is already strong.

Based on the Tenth Article of the Constitution, the redefinition of Taiwan as a 'multicultural country' indeed justifies the development of minority rights, and reconstructs the concept of ethnic rights in Taiwan.

Therefore, the experience of Taiwan shows that basic rights and special rights are complementary. In order to protect equal rights, it is necessary to practice special rights. Furthermore, the practice of a special right is also circumstantial, so for example as the aborigines have special representation rights in elections, but the Hakkas do not.

Conclusion

We have argued that the formation of ethnic groups is 'constructed' in terms of political, social and cultural changes. Through these changes, the politics of Taiwan has been viewed as a process of 'ethnic-isation', and the discourse of 'Four Ethnic Groups' has become the most important classification in Taiwan.

The discourse of 'multicultural Taiwan' and 'Four Ethnic Groups' provides three new reconstructions of ethnic relationship in Taiwan. First, the external and internal factors related to these two discourses have led the traditional ethnic groups to redefine or reconstruct their ethnic identity. Under the name of 'multicultural Taiwan' and 'Four Ethnic Groups', Taiwanese aborigines, the Hakkas, the Fulos and the mainlanders are developing new identities.

Secondly, there has also been a reconstruction of the model of ethnic policy in Taiwan. According to the model of John Rex, the ethnic policy of Taiwan has indeed developed from 'the diverse public domain and the unitary private domain' to 'the unitary public domain and the unitary private domain' to 'the unitary public domain and the diverse private domain', which is the multicultural model.

Thirdly, new ethnic rights have also developed under the influence of 'multicultural Taiwan', including basic rights and special rights. Aboriginal rights provide a good example for the investigation of the development of ethnic rights in Taiwan, especially in terms of equal rights and freedoms, non-discrimination, self-government rights, polyethnic rights, and special representation rights.

Finally, from these reconstructions, it also shows that 'multicultural Taiwan' is related to two trends. On the one hand, it is necessary to reconstruct a common, unitary public domain, which is based on basic rights and citizenship. On the other hand, it also needs to provide 'special rights' in order to maintain a 'diverse' private domain. However, the balance between 'basic' rights and 'special' rights is usually difficult in Taiwan. At first, the reconstruction of ethnicity is not stable in Taiwan. The concept of 'Four Ethnic Groups' and ethnic identity in general are problematic because the definition of 'group' and 'identity' are ever more fragmented. Secondly, even though Taiwanese society tries to develop as a 'multicultural model' following Rex, the distinction between the public domain and the private domain is very ambiguous. In addition, basic rights and special rights in citizenship are complementary and pragmatic in Taiwan. These problems lead to various challenges to 'multicultural Taiwan'.

Chapter 6: Citizenship, Civil Society and Community Renaissance

The analysis in the previous chapters has shown that in Taiwan the most powerful social cleavage is not that of class or gender but that of ethnic difference, which has a major impact on conflicts of national identity. Both ethnicity and national identity are founded on the same blood relationships and a shared culture and historical background, but not on citizenship and democracy. While there are some elements of democracy in Taiwan, the tradition of civil society is still underdeveloped.

Compared with the western experience of developing multicultural citizenship, Taiwan's situation is different in one key respect: in Taiwan the issues of multiculturalism and citizenship have to be dealt with at the same time, whereas in the west the tradition of citizenship is already strong. In the 1990s in Taiwan, one specific cultural policy -- Community Renaissance -- deliberately sought to foster communal identity, encourage civil participation, develop citizenship, and construct an active civil society. At the same time, this policy has played an important role in improving 'multicultural Taiwan'. What is not clear is whether it is possible for Community Renaissance to achieve these two broad aims simultaneously.

This chapter concentrates on Community Renaissance as a case study of cultural policy and the practice of citizenship in Taiwan. In particular, it explores whether Community Renaissance has protected cultural difference or strengthened multicultural citizenship. In the first section the focus is on the problems of citizenship and civil society in Taiwan. Secondly, the development of Community Renaissance is explained. Thirdly, the impact of Community Renaissance on the development of citizenship and civil society is discussed. The fourth section considers the issue of the toleration of cultural difference.

We will conclude that Community Renaissance *can* combine cultural difference and citizenship in many cases. In other words, civil identity does not reject ethnic identity in the practical experience of Community Renaissance. New possibilities for multicultural citizenship can be expected to emerge from Community Renaissance.

6.1 The Problems of Citizenship and Civil Society in Taiwan

In Chinese and Taiwanese history the lack of awareness of citizenship and civil society had meant that the 'country' has been seen to be based on national, blood relationships, shared culture and experience. Most Chinese and Taiwanese believe that this is how a country is built. Since there is no consciousness of citizenship or social contract in Chinese society, the emphasis has always been on control through an autocratic bureaucratic system¹. That is why many people think that democracy is alien to the country's traditions. In effect, the democracy of Taiwan is democracy only in form but not in content.

In other words, the Taiwanese identify themselves more as 'nationals' or on the basis of ethnicity rather than as 'citizens'. Qian, Yong-Xiang points out that the identity of Taiwan is always related to land, culture, history and language. In contrast, the identity of citizens should be based on equal rights and duties, public participation, the democratic process and the political system. The lack of awareness of what it is to be a 'citizen' has resulted in the underdevelopment of civil society in Taiwan. The Taiwanese prefer to view public affairs from a traditional point of view, i.e. in terms of people's relationships and 'brotherhood'². Moreover, Jiang, Yi-Hua believes that arguments about national identity, in terms of both 'unification' and 'independence', are related to nationalism, which leads to many conflicts in Taiwan. For him, nationalism is useful for encouraging a nation to resist external crisis, however, it also causes conflicts in multi-racial countries. The author stresses the need for a new view of national identity based on constitutional government and citizenship, and focusing on the protection of human rights, the practice of citizenship, and political equality³.

Similar arguments are also provided in the discussion of 'civil society' in Taiwan. Many scholars have discussed the reasons why Taiwan has not developed a civil society. Xu, Wei-Jie, for example, provides a number of reasons. Under the influence of Chinese traditional values, people have no interest in public affairs beyond considerations of blood relationship or kinship. Thus people only have private values but no public values⁴. At the

¹ Chen, Qi-Nan, *The Civil Country Consciousness and Political Development in Taiwan* (Taipei, Yun-chen Publisher, 1992), p.8. (Chinese)

² Qian, Yong-Xiang, 'Liberalism versus Nationalism -- The Rethinking of Two Values', in *China Times*, 20 November 1999. (Chinese)

³ Jiang, Yi-hua (1998), pp. 191-4.

⁴ Xu, Wei-jie, *The Participation of Citizens, and The Theory and Practice of Public Administration: The Ideal Construction of Civil Government*, PhD Thesis, Department of Public Administration, (Taipei: Cheng-Chi University, 2000), p.211. (Chinese)

same time, there is no independent public sphere as a medium of negotiation and dialogue between society and government, and hence no opportunity for citizens to participate in public affairs. In particular, the mass media were controlled by the KMT government for a long time. After 1986, when martial law was abolished, the mass media were dominated by capitalists. Thus the mass media cannot be regarded as an autonomous public sphere⁵. Another problem is that conflicts between ethnic groups and persistent arguments about 'unification' and 'independence' have further encouraged people to identify themselves with culture, blood ties and ethnicity. These tendencies have strengthened the development of Taiwanese nationalism but have not promoted the construction of citizenship consciousness and civil society⁶.

These arguments are very close to the views of Habermas. According to Habermas, citizenship is 'political membership'. It is only recently that the concept has been expanded to cover the status of citizens defined in terms of civil rights. In addition, citizenship has as its reference point the problem of societal self-organization and at its core the political rights of participation and communication. The status of citizen is constituted above all by those democratic rights to which the individual can reflexively lay claim in order to alter this material legal status⁷.

From the perspective of citizenship, Habermas reinforces the argument that national identity should be based on civil rights and democratic system, but not ethnic or cultural origins. Habermas points out:

Examples of multicultural societies like Switzerland and the United States demonstrate that a political culture in the seedbed of which constitutional principles are rooted by no means has to be based on all citizens sharing the same language or the same ethnic and cultural origins. Rather, the political culture must serve as the common denominator for a constitutional patriotism which simultaneously sharpens an awareness of the multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life which coexist in a multicultural society. In a future Federal Republic of European States, the same legal principles would also have to be interpreted from the vantage point of different national traditions and histories....It must be connected with the overlapping consensus of a common, supranationally shared political culture of the European Community. Particularist anchoring of this sort would in no way

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 213.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

⁷ Jürgen Habermas, 'Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe', *Praxis International* 12:1, April 1992, p.5.

impair the universalist meaning of popular sovereignty and human rights⁸.

Based on this model, the issues of citizenship and civil society were considered in cultural policy in Taiwan in the 1990s. Dr. Chen, Qi-Nan joined the CCA with responsibility for formulating cultural policy. Previously Chen had pointed out that in western societies the relationship between the individual and society was based on a form of social contract, and this reinforced the sense of social solidarity, cohesion and community. However, traditionally there have been no concepts of social contract, community or citizenship in traditional Chinese society. The concept of 'country' in China suggests a linkage based on a shared culture and kinship ties, but not a 'public' identity⁹. Every individual is very much the same: they share Chinese culture and traditional character, but there is no social solidarity. Thus, the construction of citizenship is very important if Taiwan is to become a civil society.

Moreover, culture plays a key role in the formation of citizenship. This is why cultural policy should be seen as a means of moving from traditional consciousness, based on national or ethnic identity, to a modern consciousness of citizenship¹⁰. In fact, many researchers have discussed the practice of citizenship in cultural policy with reference to different levels of responsibility, i.e. the supranational, national and local (sub-national) levels. Jude Bloomfield and Franco Bianchini (2001), for example, analyse the links between cultural citizenship and cultural policy in urban governance in Western Europe. They suggest that there are three distinct periods in which city authorities have considered the practice of citizenship¹¹. Culture was reconsidered as different functions in citizenship, and cultural policy was utilised to improve the practice of citizenship in the various stages. For example, in the second period (from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s) new socio-economic and political factors had a major impact on Western societies, and the more innovative and radical notion of 'emancipatory citizenship' emerged in many cities¹². Some new thinking appeared in this phase, including a greater emphasis on the importance of popular participation in cultural activities as a means of social emancipation and community development. The aim was to create a common civic space and identity based

⁸ Ibid., p.7.

⁹ Chen, Qi-Nan (1992), pp.7--8.

¹⁰ Chen, Qi-Nan, 'Cultural Policy and the New Taiwanese', *Union News*, 16 May 1999.

¹¹ Jude Bloomfield and Franco Bianchini, 'Cultural Citizenship and Urban Governance in Western Europe', in Nick Stevenson (eds.), *Culture & Citizenship* (London: Sage, 2001), p.111.

¹² This notion was expressed, for example, in the community media movement in Britain, the Soziokultur movement in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the youth movement in Italy. See *ibid.*, p. 112.

on place, to empower and give a voice to disadvantaged individuals and groups, to allow them to constitute themselves as self-conscious communities and to make their presence felt in a revitalised public sphere. Accordingly, the definition of culture was widened to include more popular cultural forms such as electronic music, video, photography, comics and murals¹³. Cultural policy sought to redefine the relationship between the local state and civil society, to create a new civil identity, and to empower disadvantaged groups.

Therefore, Bloomfield and Bianchini suggest that it is time to rethink the role of cultural citizenship in urban cultural policy. City authorities should enhance citizenship and construct a local civic identity and public sphere. Such a public sphere 'has to be both a multi-cultural and inter-cultural space, in which diverse voices can be heard, protagonists speak for themselves, control the representations of themselves to others'. It should also be 'a pluralist cultural space based on dialogue and social negotiation between different voices, value and interests.'¹⁴

Maurice Roche's analysis offers a basis for constructing a new European citizenship in cultural policy¹⁵. First, a common culture is often taken as the foundation of collective identity and hence of citizenship¹⁶. Secondly, there is not yet a common culture among the various European countries. For Roche, the culture-citizenship relationship can be seen in terms of the metaphor of a common ground of citizenship¹⁷. A 'common political culture' is here viewed as the basis of cultural citizenship. Thirdly, in order to strengthen a 'common political culture' or cultural citizenship, culture needs to be embraced as a theme in the European Union's policy¹⁸.

The lessons drawn from these cases and examples suggest a number of general conclusions. First, the importance of cultural policy is stressed through the study and the practice of citizenship. Secondly, citizenship is becoming an important issue in cultural

¹³ *ibid.*, p. 112.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 118.

¹⁵ Maurice Roche (2001), pp. 74-98.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p.75.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p.79.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, p p.81--85. Examples of such cultural policies include: (1) 1985: the plan for a 'European City of Culture';(2)1985: the Addonino Report, 'A People's Europe', which recognised the need for a popular cultural strategy to promote the EC and the case of Europeanisation and its relevance for people's everyday lives; (3) 1991: the Commission produced the 'TV Without Frontiers' Directive, which proposed programme quotas to protect European-based programming, and provided for the free movement of TV broadcasting within the EU.

policy, especially in terms of the ideas of active citizenship and civil society; and culture is also becoming a main theme in the construction of citizenship. Thirdly, cultural citizenship is viewed as a common space for both multicultural and inter-cultural development.

In Taiwan, Community Renaissance is based on the issues of citizenship and civil society, and the importance of citizenship in cultural policy. The weakness and underdevelopment of citizenship in Taiwan led to the construction of citizenship and civil society as an important issue in cultural policy in the 1990s, and led to the emergence of Community Renaissance as the main cultural policy.

6.2 The Development of Community Renaissance

In Taiwan the communal movements developed about ten years ago. From the 1980s, a series of social movements highlighted the range of social problems that Taiwan had faced for 40 years, including the reconstruction of people's relationships, the urban-rural imbalance, the degeneration of the ecological environment, and the neglect of minority groups. These social movements tried to challenge the KMT government. At first there were literary movements, environmental movements and political movements. From the 1990s, the social movements declined. 'Community' was viewed as a new basis for social movements seeking to expand their support base and resources¹⁹. Examples of this trend are the anti-reservoir movement in Mei-Long, the 'saving old trees' movement in Yang-mei town, and the Fu-lin communal movement in Taipei. The residents of communities showed a willingness to participate in public affairs when their communities faced a crisis. At the same time, the CCA began to discuss the possibilities for a new cultural policy rooted in communal identity. This led eventually to the formation of Community Renaissance, which was seen as a new way to encourage citizens' consciousness and to construct a civil society in Taiwan.

For Chen, 'community' includes geographical identity, in towns, cities and villages, and identity based on non-geographical formations, such as all kinds of occupational groups and civil associations. These are all important for the development of a democratic society. However, initially policy needs to focus on geographical communities in order to promote the identity and public participation of community members. With the construction of community 'from the bottom to the top', the political reforms of democratisation and liberalisation will be achieved, and the social order and coherence of the whole society will

¹⁹ Chen, Qi-Nan and Chen Rui-hua (1998), p. 23.

be maintained²⁰.

Community Renaissance brought together a range of ideas from Western societies and Japan. First, it reflected the notion of 'American democracy'. Chen's concepts of democracy and civil society were greatly influenced by the views of Alexis de Tocqueville, according to whom the public participation of citizens is the only sound basis for a genuine democracy and civil society. Chen believed that the practice and learning of democracy should come from the community. Through such democratic procedures people can achieve a common view as the basis for deciding about their public affairs, as in the United States, from the local level to the state level and then to the federal level²¹. In this way a sound civil society can be established.

Secondly, Community Renaissance was also influenced by the idea of 'community architecture' in the UK. This idea advocates that architectural decisions should be based on the participation of users, e.g. through community design and community landscaping. It emphasises the importance of active participation by community residents²². It is also related to communitarianism, which emphasises the 'common good' of the community (rather than individual self-interest) and the importance of citizen duty, participation, and a shared history and culture. The 'common good' thus plays the same role as the idea of the 'social contract' in connecting different individuals as citizens.

Thirdly, the 'Machitsukuri'²³ of Japan also provided a good basis for Community Renaissance. The 'Machitsukuri' stressed not only the improvement of the environment but also the health and happiness of community residents. The content of the 'Machitsukuri' included the promotion of local or communal history and culture, the protection of local customs and practices, the natural environment, the nurture of local talent, and the establishment of local or communal organisations, the creation of communal systems, the increase of local works, and the improvement of communal living conditions.²⁴

²⁰ Chen, Qi-Nan, 'Community and the Reconstruction of Country', in *China Times*, 6th October, 1994. (Chinese)

²¹ Chen, Qi-Nan, 'Ethnicity, Citizenship and Community', in *China Times*, 25th, April 1999. (Chinese)

²² Hwang, Shyh-Huei and Miyazaki Kiyoshi, 'From Products Design to Community Design: From Japan to See the Development and Way of Community Renaissance in Taiwan', in Wang, Xu-De (eds.), *Community Renaissance: The Idea and Case Studies of Community Renaissance* (Taipei: CCA, 1999), p. 62. (Chinese)

²³ It is a communal movement and community reconstruction in Japan.

²⁴ Chen, Qi-Nan and Chen Rui-Hua (1998), p.29.

Fourthly, Community Renaissance was influenced by the ideas of postmodernism. Chen acknowledges that modernism and the Enlightenment led to many advances in the world, but at the same time they caused environmental destruction, wars and the plundering of resources. Postmodernism's critique of modernism is reflected in the standpoint of Community Renaissance. For Chen:

When capitalism causes people to be alienated, community life becomes the final bastion of human nature. When the natural environment and traditional culture are destroyed, ecological ethics and local emotions become progressive thinking. When professional knowledge and rationalism overdevelop, the emotion and the humility of the common people become valuable property. When the centralism of globalisation and governmental politics and economy override others, critical localism arises. When people believe that they have unlimited potential and achievement, we begin to search for value in nature and human nature. Community Renaissance developed in this situation.²⁵

Therefore, Chen saw Community Renaissance as a kind of postmodern policy. It not only criticizes modernism but also provides more flexible and diverse attitudes for people to construct their community. Every community renaissance is a test. People will achieve different results and influences in their community. Community Renaissance is not a modern policy with very fixed principles and functions; on the contrary, it has different features according to how people deal with their communities.

Community Renaissance not only aims to reconstruct architecture and space; it also embraces the following principles:

- The existence of community and common identity is of primary importance.
- The formation of community identity arises from the active participation of residents in community affairs.
- Different communities should develop their own lives and cultural movements.
- The active participation of residents is the most important power for reconstructing community.
- Community Renaissance is concerned with the whole community, including culture, industry, environment, education and public policy.
- Community Renaissance emphasises the principle of 'from below to the top'²⁶.

²⁵ Chen, Qi-Nan, 'The Rethinking of the Enlightenment', in *Union News*, 10 August 1999. (Chinese)

²⁶ Hwang, Shyh-Huei and Miyazaki Kiyoshi (1999), pp.62-3.

Based on these principles, Community Renaissance has become as the most important cultural policy in Taiwan from 1993. In 1993, the third Chief of the CCA, Shen, Xue-yong, gave a speech emphasizing the importance of community and culture: 'there are many problems between the government and society. The CCA has to revise the relationship between local cultural centres and integrate the different cultural resources in society'. She also stressed that 'one function of local cultural construction is to nurture community consciousness. In Taiwan, the old community has been deconstructed, but the new community has not yet been formed, and this has led to the country lacking cohesion. In order to construct a strong community, it is necessary to develop communal culture'²⁷. Thus, she proposed the policy of 'using cultural construction to practise Community Renaissance'. The main purposes were: to awaken communal consciousness, improve the autonomy of community, manage culture, develop cultural affairs, promote the operation of local organisations, and integrate important public constructions²⁸.

In the same year, the Chief of the Administrative Yuan, Lian, Zhan, emphasised 'the substance of cultural facilities in towns and communities' as part of his 'Twelve Constructions'. There were three aspects of this cultural policy: the improvement of cultural activities and facilities in counties and cities; the improvement of cultural development in towns and villages; and the development and the preserve of traditional and modern arts²⁹. The aims of this policy were: to reform local society, to foster culture and the arts, and thereby to reconstruct the community in order to reform the whole society.

In 1994, the CCA decided to use the term 'Community Renaissance' to cover these new approaches to cultural policy. It endorsed a wide range of activities, including the continuation of the National Cultural Seasons, the promotion of 'cultural localization', the sponsorship of native and local cultural workshops, the setting up of new approaches to the local environment, the popularization of international activity in local areas, and the development of local cultural property.

In the late 1990s, new Community Renaissance policies included: 'The Plan to Reinforce the Facilities of Performance in Towns and Villages'³⁰, 'The Plan to Set up the

²⁷ Shen, Xue-Yong, 'The Work Report of the CCA', 8th, December 1993.

²⁸ Huang, Huang-Xiong, Quo, Shi-Ji and Lin, Shi-Ji, *The Investigation Report on Community Renaissance*, (Taipei: Yuan-liu, 2001), p. 9. (Chinese)

²⁹ Ibid: pp.56-9.

³⁰ This plan was for the period 1995-2001. It aimed to balance the cultural development of urban and rural areas, implement basic cultural construction, and encourage people to participate in community cultural

Main Exhibition Museum and Reinforce the Cultural Gallery'³¹, 'The Plan to Enhance the Local Traditional Cultural Space and Architecture'³², 'The Plans to Promote Local Cultural Property' (1999)³³, 'The Reconstruction After the 921 Earthquake', and 'The Establishment of Local Cultural Museums' (2001).

In 2002, You, Xi-Kun, head of Yi-Lan county³⁴, took over as head of the Administrative Yuan. At the same time, Dr. Chen, Qi-Nan returned to the government to push the Community Renaissance programme forward with the CCA, the Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, the Committee of Hakkas, the Ministry of Domestic Affairs, the Ministry of Economy, and the Department of Health. The new policies included: the activation of community; the integration of community resources; new tribal movements; and the new Hakka movement. The aim was to push Community Renaissance across the various Ministries and Committees³⁵.

6.3 Citizenship and Civil Society in Community Renaissance

The main aim of Community Renaissance is to construct civil society and citizens' consciousness in Taiwan. About ten years later, what are its influences on the development of citizenship and civil society in Taiwan?

First, according to Chen, we have to be clear about what 'citizen' means. For Chen, Taiwanese society is still based on 'subjects', who consider the interests of individuals, family or their friends as the most important thing. However, 'citizen' is a 'political' and 'social' unit, whose status is based on country and society. When citizens encounter problems, their 'citizen' status overrides their 'subject' status, and they follow the universal civil principle while subordinating their private interests³⁶. Therefore, we can say that 'citizen' consciousness is the basis of democratic politics.

activity.

³¹ This plan was for 1996-2001. It aimed to help local governments set up galleries and museums for their special traditions and cultures in order to enhance local culture, increase residents' identity, and encourage their participation in community affairs.

³² This plan was for 1995-1998. It aimed to encourage residents to care for their historical buildings and improve their environment in order to reconstruct local cultural property.

³³ These plans included: guidance on the reuse and exploitation of cultural resources, the drawing up of cultural pictures, the creation of cultural property, education in cultural property, and the marketing of cultural property.

³⁴ When You, Xi-Kun was the head of Yi-Lan and Community Renaissance was his main policy. Yi-lan has been very successful in achieving Community Renaissance.

³⁵ Interview with Chen, Qi-Nan.

³⁶ Chen, Qi-Nan, (1992), p.10.

In the past the Taiwanese have lacked 'citizen' consciousness. For Chen, this is because Taiwanese society has not had a 'community consciousness'. In other words, 'citizen consciousness' should be based on community. Chen's views are close to communitarianism. For example, communitarianism emphasises the common good and the shared interest of the whole community. Citizens thus believe that the 'common good' has priority over the individual's interest, and that each person will sacrifice himself/herself in order to achieve the 'common good'³⁷. Therefore, the citizenship of communitarianism is different from the citizenship of liberalism, which emphasises the rights and interests of individuals.

Furthermore, it is important for communitarians that citizens actively participate in public affairs. They believe that the freedom and autonomy of individuals can be fostered by the process of public discussion, decision-making, and the search for the common good. They criticize the liberal view of citizenship for its lack of public consciousness. Under liberalism people are concerned only about their rights and not their responsibilities as citizens. They do not respect civil practice and participation, so the public sphere is an arena in which a few people search for power and profit³⁸.

Therefore, 'participatory design' is an important principle in Community Renaissance³⁹. Yu, Guo-Hua points out that in western societies the community movements aimed to resist the urban plans dominated by the central government in the 1960s and the 1970s, and they demanded community participation. The residents of communities constructed a base for civil society through local practices, community participation, and environmental improvement⁴⁰. The process of 'active participation--civil society--democracy' is viewed as the practical operation of Community Renaissance⁴¹. 'The Plan to Write the History of Villages' is a good example of Community Renaissance. This policy seeks to encourage residents to participate in the writing of history in villages. During this process, on the one hand, residents can construct a common identity for their community. On the other hand, they can express their hopes for their community, and practice their hopes through active

³⁷ Charles Taylor, 'Cross- Purpose: The Liberalism-Communitarian Debate', in Nancy L Rosenblum (eds.), *Liberalism and the Moral Life* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989). p.166.

³⁸ Peng, Ru-Wan, *From the Citizenship of Contemporary Communitarianism to Discuss Civil Education*, MA Thesis, Research Institute of Civil Education (Taipei: National Teacher's University, 1997), p.57. (Chinese)

³⁹ Yu, Guo-Hua, *Basic Ideas of 'Community Renaissance' in Taiwan: A Local Cultural Movement in Responding to the Trend of Globalisation* (MA Thesis, Graduate School of Folk Culture & Arts, Taipei National University of Art, 2002), p. 66. (Chinese)

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, p. 67.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p.70.

participation.

The 'citizen', as seen by Chen, is located between the republican model, as advocated for example by Habermas, and communitarianism. Following the republican model, he believes that national identity should be founded on citizenship and a democratic system; at the same time, he renders a strong community in the concept of 'citizen', and emphasises the importance of community participation.

We need to consider whether, in practice, Community Renaissance has really enhanced the development of citizenship in Taiwan. As Bloomfield and Bianchini suggest, cultural policy has played an important role in improving democratic education, social emancipation and the creation of civil identity in western experience⁴². Has the same happened with Community Renaissance in Taiwan?

First, it does seem that Community Renaissance has improved active participation in public affairs at the community level. Various cases show that the residents of communities have learned how to participate in public affairs through adult learning plans, meetings, and cultural activities on a range of issues, such as cultural heritage, the natural environment, spatial reconstruction, and community development. The residents of communities have more interests than outsiders in their community and know how to strive for a common consensus in public affairs, which is of obvious benefit to democratic education⁴³. Social empowerment and self-mobilization emerge gradually through these efforts, as demonstrated by the cases of the Anti-reservoir Movement in Mei-long⁴⁴ and the Self-government Park in Danayigu⁴⁵.

In addition, Community Renaissance has helped to foster new civil identities, as shown

⁴² Bloomfield and Bianchini, (2001), pp.110--2.

⁴³ Huang, Huang-Xiong, Quo, Shi-ji and Lin, Shi-ji,(2001), pp.42--6.

⁴⁴ The KMT government wanted to set up a reservoir in Meinung, and undoubtedly this would have had a huge influence on the local environment and culture. Because 95% of the population in Meinung are Hakkas, they have developed a close relationship with the Anti-Reservoir movement. This has reinforced the identity of the Hakkas in Meinung. At the same time, the experience of Anti-Reservoir provides the good basic to develop Community Renaissance with active participation in environmental issue. More detail in chapter 8.

⁴⁵ Danayigu is an aboriginal tribe with a beautiful river and special fishes--Ku fishes (They only live in the river of Danayigu). In order to protect river and fishes, the residents develop their own rules to manage Danayigu, such as the limitation of sale lands, and set up Danayigu park. These experiences become the base to develop aboriginal self-government in the contemporary context, and Danayigu also becomes the most successful case of Community Renaissance because the active participation of the residents. More detail see chapter 7.

in the cases of Mei-Long and Yi-Lan. For example, the Yi-Lan had a series of cultural movements, such as native education, the reconstruction of local tradition, and the rebuilding of public architecture, through Community Renaissance, and these helped to provide a new local Yi-Lan identity and self-confidence. Similarly, the development of a new Mei-Long identity has also redefined the relationship between the state and citizens, and has encouraged citizens to participate in public policy.

Community Renaissance provides valuable opportunities for constructing citizen consciousness in Taiwan. At the same time, it also influences the development of civil society. As Chen observes, civil society needs to be based on community *and* citizenship⁴⁶. However, some people question the actual influence of Community Renaissance on civil society. For example, Lee, Ding-Zan points out that the construction of community (known as communitarianism) will lead to competition for resources between communities and conflicts between small and big communities⁴⁷. So we need to consider whether Community Renaissance is or is not good for the development of civil society. This is an issue which needs to be considered both theoretically and practically.

On the practical level, Charles Taylor distinguishes three different senses in which civil society can be identified in the European political tradition:

First, in a minimal sense, civil society exists where there are free associations that are not under the tutelage of state power.

Secondly, in a stronger sense, civil society only exists where society as a whole can structure itself and co-ordinate its actions through such associations, which are free of state tutelage.

Thirdly, as an alternative or supplement to the second sense, we can speak of civil society wherever the ensemble of associations can significantly determine or influence the course of state policy⁴⁸.

In terms of each of these three senses of civil society, some influences of Community

⁴⁶ Chen, Qi-Nan, (1992), p.5.

⁴⁷ ⁴⁷ Lee, Ding-zan, 'Rights and Common Good: Discuss Communitarian from the Event of Gi-Nan University', *China Times*, 24 November 1999. (Chinese)

⁴⁸ Charles Taylor, 'Modes of Civil Society', in *Public Culture*, vol. 3, no.1 (Fall, 1990), pp.102-19.

Renaissance on the development of civil society in Taiwan are discernible. In the first sense of civil society, Community Renaissance began as an official policy and became a community movement through which many associations achieved self-government at the local level, e.g. in local community societies, cultural-historical workshops, and community universities. These associations play a vital role in organising and mobilising community residents to participate in community public affairs by providing them with civil education and training. For example, community universities seek to promote people's ability to discuss public affairs in order to increase their citizenship consciousness⁴⁹. The movement of 'We Write the History of Our Village' shows how ordinary people can use their community history as a basis for establishing grass-roots democracy.⁵⁰

The second sense of civil society raises the issue of whether Taiwanese society can structure itself through the actions of associations which are free of state tutelage. At this level Community Renaissance has had two major influences. First, local autonomy and the public participation of people have been accepted as new concepts and popular values. More and more people believe that they can assume responsibility for their community affairs and can reject the domination of the government. They have acquired more experience and confidence to make decisions and negotiate with the government. In addition, Community Renaissance provides legitimacy for community groups or associations seeking to reject the tutelage of the state. Secondly, Community Renaissance has become a common position uniting different associations, such as groups of social movements and cultural workshops. Social movements declined in the 1990s but were reinvigorated by the appearance of Community Renaissance, which provided new standpoints -- cultural reconstruction and community reform -- for environmental movements, cultural movements and ethnic movements⁵¹. Many groups and associations accepted these concepts and achieved notable successes. For example, the Association of Mei-Long, which supported the anti-reservoir cause and sought to protect Hakka culture, embraced the concept of Community Renaissance to attract more people to participate in its mission⁵². The Alliance of Housewives, a traditional women's group, combined gender and community issues to meet the needs of community residents. This combination of

⁴⁹ Jiang, Ming -Xiu, and Chen, Ding-Ming, 'The Community University and The Construction of Civil Society in Taiwan' (21 Century, 2001, June, Vol.65). pp.122--30.

⁵⁰ Yang, Chang-Zhen, 'Understanding the History of the Village', in *We Come to Write the History of the Village* (Taipei: Tang-Shan, 2001), pp.14-5. (Chinese)

⁵¹ Xu, Zhen, 'Community Renaissance: A New Model of Taiwan's Communal Work', *Social Construction*, Vol. 97 (1997), pp.1-15. (Chinese)

⁵² Interview with Hong, Xin-Lan.

Community Renaissance and social movements has produced a strong 'third sector' in Taiwan. This has now emerged as a new power to rival the government.

Turning to the third sense of civil society, Community Renaissance has moved from an official policy to a broad social concept, combining different social movements and associations. In 1997, a number of groups joined to form the Association of Community Renaissance in the ROC. This association has played a major role in developing Community Renaissance research, and has provided many useful suggestions to the government⁵³. At the same time, it has also tried to construct a public sphere through which Community Renaissance workers can discuss, communicate, enter into dialogue, and develop a new community discourse. After the earthquake of 921 in 1999, this association had further opportunities to influence government policy on reconstruction issues.

As we have seen, in terms of each of the three senses of 'civil society', Community Renaissance has had a considerable influence in Taiwan. However, this does not mean that Taiwan has now become a civil society. As Gu, Zhong-Hua observes, many organisations are still dependent on personal relationships, and few organisations are constructed by the voluntary will of citizens. People tend on the whole to be 'passive' in public affairs in Taiwan.⁵⁴

Community Renaissance has now been promoted for about ten years and has had some significant impacts on Taiwan's society. In the government, Community Renaissance has spread from the CCA to other departments and agencies, including the Ministry of Domestic Affairs (the Plans for a New Picture in Cities and Towns); the Department of Health (the Plan for Community Medical Treatment); the Ministry of Education (The Plan for Long-term Learning); the Department of Environment (The Improvement of the Environment), and so on. In addition, local governments provide many policies based on the concepts of active participation and community identity⁵⁵. In the non-governmental sector, the influence of Community Renaissance has also been strong. Thus, private enterprises have sponsored the reconstruction of communities; there has been the development of community education through the establishment of community colleges;

⁵³ Sue, Zhao-Ying and Cai, Ji-Xun, *The Trajectory of Community Renaissance* (Taipei: CCA, 1999). (Chinese)

⁵⁴ Gu, Zhong-Hua, 'The Competition of Social Tradition and Modern Factors in Taiwan? Does Civil Society Appear?' *China Times*, Forum, 24 November 1999. (Chinese)

⁵⁵ Sue, Zhao-Ying and Cai, Ji-Xun (1999).

and there has been an increase in cultural and historical workshops⁵⁶. In all these ways, Community Renaissance has greatly influenced the development of civil society in Taiwan. Through active participation and self-management, a new citizens' consciousness and public sphere are also forming, thus furnishing a strong basis for resisting the government⁵⁷.

However, the situation remains problematic. As we discussed in Chapter 3, many theorists have challenged the liberal view of citizenship. For example, as Stuart Hall points out, the viewpoint of multiculturalism suggests that to some degree questions of citizenship are undermined by the growth of cultural diversity. Hall argues that there is no universal form of citizenship that can be applied to today's pluralistic societies. If anything, cultural diversity and its unstable changes will lead to more difficulties⁵⁸. A 'differentiated citizenship' or 'multicultural citizenship' is still under construction at both the theoretical and practical levels.

In the same vein, Partha Chatterjee criticises the traditional concept of civil society, which he sees as a bourgeois construction. In reality, there are some people without citizenship and who are thus excluded from civil society. The arguments and struggles between these people and the state do not take place in civil society, which is called 'political society' by Chatterjee⁵⁹. Moreover, the new communities of post-modern society, such as gender communities, gay communities, peripheral religious communities and migrant worker communities, are still generally absent from thinking about civil society. Traditional civil society is limited because some people are excluded from it. In the next section, we will discuss the relationship between Community Renaissance and the politics of difference.

6.4 Community Renaissance and the Politics of Difference

One major criticism of Community Renaissance and communitarianism is that they ignore the internal differences within communities. For example, Amitai Etzioni is

⁵⁶ Sue, Zhao-Ying (eds.) *The Development of Culture and Arts in the Counties of Taiwan -- Conceptions and Practice*, (Taipei: CCA, 1999), p.196.

⁵⁷ Zhang, Mao-Qui, 'Lee, Deng-Hui and Civil Society in Taiwan', <http://www.news.yam.com/forum/520/200005/10/15/25900.html>.

⁵⁸ Stuart Hall, 'Multicultural Citizens, Monocultural Citizenship?' in *Tomorrow's Citizens: Critical Debates in Citizenship and Education* (London, Institute for Public Policy Research, 2000), p.48.

⁵⁹ Partha Chatterjee, 'Community in the East' (translated in Chinese) in Chen, Guang-Xing (eds.) *Locating Political Society: Modernity, State Violence and Post-colonial Democracy*, (Taipei: Gu-liu, 2000), pp.37--60.

criticised by feminists on the grounds that the communitarian movement overlooks the basic inequality between men and women in communities.⁶⁰ Similar criticisms are made of Community Renaissance. For example, the ceremony of 'Playing with Lions in Yu-Tian'⁶¹ has been criticised because 'in order to construct the common identity of community, it limits other possibilities for other identities in the community, and finally it represents inequality in class, gender and ethnicity in the community'⁶². Another case is that of the people of Tou-Cheng in Yi-Lan county, who celebrated 200 years of Han immigration. The aborigines of Yi-Lan county felt angry and thought that the common identity of Yi-Lan ignored the existence of the aborigines, who had lived in Yi-Lan for over 1,000 years⁶³.

Despite these criticisms, Community Renaissance has in many ways protected the development of minorities. As Huang, Li-Lin points out:

Community Renaissance has encouraged the emergence of cultural subjects in Taiwan, such as the Hakkas, the Aborigines and women. All these groups reject the idea of only one 'national status' as defined by the state. Community Renaissance struggles not only for cultural identity but also the problem of recognition and power. With the praxis of community, Community Renaissance recognises the value of cultural diversity⁶⁴.

For Huang, Community Renaissance uses the calling of 'Hometown' to resist modernisation, assimilation by the state, and even globalisation. It has helped many Hakka villages and aboriginal tribes to protect their traditional culture in the name of community.

How, then, can Community Renaissance both protect cultural difference and ignore difference at the same time? Hwang, Shyh-Huei and Miyazaki Kiyoshi answer this question as follows:

The aborigines, the Pei-pu races, the Fulos, the Hakkas and the mainlanders lived in their

⁶⁰ Feng, Jian-san, 'The Local Media under the General Mobilisation of Capital', in *Contemporary*, Vol. 114, 1 October 1995, p. 54. (Chinese)

⁶¹ 'Playing with Lions' is a traditional ceremony in Yu-Tian.

⁶² Mu, Si-Mian, *The Diverse Locality in Taiwan: The Observation of Communal Museums in the 1990s*, MA Thesis, Center of Architecture and Urban and Villages (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1999), p.71. (Chinese)

⁶³ Huang, Quo-Zhen, *Deconstructing the Experience of Yi-Lan: Toward the Imagined Local Identity: 1990-2000* (Taipei: 2002), pp.48-9. (Chinese)

⁶⁴ Huang, Li-Ling, 'From Cultural Identity to Regional Management: The Challenge of Post-Quake Recovery to the Discourse of Community Empowerment Projects', *Research Report of Urban and Design*, Vol. 9/10, September 1999, p.151. (Chinese)

own tribes, villages, towns or communities according to their tradition, culture and history. In their tribes or villages, they had a strong tradition to help each other, and shared a kind of 'common identity', such as that of the aboriginal tribes, the Hakka villages, the Fulo towns or the military villages of the mainlanders. With these 'communities', the multi-ethnic society was set up in Taiwan⁶⁵.

The hope was that multi-ethnic cultural differences could be protected and preserved in these villages and communities. Because of social changes, economic development and the construction of one national culture, some villages and tribes were desolate and disappeared. Therefore, ethnic culture and difference lost the opportunity to develop.

In fact, some cultural differences, such as differences of local culture, were emphasised in Taiwan after the appearance of Community Renaissance. In other words, Community Renaissance 'legitimises' the politics of difference. For example, Yu-Lan county pushed the Community Renaissance programme and constructed a distinct 'Yu-Lan' culture. Yu-Lan's rivers, houses, theatres and museums express a special image of 'Yu-Lan'. Community Renaissance marked the beginning of decentralisation in cultural policy, and it also provided more possibilities for the toleration of cultural differences. Several years later, more special community cultures have developed in Yu-Lan. These are presented in various industries and festivals. 'Yu-Lan' culture can be seen to have shifted from a homogeneous culture to a heterogeneous culture with the increase of community differences. As Chen, Qi-Nan points out, cultural difference is relative. Under strong Chinese nationalism, there was only one culture in Taiwan. Then there was Chinese culture and Taiwanese culture. With the development of Community Renaissance, Taiwanese culture itself has become more diverse and heterogeneous⁶⁶. The various cultures come from countries, villages, tribes and other communities, and they cut across ethnic differences. Today, there are various Hakka cultures in Mei-Long and Bei-Pu, and diverse aboriginal cultures in different tribes and areas. In the future more cultural differences are likely to arise.

'Community' justifies the development of cultural difference in order to resist assimilation within mainstream society. However, from the standpoint of multiculturalism, community neglects the issue of internal difference. For example, Iris Young points out

⁶⁵ Hwang, Shyh-Huei and Miyazaki Kiyoshi (1999), p.61.

⁶⁶ Interview with Chen, Qi-Nan.

that today the life of the individual is diverse and fragmented, and the needs of the individual are also quite varied. The emphasis on the 'common good' places limitations on the difference between individuals and can even cause oppression. Young shows that people need more identities and that the experience of oppressed people can become a basis for new identities⁶⁷. A similar argument is that a focus on the family, the town, the school or the church is insufficient to solve the problems of oppressed people, for example, women, aborigines, gays/lesbians. For these oppressed people, the struggle for an equal status and legitimacy always challenges the authority of the community structure and the 'common good'. The latter cannot deal with these problems⁶⁸. Sometimes, indeed, they are the targets of resistance of the oppressed people⁶⁹.

For some experienced community workers, these problems can be solved by more active participation. For example, if there is more than one ethnic group in a community, the groups should enter into dialogue and communicate with each other in order to create a common consciousness; furthermore, they can share interest and difference through dialogue, but this dialogue should not be dominated by the majority. Therefore, Community Renaissance seeks to encourage active participation and the expression of different views, thereby opening up a new public sphere in order to create a civil society and provide people with opportunities to participate in public affairs⁷⁰. For example, the local government of Yi-Lan's county held 'the activity of Opening Yi-Lan for Two Hundred Years' to help establish a common identity in Yi-Lan. But in so doing it ignored the fact that many Gemalan people had lived in Yi-Lan for over 1,000 years. For them, the experience and memory of 'Opening Yi-Lan' reminded them of their suffering, since their ancestors had faced the Han's oppression and invasion. The local government used the Han's experience to deal with Community Renaissance, but ignored the feelings of the minority, i.e. it overlooked problems of internal difference. Later, however, the local government recognised the Gemalans' complaints and incorporated cultural difference into its presentation of Yi-Lan's culture⁷¹.

⁶⁷ Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p.46.

⁶⁸ Chen, Jun-Hong, *Understanding the Contemporary Debate between Liberalism and Communitarianism: The Focus on Citizen Status*, MA Thesis, Department of Politics (Taipei: Dong-Wu University, 1995), p.72. (Chinese)

⁶⁹ Feng, Jian-San (1995), p.54.

⁷⁰ Interview with Chen, Ban.

⁷¹ Huang, Quo-Zhen, (2002), pp.

Community Renaissance begins from cultural activity and then enters into the experience of everyday life through people's community⁷². Therefore, the 'community', that is valued by Community Renaissance needs to be 'contextual', 'flexible', 'humane' and 'changeable'⁷³. This is why Chen, Qi-Nan defines Community Renaissance as a 'post-modern' policy: in the various communities people devise their own ways to deal with Community Renaissance, and these will change from time to time. Community Renaissance is based on the self-management and active participation of residents in everyday life, and this should lead to greater toleration of cultural difference⁷⁴.

In fact, one kind of 'multicultural civil society', which is inclusive of all people, is now being discussed widely and is actually developing in practice through the experience of communal movements in western societies. For example, the concept of 'local citizenship' in Frankfurt in Germany seeks to incorporate the third biggest population group -- people without a German passport. These people contribute to the economy but are excluded from political rights because they are not citizens in Germany. The local government of Frankfurt has implemented policies to provide them with civil rights so that they can become 'visible' and has sought to give voice to their rights at the local level⁷⁵. Differences in class, gender and sexuality should be tolerated and presented through active participation in communities in everyday life. In this way it may be possible to achieve a multicultural civil society and a new practice of multicultural citizenship. But the final outcome is not yet clear.

To sum up, Community Renaissance has successfully negotiated the problem of 'internal difference' which is sometimes raised in criticisms of communitarianism. Community Renaissance has constructed a very diverse model of 'community' in which some of the more unitary constructions based on ethnicity, class, etc. are subverted and challenged.

Conclusion

Faced with the increasing confusion of identity, the collapse of traditional values and social structure, ethnic conflicts, and the failure of democracy in Taiwan, the government

⁷² Sue (1998), p.115.

⁷³ *ibid.*, p.116.

⁷⁴ Interview with Chen, Qi-Nan.

⁷⁵ Huang, Zhao-Xing, *Citizenship, Community and Dream* (Taipei: Ya-Ge Publisher, 1999), pp.122-4. (Chinese)

has implemented the Community Renaissance programme as a way of addressing these problems. As we have seen, the role of Community Renaissance is twofold: on the one hand, it aims to construct citizenship and civil society in Taiwan; on the other hand, it also plays a role in accommodating cultural difference. Following the discussion in Chapter 5, Community Renaissance is viewed as a new cultural policy to maintain a unitary public domain and a diverse private domain.

More specifically, Community Renaissance has had some major influences on Taiwan society.

First, the concepts of community consciousness and active participation have supported the development of a civil society and citizenship in Taiwan. Community Renaissance encourages the practice of democratic education, social emancipation and the construction of a new civil identity. This civil society now has more autonomy and independence and hence a greater capacity to resist the power of the state.

Secondly, 'community' provides people, such as Hakkas and aborigines, with legitimacy to negotiate with the government. At the same time, communities can gain more support and resources from the government to develop and protect their traditional cultures. The praxis of community provides the possibility of realising a multicultural policy in Taiwan.

Thirdly, Community Renaissance and communitarianism have been criticised from the standpoint of multiculturalism, because they are seen to overlook internal differences within communities. Beginning as an official policy, Community Renaissance has come to penetrate Taiwan society, and its promoters have drawn on the ideas of postmodernism to deal with issues of cultural difference through active participation.

According to western theory, cultural rights and multicultural citizenship are viewed as one part of citizenship in civil society. Today, Taiwan is still struggling with the construction of civil society and the traditional ethnic or national identity; neither cultural difference nor universal citizenship has yet been achieved. But both of these are viewed as vital concerns for Taiwan society. In the following chapters we will look in more detail at how the government has sought to respond to these concerns, with particular reference to three case studies: the aborigines, the Hakkas and migrant workers.

Chapter 7: Aboriginal Rights, the State and Cultural Policy

Many issues of aboriginal rights, especially aboriginal human rights, have been raised in the context of international law. In practice, however, the role of the state is of the utmost importance, since the state is the central actor involved in the implementation of such rights. At the same time, the claims of aborigines challenge two fundamental statist notions -- that of territorial sovereignty and that of a unified 'nationality' administered by government organs¹. The relationship between the state and the aborigines is thus highly complex.

Each country has its own policies and political considerations which inevitably have an impact on the approach to aboriginal issues. Thus, Canada and Australia are both viewed as 'immigrant countries' and both practice 'multicultural policy'. Norway, Finland and Greenland consider aboriginal issues from the perspective of welfare states². In Latin America there are different circumstances. New indigenous movements have emerged in Latin America since the 1960s. In the late 1980s they became increasingly visible actors³. A common discourse has emerged which includes the demand for recognition as peoples, entailing the constitutional recognition of the multi-ethnic character of the state, the demand for territory and the demand for autonomy.

Similarly, the Taiwan government has also promoted a process of democratisation and political reform since 1986, and the transformation of aboriginal policy is one key part of this process. During the 1990s, new articles dealing with aboriginal issues were added to the Constitution, dealing, for example, with political participation rights (1991, 1992), the renaming of the 'Mountain People' as 'Aborigines' in 1995, and (in the so-called Tenth Item, the 'aboriginal article') the strengthening of special rights for aborigines (1997). In 1997, The Taiwan government proclaimed in a constitutional amendment Act that Taiwan was a 'multicultural country'. Aboriginal culture is viewed as a key aspect of Taiwan's claim to be a 'multicultural country'.

¹ Richard Falk, 'The Rights of Peoples', in James Crawford (eds.), *The Rights of Peoples* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p.16.

² Harald Eidheim, 'Indigenous Peoples and the State: the Saami Case in Norway', in Jens Brosted et al. (eds.), *Native Power: The Quest for Autonomy and Nationhood of Indigenous Peoples* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1985) p.159.

³ Willem Assies, 'Indigenous Peoples and Reform of the State in Latin America', in Willem Assies et al. (eds.), *The Challenge of Diversity: Indigenous People and Reform of the State in Latin America* (Amsterdam, Thela

In this chapter we argue that multicultural Taiwan, based on four ethnic groups, still faces many challenges. The challenge from the Taiwanese aborigines is that they are developing a new aboriginal identity or tribal identity, which will challenge a unified national identity -- multicultural Taiwan. Furthermore, under the influence of multiculturalism, the aboriginal cultural policy has changed from the model of the CCA to the model of the CAA⁴. This change indicates a redefinition of social values, decentralisation, and new political considerations. Another cultural policy based on these new values has emerged and requires examination in Community Renaissance. Finally, in the case of the Taiwanese aborigines multiculturalism also challenges the traditional views of citizenship, aborigines, in particular debates on collective rights and cultural citizenship. In addition, the various tensions in the aboriginal cultural policy in Taiwan will be explored.

7.1 National Identity and the Role of Aboriginal Culture

The construction of national culture is still an important issue in the cultural policy of Taiwan. Various kinds of national culture have been promoted by governmental policy since 1949, such as Chinese nationalism and 'multicultural Taiwan'. The aboriginal culture has been forced to 'match up' to the two national cultures in order to gain the support of the government. However, 'multicultural Taiwan' also justifies the development of aboriginal identity, which is developing towards 'separation' from this new national discourse. In this section, I will point out the first tension—between integration and separation—in national identity.

7.1.1 Aboriginal Culture in Chinese Nationalism

From 1949 to the 1970s, Chinese Nationalism was a dominant influence on the development of cultural policy in Taiwan. In this situation, the aboriginal culture was forced to assimilate with the Chinese culture, and it was also viewed as one part of Chinese culture. At first, the KMT government emphasised that the Taiwanese aborigines belonged to the tradition of Chinese culture and that they could be verified as one of the Chinese peoples⁵. According to this assumption, the aboriginal culture was always mobilised as part of the various Chinese cultural movements. For example, aboriginal music, dance, cultural heritage and other performance art were presented in the Chinese Culture Renaissance Movement in Peitung, where many aborigines lived. In Taitung, the sponsor

Thesis: 2000) pp.7-8.

⁴ CCA is Committee of Cultural Affairs, CAA is Committee of Aboriginal Affairs.

⁵ Chen, Kuo-Jing (1977), p. 40.

of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance presented the discovery of Puyuma remains and undertook research into the Amis. These cases represented attempts by the government to define the aboriginal culture as Chinese culture⁶. In other instances there was an attempt to connect the tradition of the Taiwan aborigines with Chinese culture directly. For example, the KMT government promoted aboriginal culture under the theme of 'searching for our roots' in 1971, and it emphasised that the 'roots' of the aborigines were in Chinese culture. Thus it held the traditional ceremony of the Amis for a good harvest in order to strengthen the relationship between aboriginal culture and Chinese culture⁷. In addition, the government began to hold competitions for aboriginal music and dance in 1984, and it stressed that the government wanted to 'remind' people to maintain the aboriginal tradition, thereby extending the Chinese tradition forever⁸.

After the political need, the KMT government also considered aboriginal cultures from the perspective of economic interest—tourism. The government set up aboriginal museums and aboriginal cultural parks to satisfy the needs of the Han people, and some aborigines were also able to earn money through their role in tourism. Aboriginal culture was presented as the 'other' culture to the Han people so that it would attract many Han people to visit the aboriginal villages or tribes.

Therefore, there were two important aspects of the aboriginal policy of the KMT government in the age of Chinese nationalism. First, it emphasised that the aboriginal culture was one branch of Chinese culture; thus the aboriginal culture was always mobilised to support the Chinese culture during various ceremonies and celebrations. Secondly, however, the aboriginal culture was also considered from the viewpoint of tourism, when it was constructed as 'other culture'. These two aspects were contradictory at some levels. On the one hand, the government hoped to assimilate aborigines as 'Chinese'; on the other hand, it also hoped to use aboriginal cultural difference to attract tourists. However, these two aspects indeed co-existed in the earlier stage of Chinese nationalism.

⁶ Chen, Zong-Han, *The Analysis of Post-war Aboriginal Policy: Perspectives from State and Society*, MA thesis for the Graduate School of the Three Principle of Peoples, (Taipei: NTU, 1994), p.129.

⁷ Ibid., p.129.

⁸ Lee, Ming-Shu 'The Assembly for the Traditional Music and Songs of the Mountainous Peoples', *Journal of Taiwan Painting*, Vol.12, 1984, p. 34. (Chinese)

Taiwanese aborigines were forced to express a 'homogeneous, traditional' difference in order to match the imagined national identity and the need for tourists. Avtar Brah identifies four ways in which 'difference' may be conceptualised and addressed: difference as experience, difference as social relations, difference as subjectivity, and difference as identity.⁹ In the case of aboriginal cultural difference, it is not only a matter of experience but also of the social relations between the government and aborigines. Furthermore, the issues of aboriginal culture have been central to theoretical debates around subjectivity, especially those concerning the process of subject formation. Finally, some specific phenomena such as racism seek to fix and naturalise 'difference' and build impervious boundaries between groups, thus creating identity. Thus, aboriginal cultural difference creates the aborigines as a 'radicalised other'.

To sum up, aboriginal culture was viewed as one branch of Chinese culture under the mood of strong Chinese nationalism lasting until the late 1980s. The representation of aboriginal culture was constructed to match the political and economic needs of the government. However, it was redefined as part of 'multiculturalism' in order to support the new national identity from the 1990s.

7.1.2 Aboriginal Culture and 'Multicultural Taiwan'

When Chinese nationalism lost its dominant power in Taiwanese society, the KMT government and the CCA were forced gradually to shift cultural policy from a focus on Chinese culture to a focus on local cultures. In addition, the aboriginal movement sought to remind the government about the development of aboriginal culture. In other words, cultural policy moved from a monocultural policy (Chinese culture) to a multicultural policy (including Chinese culture, Taiwanese culture and aboriginal culture), and aboriginal culture began to be viewed as an important resource for the creation of multicultural Taiwan.

In the discourse of 'multicultural Taiwan', aboriginal culture is recognised as one part of national culture today. In 1992, the CCA held the first 'Artistic Season for the Mountainous Peoples', and between 1990 and 1992, in the 'Series for Dance and Music of Taiwan Aborigines', the performance of aboriginal music and dance was included in the programme of the National Theatre. This meant that aboriginal culture, which had

⁹ Brah, Avtar, 'Difference, Diversity and Differentiation' in Donald, James and Ali Rattansi (eds.), *Race, Culture and Difference* (London: The Open University, 1992), p.140.

previously been viewed as tribal culture or local culture, became one of Taiwan's 'national cultures'. In 1994, at the first aboriginal cultural meeting of the CCA, President Lee, Dan-Hui said in a speech:

'The Taiwan aborigines cannot be external to the whole Taiwanese society...However, they have to 'melt' into Taiwanese society. The problems of any ethnic group are the problems of the whole Taiwanese society; thus no one can keep himself out of the matter. In addition, the aborigines are one part of 'our' society. Therefore, I hope that everyone (the aborigines) can contribute to 'our' country, and work for the construction of a new 'Community of Destiny'¹⁰.

According to Lee, the peoples of Taiwan form a 'Community of Destiny', which means that they share the same destiny. Thus the aborigines are once again forced to place themselves in the frame of the national discourse. Furthermore, the government has sought to control the development of aboriginal culture. This is because it believes that aboriginal culture is in danger of disappearing in the future without government 'help'. For example, in 1995 the CCA held a 'Cultural Festival for the Atayal People'. The sponsor emphasised that this activity was held to reconstruct the confidence and cultural identity of the Atayal People. These statements show that the rulers believed that the aboriginal culture was declining; thus the aborigines had to be dependent on the guidance and concern of the government. Therefore, the government gained the legitimacy to direct and dominate aboriginal cultural development.

The aboriginal culture has become one of the 'national cultures' in Taiwan on the basis of government funding and the revision of the 'national discourse', from Chinese nationalism to multicultural Taiwan. In fact, the aboriginal culture plays a key role in the formation of the new nationalism. Only the Taiwan aborigines have a different cultural and blood relationship from the Chinese people¹¹. As the Head of the Department of Culture and Education in the CAA, Lin, Jiang-Yi:

'The GeZaiXi of the Fulo or the Ping-Opera of the Mainlanders, both came from mainland China. When Taiwan's cultural groups perform in other countries, people will feel that Taiwan is similar to mainland China. Taiwanese culture is similar to Chinese culture. Only the performance of the Taiwan aborigines is totally different to the Chinese

¹⁰ The speech of Lee, Dan-Hui was at the Meeting of Aboriginal Culture in 1994.

¹¹ The Taiwan aborigines are verified as Austronesians, whose blood relationship is close to other aborigines in the islands of the Pacific Ocean. They are not Chinese people at all. Their culture is presented in terms of the 'maximum' difference from Chinese culture.

culture. Only Taiwan aboriginal culture can present Taiwanese culture as different to Chinese culture'¹².

Therefore, this shows that aboriginal culture is used as a symbol of the new national identity. The aborigines are always invited to perform or celebrate at national holidays or other national ceremonies with other ethnic groups in order to show that the new Taiwan is indeed a multicultural country. The government can control and interpret aboriginal culture and its content by means of sponsorship with the aim of integrating it into national culture. Aboriginal cultural organisations have to choose between autonomy and government support. This struggle is inescapable when the government is the main supporter of the arts and culture in Taiwan¹³.

However, some new trends towards the setting up of a separate aboriginal identity have also developed under the name of 'multicultural Taiwan'. In other words, 'multicultural Taiwan' not only benefits a unified national identity, but also benefits a separate aboriginal identity. The tension between integration and separation is always reflected in multicultural Taiwan.

7.1.3 The Trend of 'Separation' from National Identity

Even though the new national discourse of 'multicultural Taiwan' tries to integrate aboriginal culture into one part of national culture, there is one approach of 'separation' in the development of aboriginal identity in Taiwan. Two cases reveal the trend to separate aboriginal identity from a unified national identity in Taiwan. One is the development of the assemblies of aborigines; the other is the view of *A New Partnership between the Indigenous Peoples and the Government of Taiwan*.

¹² Interview with Lin, Jiang-Yi.

¹³ The government has large funds and access to sponsors of aboriginal culture. In the central government, the CCA and the CAA are responsible for these matters. The local authorities also provide money to support aboriginal performances and sacrificial ceremonies. In addition, the Minister of Domestic Affairs can sponsor aboriginal activity related to religion, the Committee of Young People can sponsor youth activities, and the Minister of Education can sponsor activities related to educational issues. That is to say, the government has become the most important supporter of aboriginal cultural development, but at the same time it has been able to exercise its arbitrary power over aboriginal culture. The officers of the government can decide whether to hold aboriginal cultural festivals or ceremonies, or to invite some professors to decide on sponsorship. Thus the aborigines have actually become more passive and weaker, and they always feel uneasy because they are afraid to lose the sponsorship of the government. There are not many opportunities to gain funding from non-governmental organisations.

The Assemblies of Aborigines and the Autonomous Assemblies

There are two kinds of aboriginal assemblies in Taiwan. One is the assembly for all Taiwanese aborigines across about ten groups, for example 'the Preparatory Meeting for a Taiwanese Aborigines' Autonomous Region' in 1991¹⁴, and 'the Preparatory Meeting for the Assembly of Taiwanese Aborigines' in 1996¹⁵. Secondly, there are the aboriginal assemblies formed to practice modern democracy and autonomy for the various aboriginal groups. This innovation aims to foster a consensus inside the groups.

The Tsou¹⁶ set up the earliest aboriginal assembly, but initially it was hardly an assembly at all. A 'Meeting of the Tsou' was held every year from 1992 to discuss issues and problems, and to seek common views on the Tsou's development. The 'Meeting of the Tsou' became the Assembly of the Tsou People in 1998¹⁷. Also, the Tao¹⁸ people set up an 'Assembly of the Tao' in 1994 in order to seek solutions on disputes between the Tao and the government on issues of National Parks and nuclear waste. The Atayal People pressed for the establishment of an assembly to maintain their sovereign rights in 1997, and the assembly was duly set up in December 2000¹⁹. At about the same time, the Bunun People also prepared to set up an assembly, and used the new provisions of the Constitution to support their request. They also sought to legitimate their demand by reference to traditional Bunun culture²⁰.

¹⁴ This was set up on 2 April 1991, with an initial demand for aboriginal autonomy and land rights. The meeting was stopped several years later. Wu, Mi-Cha *The Report of Aboriginal Administrative Systems After the Simplifying of Taiwan Province*, (Taipei: CAA, 1998). p.130. (Chinese)

¹⁵ When the CAA was set up in 1996, the Preparatory Meeting for the Assembly of Taiwanese Aborigines was also set up in order to supervise the policy of the CAA. At the same time, another aim was to search for self-government. However, this was stopped in 1997. Ibid., p.131.

¹⁶ The Tsou are one group of Taiwanese aborigines, numbering about 3,000.

¹⁷ The purpose of 'the Meeting of the Tsou' was to set up the Assembly of the Tsou, which was intended to discuss Tsou Affairs, and decide policy and principles in order to search for and practice the self-government of the Tsou people. In addition, the aim was to strengthen the identity of the Tsou people, recover their traditional values and culture, and re-establish the social order of Tsou society. By Wu, Mi-Cha (1998), p.143.

¹⁸ The Tao are another group of Taiwanese aborigines. They live in a small island, which is supposed to be a national park, but was used by the KMT government to dispose of nuclear waste. There were many conflicts between the Tao and the KMT government in the 1990s.

¹⁹ The Atayal people believed that they had the land, and they wanted to set up an assembly to create their people in law. Then they would be able to decide on their own system and develop their culture and society. According to this view, the peoples can become the main basis for cultural development and creative groups. By Wu, Mi-Cha (2000), p.141.

²⁰ The aims of the Bunun Assembly are: to decide the development of the Bunun, to set up a channel between the Bunun people and the CAA, to discuss issues related to the culture, politics, education and economy of the Bunun people, and to discuss government policy concerning the Bunun people. Wu, Mi-Cha (1998), p.139.

Generally speaking, the assemblies try to construct their own distinctive methods of policy-making and to practice the right of self-government in a modern society. The Taiwanese aborigines had various political systems before the central government set up new administrative systems for the tribes. For example, there was the Chieftain system²¹ of the Amis, and the Elders system²² of the Bunun. They still have political elections for the chiefs of villages or towns, and the aboriginal representatives in the Legislative Yuan. If the Taiwanese aborigines gain rights of self-government, there will be a choice between the chieftain and representative systems²³. The aboriginal assembly opens up new possibilities for self-government.

A New Partnership between the Indigenous Peoples and the Government of Taiwan

In 1999, before the presidential election of 2000, the Taiwanese aborigines produced a new document, 'A new partnership between the indigenous peoples and the government of Taiwan' for the presidential candidates to sign. Mr. Chen Shui-bian was the only candidate to sign this document, and he won the election in 2000. Thus the document was bound to have some influence on the new president's aboriginal policy.

The document highlighted seven rights for the indigenous peoples: recognising the natural sovereignty of Taiwan's indigenous peoples; promoting autonomy for the indigenous peoples; concluding a land treaty with the indigenous peoples; reinstating the traditional names of indigenous communities and natural landmarks; recovering the traditional territories of the indigenous communities and peoples; recovering the use of traditional natural resources; and furthering the development of self-determination and providing national representation for each indigenous people²⁴. This document tries to define the relationship between the government and the indigenous peoples as an equal partnership.

Through the new development of the aboriginal movement in the 1990s, it is clear that each of the aboriginal peoples sought to strengthen its tribal identity, and this led to the creation of the new assemblies. The movement also pressed for a reform of the Constitution and gained many collective rights, or 'rights of the peoples', which have been

²¹ This means that the chieftains have the power to rule tribes. The creation of new chieftains is through their fathers.

²² A committee is constituted by the old men, who rule the whole tribe.

²³ Many people worry about this problem. (Interview with Sun, Da-Chuan.)

²⁴ 'A New Partnership Between the Indigenous Peoples and the Government of Taiwan'.

gradually accepted by Taiwanese society. The Taiwanese aborigines have presented many challenges to the political legitimacy of both the old authoritarian Taiwanese government and the new democratic government. These challenges bring into focus the tension between 'integration' and 'separation'.

7.2 Aboriginal Rights and New Cultural Policy

The tension between an integrative identity and separate aboriginal rights is also represented in cultural policy, and in particular influences the development of aboriginal cultural policy. In this section we will analyse the changes in aboriginal culture stemming from two models—the CCA and CAA. Then we will seek to show that multiculturalism is changing the approach to cultural policy in Taiwan.

7.2.1 Aboriginal Rights and Changes of Cultural Policy

Aboriginal culture used to be ignored by the government because of the assimilation policy. Then, in 1976, 'the Plan for the Maintenance of Aboriginal Culture' was issued as the first statement of aboriginal cultural policy in Taiwan. Initially, this policy was related to two principles—the construction of Chinese nationalism and the economic interest of tourism²⁵. These two principles dominated the development of aboriginal cultural policy until the late 1980s, including the establishment of the Council of Cultural Affairs (CCA) in 1981 as the main agency for aboriginal cultural policy. In 1996, the Council of Aboriginal Affairs (CAA) was set up, thus in effect producing a dual system for the making of aboriginal cultural policy.

The CCA's policy was not especially concerned with the development of ethnic culture; the focus was more on 'integration'. But the CCA still provided some sponsorship for aboriginal radio programmes. The cultural policy of the CAA is quite different from that of the CCA. It stresses 'separation' rather than 'integration'.

The Aboriginal Cultural Policy in the Model of the CCA

Even for the CCA, there have been different emphases at different stages. In the earlier stage, the aim of the CCA's aboriginal cultural policy was 'integration'. At the same time, cultural policy at this stage placed an emphasis on exhibitions of aboriginal culture and tourism. In general, consideration of the tourist industry is very important in aboriginal cultural policy. For the central government, the establishment of 'The Park of Aboriginal

²⁵ i.e. before the establishment of the Council of Cultural Affairs (1981).

Culture' provided a good place to present aboriginal buildings, life style, and art forms, such as dance, music and ritual. The Park is intended to demonstrate the government's concern for aboriginal culture and also to present that culture to the Han people. Moreover, it has become an important symbol of the identity of the aboriginal people. Local authorities have also developed their own cultural centres and museums to express the specific features of local histories and cultures, including aboriginal culture.

Another way to achieve integration through cultural policy is to support and sponsor aboriginal dance and music performances. This has become the main method of presenting aboriginal culture. The CCA supported aboriginal dance and music in three ways. First, it organised 'Artistic Seasons of the Aboriginal' and 'Literary Seasons'. Secondly, it sponsored performances by aboriginal people both in Taiwan and overseas according to 'The Law of Sponsorship for Cultural Activity'. Thirdly, it set up a scheme for 'The Sponsorship of Artistic Activity in Cultural Squares in the Holidays', which aims to support the activity of local government²⁶. Aboriginal dance and music were also performed in the National Theatre from 1990 to 1993 in 'The Series of Aboriginal Dance and Music'. This showed that aboriginal culture was accepted by the highest national culture, but in fact this had both a positive and a negative influence on the development of aboriginal culture, more this over to the main text.

However, in the middle stage, the CCA began to sponsor some aboriginal radio programmes and cultural activities from the perspective of aboriginal cultural and media rights. The distinction between this stage and the earlier stage was that, the consideration of aboriginal cultural policy was shifted from 'the performance of cultural differences to the Hans', to 'the concern for the cultural needs of Taiwanese aborigines'. For example, the earliest sponsorship by the government to improve the development of aboriginal media and programmes was undertaken by the Bureau of Information, when it sponsored radio stations in mountainous villages to produce aboriginal language programmes in 1984²⁷. From 1994, the Bureau of Information and the Ministry of Internal Affairs supported the sponsorship of programmes about aboriginal culture and language. This helped to preserve aboriginal culture, maintain aborigines' rights, and provide communication between the

²⁶ Xie, Shi-Zhong, 'The Control and Management of 'Traditional culture': the Taiwan Aboriginal Culture in the Governmental Cultural System, *Monthly for Mountains and the Ocean*, Vol. 11, 1995, pp.89-91. (Chinese)

²⁷ Lin, Cheng-Ying, *The Praxis of Multiculturalism in Taiwan? The Case of the Radio Policy of the Aboriginal Peoples*, MA thesis of the Graduate School for the Three Principles of Peoples, (Taipei: NTU, 1999, p. 44. (Chinese)

government and the aborigines²⁸. The CCA also began to sponsor two programmes in the aboriginal language from 1993, and this increased to five in number in 1994, and to eight in 1996. These policies tried to promote aboriginal cultural and media rights.

In addition, the cultural policy of 'Community Renaissance' has also had a significant influence on aboriginal culture. Aboriginal cultural development is always related to space, for example in terms of the natural environment, the community, and traditional villages. The problem of land is also very important in aboriginal culture. This is expressed in images of mountains, oceans, trees and animals. Because of the impact of economic growth and the assimilation policy, many aborigines – especially those in the younger generation -- left their villages, thus diminishing the cultural heritage. This is why the development of aboriginal culture is now seen to go together with the reconstruction of aboriginal villages, the emergence of an ethnic economy, and the solution of land problems²⁹. (Further details concerning community renaissance and aboriginal culture will be discussed in Section 7.2.2.)

Eventually, the CCA began to transfer responsibility for aboriginal cultural affairs to the CAA. This might appear to have given the aborigines themselves more scope to dominate the development of aboriginal culture. For the model of CCA, aboriginal culture is *one* of the ethnic cultures. The development of aboriginal culture is not seen as more important than the development of other ethnic cultures, and indeed ethnic culture is not regarded as a main concern of the CCA. The model of CAA sees aboriginal culture as a more important issue. After the establishment of CAA, the development of aboriginal cultural policy tends to be more separate.

Aboriginal Cultural Policy in the Model of the CAA

The Council of Aboriginal Affairs (CAA) was set up in 1996 as a central authority for making aboriginal policy, protecting the rights of the aborigines, and providing a whole picture of the development needs of aboriginal culture. The Department of Education and Culture in the CAA has several responsibilities: to consider, work out and negotiate aboriginal education and culture; to research, preserve and spread the aboriginal language; to train and foster aboriginal people; and to improve and support aboriginal media, cultural organisations and activity³⁰. In other words, the Department of Education and Culture

²⁸ Ibid., p.44.

²⁹ Tan, Guang-Ding (2000), p.94.

³⁰ *The 1999 Budget of the CAA*, p.1.

plays a very important role in the policy related to aboriginal culture. The main duties of the CAA are to formulate laws and policy to support the development of aboriginal culture, and to provide sponsorship for aboriginal cultural and educational groups.

Compared with the model of the CCA, the model of the CAA views policy from the perspectives of aboriginal autonomy and subjectivity. Certain key differences in terms of policy and strategy between the models of the CCA and CAA should be noted:

First, the model of the CCA seeks to integrate aboriginal culture into a unified national identity. However, the model of the CAA seeks to develop separate aboriginal identities. For example, The CAA's 'Law for Aboriginal Education' (1998)³¹ emphasises the importance of maintaining respect for aborigines, increasing interest in aborigines, and improving the common interest of all aboriginal groups³². The government has emphasised multicultural education and the improvement of aboriginal cultural identity, e.g. in 'The Plans to Promote Aboriginal Culture for Six Years'.

Secondly, the model of the CCA does not focus on the whole development of aboriginal culture, but only considers the sponsorship of some aboriginal cultural activities. In contrast, the model of the CAA takes a broader view of aboriginal cultural development. This can be seen, for example, in 'The Plans to Promote Aboriginal Culture for Six Years'³³: The main purposes of this strategy are as follows. First, the government should integrate resources to promote aboriginal cultural development systematically. Secondly, it must help the aborigines to maintain the preservation of traditional aboriginal culture. In order to do so, the government has sought to integrate human resources and other relevant plans to support aborigines, and has undertaken to develop aboriginal culture through various means: the construction of art museums; reports on aboriginal history; an aboriginal dictionary and textbooks; and exhibitions of aboriginal culture and arts. Thirdly, the government aims to strengthen the cultural identity of the aborigines, and promote the development of multiculturalism through aboriginal education.

Another example is that the CAA issued the draft of 'The Aboriginal Developmental Act' (2000) to integrate the various laws and regulations relating to aborigines, and to

³¹ From <http://www.apc.gov.tw/laws/The Law for Aboriginal Education.htm> (in Chinese).

³² Article 2 of the 'Law for Aboriginal Education'.

³³ From <http://www.apc.gov.tw/laws/The Plans to Promote Aboriginal Culture for Six Years.htm> (in Chinese).

improve the development of aborigines, since the old laws and policies were too dispersed. The main principles of the Aboriginal Developmental Act include: first, the idea that equality for the peoples should be protected³⁴; secondly, the principle of multiculturalism is acknowledged³⁵; and thirdly, aboriginal cultural rights are protected³⁶.

The model of the CAA was more concerned with the cultural rights of aborigines, its aim was to enhance the development of multicultural citizenship. The Draft of 'The Aboriginal Self-government Act' (2001) is an example of consideration given to the development of aboriginal culture based on the right of 'self-government'. Article 94 states that the autonomous regions should dominate the preservation, maintenance, promotion and safekeeping of the aboriginal arts and ancient objects. They should set up their own institutions to protect ancient artifact. Article 97 states that the aboriginal languages should be recognised as public languages in the autonomous regions.

The shift from the model of the CCA to that of the CAA reflects a redefinition of social values and a stress on decentralisation in cultural policy. For example, the CAA's policy rejects the CCA's centralisation of national identity, and uses aboriginal subjectivity to reject the values of the Hans. At the same time, the CAA's policy builds some new values, such as equality and social justice, to justify aboriginal rights in cultural policy. However, there is still a danger that the CAA may become another new 'centre' in cultural policy. This is why Community Renaissance is important: it provides another way to 'decentralise' aboriginal cultural development.

7.2.2 Community Renaissance in Aboriginal Tribes

Community Renaissance has developed from a cultural policy of the CCA to a main

³⁴ For example, see Article 5: the government should ensure that the aboriginal peoples share equal rights with other peoples. The aboriginal peoples have the right to be exempt from any forms of inequality. Article 6: when the government deals with aboriginal affairs or make laws, it should respect the language, culture and traditional customs of the aboriginal peoples in order to protect their rights. If the aboriginal people cannot understand the national language, the government should provide translators.

³⁵ Article 13: the government should follow the principles of multiculturalism, equality and respect to protect cultural and educational rights, and should establish a cultural and educational system to fit the needs of the aboriginal peoples.

³⁶ Article 18: the aboriginal peoples have cultural rights, such as the right to learn about their language, history, arts, social system, customs, life-style, traditional values and so on. Article 19: the government should preserve and maintain the aboriginal cultural heritage, and promote their arts, customs and crafts. Article 20: the government should maintain or recover original place names according to the need of the aboriginal peoples. Article 21: the government should protect and help the aboriginal peoples to have the right to use the mass media, and should encourage the media to communicate the culture and life-style of the aboriginal peoples, in order to improve the understanding and respect between the ethnic groups.

policy across the various government departments. For example, the CAA's policy of a 'new tribal movement' is a new product of aboriginal cultural policy under the influence of Community Renaissance.

In fact, the concept of 'tribal movement' developed quite early. In the early 1990s, one leader of the ATA³⁷ (Association of Taiwanese Aborigines), TaiBang Sasala, stressed the idea of tribalism in the hope of developing an aboriginal movement in the tribes. At this time the Rukai people mounted resistance against the construction of the 'Ma-Jia Reservoir' by the Han people in their hometown. In 1993, the cultural policy of 'Community Renaissance' was emphasised by the CCA. TaiBang Sasala combined the idea of 'tribalism', the strategy of 'Community Renaissance' and the Anti-Reservoir movement to reconstruct his tribe. After that, 'Community Renaissance' became the key to tribal reconstruction.

According to the main leader of 'tribalism', Sasala, the tribes are the motherland of Taiwan aborigines. All aborigines should return to their motherland, reconstruct the history of the motherland, rebuild the social structure and cultural tradition, and then the aboriginal community can be revitalised³⁸. In addition, the aboriginal intellectuals also feel that 'tribalism' can be practised in the bottom-up discussion of public affairs, thus encouraging more aborigines to participate in public affairs. Thus the position of the aborigines can be changed from that of 'the dominated' to that of 'participants'. Furthermore, collective identity, community identity and tribal identity can all be strengthened³⁹.

This view is quite close to the idea of Community Renaissance. At the discussion meeting on 'Aboriginal Cultural and Artistic Inheritance and Development' in 1995, the vice-chief of the CCA, Chen, Qi-Nan pointed out that aboriginal cultural development and the development of aboriginal tribes are the 'same' question⁴⁰. Without aboriginal tribes or communities, it is impossible to develop aboriginal culture. At the same time, aboriginal

³⁷ Association of Taiwanese Aborigines (ATA) was the most important aboriginal organisation to promote aboriginal movements in the 1980s and the earlier 1990s.

³⁸ TaiBang Sasala, 'The Rebirth of the Hometowns: From *High Mountain Green* to *Tribalism* -- A Rethinking and Observation from the People in the Aboriginal Movement', web site: <http://www.wildmic.npust.edu.tw/sasala/index>. (Chinese)

³⁹ Zhang, Wei-Qi, *The Community Renaissance of the He-dong Tribe--A Tribe Wants to Be a Community?* (MA thesis for the Graduate School of Ethnic Relationships and Culture, Dong-Hua University, 1998), p. 7.(Chinese)

⁴⁰ Chen, Qi-nan, in *The Report of the Discussion Meeting on Taiwanese Aboriginal Cultural and Artistic Inheritance and Development* (Taipei: CCA, 1996), p.12. (Chinese)

culture is also an important factor in improving tribal development. For most aboriginal tribes, aboriginal cultural property will provide the opportunity to better the depressive state of the economy⁴¹.

There are different views on the impact of Community Renaissance. Some observers believe that it has led to increase cultural diversity for the various groups, such as the Hakkas, the aborigines and women, in the struggle against modern national identity⁴². But others point out that Community Renaissance pushes the 'aboriginal tribes' to become 'a community', and this leads to the modern nation-state integrating aboriginal culture into national culture. In addition, Community Renaissance enters into the aboriginal tribes. Does it provide a path for the aborigines to resist modernisation and industrialisation? Or does it encourage the aboriginal culture to become a cultural commodity to be consumed by the global market⁴³?

In 2001, the Control Yuan⁴⁴ undertook a survey to evaluate the effects of Community Renaissance, and this survey also discussed the cases of aboriginal tribes. According to the survey, the principles of community renaissance are 'from below to above', 'the autonomy of tribes' and 'public participation' as a basis for developing aboriginal communities in the long term and strengthening communal identity⁴⁵. According to these principles and the findings of researchers, the 'positive' influences of Community Renaissance on aboriginal tribes are as follows:

First, Community Renaissance can help tribes to achieve permanent development: As Chen, Qi-Nan points out, the aim of Community Renaissance is to help some marginal communities to meet the challenge of urbanisation and industrialisation. For most aboriginal tribes, the tribal economy is depressed, residents have to move away to work, and thus tribal culture and life style are also washed away. Therefore, Community Renaissance is viewed as a useful way to activate aboriginal tribes. In most cases, the development of cultural property and tourism is seen as the best way of improving the tribal economy⁴⁶. Thus the tribe can develop its new economy and also increase the value

⁴¹ Ibid., p.12.

⁴² Huang, Li-Ling (1999), pp.150-2.

⁴³ Zhang, Wei-Qi (1998), p.13.

⁴⁴ It is an administrative institution of the central government to supervise the practices of policy.

⁴⁵ Huang, Huang-Xiong, Quo, Shi-ji and Lin, Shi-ji, *Report of the Survey for Community Renaissance* (Taipei: Yuan-liu Publisher, 2001), p.139. (Chinese)

⁴⁶ Ibid., p.139.

of tourism in order to expand the tribe.

Secondly, Community Renaissance can enhance the coherence of tribal consciousness and strengthen cultural identity: some tribes face specific problems such as loss of land, language problems, and a worsening economy, and hence the residents of those tribes are beginning to lose their tribal consciousness and cultural identity. The Shao are an example of this situation⁴⁷. In order to recover the identity of the Shao, cultural associations on the basis of the Community Renaissance strategy have been set up to reconstruct Shao culture and tribalism. The measures adopted by the Shao cultural associations include the reconstruction of tribes after the Twenty-first September (921) Earthquake, the setting up of Shao cultural villages, returning to their traditional hometowns, teaching the Shao language to the young generation, and collecting Shao history and culture⁴⁸.

Thirdly, Community Renaissance helps the preservation and popularisation of aboriginal culture, since the recovery of culture is *always a key point in the process of* strengthening a common identity. In the tribal Community Renaissance, the practice and development of traditional culture is an important aim. For example, the 'tribal classroom' has been set up to teach the traditional values and relationships between people and the earth⁴⁹. In Tanaiku, various cultural and educational courses have been organised to teach traditional dance, music and culture⁵⁰.

Fourthly, Community Renaissance provides an opportunity to put the principle of 'participation from below to above' into effect, thus fostering a consensus among the whole tribe as a basis for self-government. For example, the residents of Tanaiku set up new regulations, pushed for social welfare improvements, and protected their environment, and finally proceeded to tribal self-government. This successful experience has been viewed as an important case for the Thso to promote their self-government⁵¹.

Fifthly, Community Renaissance demonstrates the possibility of reconstructing a new tribal culture. It provides some positive thinking for aboriginal tribes, including ways of

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.140.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.140.

⁴⁹ Cheng, Jin-feng, *Museum and Its Fabrication of Taiwan Aboriginal Image: An Example of Taiwan Aboriginal Culture Park*. MA thesis, Graduate of Museum, (Taiwan: National Taiwan Art Faculty, 2001), p.68. (Chinese)

⁵⁰ Lv, Jia-hong, *The Research for the Development of Taiwanese Villages: the Case Studies of Tanaiku and Lan-Tan*, MA thesis of the Department of Politics, (Jia-yi: University of Zhong-Zheng, 1999), pp.64--6. (Chinese)

⁵¹ Interview with Voyu.

developing a tribal economy, protecting a traditional culture, and achieving self-government. Generally speaking, Community Renaissance helps the aboriginal tribes to 're-exist' and 'reconstruct' themselves in modern society.

However, some case studies also reveal certain negative impacts of Community Renaissance:

First, aboriginal tribes have the idea of 'community' in their tradition, but 'Community Renaissance' is a new issue. Compared with the Han people, aborigines have a stronger tribal identity. The new idea of 'Community Renaissance' causes further confusion between 'tribe' and 'community'. Thus, 'Community Renaissance' is viewed not as a policy from the 'bottom up' but from the government.

Secondly, since the concept of 'community' is confusing to many aborigines, 'Community Renaissance' is viewed as a means of developing cultural property, tourism and the improvement of a tribal economy. This simplification of 'Community Renaissance' leads to other problems. For example, other aborigines feel uncomfortable about 'selling' their traditional culture⁵², and some aboriginal tribes are criticised as being 'too commercial'.

Thirdly, the main principle of Community Renaissance is to participate in public affairs from the bottom to the top. However, the confusion about 'community' leads to an external team⁵³ teaching tribal residents 'what Community Renaissance is' and 'how to do Community Renaissance'. In this way, the 'from the bottom to the top' principle becomes 'from above to below' in practice, thus hindering public participation⁵⁴.

Fourthly, many external teams have experiences of Community Renaissance, but most of it is related to Han villages or towns. In addition, some successful cases of Community Renaissance -- mostly in the Han villages -- have also influenced the imagination of Community Renaissance in tribes. Some cases also show that Community Renaissance is 'copied' or 'transplanted' from a Han community to aboriginal tribes, thereby damaging

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Generally, one 'external team' fosters community renaissance in a tribe. The CCA provide money for external teams, and the teams present their plans for run community renaissance. Most external teams consist of academics.

⁵⁴ Zhang, Wei-Qi (1998), p.140.

aboriginal cultural development.

Fifthly, another problem is that many projects try to construct a common identity or memory based on the traditional culture. The 'searching' for the traditional culture is important during the process of Community Renaissance. However, what is traditional culture? Most traditional culture is mixed, fragmented and shaped into a hybrid under the process of modernisation and assimilation. In addition, tradition is 'invented' or presented as a 'performance', and is far removed from everyday life⁵⁵.

The various cases show that the reconstruction from 'tribes' to 'community' is an opportunity to rebuild tribal culture in the contemporary context. However, there are also some dangers during the process of Community Renaissance. From the perspective of the present study, Community Renaissance is a special cultural policy which can balance the tension between integration and separation. It emphasises the development of tribes and tribal identity, which can strengthen the need for separation. At the same time, it also integrates the aboriginal tribes, in the name of communities, based on the democratic system and multicultural citizenship, into a new national identity.

7.3 Aboriginal Rights: the Possibility of Multicultural Citizenship?

Aboriginal rights provide a new beginning for multicultural citizenship in Taiwan. When the Taiwan government claims that Taiwan is a multicultural country and also tries to use multiculturalism as a way to integrate the various national identities, however, Taiwanese aborigines can also use 'multiculturalism' to legitimise their demand for cultural rights⁵⁶. With the development of cultural rights, Taiwanese aborigine groups have become the first to strive towards multicultural citizenship in Taiwan. Now, I explore whether multicultural citizenship can indeed be practised in the case of the Taiwanese aborigine.

7.3.1 The Right to Cultural Identity

The right to cultural identity is emphasised in many international laws⁵⁷, but does not have an agreed, clear definition. We will argue that the right to cultural identity should be practised not only through the making of policies to protect aboriginal cultural identity, but also by improving or creating a better space, without discrimination, in which the

⁵⁵ Zhang, Wei-Qi (1998), p.138.

⁵⁶ In an interview, Sun, Da-Chuan stated that the legitimacy of aboriginal cultural rights comes from 'multiculturalism'.

⁵⁷ Such as the Algiers Declaration Act (1976), the Declaration of San Jose (1981).

Taiwanese aborigines can really develop their cultural identity. For example, only aboriginal children have to accept 'multicultural' education in Taiwan; other ethnic groups do not have a clear idea of 'multiculturalism', and they continue to belittle the aboriginal culture. In this situation, the right to cultural identity is not really put into effect. Multiculturalism needs to be applied to the dominant groups too.

The old assimilation policy limited the right to aboriginal cultural identity. From the 1980s, several aboriginal movements appeared in search of their cultural identity. At the same time, the government also changed its policies to promote aborigines' cultural identity. The main movements and policies included the renaming of Taiwanese aborigines⁵⁸ (1995), the reinstatement of aboriginal traditional names (1999), and a new way to identify aboriginal status (2000).

The Rename Movement⁵⁹ was important for the formation of collective identity. The movement contained several elements. First, it expressed the view that the Taiwan aborigines did not have to accept the names given to them by other ethnic groups or peoples. They should define themselves. Secondly, the name 'Taiwan Aborigines' signified a close relationship between them and this land. Lin, using the explanation of S. James Anaya, identified two meanings of 'aborigines' or 'indigenous peoples'. One is that their ancestors or they themselves have close relations with the land that they live on. Thus they are 'aboriginal' or 'indigenous'. At the same time, they are always divided into different communities; thus they are 'aborigines' but not 'aborigine'⁶⁰. Therefore, the aborigines are different from a 'minority', because they are 'aboriginal' and are also deprived of many things, such as culture and lands. ATA used the name 'Taiwan aborigines' to stress their legitimacy in demanding their original land, cultural rights and the right to self-determination.

⁵⁸ The Rename Movement appeared in 1987. In 1995, the government changed the name of the 'mountain people' to 'Taiwanese aborigines'.

⁵⁹ From 1984, ATA began to promote the Rename Movement. In the Ching Dynasty, the Han people called the Aborigines 'Fan', meaning 'animal' and 'not human'. Under Japanese rule, from 1895 to 1945, the Japanese government called them 'Fan' and 'Mountain Race'. Their status was lower than that of the Han people under the law of the Japanese government because they were still not 'human beings'⁵⁹. After the KMT government moved to Taiwan, the Aborigines were called 'mountain people', and they were viewed as one ethnic group among the Chinese People. The definition of the Aborigines as 'Chinese people' provided the legitimacy for the KMT to assimilate the Aborigines as 'Chinese'. However, ATA rejected all of these names and renamed themselves as 'Taiwan Aborigines', and the Rename Movement sought to promote the acceptance of this name by Taiwanese society.

⁶⁰ Lin, Shu-Ya (2000), pp.5-7.

Furthermore, the Rename Movement was important in the promotion of collective identity among the pan-Taiwan aborigines. Before the 1980s, most aborigines were ashamed of their name and status⁶¹. Thus the Rename Movement provided a new name for all aborigines, who could begin to request their collective rights, because 'Taiwan aborigines' was a collective status.

In addition, traditional aboriginal names are an important symbol of cultural identity⁶². The KMT government introduced a new measure to allow aborigines to reinstate their traditional names in 1995, and amended this measure in 2000. However, from 1995 to 2001, only 700 aborigines applied to recover their names. One reason is that the administrative process is quite complex; another reason is that the government does not provide enough help to encourage aborigines⁶³. In fact, many young aborigines do not have traditional names under the old assimilation policy⁶⁴. Without a more active intervention from the government, the strategy of recovering traditional names is unlikely to result in a strong sense of aboriginal cultural identity.

'The Measure to Identify Aboriginal Status' was passed in 2001, and provided a new way to identify who are aborigines. Before this measure, aboriginal women who married Han men would 'become' Han people, and their children would be viewed as Han people but not aborigines. However, the new measure provides the opportunity for someone whose father or mother is aborigine to choose between the status of aborigine or Han. According to this new measure, there are 4,000 more aborigines than before⁶⁵.

The key issue is whether these policies actually strengthen aboriginal cultural identity or not. According to a survey in 2000, aboriginal cultural identity is still weak in the view of the Hans. For example, most Hans believe that aborigines do not work hard, and this view is also accepted by aborigines themselves⁶⁶. In addition, about 54.4% of aborigines think that for this reason they have lower economic and social status. Furthermore, this research shows that an aborigine who has more interaction with the Hans and higher

⁶¹ Xie, Shi-Zhong, *The Stigma of Identity -- The Ethnic Changes of Taiwan Aborigines* (Taipei: Zi-Li Publisher, 1984), pp.33-36. (Chinese)

⁶² The Taiwanese aborigines were forced to use Han names under the assimilation policy. In fact, they were also forced to use Japanese names under Japanese rule.

⁶³ Interview with Ba-Nai.

⁶⁴ Interviews with Ba-Nai and SiNaiYang.

⁶⁵ Qui, Xian-Ming, 'The Amendment of Aboriginal Status: Identification of Aborigines is a Fashion', *Liberty Times*, 6 April 2001. (Chinese)

⁶⁶ For example, the Hans believe that Taiwanese aborigines are 'lazy'. Moreover, many Taiwanese aborigines themselves believe that they are lazier than the Hans.

economic and social status has lower self-identity. In other words, closer ethnic reactions seem to lead to the loss of aboriginal self-identity⁶⁷.

Han values impact negatively on aboriginal cultural identity. As Frantz Fanon pointed out, the blacks became the 'other' in the view of the whites. Fanon develops his theory of colonised experience around this concept of 'the other'. He stresses that the crisis of identity in the black community results from western values, which construct the black as 'the other' in their culture, and this leads to the black people experiencing the inferiority of the colonised. The black is forced to subject himself to an objective examination, to discover his blackness and ethnic characteristics, and he is battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defect and slaveship⁶⁸. Eventually he is completely dislocated. Unable to be abroad with the other, the white, he takes himself far off from his own presence and makes himself an object.⁶⁹ During this process, the black is forced to change his location from 'self' to 'other'.

Similarly, aborigines cannot have a strong cultural identity related to their own ethnicity if they accept the Han perspective. The more they interact with the Hans, the less they identify with their own culture and ethnic group. This phenomenon creates a significant problem for multicultural policy in Taiwan: the policy is implemented in relation to minority groups but not the majority. Most Han people still believe that Taiwanese aborigines are 'poor, lazy, heavy drinking and sell their daughters as young prostitutes'⁷⁰. However, the government has failed to see that it is very difficult to improve aboriginal cultural identity unless society changes its attitude towards aborigines. In addition, aboriginal self-identity is also related to participation in and access to their own culture, which can strengthen their confidence. In the next section, I will discuss the importance of participation in minority culture in the practice of multicultural citizenship.

7.3.2 The Right to Participate in Cultural Life

According to the Report of the European Round Table (1994), the meaning of 'the right

⁶⁷Fu, Yang-Zhi, 'The Self- Image of Taiwanese Aborigines' in *Forum, United Times*, 19 November, 2000. (Chinese)

⁶⁸ Fanon, Frantz, *Black Skin, White Masks*. (London: Pluto Press, 1992), pp. 109--110.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p.112.

⁷⁰ Fu, Yang-chih, 'The Socioeconomic Plight of Taiwan's Native Austronesian-Speaking People: Squaring the Accounts of Han Chinese and Native People', *Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology Academia Sinica*, No. 77, Spring 1994, p. 77. (Chinese)

to participate' is 'equality of opportunity for participation by all, both in the creation and in the enjoyment of the *majority* culture and *minority* culture, and including the freedom to choose to be or not to be part of any particular cultural group and to contribute to its development'.⁷¹ Before then, the European Declaration of Cultural Objectives in 1984 stated that governments should promote policies 'to enable everyone to contribute to the shaping of ideas and to participate in choices which determine the future....'; and states should 'promote recognition of the cultures of regions, migrants and minorities and their participation in the community, so that our society -- mindful of such diversity -- will allow the emergence of new forms of social cohesion'⁷². Thus cultural policy should promote affirmative action to ensure equality of access and equal opportunities for everyone to participate in cultural life. For example, priority should be given to measures designed to advance the opportunities for participation by members of minority groups; priority should also be given to addressing the impact of market-driven forces which may reduce the opportunities for participation in cultural life for people living in economic disadvantage, and to ensuring financial and physical access to cultural activities for everyone⁷³.

The first problem concerning participation in cultural life is the equality principle. Thus Taiwanese aborigines and the Han people are supposed to have an equal opportunity to participate in cultural life, but in reality they do not. First, we need to consider how aborigines can participate in the majority culture of Taiwan, and how the government can act to overcome the problem. Secondly, we need to ask: can aborigines actually participate in their minority culture? Does the government provide support and opportunities to help aborigines participate in their own culture? What can the government do to overcome this problem? How does the government try to help aborigines to access their activities? What does the government do to improve the right to participate in cultural life?

Participation in cultural life, whether in the majority culture or the minority culture, is very limited for Taiwanese aborigines. First, according to cultural statistics for 1999, the main cultural activities of aborigines are: watching TV and video, listening to the radio, reading books and newspapers, going fishing, and joining religious activities. Most of these activities are related to the mass media. In other words, the mass media play a very important role in their participation in cultural life. However, the mass media do not provide many opportunities for aborigines to access their own culture. According to Chen,

⁷¹ *Report of the European Round Table* (1994), p.50.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p.53.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

Yi-Xiang's research, there is not a single TV programme in an aboriginal language. Moreover, the programme content related to minority groups, such as aborigines and the Hakkas, accounts for only 0.24 % of all programme content on the various channels⁷⁴. Aboriginal radio programmes account for only 0.44% of all programmes, but the aboriginal population is more than 2% of the total⁷⁵. Thus, it is very difficult for aborigines to access their own culture through the mass media.

There are not many cultural activities in tribes⁷⁶. These activities could help aborigines to understand their culture, but they cannot participate easily because they do not have the necessary free time. Lin, Jiang-Yi points out that national holidays have a huge influence on aboriginal activity. Han people always define their traditional festivals as 'national holidays', such as Chinese New Year, the Dragon Boat Festival or the Moon Festival. Aborigines do not have these festivals in their traditional culture. But because they are 'national holidays', aborigines have begun to do something, since they do not need to work on these days. Gradually, aborigines have come to celebrate these festivals. On the other hand, they do not have holidays for their own traditional festivals, so most of the latter are cancelled or simplified, thus causing cultural loss and change⁷⁷.

Turning to language rights, there are over 20 aboriginal languages in Taiwan, but it is very difficult to use them in the public sphere. Only 40% of aboriginal families use their mother tongue. Compared with the Hakkas, it is more difficult for the aborigines to maintain their mother tongue in the private or the public sphere.

7.3.3 The Right to Develop a Culture

The right to develop a culture is discussed in many international declarations, such as UNESCO's Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation (1966), the Algiers Declaration (1976), and the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (1994, Article 13). Under the assimilation policy, for several generations, Taiwanese aboriginal culture was seriously damaged and in some cases

⁷⁴ Chen, Yi-Xiang, *The Diversity of Taiwan's TV Programmes*. PhD Thesis in Journalism, (Taipei: National Cheng-Chi University, 2000), p. 227. (Chinese)

⁷⁵ Liu, Yu-Li, (1996), p.14.

⁷⁶ Under Japanese rule and the KMT government, many aboriginal ceremonies were curtailed. Over 50 years later, some tribes have begun to recover their traditional ceremonies, but in some cases they no longer know how to celebrate them.

⁷⁷ Interview with Lin, Jiang-Yi. From 2002, the government has decided to provide one day off for Taiwanese aborigines for their traditional festivals. But most of these festivals need several days. This shows that the government's policy is no more than 'symbolic'.

eliminated. Today, the development of aboriginal culture is viewed as the main aim of cultural policy. Detailed strategies for achieving this aim include 'The Plans to Develop Aboriginal Society'⁷⁸ and 'The Plans to Promote the Aboriginal Culture for Six Years'⁷⁹. Thus the government has begun to be concerned about aboriginal cultural development. However, there are still many difficulties to overcome. The 'White Paper on Aboriginal Culture across the Centuries' highlights a number of problems facing aboriginal culture in the future. First, there have been changes among the aboriginal tribes: the Han people have moved in to the aboriginal villages and there has been an increase in the number of aborigines in the cities. Secondly, there has been an increase in the number of marriages between Han and aborigines, so that traditional ethnic identity has changed. Thirdly, the life style and production practices of aborigines have changed. Fourthly, there has been a collapse of aboriginal oral literature because their languages are not written languages. Finally, globalisation and new attitudes arising from the dominant society have brought new influences to bear on the development of aboriginal culture⁸⁰. Thus, in the research interviews, most aborigines expressed pessimism about their future.

First, the government does not provide enough support for implementing the right to develop a culture in practice. The main reason is that the government spends more on sponsoring sacrifices for good harvests than on actually developing aboriginal culture. There is a danger that original academic research and collections of traditional history, and music and dance will not be able to continue, because the budget is limited⁸¹. Thus, the right to develop a culture needs more practical support.

Secondly, most aborigines have to struggle with financial problems, so they are more concerned about their economic development and social welfare than they are about

⁷⁸ *The Plans to Develop Aboriginal Society* (1998) emphasised the maintenance of traditional aboriginal cultural property, e.g. historical relics, music, dance, languages, spoken literature, arts., and the reconstruction and reporting for traditional tribes, e.g. undertaking research to identify remains, maintaining historical spots, publishing aboriginal historical literature.

⁷⁹ *The Plans to Promote Aboriginal Culture for Six Years* (1998) emphasised fostering young aboriginal artists in order to maintain the traditional culture, including folk culture, traditional dance, music, songs and literature, and the popularising of aboriginal culture in people's lives, e.g. by sponsoring aboriginal cultural activity, cultivating aboriginal folk culture, and improving cultural exchange between the various ethnic groups

⁸⁰ Cultural and Educational Association of Taiwanese Aborigines, *The White Paper on Aboriginal Policy Across the Centuries* (Taipei: Cultural and Educational Association of Taiwanese Aborigines, 1998), p.136. (Chinese)

⁸¹ Interview with Sun, Dan-Chuan.

cultural issues⁸². According to research in 1996, 73.1% of aborigines have employment difficulties; 61.7% have economic problems, compared to 31.1% concerned about cultural loss⁸³. Another survey in 2001 also shows that the average income in Taiwan is 2.6 times the average income of aborigines⁸⁴. Thus, it is clear that the most important problems for aborigines are economic, not cultural. Hence the aborigines also need the support of the government to overcome these difficulties in order to practice the right to develop a culture.

Thirdly, aboriginal cultural development faces a difficult choice between modernisation and tradition. The traditional aboriginal culture belonged to everyday life. However, when the life style changed, it was difficult to maintain the culture. At the same time, traditional aboriginal music and dance are also forced to modernise in order to fit in with the tastes of modern audiences⁸⁵. These factors inevitably make it difficult to develop authentic aboriginal culture.

Aboriginal cultural development depends on both 'preservation' and 'participation': 'preservation' of traditional culture, and 'participation' in the future development of aboriginal culture. Therefore, the government believes that Community Renaissance, or the 'new tribal movement', can solve aboriginal problems. The new chief of the CAA, Chen, Jian-nian, has stated that the new tribal movement could attract more aborigines to reconstruct tribes, push the development of tribal industry, and increase opportunities for employment. At the same time, aboriginal cultures could be preserved in tribes. Thus, the new tribal movement is viewed as the best way to keep a balance between cultural preservation and economic development.

7.3.4 The Right to Represent Their Groups

'The right to represent their groups' is also viewed as an important concept in aboriginal cultural rights. For example, in the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article 16 states that indigenous peoples have the right to maintain the dignity and diversity of their cultures, traditions, histories and aspirations, appropriately

⁸² Interview with Pu, Zhong-Cheng.

⁸³ The data are from the CAA.

⁸⁴ The data are from the CAA.

⁸⁵ DuLai, Wa-Dan points out that traditional aboriginal dance did not use a 'stage' and always lasted for several hours. Their performances were for the spirits of ancestors or their gods. However, the methods of performance have been changed in order to fit the needs of a modern audience. If the dances are too long, the audience will feel bored.

reflected in all forms of education and public information. The state shall take effective measures to eliminate prejudice and discrimination and to promote tolerance, understanding and good relationships among indigenous peoples and all segments of society.

'Representation' is a major issue in contemporary cultural studies. Many researchers discuss the power relationship between 'representer' and 'represented'. For example, Edward Said's *Orientalism* shows that eastern society came to be dominated by western society through the power invested in knowledge. Citing Karl Marx, Said states: 'they can not represent themselves; they must be represented'. In this case, it is eastern society that has to be 'represented'⁸⁶. Similarly, Fanon's view of the 'other'⁸⁷ also shows how the views of whites influence the values of blacks. These various theories agree that the key issues of representation are: Who has the power to represent? Who can interpret the meaning of differences? Through whose standards are these differences seen? Thus, many international conferences have emphasised the importance of the right to be represented, but the problem remains of how best to represent aborigines through their own subjectivity.

If we consider the representation of aborigines in Taiwan through, for example, the mass media, textbooks, museums and academic research, we can identify several problems. The first is that of 'invisibility'. For example, in the educational system, the representation of aborigines in the educational system is still limited. One survey of textbooks for primary schools and junior high schools in 2001 analyses textbooks for Chinese literature and social sciences. In two Chinese literature textbooks there was no mention of the Taiwanese aborigines, and one other textbook devoted only one per cent of its content to the aborigines – the highest proportion of any textbooks. In the social sciences, the highest rate was about 5.0%, but in most textbooks the range was between 0.7% and 2.3%⁸⁸.

Kung, Wen-chi has analysed aboriginal news in Taiwan's press and highlights certain problems of representation. For example, the Taiwanese mainstream press has simply neglected aboriginal issues⁸⁹. The second problem is that most of the aboriginal news of the mainstream press is focused on the annual harvest festival and traditional rites, or the

⁸⁶ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*, (London: Penguin Books, 1995).

⁸⁷ Fanon, Frantz, *Black Skin, White Masks*. (London: Pluto Press, 1992).

⁸⁸ 'It is Difficult to See Aboriginal Culture in the Textbooks of Primary Schools', *The Night News of Independence*, 18 March 2001.

⁸⁹ Kung, Wen-chi, *Indigenous People and the Press: A Study of Taiwan* (Taipei: Han-lu Publisher, 2000), p.210.

social problems of aboriginal tribes, such as alcohol abuse and poverty⁹⁰. This tends to increase the misrepresentation of aborigines and leads to stigmatisation⁹¹. In addition, the media rights of aborigines have not been implemented, and this is another problem that leads to the misrepresentation of aborigines in Taiwan. For example, the right of access to the mass media and the right to own mass media are still underdeveloped in Taiwan⁹². People use 'Han culture' to consider aboriginal issues, since few aborigines can work in the mass media to present their own views.

Another major influence on aboriginal representation is the museums. In recent years, many aboriginal museums have been set up and have become an important channel through which the Hans seek to understand aborigines. Cheng, Jin-feng points out that the representation of Taiwanese aborigines in museums still concentrates on 'traditions' and 'truth', and makes aboriginal pictures match the official policy, academic discourse and tourists needs. These 'traditions' and 'truths' copy the knowledge from 'aboriginal research', which is controlled by the Hans, and *strengthen the image of the aborigines as the 'other'*⁹³. At the same time, the differences between the aborigines and Hans are presented as homogeneous stereotypes. It is more difficult for aborigines to represent their 'own' culture. Undoubtedly, aborigines have little say in how they are represented by museums⁹⁴.

Cheng, Jin-Feng stresses a new trend in the representation of aborigines: towards tribes and their everyday life. Such representation is in 'tribal classrooms' or 'ecological parks', rather than museums, with the aim of representing aboriginal culture in a more authentic way. This new trend offers a real possibility for aborigines to represent their own culture and subjectivity⁹⁵.

To sum up, the cultural rights of aborigines have been given more attention since the establishment of the CAA, but most aborigines are still a long way from actually achieving those rights in practice. The government has introduced several policies to protect the right to cultural identity, such as the renaming of 'Taiwanese aborigines', re-identifying 'who aborigines are', and recovering aborigines' traditional names. However, aboriginal cultural

⁹⁰ Ibid., p.211.

⁹¹ Kung, Wen-chi, *Loyal to Aboriginal Felling: The Media, Culture and Policies of Aborigines* (Taipei: Qian-Wei Publisher, 2000), p.110. (Chinese)

⁹² Kung, Wen-Chi (2000), p.342.

⁹³ Cheng, Jin-feng, (2001), p.53.

⁹⁴ Ibid.,p.62.

⁹⁵ Ibid.,p.66.

identity still faces many challenges for the young generation, and it needs more support from the government. The right to participate in cultural life, in either the majority or minority culture, is still underdeveloped in Taiwan. Modernisation will bring about the most difficult challenge for the future of aboriginal culture. In terms of the right to represent a group, the majority society still has some negative impressions of aborigines.

In addition, some new ideas about cultural rights need to be taken into account. For example, the Declaration of Stockholm (1998) asserts the right to participate in cultural policy, which means that aborigines have the right to participate in the making of cultural policy, and states need to recognise this right. However, this right has not previously been emphasised in Taiwan⁹⁶. Another issue concerns intellectual property rights, which are viewed as very important in international law, e.g. in the Declaration of Mataatua. The Taiwanese government issued the 'Law of Aboriginal Intellectual Property' in 2001 as a first step in implementing these rights in practice.

Conclusion

Aboriginal culture is viewed as an important part of 'multicultural Taiwan', both in the national discourse of 'multiculturalism' and in cultural policy. After several years, we find that aboriginal culture is now placed within the framework of national culture, and the aborigines can use the slogan of 'multiculturalism' to demand more rights from the government. However, there are many tensions facing aboriginal cultural policy in Taiwan. The first is between a single homogenised 'aboriginal' ethnic identity and separate tribal identities. The next is between an aboriginal culture which is 'represented' to the majority culture as 'other' and an aboriginal culture which is preserved and developed by and for the aborigines themselves. In addition, the tension between 'preservation' and 'participation' is also viewed as problematic. Consequently there are varied influences on the practice of multicultural citizenship. In the case of Taiwanese aborigines, this concept should encompass the right to develop a culture, the right to represent, the right to participate in cultural life, and the right to cultural identity.

At the same time, the case of Taiwanese aborigines shows that multiculturalism challenges national identity, cultural policy and the concept of citizenship in Taiwan. Rather than supporting the new national identity -- multicultural Taiwan-- the development of aboriginal identity tends to create a separation from it. The tension between integration

⁹⁶ Interviews with Ba-Nai and Chen, Zheng-rui.

and separation leads to uncertainty and instability in Taiwan's national identity. Furthermore, multiculturalism changes the view of cultural policy in Taiwan. The shift from the model of the CCA to that of the CAA reveals the redefinition of social values and the demands of decentralisation. Community Renaissance is a good example of this shift.

Finally, multiculturalism challenges the traditional concept of citizenship in Taiwan. After the establishment of the CAA, many laws and policies were introduced to protect aboriginal cultural rights, such as the right to cultural identity, the right to participate in cultural life, the right to develop a culture, and the right to represent their groups. Nevertheless, many cultural rights have still not been fully implemented by the government. In particular, new views of citizenship highlight the importance of cultural rights in citizenship. This is clearly demonstrated in the case of the Taiwanese aborigines.

Chapter 8: Hakka Identity and Cultural Policy

The Hakkas are the second largest ethnic group in Taiwan, accounting for between 12% and 15% of the total population. Compared with the other groups, the Hakkas have a similar economic and political status to that of the Fulos¹, and a higher status than that of the Taiwanese aborigines. At the same time, their population is larger than that of the mainlanders. Thus, other groups wonder why the Hakkas are often viewed as a 'minority'². However, compared with the Fulos, whose population is equivalent to about 65% of the total population of Taiwan, and the mainlanders, who enjoy political and cultural dominance³, the Hakkas face some similar problems to those facing the Taiwanese aborigines. For example, they lost their mother language and culture under the domination of Chinese nationalism between 1949 and the 1990s. From the 1980s, the Fulo culture, under the name of 'Taiwan consciousness', began to corrode the Hakka culture. The reconstruction of Hakka identity and cultural development has thus become the key to the future existence of the Hakkas in Taiwan.

Compared with the Taiwan Hakka and Taiwanese aborigines, Taiwanese aborigines have a cultural system that is independent of the Han culture. They thus represent a very distinct culture and clearly separated from other ethnic cultures. However, the Hakka culture is one of the Han cultures, so if the Hakkas want to set up a distinction between themselves and other Han cultures, they may find that only the Hakka language and some special Hakka foods are indicative of 'Hakka culture'⁴. In fact, the Hakka culture involves various 'hybrid' factors which are based on their interactions with other ethnic groups and their mix with other ethnic cultures.

In this chapter, we will use the case of the Hakkas to consider the challenges of multiculturalism in Taiwan. From the Hakka's case, we can see the challenge of 'hybrid' ethnic identity to 'multicultural Taiwan', which is based on 'Four *Homogenous* Ethnic Groups'. The Hakka's experience shows how difficult it is to reconstruct a homogenous ethnicity in Taiwan today. The chapter considers three aspects. First, we will analyse how

¹ Huang, Xuan-fan, *Language, Society and Ethnic Consciousness: The Research of Taiwanese Linguistic Sociology* (Taipei: Wen-he Publisher, 1995), pp.43-5. (Chinese)

² Xiao, Xin-huang, 'Clarifying the Misunderstanding of the Hakka Issues', in *China Times*, 3rd March 2000.

³ Huang, Xuan-fan (1995), p.45.

⁴ Interview with Wen, Zhong-liang.

the Hakka identity has been reconstructed since 1988, when the Hakka movement first appeared, and how it has gained a position in the new national discourse of a 'multicultural Taiwan', and how it has become one part of national culture. We will show that the 'hybrid Hakka culture' has led to certain tensions with the 'homogenous' Hakka identity in the discourse of multicultural Taiwan. Secondly, we will discuss the process of 'putting Hakka' into public policy, and how the government has sought to do so within its multicultural policy. The creation of Hakka policy is viewed as a new cultural policy with the same difficulties: on the one hand, Hakka policy has to deal with a 'hybrid' culture; on the other hand, it has emerged from centralised 'public policy'. Thirdly, we will evaluate the new rights of the Hakkas as they have been expressed and expanded in public policy and the emerging conception of citizenship in Taiwan.

8.1 Hakka Identity in Taiwan--Hybrid or Homogenous?

The Hakkas have lived in Taiwan for over 300 years, but Hakka identity is going through a process of definition and redefinition involving reactions between the Hakkas and other ethnic groups. In this section, we will discuss the development and changes of Hakka identity in Taiwan since the 1980s.

8.1.1 The Reconstruction of Hakka Identity

'Hakka' is a complex ethnic and cultural phenomenon. Academic analysts have still not identified the origins of the Hakkas with any certainty. The most popular view is that the Hakkas lived in the northern part of mainland China several hundred years ago. Because of the impact of wars and political and economic factors, the Hakkas moved collectively more than five times during succeeding centuries⁵. In the seventeenth century, some Fulos and the Hakkas in the Fujian and Guangdong provinces moved to Taiwan and became the two major ethnic groups on the island.

'Hakka identity' in Chinese Nationalism

The Hakkas developed a special identity because of their long history of immigration. In order to adapt to different ethnic relationships (they were always newcomers), the Hakkas had to change or correct their identity or redefine their ethnic character. Furthermore, the Hakkas created different ethnic styles according to their circumstances and their interaction with 'neighbours', such as the Fulos. Thus, the Hakkas vary according

⁵ Lee, Quang-Zhen, 'A Decade of Hakka Activism', *Quang-Hua Magazine*, August 1999, p.10. (Chinese)

to their location.⁶ For example, the Hakkas in Guangdong province (in mainland China), Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore are different: the only thing they share is the same Hakka language⁷.

The collective identity of the Hakkas has been formed in the process of meeting other ethnic groups⁸. Because the Hakkas were always questioned about their background and origins by other ethnic groups, they had a strong tradition of maintaining their family history. Nicole Constable points out that the key to Hakka identity is not language, shared political interests, shared cultural practices, religion or native place, but it is the way in which these and other elements are invariably tied to Hakka history. In other words, Hakka identity must be viewed as having been constructed through the telling and retelling of history⁹.

Furthermore, this identity is constructed through the image of 'the descendants of the Chinese Nobles'¹⁰. The emphasis on a common history also stresses the close relationship between the Hakkas and mainland China, because all Hakkas came from there¹¹. Thus the Hakkas are viewed as an ethnic group with a strong link to China but not Taiwan. Hence, in the age of Chinese nationalism, the traditional Hakka discourse -- 'the descendant of the Chinese Nobles' -- was not advantageous to the Hakkas, since all ethnic groups were forced to be Chinese, including Taiwanese aborigines. The Hakkas' culture and language were lost

⁶ Chen, Ban, Liutui is the cultural park of the Hakkas – 'Thinking about the Hakka Cultural Park of Pingtung County from Community Renaissance', at web site: [http://www.ceformosa.org.tw/the_reconstruction_of_hometown/the_column_of_the_reconstruction_of_hometown/Chen, Ban/Liutui is the Cultural Park of the Hakka.htm](http://www.ceformosa.org.tw/the_reconstruction_of_hometown/the_column_of_the_reconstruction_of_hometown/Chen,_Ban/Liutui_is_the_Cultural_Park_of_the_Hakka.htm). (In Chinese)

⁷ However, there are different Hakka dialects, including Hai-lu, Si-Xian and Rao-Ping.

⁸ Lin, Qing-hong, Zhong, Rong-Fu, Shi, Zheng-Feng and Jiang, Jiong-Ren, *The Ethnic History of the Hakkas in Kaohsiung* (Kaohsiung: The Committee for Research, Development and Access in Kaohsiung City, 2000), p.35. (Chinese)

⁹ Nicole Constable, 'History and the Construction of Hakka Identity', in Chen Chung-Min, Chuang Ying-Chang and Huang, Shu-Min (eds.), *Ethnicity in Taiwan: Social, Historical and Cultural Perspectives*, (Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 1994), p.76.

¹⁰ The most obvious example of this is that when other ethnic groups defined the Hakkas as 'barbarian' during the 1920s and the 1930s in mainland China, the Hakka researcher, Lo, Xiang-Lin, established a new 'Hakkaology', which described the Hakkas as 'descendants of Chinese nobles', with a different Hakka family history. This strategy of self-definition and self-construction provided the main base for establishing the identity of the Hakkas, and this in turn had a major influence on the identity of the Hakkas in Taiwan. The research of Lo, Xiang-Lin also reveals important aspects of the traditional identity of the Hakkas. Lo collected and analysed many family histories of the Hakkas, and concluded that the Hakkas were the 'pure' Han people from the centre of mainland China. Lo constructed a perfect picture of the history of the Hakkas' immigrations. His research emphasised that the Hakkas were the most orthodox race among the Han people, and that the Han were the most important ethnic group among the Chinese people.

¹¹ Howard J. Martin (1998), p.225.

in the assimilation policy, as was also the case with other ethnic groups such as the aborigines and the Fulos. But after the increase of Taiwanese consciousness, dominated by the Fulos, the Hakkas were criticised for 'not identifying with Taiwan'¹². Yang, Chang-Zhen points out that while the Fulos, whose ancestors also came from the southern part of China, have given up their nostalgia for China and become 'Taiwanese', the Hakkas are still confused about whether they should become Taiwanese or not¹³.

From The New Hakkas to the Taiwanese Hakkas

The localization movements of the 1970s and the aboriginal movements of the 1980s stimulated the Hakkas to redefine their position in Taiwan. From the late 1980s, the Hakkas began to develop their own movement in an attempt to reconstruct a new ethnic identity in Taiwan.

The Hakka Affairs Public Association (HAPA) created a new discourse for the Hakkas as 'the New Hakkas' (1998). A poem by the first president of the HAPA, Zhong, Zhao-Zheng¹⁴, called 'the New Hakkas', stated:

Do not speak, the Hakkas were very great before,
Do not speak, the Hakkas were so outstanding before,
We are the new Hakkas now.
We had endless pains and difficulty, across mountains and sea to Taiwan.
We were in tears and blood, opened up the forests and trees to set up home.
We are the new Hakkas now.
Do not say this land is poor, do not say this land is barren.
Our hopes are here now.
We will create the new spirit of the Hakka. We will create the glory of the Hakka.
We are the new Hakkas now¹⁵.

In this poem, Zhong shows us the meaning of 'the new Hakkas'. First, the new Hakkas had to shake off the old, traditional construction of the Hakkas, and not 'speak the past' anymore. Furthermore, Zhong turned the Hakkas' identity from mainland China to Taiwan, and tried to search for a common experience in Taiwan. No matter how poor this land is, Taiwan is the only hope for the new Hakkas. Moreover, the hope for the new Hakkas is that

¹² Xiao, Xin-huang (2000). Some similarities to the mainlanders as noted in Chapter 5.

¹³ Lee, Quang-zhen (1999), p.12.

¹⁴ He is a famous Hakka writer in Taiwan.

¹⁵ Zhong, Zhao-Zheng, 'New Hakkas', in HAPA (eds.), *New Hakkas* (Taipei: Taiyuan, 1998), p.83. (Chinese)

they must demand freedom and democracy in Taiwan¹⁶.

Lee, Qiao also points out that the new Hakkas have to set up two kinds of identity in Taiwan. The first is an 'ethnic identity'. In Taiwan, the mainlanders control the most powerful political tools, and the Fulos have a majority of the population; thus the new Hakkas have to emphasise their own ethnic status in order to exist between these dominant ethnic groups. Secondly, it is necessary to change the focus of identity from China to Taiwan. Because of a long period of immigration, lasting thousands of years, the Hakkas have maintained their sense of being 'guests'.¹⁷

'The new Hakkas' marks the beginning of a break in the relationship between the Hakkas and mainland China. The discourse of the 'Taiwanese Hakkas', which was highlighted by the 'Taiwanese Hakka Camp' in 1996, seeks to strengthen the relationship between the Hakkas and Taiwan. The Camp articulated a new concept -- the 'Taiwanese Hakkas' -- to announce the reconstruction of 'local ethnicity' in Taiwan. For the Camp, emphasis on the 'the descendants of the Chinese nobles' in the traditional Hakka discourse is far removed from the reality of Taiwanese society today. They see themselves as 'Taiwanese Hakkas' but not 'Hakkas in Taiwan'. They are not one of the many branches of

¹⁶ The other members of the HAPA have also tried to construct the discourse of 'the new Hakkas' in Taiwan. The main characteristics of this discourse are:

First, the identity of 'the new Hakkas' is for all the Hakkas of Taiwan, and not only for the Hakkas of Liutui or Taoyuan/Hsinchu/Miaoli. The new Hakkas can be viewed as having a 'pan-Hakka consciousness' in Taiwan, and this can be used to promote a collective Hakka identity and the mobilisation of the Hakkas in Taiwan. But at the same time, the cultural differences between the various regions tends to be ignored by this 'pan-Hakka consciousness'.

Secondly, the discourse of 'the new Hakkas' combines the Hakka identity and the identity of Taiwan together, thus bringing to an end the nostalgia for mainland China as a 'homeland'. The Hakkas believe that Taiwan is their 'homeland' now, and they no longer see themselves as 'guests' in Taiwan. For many Hakkas, 'the new Hakkas' is a new choice but also a new challenge.

Thirdly, the appearance of 'the pan-Hakka consciousness' has led to a new development of Taiwanese nationalism, which has always been dominated by the Fulos. 'The new Hakkas' announce that they are one of the masters in Taiwan, and that the Fulos are not the 'only' master. This has resulted in a greater diversity in the construction of Taiwanese nationalism. In addition, the classification of ethnicity in Taiwan has shifted from the Ban-Sheng/Wai-Sheng classification to the idea of 'the Four Ethnic Groups' -- the Fulos, the Hakkas, the Aborigines and the mainlanders.

Fourthly, the appearance of 'the pan-Hakkas consciousness' is useful for enhancing the Hakkas' public status. The Hakkas are recognised as having a 'collective status' by the government. Thus they can demand the development of Hakka culture, language and ethnicity. In 2001, the establishment of the Committee of the Hakkas gave formal recognition to the Hakkas. They thus gained official support from the government to develop their ethnicity.

¹⁷ Lee, Qiao, 'The Development of the Hakkas in Taiwan Society', in HAPA (ed.), *New Hakkas* (Taipei: Taiyuan, 1998), pp. 35-6.

'Chinese tradition' in the world¹⁸. Moreover, the identity of 'Taiwanese Hakkas' is the key to identify themselves not only for Hakkas but also for Taiwan.

Through the shift from 'the traditional Hakkas' to 'the new Hakkas' to the 'Taiwanese Hakkas', the Hakkas have tried to reconstruct their ethnic identity in order to gain a position in the new national discourse of 'multicultural Taiwan'. At the same time, the traditional 'Chinese' Hakka and 'local' Hakka identities still have an influence on the Hakkas and stress the diversity of Hakka identity.

8.1.2 The Diversity of Hakka Identity

The Hakkas have experienced various constructions of their ethnicity. However, their identity remains diverse and multiple. It ranges from the experience of local Hakka villages to traditional Chinese Hakkas, and from the identity of Liutui and Taoyuan/Hsinchu/Miaoli to 'pan-Hakka consciousness', as in 'the new Hakkas' and the concept of Taiwanese Hakkas. Shared ancestors, language, history, culture, homeland, personal experience, and national identity are all major influences on how the Hakkas 'imagine' or 'invent' their ethnicity. The interviews for the present research revealed several kinds of Hakka identity. We will consider each of these in turn.

Local identity

Local identity for the Hakkas comes from experience in small Hakka towns or the bigger Hakka villages, such as Taoyuan/Hsinchu/Miaoli or Liutui. However, the most common situation is where the people identify themselves as Hakkas from their hometowns. For example, the people of Meinung have a very strong identity as Hakkas because of the anti-reservoir movement¹⁹. The experience of this movement made the people of Meinung feel that 'we are the Hakkas'. Among the different Hakka villages, there is evidence of considerable cultural variation. Chen, Ban argues that because of this it is difficult to set up a 'pan-Hakka consciousness' in Taiwan. There is no social institution to support this. Thus 'pan-Hakka consciousness' will become 'vacuous' in the future. Chen thinks that the Hakka movement needs to combine with the communal movement in order to provide the space and material to develop the Hakka identity²⁰.

¹⁸ Yang, Chang-Zheng, *The Declaration of the Establishment of the Hakka Alignment* (1996).

¹⁹ The KMT government wanted to set up a reservoir in Meinung, and undoubtedly this would have had a huge influence on the local environment and culture. Because 95% of the population in Meinung are Hakkas, they developed a close relationship with the Anti-Reservoir movement. This has reinforced the identity of the Hakkas in Meinung.

²⁰ Interview with Chen, Ban.

Language identity

Because the Hakkas, the Fulos and the mainlanders are all Han people, they look quite similar in appearance. Thus, the ability to speak the Hakka language became a key factor in recognising the Hakka ethnic status. Many people construct their identity from language: 'you are Hakka, so you have to speak the Hakka language' is the guiding principle. If the Hakkas meet someone who can speak the same language, they feel very close to them, even if they come from different areas.²¹

Identity based on kinship or blood relationship

Many new generations of Hakkas were born in the big cities and have consequently had no opportunity to make contact with and understand the Hakka culture or learn the Hakka language. But their parents are Hakkas, so they identify themselves as Hakkas²². With the increase of marriage across ethnic boundaries, it has become more difficult to define who a Hakka is. If a Hakka marries a Fulo, what identity do their children have?²³

In addition, the identity of kinship or blood relationship emphasises common ancestry, which is therefore close to the sense of Chinese Hakka or international Hakka identity. Thus the Hakkas feel confused about the link between their ethnic identity and national identity. However, the identity based on kinship and blood relationship is still important in Taiwan²⁴.

The 'pan-Hakka consciousness' of Taiwan

Under the impact of the localisation movement, many Hakkas are aware of the need for their own distinctive culture. Even though there are many different Hakka dialects and many cultural differences among the various Hakka villages, the feeling that 'we are the Hakkas' has become stronger. For example, the discourses of 'the new Hakkas' and 'the Taiwanese Hakka' are constructed towards the formation of the 'pan-Hakka consciousness'. The influence of this consciousness is not easy to evaluate. Some people, such as Xu, Zheng-Quang, believe that it is becoming more popular²⁵. On the other hand, some people say that the 'pan-Hakka consciousness' may be common in Taipei, but that most Hakkas in the villages do not understand or recognize this situation²⁶.

²¹ Zhong, Tie-Ming, 'The Sprit of the Hakkas', in HAPA (eds.), *New Hakkas* (Taipei: Taiyuan, 1998), p.47.

²² Interview with Lin, Xiao-Fang.

²³ Interview with Yang, Chang-Zhen.

²⁴ Zhong, Tie-ming (1998), p.47.

²⁵ Interview with Xu, Zheng-Quang.

²⁶ Interview with Zeng, Nian-Yu.

The Identity of Chinese Hakka and International Hakka

The history of family and ancestors plays an important role in Hakka culture. Since their ancestors came from mainland China, the Hakkas have a stronger identity with, and memory of, China than do the Fulos, whose ancestors also came from mainland China.²⁷ Some Hakkas still believe that their 'roots' are in mainland China²⁸.

At the same, the Hakkas also have a strong identity with their 'members', who share the same language and blood relationship in various countries across the world. The Association of the Global Hakkas is emphasized by the Hakkas and the *Committee of the Hakkas* in Taiwan.

Multiple or multi-ethnic Hakka identity

Because of the prevalence of marriages between the different ethnic groups, some new generations of Hakkas, who live away from the Hakka villages, have *forgotten their* ethnicity or have become assimilated by the Fulos. They are called 'the Fulo-Hakkas'. On the other hand, there are some Fulos who live in the Hakka villages and are assimilated by the Hakkas. These are called 'the Hakka-Fulos'²⁹. In addition, there are 'the Hakka-Pingpu'³⁰ and 'the Pingpu-Hakkas'. There are Chinese Hakkas who moved to Taiwan in 1949 with the KMT government and who are called 'the mainlander-Hakkas'³¹. All this testifies to the enormous complexity of Hakka identity. This new development of Hakka identity reminds people that ethnic boundaries have become blurred in Taiwan. Compared with the new 'pan-Hakka consciousness', the multiple Hakka identity may be closer to the real ethnic situation in Taiwan. For example, new research by Qio, Yan-Guang shows that most Fulos also have a blood relationship with the Hakkas, because

²⁷One research study shows that 42% of Hakkas identify themselves as 'Chinese', 26% of them choose to be 'Taiwanese', and 32 % of them see themselves as 'Taiwanese and Chinese'. Only 26% of the Fulos identify themselves as 'Chinese', 35% as 'Taiwanese', and 39% as 'Taiwanese and Chinese'. You, Ying-lung, 'Ethnic Identity and Political Cognition: An Analysis of Taiwanese Voters', *Taiwanese Political Science Review*, No. 1, July 1996, pp.55--82. (Chinese)

²⁸For example, one Hakka Legislator demanded that the Chief of the Committee of the Hakkas, Yeh, should visit mainland China to search for her 'roots', but Chief Yeh rejected this request.

²⁹Wu, Ming-Zhong showed that his ancestors were Fulos, but many old generations all spoke the Hakka language. Thus he identified himself as a Hakka.

³⁰The Pingpus were Taiwan Aborigines and used to live in the plains. However, they were assimilated by the Han people; thus there were no Pingpu people as far as government policy is concerned. But some people still identify themselves as Pingpu.

³¹The problem of identity for the 'Wai-Sheng Hakkas' is very complex. These are the Hakkas who moved to Taiwan in 1949 with the KMT government. Most of them are viewed as 'Wai-Sheng Ren'—mainlanders -- but they can speak the Hakka language. Therefore, some of them identify themselves as mainlanders, and some of them identify themselves as Hakkas.

their ancestors are Hakkas even though they have lost their memory of this ancestry (or never knew about it)³². According to this research, most of the Fulos are in fact 'Fulo-Hakkas'.

At the same time, the Hakka identity can be viewed as a 'diaspora' experience. As Paul Gilroy points out, this experience shows us that 'race', ethnicity, nation and culture are not interchangeable terms, and cultural forms cannot be contained neatly within the structure of the nation-state. This quality can be used to reveal an additional failing of the 'rigid, pseudobiological' definition of national cultures, which has been introduced by ethnic absolutism³³. For example, black Britain is a diaspora culture, which does not only form its culture from Britain, but gets raw material for creative culture from black America and the Caribbean. In other words, black culture is always made and re-made across different nations and culture.

Stuart Hall agrees that black experience is a 'diaspora' experience³⁴, and it should be seen as a 'new ethnicity'. The 'old ethnicity' -- traditional black discourse -- is grounded in a particular political and cultural analysis. Politically, it was coined as a way of referencing the common experience of racism and marginalisation, as expressed in different histories, traditions and ethnic identities. Culturally, this analysis has been formulated in terms of a critique of the 'unspoken and invisible other' in cultural discourses³⁵. In the 'old ethnicity', the term 'ethnicity' acknowledges the place of history, language and culture in the construction of subjectivity and identity, as well as the fact that all discourse is placed, positioned, situated³⁶. However, the new phase of ethnicity does to some degree displace, reorganise and reposition the different cultural strategies in relation to one another. It is more diverse, since it cannot be represented without reference to the dimensions of class, gender, sexuality and ethnicity³⁷. Furthermore, its experience shows the process of 'unsettling, recombination, hybridisation and 'cut-and-mix'³⁸. As Hall points out, young

³² Qiu, Yan-Qui and Wu, Zhong-Jie, *The Map of Taiwan Hakka* (Taipei: Owl Publisher, 2001), pp.80-82. . (Chinese)

³³ Gilroy, Paul, *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack: The cultural Politics of Race and Nation*.(London: Century Hutchinson,1987), p.154.

³⁴ Hall, Stuart, 'New Ethnicities' in Donald, James and Ali Rattansi (eds.) ' *Race, Culture and Difference* (London: The Open University,1992) pp.252—9.

³⁵ Ibid:p.252.

³⁶ Ibid: p.257.

³⁷ Ibid: p.255.

³⁸ Ibid: p.258.

generation blacks can speak from three identities: Caribbean, black and British³⁹.

It is important to understand the diversity of the Hakka identity and diaspora experience. The Hakkas had several long-time migrations, but insisted on keeping their traditional life, culture and language. But they also had to reconstruct themselves from the viewpoint of other native ethnicity and in order to survive in the new homeland. Accordingly, the forms of Hakka culture and identity are very diverse and plentiful.

8.1.3 'Hybrid' Hakka Identity and 'Multicultural Taiwan'

The foregoing discussion demonstrates how Hakka experience blurs ethnic boundaries and challenges traditional ethnicity. In fact, the Hakka phenomenon presents a special case of multicultural Taiwan. The Hakka are thus close to the idea of a postmodernist 'hybrid' culture⁴⁰. Hybridity works simultaneously in two ways: organically by hegemonising, creating new space, structure, scenes; and intentionally by diasporising, intervening as a form of subversion, translation and transformation. The Hakkas' experience involves both organic and intentional hybridisation, and processes of merging and of the dialogisation of ethnic and cultural differences set critically against each other. These processes, Hall suggests, do not make up a narrative; rather 'they are two phases of the same movement, which constantly overlap and interweave'⁴¹. They operate dialogically together, in a double-voiced, hybridised form of cultural politics. The existence of 'Fulo-Hakka', 'Hakka-Fulo', 'Pingpu-Hakka', 'Hakka-Saisiyat' and 'Mainlander-Hakka' reveals the 'organic hybridity' Hakka.

Taiwan is a small island, and the boundaries between the ethnic groups are blurred and unclear. For example, President Chen, Shui-ban, and ex-President, Lee, Deng-Hui, are Fulos or Hakkas⁴². The mother of Zhu, Tian-zin, the famous writer, who is viewed as a

³⁹ Hall, Stuart, 'Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities' in *Culture, Globalization and the World-System* (eds.) by Anthony D. King (New York: State of University of New York, 1991) p.59.

⁴⁰ 'Hybridity' and 'hybrid culture' are discussed by many researchers in cultural studies. Homi K. Bhabha, who was the first to use the term 'hybridity' in cultural studies, transformed the term from Bakhtin's 'intentional hybrid' into an active moment of challenge and resistance against a dominant cultural power. Bhabha translated this moment into a 'hybrid displacing space' which develops in the interaction between the indigenous and colonial culture. He has since extended his notion of 'hybridity to include forms of counter-authority'. E. Said and S. Hall also use this term. In Said's phrase, 'hybrid counter-energies' challenge the centred, dominant cultural norms with their unsettling perplexities generated out of their 'disjunctive, liminal space'. Hall use the term to discuss black cultural politics and diaspora experience. See Robert J.C.Young, 'Hybridity and Diaopora', in *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), pp.1--28.

⁴¹ Ibid., pp.24--5.

⁴² President Chen and Mr. Lee are verified as Hakkas. However, they cannot speak the Hakka language, and they have quite a strong Fulo identity. For example, President Chen has given several speeches in the Fulo

representative of mainlander literature, Zhu, is a Hakka. She lived in a small Hakka town for several years when she was a child. The famous director of 'The Sadness of the City', which discusses 'the Event of Two, Two Eight', Hou, Xiao-Xian, is a mainlander-Hakka⁴³. 'Hakka' exists in most of the population of Taiwan, irrespective of whether they identify themselves as 'Fulos' or 'mainlanders'. Chen, Ban points out that if 'Hakkas' refers to people whose ancestors are Hakkas, then about 80% of Taiwan's population are 'the Hakkas'⁴⁴.

On the other hand, Hakka is also an 'intentional hybridity'. In practice Hakka culture has become one part of a hybrid Taiwanese culture. For example, in the history of Taiwanese literature, many Hakka writers created important works to describe Taiwanese history, culture, society and destiny. These works do not express only the Hakka experience or present only Hakka views; the influences of the Han, Japanese and other cultures also blend into their creations. The Hakka writers use their ethnic culture and consciousness as part of the whole mixed Taiwanese culture. Chen, Ban also identifies some quite interesting 'hybridities' in those areas where the Atayal, Saisiyat and Hakkas live together. For example, one person has an 'Atayal tattoo' on his face, but he is a Hakka. A traditional Hakka tea-kettle is used for a different function by the Saisiyat⁴⁵. This 'infiltration' between the various ethnic groups is viewed as a normal cultural phenomenon in Taiwan society.

The experience of the Hakka shows the openness of ethnic boundaries and the hybridity of ethnic culture, which creates the unique character of a multicultural Taiwan. As Robert J.C. Young shows, hybridity 'makes differences into sameness, and sameness into difference, but in a way that makes the same no longer the same, the different no longer simply different'⁴⁶. Furthermore, it suggests the impossibility of essentialism, but denotes a fusion and describes a dialectical articulation⁴⁷.

The Hakka case shows that multicultural Taiwan has to meet the challenge of a hybrid culture and multiple identity. The discourse of 'multicultural Taiwan' and 'Four Ethnic Groups' seeks to strengthen a new national identity based on the various ethnic identities.

language, and many Hakkas feel angry about that. The Hakkas hope that President Chen will use the 'common' language in public. President Chen and Mr. Lee can thus be described as 'Fulo-Hakka'.

⁴³ Qiu, Yan-qui and Wu, Zhong-jie (2001), p.87.

⁴⁴ Interview with Chen, Ban.

⁴⁵ Interview with Chen, Ban.

⁴⁶ Robert J.C.Young,(1995), p.26.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 27.

However, the experience of the Hakka identity highlights the difficulties of reconstructing a homogeneous, unified identity in Taiwan. It also raises the fundamental questions about the nature of collective identity and national identity in 'multicultural Taiwan' and its 'Four Ethnic Groups', as well as the distinction between the public domain and the private domain. The next step is to examine how cultural policy can respond to these 'hybrid' cultures and ethnicity.

8.2 The New Creation of Cultural Policy—Hakka Policy

Multicultural Taiwan provides the legitimacy for creating a new Hakka policy. However, the whole process of putting Hakka into public policy seems to be 'centralised'. At the same time, the tension between a homogeneous, unified Hakka culture, and a hybrid Hakka culture is also expressed in cultural policy. It also raises a new dilemma between 'centralisation' and 'decentralisation'.

8.2.1 Putting 'Hakka' into 'Policy'—Towards 'Centralisation'?

Hakka policy has developed only recently. Before the 1988 movement of 'Returning My Mother Language to Me', the Hakkas, just like other 'invisible' people in Taiwan, did not receive much support from the government. However, with the raising of Hakka consciousness and the Hakka movement, and the development of Hakkaology, Hakka issues have become public matters in Taiwanese society. The KMT government and the other political parties are forced to provide a 'Hakka policy' in order to win the vote of the Hakkas at elections. Finally, 'Hakka policy' has become public policy in the government. In this section, we will discuss the process of 'putting' Hakka into 'policy' by considering the Hakka social movement, the development of Hakkaology, and the issue of political alliance. The trend seems to be towards a centralised cultural policy.

The Hakka Social Movement

The Hakka social movement provides a basis for supporting Hakka as a public issue. Initially, the appearance of the Hakka movement came out of the fight for individual rights. For example, some of the Hakka old generation, who can speak only their language and no others, could not watch TV or listen to the radio because they did not understand Mandarin. Thus they became marginal people or 'second-class citizens' in society⁴⁸. There was clearly inequality between the different ethnic groups on cultural issues; thus the Hakkas began to fight for their rights. In 1987, some young Hakkas set up the magazine *The Hakka*

⁴⁸ Interview with Yang, Chang-Zhen.

Storm. In the first issue, they pointed out that:

We find that the language has been disappearing gradually; maybe after several years our language will disappear, and the Hakka culture will disappear as well, and then the Hakkas will break down in the future. ... Thus, we have to stand upon the base of 'the Humanity of the Hakka' to promote Hakka consciousness, to improve the cohesion of the Hakkas, to unify the power of the Hakkas, and to fight for the common interest of the Hakkas. Finally, we have to promote the status of the Hakkas in the political, economic, social and cultural fields, so that the Hakkas can play a more active role in democratic and multicultural society.⁴⁹

In 1988, the members of the magazine began to press the KMT government to provide TV programmes in the Hakka language, and demanded the right to speak the Hakka language; but they got no response. On 12 December 1988, the Hakkas held their first demonstration -- 'Returning My Mother Language to Me' -- to demand their language rights according to three points⁵⁰. In this demonstration, the Hakka movement used the language rights issue in two ways. First, they claimed that the right to use the mother language should be viewed as part of being a citizen in Taiwan. Secondly, each person who speaks the Hakka language should be recognized as having 'collective status' by the government and other ethnic groups.⁵¹

After 1988, the Hakka movement declined, but the Hakka elite and intellectuals remained aware of the importance of political movements through this experience. In 1990, the Hakka Affairs Public Association (HAPA) was set up to promote the Hakka movements and provide a discourse of 'the New Hakkas'.

The third wave of the Hakka movement developed from the campaign for Hakka radio in 1994-95. From 1993, there were so-called 'Underground Radios', which appeared to

⁴⁹ *The Hakka Storm* (Taipei, 1987), p.1. (Chinese)

⁵⁰ The first point was the abolition of the limitation of the use of the Hakka language in TV and radio programmes. Secondly, the government should practice bilingual education and establish a policy for 'language equality'⁵⁰. The third point was to correct Article 20 of the Broadcasting Act, which limited the use of 'dialects' such as the Fulo and Hakka languages in TV and radio programmes.

⁵¹ The government provided the sponsorship to produce a TV programme in the Hakka language once a week, and the three official TV stations began to broadcast news in the Hakka language for 15 minutes per day in 1989 in response to the Hakka demands. The demand for an amendment to the Broadcasting Act was implemented in 1993. Other demands gained no formal response from the government. Zeng, Jing-Yu, *The Research for the Movements of the Taiwanese Hakkas*, MA thesis, Graduated School of Civil Education, Taipei: Teacher's University, 2000), p.106. (Chinese)

challenge and break through the KMT's control of broadcasting systems⁵². Some Hakkas joined these 'Underground Radios' and set up 'Formosa Hakka Radio' in 1994. This was the first radio station broadcasting in the Hakka language, and became an important institution for promoting Hakka consciousness. It provided a forum for the Hakkas to exchange public issues in order to reach a common view. The KMT government began to confiscate these 'Underground Radios' and prepared to open up some TV and radio channels in 1995. In order to defend its position, 'Formosa Hakka Radio' collected money in different Hakka villages around Taiwan. Most of the young and old Hakkas responded generously, because they wanted to set up their own radio station⁵³.

At the same time, Hakka Radio also provided opportunities for other ethnic groups to understand the Hakkas. In addition, the process of the establishment of 'Formosa Hakka Radio' showed that the Hakkas have an ethnic status and are a kind of community, with their members having the right to access, *satisfy and develop their culture*. Many Hakka audiences cry when they listen to 'Formosa Hakka Radio'⁵⁴ and they feel happy when they listen to Hakka songs. This shows that Taiwanese cultural policy has long ignored the cultural needs of a significant ethnic group which had no alternative but to fight for their cultural rights. The case of 'Formosa Hakka Radio' illustrates the new way of thinking about citizenship in Taiwanese society.

The three waves of the Hakka movements -- 'Returning My Mother Language to Me', HAPA and 'Formosa Hakka Radio' -- promoted the formation of a pan-Hakka consciousness and made the invisibility of the Hakkas into a 'public issue' in Taiwan.

Academic Research on 'Hakkaology'

In the process of promoting the Hakka issue as a public problem, the academic field of 'Hakkaology' has provided a strong theoretical base. Hakka intellectuals have constructed new theories and discourses to support the Hakka 'collective', and achieve 'public' status. At the same time they have created a more public agenda to generate greater discussion of

⁵² These 'Underground Radios' used simple and economic technology and capital to run their 'illegal' radios, and offered a harsh critique of the KMT government. Their opinions on public issues attracted widespread attention and had a far-reaching influence during the elections.

⁵³ At first 'Formosa Hakka Radio' could not get a radio management licence, and this caused strong indignation among the Hakkas. The Hakka supporters went to the Bureau of Information to demand an explanation. The officers of the Bureau stated that there were not enough channels for so many applications. Finally, 'Formosa Hakka Radio' set up a group to search for a possible channel, and the Bureau of Information agreed with the legal establishment of the radio station.

⁵⁴ *The Story of the Formosa Hakka Radio* (Taipei, Formosa Hakka Radio, 1996). (Chinese)

Hakka issues.

Before 1987, ethnic consciousness and ethnic research were not vigorous, and hence Hakkaology was not very popular⁵⁵. With the growth of Hakka consciousness, Hakkaology became increasingly important⁵⁶. In addition, more academic theses and dissertations on Hakkaology appeared after 1987⁵⁷. Luo, Lie-Shi points out that the new approach of Hakkaology is focused on the discussion of 'Hakka-sation' but not on 'Hakkaness' as before⁵⁸. Chen, Yi-Jun also shows that Hakkaology in Taiwan no longer emphasizes 'Chinese status' but tries to define the Hakkas in the history of Taiwan⁵⁹. The new upsurge of Hakkaology in Taiwan seeks to construct a special 'Taiwanese Hakkaology' and pays more attention to the self-definition of the Hakkas in Taiwanese history.

After the Hakka social movement, the appearance of Hakkaology created a new public issue for the Hakkas. The issue of political alliance was to provide the final step of 'putting Hakka' into 'policy'.

⁵⁵ Chen, Yi-Jun, 'Searching for the Hakka: A Review of Literature on the Hakka in Taiwan', fourth International Conference on Hakkaology (Taipei: Institute of Ethnology Academic Sinica, 1998), p. 1338. (Chinese)

⁵⁶ Some important developments are as follows:

1991: Xu, Zheng-Quang, of the Institute of Ethnology Academic Sinica, edited the book *Moving Around the Ethnicity and the Reality-- The Hakka Society and Culture*⁵⁶. This book discusses the nature and scope of Hakkaology, the development of the Hakka language, the exploration of Hakka architecture, and research into Hakka music, culture, theatre, folklore, religion, history, social movements and the ethnic relationships of Taiwan.

In 1994, the Committee of Cultural Affairs (CCA) and *The Magazine of the Hakkas* held the first Hakka conference. This focused on the Hakkas' ethnic relationships, the history of immigration, social movements, and Hakka literature, theatre, music and painting. The presentations were published in a book. In the same year, the First Hakka Academic Conference, held by HAPA, and the Seminar on the Hakka Language, which was held by the Graduate School of Language in the University of Qing-Hua, confirmed the upsurge of Hakkaology.

In 1997, the government of Taipei City held a Conference on the Development of the Hakkas. In 1998, the Fourth International Hakkaology Conference was held by The Institute of Ethnology Academic Sinica and the Internal Association of the Hakkas. The topics concentrated on 'The Hakkas and Taiwan', and this was viewed as the most extensive discussion of Hakkaology in Taiwan⁵⁶. In the same year, The Centre for the Cultural Research of the Hakkas was set up in the National Central University. This centre also publishes the *Journal for the Cultural Research of the Hakkas*. It is the first academic centre for Hakkaology.

⁵⁷ According to Luo, Lie-Shi, in *The Evaluation of MA and Phd Theses on Hakka Issues* (1966--1998), there were 119 theses on Hakka issues, only 20 of which were finished before 1987.

⁵⁸ Luo, Lie-Shi, *ibid.*, in *Hakka Cultural Research*, vol. 2, June 1999, p.136. (Chinese)

⁵⁹ Chen, Yi-Jun (1998), p.1335.

Political Alliance

A political alliance was a useful way to support the Hakka agenda as a public issue. After 1988, some of the editors of *The Hakka Storm* developed a close relationship with the members of the DPP. They shared some common views on ethnic problems, and then they produced 'The Multicultural Melting of the Ethnic Relationship and Culture -- The Ethnic and Cultural Policy of the DPP'. This was the first time that the political party had accepted the diversity of Taiwanese ethnicity and identified four ethnic groups in Taiwan⁶⁰. With the positive experience of this cooperation, some Hakka intellectuals began to co-operate further with the DPP to promote Hakka objectives through the HAPA, for example. The main developments relating to Hakka issues in the political field are as follows:

- 1994: The HAPA helped Chen, Shui-Bian (DPP) to form the Hakka policy for the election campaign for Mayor of Taipei City, and after he won the election, the HAPA also helped him to implement this policy⁶¹. This was the first time that the Hakkas were viewed as a public issue and gained political support.
- In 1995, the HAPA brought up the issue of Hakka policy in the election for legislators, and helped the candidates who sought to implement that policy.⁶² The main influence of the HAPA was in pushing Hakka issues into the public sphere and

⁶⁰ DPP, *The Multicultural Integrative Ethnic Relationship and Culture*, p.77. There are more details of this policy in Chapter 4.

⁶¹ The Hakka policy outlined by HAPA for Chen, Shui-Bian included: the establishment of Hakka TV; the publishing of the Hakkas' history; working for education in the mother language for the Hakkas; holding the Hakka Cultural Festival; and establishing a cultural centre of the Hakkas. Therefore, during Chen, Shui-Bian's term of office as Mayor of Taipei City, he used public resources to support the Hakkas, e.g. for the following projects: the establishment of the Hakka Meeting Building and the Hakka Cultural Center, the holding of the Hakka Cultural Festival; the broadcasting of Hakka programmes on Taipei Radio; and the media production of the Hakkas' history in Taipei. See Dai, Biao-Cun and Wen, Zhen-Hua, *The Hakka History of the Taipei Metropolis* (Taipei: Committee of Taipei Literature: 1998), p.195. (Chinese)

⁶² In this policy, they pointed out ten items for the promotion of Hakka rights as follows: (1) the government should set up a Committee of Hakka Affairs. (2) Education in the mother language, such as the Hakka language, should be practiced in junior high schools and primary schools. The government should train teachers and produce textbooks and a dictionary for the Hakka language. (3) The government should regulate the Mandarin, Fulo, Hakka and Aboriginal languages as equal official languages. People should be able to choose the language they want to use in public. (4) The Broadcasting Act should increase protective measures to promote the mother languages of the minorities in Taiwan. (5) A Hakka radio station should be set up in the main Hakka villages and counties. (6) The government should employ officers in proportion to the distribution of ethnic populations. (7) There should be announcements in the Hakka language in public places, e.g. train stations and airports. (8) The Committee of Cultural Affairs should establish a Hakka cultural park and cultural centers. (9) A Department of Hakka Theatre should be set up in the national theatre schools. (10) The government should begin to compile a Hakka history in Taiwan. Zeng, Jing-Yu (2000), p. 114.

using the election to promote those issues. Thus the Hakkas came to have 'public status' in Taiwanese society gradually. After this election, 16 Hakkas became legislators, and they held a meeting to discuss Hakka issues. In addition, they hoped to set up a sub-group of the Hakkas across the political parties; however, they were not successful.

- In the election for the President in 2000, Hakka policy became a crucial issue on which the candidates sought to gain the support of the Hakkas. The three main candidates, Chen, Shui-Bian (DPP)⁶³, Lian, Zhan (KMT)⁶⁴, Song, Chu-Yu (no party)⁶⁵ and Xu, Xin-liang⁶⁶, all emphasised their Hakka policy⁶⁷.

By entering into political alliances with parties at elections, the Hakkas finally became an object of public policy. In June 2001, the Committee of the Hakkas was established, which means that the collective status of the Hakkas is now recognized by the government. The next concern is: what exactly is the Hakka policy of the government?

The Creation of Hakka policy

The government provided a number of policies in response to the demands of the

⁶³ The Hakka policy of Chen, Shui-Bian included: to establish the University of 'Justice of the People'; to establish the Committee of the Hakkas; to make the Law of Equal Languages, which would prevent the use of the name 'national language', and the Fulo, Hakkas, Aboriginal and Mandarin languages would be viewed as official languages; to hold a regular national Hakka Cultural Festival; to set up the Community School for the Hakkas; and to establish the Hakka Cultural Park.

⁶⁴ The Hakka policy of Lian, Zhan in the KMT party included: to set up the central Hakka Committee; to introduce a law to protect ethnic languages; to sponsor The Center for the Cultural Research of the Hakkas in the National Central University; to set up the Hakka Museum; and to promote an improved quota for the Hakkas' representatives.

⁶⁵ The Hakka policy of Song, Chu-Yu included: to promote the Hakkas as important officers; to set up the Committee of the Hakkas; to preserve the language and culture of the Hakkas, e.g. by setting up the Hakka Cultural Park and the Hakka Cultural Center; to set up the Hakka University in the Hakka villages; to push the industry of the Hakkas; and to strengthen the cultural exchange between Taiwanese Hakkas and international Hakkas

⁶⁶ The Hakka policy of Xu, Xin-liang was to establish the 'law of Ethnic Equality' to emphasise that Taiwan is a 'multi-ethnic' and 'multi-lingual' country. Another aim was to set up a Ministry of 'Minority Groups and Cultures' and 'Ethnic Cultural Foundations' and 'Hakka Cultural Centres' in towns and villages in which the Hakkas constitute over 25% of the total population. The Hakka programmes in the various areas would be guaranteed. The system of the Hakka language would be modernised, and history would be reinterpreted from the viewpoint of the Hakka people. A cultural public space for the various ethnic groups would be established.

⁶⁷ The Hakka policies of these three presidential candidates are quoted from the yahoo web site for the 2000 election.

Hakkas. However, 'Hakka policy' was not considered comprehensively until the establishment of the Committee of the Hakkas. Before that, the Committee of Aboriginal Affairs was set up to strengthen the protection of aboriginal rights, which was seen to be symbolic of 'the reconciliation between the Hans and the aborigines'. At the same time, it was also the first step by the government to establish Taiwan as a multicultural democratic country. Afterwards, the establishment of the Committee of the Hakkas was viewed as the second step forward towards a multicultural democratic country⁶⁸. In other words, Hakka culture was added to a new national culture, which was constructed by the 'Four Ethnic Groups'; and as a result, a new national discourse – 'multicultural democratic Taiwan' – was instituted. -

Hakka policy has thus been one element of multicultural policy in Taiwan. There are several key features of Hakka policy. First, the 'invisible' Hakka culture will be moved from the private sphere into the public sphere. For example, the Hakka culture was previously viewed as a 'private' culture in Hakka families, so that the Hakkas could not show off their culture or speak their language in public⁶⁹. However, Hakka culture is now redefined as one part of 'multicultural Taiwan' and has now entered the public sphere. Furthermore, Hakka culture will strengthen Taiwan's multiculturalism, e.g. in terms of the diversity of language, different views of Taiwanese history, and more cultural differences in the public sphere.

Secondly, the new collective rights of the Hakkas should be protected by the Hakka policy. Cultural rights were not previously included in the status of citizenship. Some rights, like the right to participate in one's own culture, the right to develop a culture and the right to language rights, were ignored by the government. With the development of Hakka collective rights, the concept of citizenship will be expanded.

The whole process of 'putting Hakka into public policy' constructed a trend toward 'centralisation'. At the beginning, the Hakka movement was active in Taipei, the Capital of Taiwan, which was not the main area of Hakka concentration. The claims of the Hakka movement were criticised as being 'far from the daily life of the Hakkas'⁷⁰. Furthermore, once Hakka culture entered the public sphere, it was bound to be influenced by the governmental system. In 2002, the establishment of Committee of the Hakkas becomes the

⁶⁸ *The Persuasive Leaves for the Committee of the Hakkas* (2001), p.10.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p.4.

⁷⁰ Interview with Zeng, Nian-Yu.

main institution to formulate Hakka policy in the central government. Many Hakkas worry that the influence of 'central Hakka policy' will damage the diverse Hakka culture.

As we discussed above, the Hakka culture and identity have developed towards 'hybridity' and 'diaspora'. Is it possible for the government to provide a suitable policy to maintain this 'hybridity' and 'diaspora'? Or will the Hakka culture become a homogenous culture under governmental influences. In fact, Community Renaissance provides the best possibility for maintaining the diversity and hybridity of Hakka culture.

8.2.2 Hakka Culture and Community Renaissance--A Possibility towards 'Decentralisation'?

Hakka social movements seeking to promote the ethnic consciousness of the Hakkas appeared in 1988. Like other social movements, the Hakka movements turned into communal movements from the mid-1990s. Some of the Hakkas continued to push the Hakka social movements to cooperate with the political parties. However, the Hakka communal movements have led to many achievements, such as those in Liutu, Meinung, Beipu and Jiuzantou.

Why did the Hakka movements turn to community? There are two ways to think about this problem. The first is from the experience of the communal movements, e.g. the experience of Meinung. Because of the anti-reservoir movement, the residents of Meinung share a strong consciousness to protect their community. Over 95% of the Meinung people are Hakkas; thus their communal consciousness is related to Hakka culture and history. In 1994, the CCA promoted 'Community Renaissance' and provided sponsorship for communal cultural affairs. The Association of Meinung, the main anti-reservoir organization group, felt that they could cooperate with the CCA in some cases, and they could gain support to promote communal affairs. In this case, communal consciousness came out of the anti-reservoir movement, and then it expanded to include ethnic identity⁷¹.

The second experience is from the development of the Hakka movement. Like the aboriginal movement, the Hakka movement appeared in Taipei in 1988, but there were not many Hakkas living in Taipei. Most of the Hakkas lived in the Hakka villages, such as those in the northern parts of Taiwan, Taoyuan/Hsinchu/Miaoli, the middle part of Dongshi,

⁷¹ Interview with Hong, Hsin-Lian.

Shiguang and Fengyuan, the southern part of Liutui, and Hualien in the west. When the Hakka movements appeared in Taiwan, most of the Hakkas did not understand what had happened in Taiwan. Moreover, the Hakkas outside Taipei City did not completely agree with the demands of the Hakka movements⁷². Some members of the Hakka movements felt that they should pay more attention to the views of the Hakka villages. Indeed, some felt that the hope of the Hakkas was dependent on the Hakka villages. Only in the Hakka villages can the Hakka language, culture and life-style be preserved collectively. If the Hakka villages disappear or decay, the Hakka culture will not exist⁷³. Thus it is important to promote the Hakka villages, and Community Renaissance is a good way to do this⁷⁴. According to this view, the purpose of promoting communal consciousness is to develop ethnic consciousness.

Community Renaissance has become a vitally important part of Hakka cultural policy. This is because, first of all, it emphasizes the connection with the land and localization, which increases the various Hakka cultural differences based on regions. Thus the northern Hakkas are different from the southern Hakkas. On a smaller scale the Bei-pu Hakkas are distinct from other Hakkas. Hakka culture has accordingly become more heterogeneous – like a mosaic culture -- under the influence of Community Renaissance. In addition, Community Renaissance is constructed on the basis of everyday life. Thus it provides a way to 'renew' Hakka culture in modern society. For example, the life-experience of Mei-nong has created a modern Hakka rock group -- Giao-gong Music Band.

However, some researchers have concluded that Community Renaissance ignores the internal differences among the Hakkas in order to establish a common identity. For example, Chen, Chia-Yi argues that the Bei-pu community concentrates on the Hakka culture and history to strengthen community consciousness, but it ignores one aboriginal group, the Saisiyat, who had lived here before the Hakkas. The Saisiyat are represented as 'the other' by the new discourse of Bei-pu⁷⁵. In this case, it seems that a multiple, heterogeneous cultural identity is limited in the name of community. As in the case of Yi-lian County, Bei-pu sets up a visible, special Hakka image in Taiwan, which shows the possibility of a heterogeneous Hakka culture. However, in order to construct a

⁷² Interview with Zeng, Nian-Yu.

⁷³ Interview with Gu, Xiu-Fei.

⁷⁴ Interview with Xu, Zheng-Quang.

⁷⁵ Chen, Chia-yi, *Compare the History of Saisiat and Hakka about the Ethnic Conflict*. MA Thesis, Department of Sociology, (Xin-Zhu, National Qing-Hua University, 1999). (Chinese)

homogenous Bei-pu community, internal difference is ignored.

Thus, some community workers are seeking to improve the strategy of community renaissance in order to protect the internal difference of the community. For example, the emphasis on public participation and active dialogue between the various cultural groups will hopefully develop a more 'fluid, multiple, and open' community identity⁷⁶.

The creation of Hakka policy and the influence of Community Renaissance reveal the tension between the two trends. As the focus of a public policy, Hakka culture will face centralization from the government, represented by the Committee of the Hakkas. At the same time, the establishment of the Committee of the Hakkas and Hakka policy also strengthen a pan-Hakka consciousness. However, the hybrid Hakka culture can also be maintained through Community Renaissance. These two trends will undoubtedly continue to influence the development of Hakka cultural policy in Taiwan.

8.3 The Expansion of Hakka Collective Rights in Citizenship

The expansion of the Hakka rights also can be viewed as part of the construction of multicultural citizenship which provides the base to a common and public culture.

As Stuart Hall and David Held explain in their discussion of the new politics of citizenship in the 1990s, the key innovation has been an expansion of the definition of citizenship and the base upon which rights are demanded:

A contemporary 'politics of citizenship' must take into account the role which the social movements have played in expanding the claims to rights and entitlements to new areas. It must address not only issues of class and inequality, but also questions of membership posed by feminism, the black and ethnic movements, ecology and vulnerable minorities, like children⁷⁷.

The expansion of citizenship can identify two dimensions of change. First, one can think of the redistribution of resources from the government. The second dimension of

⁷⁶ Interview with Chen, Ban.

⁷⁷ Stuart Hall and David Held, 'Citizens and Citizenship' in, Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (eds.) *New Times: the Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s*, (London: Lawrence & Wishart in Association with Marxism Today, 1990), pp.176.

change could be called recognition and responsiveness⁷⁸. In the Hakkas' case, we can also identify new rights that expand the citizenship of the Hakkas based on these two dimensions.

8.3.1 The Right to Access and Participate in Cultural Life

The lack of Hakka cultural production also influences the practice of 'the right to participate in cultural life'. Hakka music, theatres, films, TV and radio programmes are very rarely seen in Taiwan. In this situation, the Hakkas learned to give up their own culture and to relate to other cultures, such as the Fulo culture or the mainlander's culture⁷⁹. Therefore, the Hakkas' participation in the mainstream culture is similar to that of other ethnic groups; but their participation in their own culture is very limited.

In order to increase the level of Hakka participation in Hakka culture, the government has introduced several policies:

The Hakka Cultural Festival

Since 1995, when Chen, Shui-Bian won the election for Mayor of Taipei City, the Hakka Cultural Festival has been held every year in Taipei and is becoming one of the main Hakka policies. Many other cities and counties also hold a Hakka Cultural Festival to promote the cultural development of the Hakkas. These festivals have several functions. For example, the Hakka Cultural Festival can combine Hakka culture and modern life, and thus helps to add new cultural elements to the traditional Hakka culture. At the same time, people can learn the traditional Hakka culture through modern cultural activity⁸⁰. In addition, for the young generation of Hakkas, who were born in Taipei, the Hakka Cultural Festival helps them to understand 'what the Hakka is'⁸¹.

The sponsorship of Hakka culture and Hakka cultural organizations

The Committee of Cultural Affairs initially was not interested in ethnic cultures, since the KMT government did not want to strengthen any kind of separate ethnic identity. Ethnic cultural activities have tended to gain the sponsorship of the CCA for two reasons. First, they are held in the name of 'communal activities'. For example, in the National Cultural Seasons of 1994, the 'Festival of Hakka Mountain Songs' was held in Hsinshu County, since over 70% of its population are Hakka. Maioli County also hosted the

⁷⁸ Renato Rosaldo (1999), p.255.

⁷⁹ Interview with Zhong, Tie-Ming.

⁸⁰ Dai, Biao-Cun (1998), pp.161-2.

⁸¹ Interview with Lin, Xiao-Fang.

'Seminar of the Hakka Cultural Heritage' for the same reason⁸². The second reason why the Hakka culture can gain sponsorship is in the name of 'traditional arts preservation': the Hakka's CaiChaXi, the Fulo's GeZaiXi and the mainlander's KunGu are examples of traditional theatre research⁸³. In 1997, the CCA decided to sponsor the media of the minority groups, and in so doing it claimed to be developing and protecting the Hakka and aboriginal cultures⁸⁴.

Moreover, a new problem is whether the CCA will reduce its sponsorship of Hakka culture now that the Committee of the Hakkas has been set up. In the case of the aborigines, the CCA did not think that it needed to support the aboriginal culture after the establishment of the Committee of Aboriginal Affairs. However, the budget of the CAA is much smaller than that of the CCA, and this has led to a huge reduction in the overall sponsorship of aboriginal culture⁸⁵.

The Committee of the Hakkas has provided some policies to improve cultural participation. In 'The Plan to Promote the Hakka Culture in Six Years'(2002) the measures include: helping to set up Hakka cultural workshops and artist villages; setting up Hakka cultural centres to help the local governments and communities to promote Hakka culture; and reconstructing Hakka cultural life by improving Hakka cultural activities, recording Hakka culture life, and creating the Hakka's traditional culture⁸⁶.

Another factor which has led to the lack of participation in Hakka culture is the role of the mass media. The mass media are an important channel through which people can reach and participate in cultural life; at the same time, many arts or cultures are expressed through the mass media⁸⁷. However, for the Hakkas it is very difficult to participate in their culture through mass media. We will now discuss this problem in terms of language rights.

⁸² Xiao, Ya-Tan (2000), pp.97-9.

⁸³ The Chief of the CAA, Lin, Cheng-zhi's, report to the Committee of Education of the Legislative Yuan, 7 October 1996.

⁸⁴ The points of policy of the CCA in 1997.

⁸⁵ Interview with Xu, Zheng-Quang.

⁸⁶ 'The Plan to Promote the Hakka Culture in Six Years' (2002), pp.6--12.

⁸⁷ The development of traditional drama is an example of this. Under Chinese nationalism, the KMT government prohibited TV stations from broadcasting Fulo and Hakka dramas, but encouraged them to broadcast Chinese opera. From the 1990s, these limitations were abolished, and traditional Fulo dramas, such as GeZaiXi, became very popular through the mass media. But the Hakka drama, CaiChaXi, was still not permitted to be shown on television.

8.3.2. Language Rights

There is considerable research to show that the language rights of the Hakkas are restricted. For example, the proportion of people who can speak the Hakka language is only 3% in Taipei City, much less than the Hakka population, which is about 12% of the total⁸⁸. The Hakka language is only used in Hakka families⁸⁹; even so, about 22.4-26.4% of the Hakkas' young generation have lost their mother language⁹⁰. For many Hakkas the preservation of the Hakka language is the most important mission.

The teaching of the mother language

The Ministry of Education practices 'the Education of the Mother Language'. In primary schools the students have to learn this mother language for two hours every week. In the Hakka villages the schools teach the Hakka language as the mother language. In order to help the Ministry of Education, the Committee of the Hakkas will set up a group to train Hakka teachers, to improve the Hakka language as a written language, to edit Hakka textbooks, and to carry out research into the Hakka language. In addition, they will provide sponsorship to kindergartens to teach Hakkas, and to increase the base for the education of the mother language.

Most Hakkas agree that the learning of the Hakka language should be as early as possible in life. But they also doubt whether only two hours of learning is sufficient. Moreover, a researcher in the field of the Hakka language, Yang, Jing-Ding, points out that there are three main problems in teaching the language: the difference between pronounced and phonetic symbols; the difficulty of writing the Hakka language; and the lack of Hakka textbooks⁹¹. He hopes that the Committee will resolve these problems as soon as possible.

The promotion of the Hakka language as a public language

When the policy of 'National Language' was practiced, the Fulo, Hakka and aboriginal languages were viewed as 'family' languages which could not be used in public. Even in the Hakka villages, the Hakkas also feel that they have to speak Mandarin in public. They can only speak their mother language at home⁹². Outside the Hakka villages, they never speak the Hakka language, because they assume that no one can understand it. Therefore, the

⁸⁸ Huang, Xuan-Fan (1995), p.160.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p.147.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p.146.

⁹¹ Yang, Jing-Ding, 'Keeping the Hakka in Mind, Standing up in Taiwan', in *Liberal Times*, 17 June 2001. (Chinese)

⁹² Interview with Zhong Tie-Ming.

space for the development of the Hakka language is narrow, because not many people want to learn a 'family' language. The Committee of the Hakka hopes to push the Hakka language as a public language, and then people will have more motivation to learn it. The beginning of the new policy will involve providing public announcements in the Hakka language, translations in the Hakka language at public meetings, and Hakka language services in government. For example, the Committee of the Hakkas has urged 'the service of the Hakka language in the administrative institutions'⁹³. In the future, the Committee hopes that people will be able to speak the Hakka language freely, whether at work or during their leisure time⁹⁴.

The establishment of an equal language system

The problem of an 'equal language system' in Taiwan is very complex. The 'National language' – Mandarin -- is viewed as the language of the 'mainlanders'. The largest ethnic group, the Fulos, has asked for their language to be 'the second official language'. Of course, the other minority groups, such as the Hakkas and Taiwanese aborigines, who face the serious crisis of language loss, are worried that this 'second official language' will lead to the demise of their own languages. At the same time, the Committee of the Hakkas has also expressed its intention to press for 'the Law of Equal Language'⁹⁵. However, the various views of a national language or official language are still diverse, and so the government has no clear approach to abolishing the policy of having Mandarin as the national language. In particular, there are over nine kinds of aboriginal languages, and it is difficult to decide which one can be representative of the Taiwan aboriginal peoples. In addition, a 'common' language in Taiwan is still needed; thus it is important to look for a way in which the people can share the same language to communicate while at the same time keeping their own mother languages. The equal system of language will provide the beginning of multiculturalism in Taiwan.

⁹³ This policy was passed on 24 March, 2002 by the Committee of the Hakkas.

⁹⁴ Interview with Xu, Zheng-Quang.

⁹⁵ There are various ways of discussing this problem. First, the government should abolish the 'National Language' policy and use the languages of the Fulo, the Hakkas, the Aborigines and Mandarin as the four official languages. These four languages should share the same and equal status, and the public sphere will provide these four languages for announcements or translations. The view of 'four official languages' is certainly a more equitable way to deal with the different ethnic groups. However, there are many practical problems. For example, there are more than nine ethnic groups among the Taiwanese aborigines, so whose language will be chosen to be representative of the aboriginal language? The second way to think about this problem is that Mandarin is viewed as the shared language, but the government should protect other languages in order to provide for bilingual education in different areas.

Language in the mass media

The Hakkas do not have enough language rights, in particular in the mass media.⁹⁶ Most of the Hakkas cannot listen to their language on the radio. The old generations of the Hakkas, or the Hakkas who do not learn other languages, have in practice lost their rights to use and access the mass media. Many social movements demanding the rights of the Hakkas have arisen from this problem⁹⁷. In order to respond to the demands of the Hakkas, the Bureau of Information abolished the limitations on the use of dialects in TV programmes and permitted the establishment of the Formosa Hakka Radio. In addition, it began to sponsor productions of Hakka programmes on the radio and TV⁹⁸.

However, the broadcasting system of Taiwan is now becoming increasingly commercial with radio and TV companies producing programmes according to commercial interest rather than the needs of ethnic groups. Thus the problem for the Hakkas in accessing the mass media is another important policy concern for the Committee of the Hakkas. The Committee states that its policy is to train the Hakkas to produce their own programmes (including news programmes), to cooperate with other media to produce Hakka programmes, and to support the establishment of a national Hakka radio service⁹⁹.

According to 'the Plan to Recover the Hakka Language in Six Years', the Committee of the Hakkas will sponsor the TV companies to produce 14 hours of Hakka programmes each week; to provide Hakka programmes to the various TV companies; to dub famous

⁹⁶ The research compares the proportions of the ethnic population with the rate of use of different languages on the radio. It shows that the proportion of the ethnic population (the Fulo: the mainlanders: the Hakkas: the aborigines) are 73: 13:12:1.7, and the rate of their language use on the radio is 49.93: 46.73: 1.47: 0.44). See Liu, You-Li, *A Survey of the Use and Satisfaction of the Hakkas in the Media* (Taipei: Research of the CCA, 1997), p.12. (Chinese)

⁹⁷ Interview with Yang, Chang-Zhen.

⁹⁸ In 1996, The Bureau of Information began to allow five private radio stations to broadcast Hakka programmes in 1995, and produced nine programmes.

In 1997, the Foundation of Radio and TV set up the Centre of Hakka Radio to provide Hakka programmes for the different channels. At the same time, Chinese Radio set up a Hakka channel, and the New Hakka Radio was also permitted. This became the first commercial Hakka channel.

The Company of Taiwan TV produced the first Hakka TV Programme, 'Native People and Native Feeling', in 1989 in response to the demands of the Hakka social movement. Then, the Company of Chinese TV also produced 'Painting for the Hakka Culture' in 1990. In 1991, the three TV companies began to broadcast Hakka news for 15 minutes every day. In 1996, 'the Satellite of the Central Plains' was set up as the only channel broadcasting in the Hakka language for the whole day. After public TV was set up in 1998, it provided some Hakka programmes, such as the Hakka News Magazine in 2001 and the first Hakka series -- 'Cool Nights' -- in 2002. From Chang, Jin-Hua, 'Multiculturalism and the Media Policy of Taiwan -- A Case study of Taiwan Aborigines and the Hakkas', *Radio and TV*, Vol.3, No.1, 1997, pp.8-10. (Chinese) and Liu, You-Li (1997), pp.167-172.

⁹⁹ *The Persuasive Leaves for the Committee of the Hakkas* (2001), p.11.

films in the Hakka language; and to sponsor the establishment of Hakka radio and Hakka channels¹⁰⁰.

8.3.3 The Right to Represent and to be Represented

The representation of the Hakkas has always been very limited. Thus, they are viewed as 'invisible' in Taiwan for two reasons. First, it is very difficult to 'find' Hakkas in everyday life. Secondly, the 'collective' Hakka have previously been ignored by the mass media and Taiwanese history. At the same time, the Hakka are one branch of the Hans. Thus the distinct identity of the Hakkas is not as clear as that of the Taiwanese aborigines. But this does not mean that the Hakkas do not need the right to represent themselves. Indeed, the Hakkas are always sensitive to their image or representation, in particular to the interpretation of the Hakkas' status in Taiwanese history.

The redefinition of the history of the Hakkas

Powerful groups always control the writing of history. Similarly, the writing of Taiwanese history was dominated by the Fulos in the earlier stages and by the mainlanders after 1949. For example, the two main books on Taiwanese history, *Taiwan's General History* by Lian, Heng, and *Four Hundred Years of Taiwanese History* by Shi, Ming, are written by Fulos. Thus, the Hakkas are described as 'others' and as an 'accessory' of the dominated groups during periods of ethnic conflicts between the Hakkas and the Fulos¹⁰¹. These views have led to a 'stigma' being attached to the Hakkas, and also to continuing misunderstandings between the Fulos and the Hakkas. Until the present age, most county histories, like those of Taoyuan/Hsinchu/Miaoli, where the Hakkas are in the majority, were written by Fulos. Recently, in response to this situation, Hakkas have sought to produce a new version of their history¹⁰².

In 1997 and 1998, Taipei city and Taiwan Province began to sponsor the writing of Hakka history. The Chief of the Preparatory Committee, Xu, Zheng-Quang, believes that the Hakkas have to construct their own views of history if they are to have their own identity and self-confidence¹⁰³. The Committee of the Hakkas is preparing to edit *Important Historical Events of the Hakkas* and other Hakka historical works.

¹⁰⁰ The Draft of the Plan to Develop the Hakka Media in Six Years, pp.5--6.

¹⁰¹ In the event of 'Lin, Shuang, Wen' (1786) and the event of 'Zhu, Yu-gui' (1721), which were two serious ethnic conflicts between the Fulos and the Hakkas, the Hakkas were described as an 'accessory' of the Ching Dynasty in oppressing the Fulos.

¹⁰² Interview with Xu, Zheng-Quang.

¹⁰³ Interview with Xu, Zheng-Quang.

'We come to write the history of the village'

In 1998, the Department of Cultural Affairs in the government of Taiwan Province combined Community Renaissance and local historical research to initiate the plan: 'we come to write the history of the village'. This plan sought to mobilize the people of villages to write their own history in different ways, e.g. through oral history, the discovery of landmarks in villages, the construction of village museums, and community theatre. The purpose of 'we come to write the history of the village' is to present various memories of the villages in terms of the local view in order to understand the history and cultural roots of the community¹⁰⁴. In addition, this plan also seeks to change the traditional view of history, which is presented by intellectuals or officials, and to encourage a more local or more popular view of history.

Most Hakkas feel anxious because their ethnic status is excluded from official history. Thus in the past they have preferred to construct their status in terms of 'the Nobles of the Han people' through 'the invention of tradition'. However, the history written by the common people seeks to get in touch *more closely with the real world of everyday life*. In offering an alternative to traditional official history or Chinese nationalism in history, the aim is to provide a 'folk' way to discuss history.

The local historical view has led to new influences on cultural policy. For example, the Taipei government has sought to undertake a 'Search for the Hakkas in Tonghua Street' and to present a new view of 'Taipei Hakkas' on the basis of the same model as 'we come to write the history of the village'.

The Representation of the Hakkas in the Mass Media

Minority groups always face difficulty in their representation in the mass media. In the case of the aborigines, the mass media like to represent them as 'brutal, uneducated, poor or guilty'. The Hakkas are not represented 'usually' as aborigines in the mass media, even though their population is much bigger than that of the aborigines. In other words, they are 'ignored' by the mass media. Even so, the role of 'Dong, Yue-hua' in the late 1990s illustrates the bitter experience of Hakka representation in the mass media¹⁰⁵. It

¹⁰⁴ Hong, Meng-Qi, 'Writing the History from the Roots', in Wu, Ming-Cha, Chen, Ban and Yang, Cheng-Zhen (eds.), *The Beginning of the Village Movements* (Taipei: Tang-Shan, 1999), pp.10-1. (Chinese)

¹⁰⁵ 'Dong, Yue-hua' is a female comedian played by an actor. The television programme hints that she is a Hakka, and uses her stupid, fat and vulgar appearance to make fun of her. However, this role causes much

demonstrates that there are few genuinely multicultural attitudes in the Taiwanese mass media. Moreover, the mass media provide a misleading image of the Hakka and 'look down' on other ethnic cultures¹⁰⁶.

In general, the right of representation of the Hakkas is still underdeveloped and ignored in Taiwanese history and the mass media. The Hakkas seek to gain more opportunities to represent their ethnic group in the future, thereby regaining their ethnic confidence.

8.3.4 The Right to Develop a Culture

For many Hakka cultural workers, the most important problem is 'how to develop the Hakka culture in modern society' or 'how to combine the Hakka culture and modern culture'. Most of the Hakka culture only exists in the traditional agricultural way of life, and is declining with the modernization of the whole of Taiwan's society. A new or modern Hakka culture has not really emerged in Taiwanese society. Thus many Hakkas are worried that the Hakka culture will disappear in the future.

The difficulties facing Hakka culture in modern society include the role of the government and of the market. First, the administrative system of the government cannot provide enough support to the Hakkas to develop their culture in modern society.¹⁰⁷ Thus, many Hakka cultural workers believe that the Hakka culture should enter the second market of popular culture and increase their commercial influence. They base this view on the experience of the Fulo culture. The Fulos' music and songs, for example, used to be viewed as 'low level'; however, with the expansion of the Fulo music market, many good

anger among the Hakkas.

¹⁰⁶The event of 'Dong, Yue-hua' caused widespread discussion in 1998. See Zhang, Jin-hua, 'Discuss the 'Dong, Yue-hua' phenomenon in terms of multiculturalism' (a media-based study), *China Times*, 10 May 1998; Liu, Mei-Hui, 'Spread ethnic justice, reduce ethnic misunderstanding' (a sociological view), *China Times*, 30 April 1998; and, on the reaction of Hakka organisations, 'The Taiwan Hakka Camps 'Reject' Dong, Yue-hua', *China Times*, 5 May 1998. (All in Chinese)

¹⁰⁷ The experience of Chen, Yong-tao, who is a Hakka singer, provides a good example of the problem of the government. He cannot get sponsorship from the National Cultural and Artistic Foundation, which is the main institutional sponsor of cultural and artistic activities, since his music is different from standard western music. He also tried to apply for a grant from local government, but discovered that he did not have sufficiently close relations with the local government. In addition, he was also invited to take part in some official cultural activities, but his experiences were very bitter. The famous case is the argument between Chen, Yong-tao and the Taipei Cultural Bureau in the 'Festival of One Hundred Years of Taiwanese Songs'. The Cultural Bureau arranged the show before his performance, and Chen, Yong-tao was very angry about this and complained to the mass media, which then became big news. In the end, he decided to give up the grants from the government, and sell his work through selected channels, such as small local shops, mail order, and at small vocal performances. (Interviews with Gu, Xiu-ru and Chen, Yong-tao.)

songs appeared. Today, Fulo music is becoming very popular in Taiwan society. The experience of the aborigines tells the same story. When aboriginal music first entered the popular market, several aboriginal singers became very popular, which attracted many fans and artists from the young generation who felt interested in aboriginal culture and music. Today, aboriginal music has developed as a special and outstanding area of Taiwan's music¹⁰⁸. But some Hakkas still doubt whether commercialization will have a positive influence on Hakka culture. Since the population of the Hakkas is much smaller than that of the Fulos, Hakka culture is not as 'distinct' as aboriginal culture. Can the Hakka culture compete with other cultures in the commercial market? Or will the Hakka culture disappear or be ignored?

We can see that the practice of multicultural citizenship is still limited in the Hakka's case. In other words, 'multicultural Taiwan' only begins to address concerns about Hakka rights, and there is still a long way to go.

Conclusion

The case of the Hakkas illustrates the difficulty of constructing a homogenous, unified identity, whether in national or ethnic terms, in Taiwan today. Firstly, the hybrid Hakka culture and the multiple Hakka identities both challenge the discourse of 'multicultural Taiwan' and 'Four Ethnic Groups'. In other words, this hybridity challenges the nature of collective identity and national identity. Furthermore, it also influences the development of cultural policy. The Hakka's case shows that the unitary public domain should be based on multicultural citizenship. At the same time, multicultural citizenship can maintain 'diversity' in the private domain.

Secondly, the tension between 'centralisation' and 'decentralisation' is also reflected in the new creation of cultural policy -- Hakka policy. The formation of this policy demonstrates the trend of centralisation since Hakka affairs have become a concern of the government and have been dominated by the Committee of the Hakkas. However, Community Renaissance can provide another way to maintain the 'hybrid' Hakka culture.

Finally, although Hakka rights are still limited, their development is also expanding citizenship. The Hakkas' cultural and language rights are gradually being protected. This trend should be continued through a cultural policy based on multicultural citizenship.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Wu, Ming-Zhong.

Chapter 9: Migrant Workers and Multiculturalism in the Global Age

In the 1990s, migrant workers from East Asian countries, including the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia, brought new cultural differences to Taiwan. Today there are about 320,000 migrant workers in Taiwan, which is approximately the same number as the total population of Taiwanese aborigines. Their presence is viewed as a new test of the government's multicultural policies.

As we have discussed in the previous chapters, in its earlier stages 'multicultural Taiwan' was seen as a way to integrate national identity. Afterwards, it indeed influenced the reconstruction of ethnic relationships, and improved the cultural rights for minority groups. However, is the multicultural policy of Taiwan really based on the principle of equality to protect minority rights and cultural differences? The case of migrant workers provides a good test to investigate this question. In this chapter, from the experience of migrant workers, I will argue that multiculturalism in Taiwan tends to focus on national identity, rather than the rights and equality of minority groups. Migrant workers are constructed as the new 'other' in the national discourse, and are isolated from multicultural policy.

Thus, this chapter is divided into two sections. The first part of the chapter outlines the background to the issue of migrant workers in Taiwan, examines the role of migrant workers in the new construction of the national identity, evaluates the cultural rights of migrant workers and turns to the influence of migrant workers on Taiwan's multiculturalism. The second part focuses on the new challenges of 'global citizenship' in Taiwan's society in which NGOs try to change traditional citizenship based on national boundaries. The government is forced to provide a new cultural policy to improve the rights of migrant workers based on 'universal human rights'. However, the formation of a cultural policy for migrant workers also demonstrates the possibilities of developing 'global citizenship' in Taiwan.

9.1 'A New Other?' --The Test for 'Multicultural Taiwan'

From 1991, the Taiwan government abolished the restrictions on migrant workers¹ in Taiwan. This meant that, on the one hand, the government could solve the problem of illegal migrant workers in Taiwan, and, on the other hand, it could intervene in the management of migrant workers². Subsequently, the government also abolished the restrictions on migrant housemaids. In 2000, there were over 320,000 migrants in Taiwan, speaking over five different languages and varying in lifestyle, appearance and religion³.

As a result of economic growth, the problem of labour shortage emerged in Taiwan in the 1980s. Research by the government indicated that in 1987 the rate of labour shortage in the construction business was 77%⁴, and in manufacturing industry the rate was 66%.⁵ Businessmen therefore repeatedly asked the government to allow migrant workers into Taiwan. At the beginning of the 1990s, there was a rapid expansion of large-scale public works projects, which in 1989 forced the government to announce 'the measure to solve the labour power problem in 14 important constructions and industries'. In 1991, the government announced 'the temporary measure to solve the problem of labour power' by removing restrictions on migrant workers in other industries. In 1992, 'the law of occupation and service' allowed the government for the first time to appoint migrant workers to government posts⁶.

The attitudes underpinning these changes of policy may be summarised as follows. First, the government views migrant workers as temporary residents in Taiwan; when there is enough labour power, the government can cancel the migrant workers system. Thus, there is no long-term plan for migrant workers. Secondly, since it is businessmen who have the greatest interest in migrant workers, the government is happy to hand over

¹ According to Wu, Ting-feng, there are two kinds of workers from other countries. One group consists of migrant workers, who stay in Taiwan for a short time. The other group consists of immigrant workers, who can gain citizenship and stay indefinitely. In the case of Taiwan, it is the first group who are numerically the most important. Wu, Ting-feng, *The Cultural Struggle of Migrant Workers for Leisure Time*, Master's Dissertation, Department of Sociology, (Taichung: Dong-Hai University: 1997), p. 14. (Chinese)

² Jiang, Kun-feng, *Searching for Gold? Bad Dream? The Taiwanese Experience of Migrant Workers in the Construction Business*, Master's Dissertation, Department of Labour Studies, (Ga-yi: National Zhong-Zheng University: 1997), p.17. (Chinese)

³ Wu, Jing-ru, 'The Human Rights of Migrant Workers', in Chen, Jun-hong (eds.), *The Human Rights of Taiwan in 2000* (Taipei: Xu-sheng Publisher, 2001), p. 147. The number of migrant workers is now near the total population of Taiwanese Aborigines, and will soon become the fourth or fifth largest group in Taiwan.

⁴ It means that if the construction business needs one hundred workers, the shortage of workers is 77. Thus migrant workers are needed to supply it.

⁵ Jiang, Kun-feng (1997), p.17.

⁶ Wu, Ting-feng (1997), p.5.

responsibility for managing migrant workers to them. It is not interested in the relations between businessmen and migrant workers. In effect this means that businessmen can exploit and oppress migrant workers, and that the rights of migrant workers are not protected by the government⁷. Thirdly, the government uses a form of contract according to which every migrant worker can stay in Taiwan for no longer than three-and-a-half years, and no migrant worker can bring his/her family or children to Taiwan⁸. This is to ensure that the government does not have to provide insurance, welfare or education to the families of migrant workers.⁹

Although there were over 320,000 migrant workers in Taiwan in 2000, a population close to the number of Taiwanese aborigines, the government still did not take the rights of migrant workers seriously. In this section, I will argue that migrant workers are excluded from 'multicultural Taiwan' since they are viewed as 'others' in the new national identity. Therefore, their cultural rights cannot be practised. However, by excluding their cultural differences and rights, Taiwan also limits the possibility of making its culture more diverse.

9.1.1. The Role of Migrant Workers under 'Multicultural Taiwan'

Migrant workers are viewed as 'others' under the new national identity--multicultural Taiwan. After the experience of political democracy and ethnic conflicts, the Taiwanese began to learn to face other cultural differences with a more open mind and a more positive attitude. This applied particularly to the Hakka and Fulo cultures, which had previously been viewed as 'inferior' to Chinese culture. In addition, the government has also sought to maintain greater equality in dealing with different cultures and to respect their diversity. However, this 'learning' process has still not been extended to the case of migrant workers in Taiwan, whose culture is still seen in a negative light.

The roles of 'others' are represented in the several ways. First, migrant workers are

⁷ This thinking can be seen in many practical policies. For example, if migrant workers run away, the employers have to take responsibility. Thus the employers have a good excuse to place limits on the action of migrant workers or retain their passports or money.

⁸ According to the regulation of the Committee of Labour Affairs (CLA), every migrant worker can stay in Taiwan for two years initially. After that time, the employer can apply to extend the period of stay. The first extension is for one year and the second extension is for half a year. Thus the longest time that a migrant worker can stay in Taiwan is three-and-a half years. However, this policy was changed in 2002. Migrant workers can now stay in Taiwan for up to six years, and they can extend their stay without limitations.

⁹ Since the period of stay for migrant workers is limited, the CLA forbids migrant workers from entering Taiwan with their families or from becoming pregnant.

often represented as violent, dangerous criminals. The famous case is the earthquake of 921 in 1999. At this time there were rumours that migrant workers were robbing people, since the victims of the earthquake had no homes to go back to. These rumours were also broadcast by the mass media. Thus the victims were very scared and tried to defend themselves by setting up organisations or equipping themselves with weapons. However, the truth of the matter was that the migrant workers themselves were also hurt by the earthquake, but local governments offered them no support. Many migrant workers lost property, residences and jobs during the earthquake.¹⁰ Similarly, the mass media likes to portray migrant workers as a risk to public security, even though, in reality, the crime rate for migrant workers is lower than that for Taiwanese.¹¹

Secondly, the culture of migrant workers is often viewed as inferior and uneducated. For example, Xu, Hong-Yi examined the influence of Filipino culture in Taipei, and found that most people regard Filipino culture as poor and dirty¹². Another example is that many migrant workers like to meet their friends at Taipei Rail Station, especially on Sundays. This causes Taipei residents to say that 'our' station is 'occupied' by migrant workers¹³.

The third representation of migrant workers is that they are responsible for unemployment in Taiwan, in particular the unemployment of Taiwanese aborigines. In 2001, a survey by the Committee of Aboriginal Affairs showed that the rate of unemployment among the aborigines was 12.26% compared with an average of 5.4 % for Taiwan as a whole¹⁴. It is argued by many that the main reason for high unemployment among aborigines is the presence of migrant workers. They affect job opportunities for the aborigines, since the average wage of migrant workers is only 70% that of the average wage of local labourers, including the aborigines. This has led to the increasing

¹⁰ Lee, Yi-Dao, 7 October 1999, on the 'Bitter Workers Forum' web site, http://192.192.148.27/current/921_equake/labor.html. (Chinese)

¹¹ According to research by the Alliance of Labour Alignment, the crime rate for migrant workers is 28.5 per 100,000 persons, while the crime rate for Taiwanese is 51.09 per 100,000 persons. Clearly, the migrant workers are being stigmatised as violent people. See: <http://www.labor.ngo.org.tw/labor-right-report/20report/6-foreign-labor.htm>. (Chinese)

¹² Xu, Hong-Yi, *The Use of Space and Its Effect on a Filipino Labour Gathering Area -- Christopher Church Area in Chung-Shan North Road*, MA Dissertation, Department of Architecture, (Taipei: Dan-Jiang University: 2000), p.77. (Chinese)

¹³ Many migrant workers meet their friends at rail stations, including those of Taipei and Taichung. Such gatherings cause resentment among local residents, because they believe that the rail station is 'occupied' by migrant workers and becomes dirty and noisy.

¹⁴ The data from CAA.

marginalisation of the aborigines in Taiwan's labour market¹⁵.

These representations show the relationship between migrant workers and Taiwan's new national identity. Taiwanese aborigines used to be the 'other' to the Han society of Taiwan, but now the new 'other' -- migrant workers -- has taken their place and their status. As 'others', the widespread negative impression of migrant workers in Taiwan can be explained in two ways. First, it comes from racial discrimination. Secondly, they come to Taiwan to undertake 'difficult, dangerous and dirty' work, i.e. 'lower-class' jobs.¹⁶ This perceived double weakness of race and class leads to discrimination.

As 'other', -migrant workers face two types of exclusions: 'individual cultural exclusion' and 'collective cultural exclusion'. Individual cultural exclusions occur between every migrant worker and his/her boss, and concern differences of religion, life style or eating habits. Since the migrant worker is hired, his/her need will be ignored or viewed as an individual problem. Migrant workers are asked to 'accept Taiwanese culture' as soon as possible. The most common conflict is over religious problems. Catholicism (the Philippines), Islam (Indonesia) and Thai Buddhism are not common in Taiwan. Most migrant workers find it very difficult to *continue their religious and cultural observance* in Taiwan. For example, most Philippine workers want to go to church every Sunday even if their bosses ask them to work. For migrant housemaids, in particular, there is always a struggle between the demands of the boss and the need to go to church¹⁷. Most Indonesian workers are Muslim, but Taiwanese bosses do not like them to wear white headscarves, since white is not a lucky colour in Taiwanese culture. In addition, Muslims have important prayer meetings on Fridays and abstain from food during Ramadan. Usually, they are asked to give up their religious tradition and yield to their bosses.¹⁸ Although the Bureau of Indonesia in Taiwan appealed to the Taiwan government to let the Indonesian community maintain their traditional life in Taiwan¹⁹, all the government could do was to ask the bosses to improve the rights of migrant

¹⁵ Pan, Mei-ling, 'Globalisation and Minority Labour: Taiwanese Aborigines and Migrant Workers'. <http://www.home.kimo.com.tw/liutaho/A75.htm>. (Chinese)

¹⁶ By comparison with migrant workers, workers from Western countries or Japan are not discriminated against in Taiwan, since most of them do white-collar jobs.

¹⁷ Lin, Chin-ju, 'The State Policy that Divides Women: Rethinking Feminist Critiques of 'The Foreign Maid Policy' in Taiwan', in *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies*, Vol.39, September, 2000, p.120. (Chinese) According to Lin, most employers do not like providing a holiday on Sunday for their housemaids for two reasons. First, employers believe that the housemaid will be led astray by their friends in church. Secondly, employers themselves want a holiday on Sunday, and therefore they need the housemaid to work.

¹⁸ Interview with Qong, You-qian.

¹⁹ *Post News*, Kabayan, 13th, May, 2001.

workers.

Collective cultural exclusions tend to arise between the community of migrant workers and Taiwanese society, such as the conflict between some community residents and Philippine workers because Philippine workers like to gather around the Catholic Churches for shopping, eating or meeting with friends. Community residents felt that Philippine workers damage their safety and environment, and asked the church to move away from this community, and eventually the Taipei city council had to intervene²⁰. Moreover, migrant workers feel the disdain of the whole society. The Chief of the Taipei Foreign-Workers Counseling Center, Qong, You-qian, has revealed that many migrant workers told her that people would not sit next to them on a bus, and that if they talked to their friends in their own language, other people would look at them in a unfriendly way²¹. The feeling of discrimination was vividly expressed in poems for the First Migrant Worker's Poetry Writing Contest. For example:

Island of Taiwan, listen to my cry and plea; respect my human rights and dignity,
I also contributed to your prosperity, why is treating me fairly impossible for thee?²²....

As Taiwan has developed toward a multicultural society, the old 'other' (aborigines or the minority groups) has been incorporated. However, at the same time migrant workers have been constructed as the new 'other' in this discourse and have thus been excluded from multicultural policy. Their cultural differences have indeed become a new 'test' for the multicultural policy of Taiwan. In practice it seems that Taiwan cannot really tolerate cultural differences, and that the mainstream society has some fundamental cultural conflicts within it. At the same time, the migrant workers cannot share cultural rights and their human rights are also limited. It also shows that multicultural Taiwan cannot extend multicultural citizenship beyond the national boundaries²³. In the following part, I will discuss the cultural rights of migrant workers in Taiwan.

9.1.2. The Cultural Rights of Migrant Workers in Taiwan

How have the cultural rights of migrant workers developed in Taiwan? The Alliance of Labour Alignment examined the situation with respect to the human rights of

²⁰ Interview with Qong, You-qian.

²¹ Interview with Qong, You-qian.

²² Estrella de Castro, 'Migrants Cry', First Migrant Workers' Poetry Writing Contest, 2001.

²³ In addition to the arguments about global citizenship, the issue of migrant workers also raises questions about the 'reach' cultural policy. Migrant workers have been entrusted to the market (the employers), not taken on as an issue for the state. So are there limits to how far the state can intervene.

migrant workers in Taiwan on International Migrant Workers Day (18 December) in 2000, using 12 indices. These include two indices related to cultural rights: the freedom of individuals and religion, and the situation in terms of discrimination. This research showed that the freedom of individuals and religion was lacking. Employers limited the individual and religious freedom of migrant workers and treated the workers as 'instruments'. As for discrimination, it was found that migrant workers are viewed as 'stigma groups' in Taiwanese society.²⁴ According to this report, the cultural rights of migrant workers are still underdeveloped in Taiwan, and more protection by the government is needed.

On the basis of the evidence presented here, our evaluation of migrant workers' cultural rights in Taiwan is as follows.

The right to participate in cultural life

The right to participate in cultural life is still limited for migrant workers in Taiwan. The main reasons are related to the limitations imposed by employers and the lack of a cultural environment for migrant workers. For example, employers have the power to manage migrant workers according to the law; and so most employers tend to limit the rights of migrant workers because this is convenient for them. For example, some employers only provide two free days per month, since they believe that migrant workers will become 'worse', for example by asking for more holidays or money. The extension of working hours leads to a decline of cultural life and the limitation of cultural identity. If Filipinos have a holiday on Sunday, they can go to church to maintain their cultural experience and their religion. Thus, the main factor for them is whether they can have a holiday on every Sunday. For Thais and Indonesians, however, there are not many Buddhist temples or Mosques in Taiwan. In addition, both NGOs and the local governments hold celebrations or festivals to provide more opportunities for migrant workers to access their culture.

Because Filipinos can read English, they have wider access to the mass media in Taiwan, i.e. newspapers, radio and television. In addition, Taipei Radio also broadcasts in the Filipino language. The Thais are the biggest migrant group in Taiwan. The CLA (Committee of Labour Affairs, the highest institution of labour affairs in the central

²⁴ The Report on National Migrant Workers Day on 12 December -- the Human Rights of Migrant Workers', from The Alliance of Labour Alignment and New Thing Social Services Centre, 12 December 2000.(Chinese)

government) sponsors Thai programmes in the counties with large Thai populations, such as Tao-yuan County. Taipei Radio also provides programmes in Indonesian and Vietnamese. Radio is viewed as the most useful way to provide information and entertainment to migrant workers. Up till now, there have been no programmes for migrant workers on TV or satellite.

Research evidence shows that employers prefer to pay more money, rather than providing more days to migrant workers in order to control them easily²⁵. Their holidays have been reduced from four or five days to two days per month. Thus they cannot easily participate in cultural life. In addition, language is another barrier to cultural participation. In general, migrant workers' rights to participate in cultural life are very limited.

The right to develop a culture

Migrant workers are viewed as 'short stay' workers, and hence their right to develop a culture has not been really considered by the government. However, a distinctive way of life and cultural experience have developed for migrant workers in Taiwan. For example, one cultural organisation, The Samahang Makata-Taiwan International Filipino Group of Writers in Taiwan (SMT) has been set up to promote creative writing. The members are Filipino migrant workers, such as workers in factories, constructors on sites, or domestic assistants working with families. They write about their experience of loneliness and isolation in Taiwan. At the same time, they also hope to communicate with Taiwan's society through their literary creations²⁶. The Taipei City government responded to this new development by holding the first migrant workers' poetry writing contest in 2001. It also hopes to encourage the development of a new migrant workers' culture through this activity²⁷.

The right to be represented

As we have explained above, the representations of migrant workers have always been very negative or invisible. The representations in the mass media lead to more misunderstanding and discrimination in Taiwan society. The right of migrant workers to be represented should be seriously considered by the whole society. Thus, many local

²⁵ Lin, Chin-Ju (2000), p.120.

²⁶ Qiu, De-Zhen, 'The Poetry of Migrant Workers, Cultural Strike' on ePots (2002). EPots is an internet magazine. Web site is: <http://iwebs.url.com.tw/main/html/epots/68.shtml>. (Chinese)

²⁷ Interview with Qong, You-qian.

governments, like Taipei City, have now decided to hold big festivals and celebrations for migrant workers. These serve several purposes. First, the hope is that the cultures of migrant workers will become 'visible' in Taiwan. Secondly, migrant workers will hopefully be able to form a collective identity in Taiwan and thus avoid social exclusion. Therefore, the government seeks to offer more opportunities for employers to understand migrant workers' cultures.

According to these various cultural rights, it is clear that a truly multicultural policy is not applied to migrant workers in Taiwan. In other words, 'multicultural Taiwan' only applies to citizens, and there is limited concern with universal human rights across national boundaries.

9.1.3. Can Migrant Workers Improve Multiculturalism in Taiwan?

With the development of globalisation, more and more people travel across national boundaries to work²⁸. What can the experience of migrant workers teach Taiwan? Will there be more experience of cultural difference and globalisation, or more discrimination and cultural inequality? In this part, I will argue that the collective of migrant workers' cultures are 'negative' and 'invisible' in Taiwan, thus it is difficult to make Taiwanese culture more diverse.

Chiou, Shwu-wen discusses the cultural experience of 'the foreign/migrant bride' in Taiwan through the concept of 'local internationalisation', and emphasises the importance of combining locality and international society. For her, immigrants are bearers of different cultures, and local people have the opportunity to combine with these new international cultural influences. Can these immigrant brides improve cultural exchange and strengthen the possibility of multiculturalism? Or are they forced to live in an 'assimilated' environment so that they silently lose their own culture²⁹?

The same problem applies to migrant workers. They come from south-east Asia and enter into the Han society, thus becoming 'the bearers of a different culture'. Can these workers therefore provide more opportunity for Taiwanese people to experience international society? Or, as another scholar, Hsia, Hsiao-chuan, asks, will migrant workers merely strengthen the unequal structure of international society and reinforce

²⁸ Data from the IOL.

²⁹ Chiou, Shwu-Wen, 'Local Internationalisation: The Philippines Brides in Japanese Villages', *Contemporary*, Vol. 141, 1 May 1999, p. 108.

racial discrimination in order to enhance the national identity of Taiwan?³⁰

Of the various groups of migrant workers, the Filipino workers have a more noticeable collective culture in Taiwan by virtue of their association with Catholics. According to the research of Xu, Hong-Yi, the culture of the Philippines has had a major influence around St. Christopher's Catholic Church. Many Filipino workers go to Mass in the church and afterwards have a picnic in the park or go shopping with friends. The collective action of Filipino workers has led to some new changes around the church, such as the opening of many shops using the English or Filipino language on their signboards, the provision of a mail service to the Philippines, and the sale of cheap products. The area has become a small 'Philippines town'³¹.

However, this new collective Filipino culture does not increase the opportunities for cultural exchange between Taipei residents and migrant workers. Indeed, it appears that residents think that their streets are 'polluted' by migrant workers, and believe that these workers pose a threat to public security around the area³². The communal residents want the church to move to another location so that the Filipino workers will not be able to gather here again. Many Taipei citizens want to 'separate' them in a special place so that they can no longer 'bother' people. The Taipei city council tried unsuccessfully to move them to a derelict football field. Now the council plans to set up a new cultural centre for migrant workers in order to solve this problem³³. But for Xu, Hong-Yi, the basic problem of the use of space by migrant workers comes down to the question of whether 'migrant workers are citizens or non-citizens'. If migrant workers are viewed as 'non-citizens', the city plan of the government fails to consider their needs as a whole, and the only way is to 'separate' migrant workers from the city's citizens³⁴.

The Filipino culture, which is the most visible migrant culture in Taiwanese society, is viewed as an 'inferior, negative' culture. It is interesting to compare this image to that of Thai culture, since the Thais are the biggest group of migrant workers in Taiwan³⁵. In

³⁰ Hsia, Hsiao-Chuan, 'Transnational Marriage and the Internationalisation of Capital - The Case of the 'Foreign Bride' Phenomenon in Taiwan', in *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies*, Vol.39, September 2000, p. 88. (Chinese)

³¹ Xu, Hong-Yi (2000), pp.53-77.

³² Xu, Hong-Yi (2000), pp. 96-8.

³³ The Administrative Plan for Taipei city council, 2001. The Report of the Mayor to the Taipei Assembly.

³⁴ Xu, Hong-Yi (2000), p.107.

³⁵ According to the report of the CLA in 2001, the biggest group of migrant workers is that of the Thai workers (about 140,000 in number), the second largest group is that of the Indonesian workers (about

making such a comparison, Wu, Ting-Feng concludes that the Filipino workers can maintain their own cultural experience through their English-speaking and Catholic networks. But the Thai workers cannot do the same, since, for example, they cannot communicate with the Taiwanese except by learning Chinese. Thus they tend to become an 'invisible' group³⁶. They only meet their friends at railway stations or in parks, or they go to Thai restaurants³⁷ in their leisure time. Thus they have no opportunity to participate in their own culture, except when the local government or their employers hold activities for them³⁸.

Turning to the Indonesian migrant workers, most are housemaids and are dispersed in different Taiwanese families. It is therefore more difficult for them to form a collective culture. The focus of their culture is religion. Since there are only 50,000 to 60,000 Muslims in Taiwan, most Taiwanese see them as 'strange', and many employers limit the religious freedom of Indonesian workers. In order to keep their jobs, the Indonesian workers are also encouraged by employment agencies to suppress their religious practices at work³⁹.

According to the above-cited researchers, although migrant workers bring new, different cultural experiences to Taiwan, there are not many cultural exchanges between migrant workers and local residents. *Individual* migrant workers are visible in Taiwan, but their *collective* cultures are excluded. These 'different' cultures are thus 'stigmatised' or rendered 'invisible' by Taiwanese society. In addition, migrant workers are constructed as the 'other' in the imagination of national identity in Taiwan in order to enhance the national boundary between 'us' and 'them'. Thus, there is little opportunity for the migrant cultures to bring about significant cultural changes in Taiwan. In other words, their cultures are 'isolated' from Taiwan.

Increasingly, this 'isolation' seems inappropriate in today's age of global citizenship and human rights. We shall discuss this ambiguity further in the next section.

89,000), and the Filipino group is ranked third (about 83,000). The Filipino group used to be the biggest (about 110,000), but because of growing political problems between the Taiwan and Philippines governments, the CLA reduced the Philippines quota and increased the quota for the Vietnamese.

³⁶ Wu, Ting-Feng (1997), p.85.

³⁷ There are some restaurants specifically for migrant workers in Taiwan, e.g. there is a Thai restaurant in the Taipei rail station. This is an ideal place for Thais to meet their friends.

³⁸ The local government and the employers hold collective activities for Thai workers at special holidays or festivals, e.g. the birthday of the Thai King. See *China Times*, 4 April 1995.

³⁹ Interview with Qong, You-qian.

9.2. Multiculturalism in a Global Age

Following the discussion, multicultural citizenship of migrant workers is not practised because they are viewed as 'other' in Taiwan. 'Multicultural citizenship' cannot be provided to non-citizens, so their cultural rights are also limited. However, the view that citizenship should be based on national boundaries, has been increasingly questioned in recent years. Many research findings show the need to redefine citizenship in a global age. Some of the new opinions, pushed by the NGOs, are having an influence on the Taiwan government.

9.2.1. Citizenship in a Global Age

Arjun Appadurai has pointed out that there are five kinds of flows in the global age: ethnoscape, technoscape, finascape, mediascape and ideoscape, all of which lead to a 'deterritorialised' situation⁴⁰. Similarly, Anthony Giddens considers the influence of globalisation on governance⁴¹. On the subject of citizenship, Giddens also points out that there has been a major impact on sovereignty and the nature of national identity. The nation-state is not disappearing or losing its power in the world, but is being reshaped, especially in the West, e.g. through the emergence of the European Union⁴².

Many other new terms and theories have been constructed in the same vein. Christian Joppke shows that contemporary immigration, with its dual implications of post-national membership and multicultural identity politics, represents a profound challenge to every component of the classical model of citizenship⁴³. She distinguishes between the challenge to citizenship as a legal status, which is associated with the rise of '*post-national membership*', and the challenge to citizenship as an identity, which is associated with multicultural identity politics⁴⁴. In addition, '*global citizenship*', used by Michael Muetzelfeldt and Gary Smith, refers to the capacity for developing civil society beyond national boundaries, and taking on transnational features in areas such as communication; development of shared values and mutual respect, and co-ordination of

⁴⁰ Arjun Appadurai, 'Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Culture Economy', in *Public Culture*, Vol.2, Spring 1990. 'Finascape' means the flows of finance across the national boundaries.

⁴¹ Anthony Giddens, 'Citizenship Education in the Global Era', in *Tomorrow's Citizens: Critical Debate in Citizenship and Education* (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2000), p.19.

⁴² *ibid.*, p. 21.

⁴³ Christian Joppke, 'Immigration Challenges the Nation-State', in Christian Joppke (eds.), *Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 23.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, p.24.

economic, social and environmental policy⁴⁵. These commentators try to construct a set of global rights and obligations associated with global citizenship. These are the rights and obligations that may emerge in global relationships. For example, some human rights are global issues: the rights of all people in authoritarian states, the rights of indigenous peoples or minorities in more or less liberal states⁴⁶.

Some arguments on the relationship between national state and citizenship remain contentious. Stephen Castles highlights two opposing positions in theories of citizenship in a global age. The first position is that the substance of citizenship and the nation-state are changing anyway through the forces of globalisation, so that little further action is needed. Examples of this position are the works of Kenichi Ohmae and Yasemin Soysal. Ohmae uses the image of 'the borderless world' to describe a future in which traditional national borders have almost disappeared because of the construction of an 'interlinked economy'⁴⁷. Soysal uses the model of '*postnational membership*' and argues that a new and more universal concept of citizenship needs to be based on universal personhood rather than the national belonging. Furthermore, the rights and privileges reserved for the citizenship of a nation are codified and expanded as personal rights, undermining the national order of citizenship⁴⁸.

The second position is the 'belief that the nation-state, although weakened by international and external contradictions, is still the only political unit capable of maintaining democratic citizenship'. This position is evident in the writings of Robert B. Reich and Dominique Schnapper. Reich asks whether there can be a national society in the absence of a national economy, and he believes that a reassertion of national solidarity would 'protect people's property from the depredations of a larger and ever more desperate population outside'⁴⁹. At the same time, Schnapper discusses the crisis of democratic citizenship, and points out that there is a contradiction between the 'external' nation and the 'internal' nation. At the external level, the power of the nation will be reduced by the increase of international markets and international organisations, such as

⁴⁵ Muetzelfeldt, Michael and Gary Smith, 'Civil Society and Global Governance: The Possibilities for Global Citizenship', *Citizenship Studies*, Vol.6, No.1, 2002. pp.55--75.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.62.

⁴⁷ The 'interlinked economy' consists of the Triad (the USA, Europe and Japan), joined by new industrial economies like Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Stephen Castles, 'Globalisation and the Ambiguities of National Citizenship', in Rainer Baubock and John Rundell (eds.), *Blurred Boundaries: Migration, Ethnicity, Citizenship*. (Vienna, Ashgate Publishing:1998), p. 231.

⁴⁸ Soysal (1994), p.1.

⁴⁹ Castles (1998), p.237.

the IMF. At the same time, at the internal level, the people will protect the nation because they want to emphasise the interests of the individual, which suggests a trend toward 'depoliticisation'. In terms of depoliticisation, people concern the personal interests more than the political issues of the whole nation and country. However, in this respect there is a contradiction

'[b]etween the objective integration of people in a virtually global space and their social habitus, that is their feeling of collective identity, as well as their political participation, which continue to be mainly expressed at the level of the nation'⁵⁰.

Thus, the development of universal rights also brings about a new challenge to the national state, since it points to the replacement of 'national citizenship' by human rights across national boundaries⁵¹. For example, the 'International Convention of the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families' (1990) demands almost the same rights as those associated with 'national citizenship' based on human rights. According to this Convention, many human rights of migrant workers should be protected by national governments. The Convention includes a number of articles dealing with cultural rights, e.g. Article 7 (on the protection of people without discrimination), Article 12 (which states that migrant workers should have freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the freedom to choose, accept, access and practice their religions), Article 13 (on freedom of expression), and Article 43 (which states that migrant workers should enjoy the same treatment as a national citizens in certain key areas, e.g. education and cultural participation.⁵²

It is interesting to consider, from these different perspectives, whether and, if so, in what ways the influence of migrant workers has brought about new challenges to 'national citizenship' in Taiwan. In fact, it is impossible to detect any serious challenges to citizenship from the influence of migrant workers. However, it is noteworthy that NGOs specialising in human rights and also labour groups have begun to make increasing demands for the protection of the universal human rights of migrant workers. For example, restrictions on pregnancy were abolished following complaints by NGOs in

⁵⁰ Schnapper, quoted in Castles (1998), p.238. In the case 'depoliticisation', the individual is concerned with primary personal interests rather than the 'common' interests of the whole nation or country, such as political or social issues.

⁵¹ Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, *Limit of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p.157.

⁵² Su, Li-Jiao, *Research on Foreigners and Their Rights in Taiwan* (MA Thesis, Graduate School of Administrative Police, University of Central Police, 2000), p.117. (Chinese)

2001. If migrant workers procreate their next generation in Taiwan, the question of whether their children are entitled to the same treatment as the children of other citizens will become a major problem in the future.

Generally speaking, the new trend of universal human rights should bring about new pressure on the government to change its policy on migrant workers and their status in Taiwan. However, the government still keeps tight control of the definitions of citizens and citizenship, so at present a 'post-national' citizenship is unthinkable in Taiwan. Views of universal human rights first influenced NGOs in Taiwan, and then the NGOs forced the government to change its policies in order to protect the rights of migrant workers. Some new policies have now been implemented through the dialogue between the government and the NGOs, especially on cultural issues.

9.2.2. The 'Push' by NGOs for the Rights of Migrant Workers.

NGOs play a key role in some global issues, such as human rights, aboriginal rights, environment policy or labor rights. In the case of migrant workers, there are two main groups of NGOs which support their rights in Taiwan: Catholic groups and the labour movement.

Migrant workers and Catholicism

Catholic organisations play an important role in helping migrant workers in Taiwan. The main reason is that most Filipino workers are Catholics. When they encounter problems, they ask for help from the Catholic Church. Many Catholic churches provide services for migrant workers and have set up special organisations for migrant workers, not only for Filipinos but for other nationalities. Examples of Catholic agencies are: 'The Attentive Group for Migrant Workers in Catholicism', 'The Hope Migrant Workers Centre' and 'The New Thing Social Service Centre'. These agencies all provide advice on daily life, cultural and religious activities, and legal services in relation to conflicts between employers and migrant workers. In addition, they also help migrant workers to fight for their rights, e.g. the right to holding labour demonstrations. Furthermore, they provide various training courses for migrant workers, e.g. in languages and computing.

These organisations always combine concerns for migrant workers with religious activities. For example, Taiwan's Catholics have designated a special day for a migrant worker's Mass since 1996. They also ask other people to pray for and support migrant workers. This approach serves two purposes. On the one hand, it provides valuable support in areas of religion, daily life and industrial relations for migrant workers. On the

other hand, it also helps to educate other believers about migrant workers and their lives.

Support from Labour Organisations

Since the problem of migrant workers is also a kind of labour problem, labour organisations in Taiwan have a major role to play. However, different labour organisations have different attitudes towards migrant workers. Some groups are against the policy of migrant workers, because they prefer to support the interests of local labour. Furthermore, the issue of migrant workers is also closely linked to issues of race and class, and this creates further challenges for labour organisations.

Wu, Ting-Feng is critical of labour organisations in Taiwan, because his research shows that they tend to adopt a 'race is first, class is second' attitude towards migrant workers. He believes that these groups are only concerned with the national interest and so exclude the interests of the working class outside the national boundary. Thus, the working class as a whole will take second place to the national interest⁵³.

However, some labour groups reject the prioritisation of any national identity over class identity, and insist that there is no difference between the 'local' working class and the 'foreign' working class. For example, Gu, Yu-lin argues:

The discussion of the national boundary is only of benefit to businessmen. When they seek cheaper labour outside the national boundary, we cannot see any advantage for the working class, no matter whether they are internal or external to the national boundary. The working classes of the whole world share the same destiny as the Taiwanese working class⁵⁴.

Based on human rights and class-consciousness, the issue of the human rights of migrant workers has now begun to gain more credibility among Taiwan's labour organisations. In particular, many members of these organisations work for the government, and they are able to provide more information and understanding of the situation of migrant workers⁵⁵.

⁵³ Wu, Ting-feng (1997), pp. 117-120.

⁵⁴ Gu, Yu-lin, 'Who is 'Destiny Community?', in *Taiwanese Labour Movement* (1996), p.80. (Chinese)

⁵⁵ For example, the person in charge of The Committee of Labour Action, Zheng, Cun-qi, has worked for the Taipei city council as Chief of the Bureau of Labour since 1998, and Qong, You-qian, who used to work for 'Hope Migrant Workers', is the Chief of the Taipei Foreign Workers Consulting Center.

From the experiences of NGOs in the case of migrant workers, we can find that NGOs have a double function here. First, because the NGOs are independent from the power of the government, they struggle to improve the rights and equality of migrant workers, also influence and strengthen the construction of civil society in Taiwan. At the same time, the issue of migrant workers is beyond national boundaries. Therefore, their second function is related to the development of 'global citizenship' and 'global civil society'. As Muetzelfeldt and Smith point out, there is a widespread assumption among NGOs that their transnational networking and collaboration can help solve global problems. In the emerging 'international civil society', or as it is called 'global civil society', NGOs should be a new force 'from below' in global and regional politics, which is capable of contributing significantly to the solution of problems that transcend national boundaries and appear beyond the abilities of states to resolve⁵⁶.

9.2.3. The Attitude of the Government in Taiwan

The Taiwan government faces many demands from NGOs to improve the rights and equality of migrant workers. We now need to consider the way in which the central government of Taiwan treats the cultural rights of migrant workers and deals with their cultural difference. According to Qong, You-qian, the Chief in the Consulting Centre of Migrant Workers in Taipei, the policy regarding migrant workers will not last for more than five or six years, after which time there will be a sufficient supply of labour in Taiwan, and so the policy will be cancelled. However, many industries have now begun to move to mainland China in search for cheap labour, and the Taiwan government has therefore had to continue using migrant workers as a way of encouraging industries to stay in Taiwan. Thus, for the present the government has no choice but to retain its migrant workers policy. In this situation, the CLA (Committee of Labour Affairs) has no system to deal with the management and import of migrant workers. Indeed, on the contrary, it gives the employers the dominant power to manage migrant workers. As there are no laws to protect migrant workers' human rights and to ensure their equitable labour conditions, the cultural rights of migrant workers are still ignored⁵⁷.

Although the laws regarding migrant workers have still not been settled, the CLA is at least paying more attention to the cultural needs of migrant workers. In 1995, the CLA began to provide sponsorship to broadcast radio programmes for the Thai, Indonesia and

⁵⁶ Muetzelfeldt and Smith (2002), p.63.

⁵⁷ Interview with Qong, You-qian.

Filipino workers⁵⁸. In addition, the CLA began to set up consulting centres for migrant workers in local governments. These centres became the main institutions providing legal advice and cultural activities for migrant workers⁵⁹. For example, the Taipei consulting centre held the first cultural exchange party for migrant workers, 'We are the World', in 1996. This suggests that there is now a new attitude towards migrant workers on the part of local governments⁶⁰.

The cultural activities for migrant workers supported by the Taipei city council serve several purposes. First, they provide the opportunity for migrant workers to maintain their cultural experience and traditions in Taiwan, for example, in the Christmas party at St. Christopher's Catholic church (2000), the celebration of St. Cross Day (1998-2001), and the carnival of migrant workers, which had music provided by bands from the Philippines and Thailand (2000). In this way, migrant workers can access and continue their important cultural festivities in Taiwan.

Furthermore, the programme of cultural activities tries to improve the collective culture of migrant workers in Taiwan and increase its visibility in Taiwanese society. The exhibition of photographs of the life of migrant workers in Taiwan (2000) and the migrant worker's poetry writing contest (2001) were held to improve the development of migrant workers' culture, and to provide more opportunities for Taiwanese people to understand migrant workers and their lives.

In addition, the Taipei city council has tried to help migrant workers to understand Taipei by involving them in cultural activities, such as the production of the Taipei cultural map, which can help migrant workers to overcome language problems and travel in Taipei; cultural tours around Taipei; and traditional Chinese festivals.

Fourthly, the Taipei city council takes positive steps to help migrant workers participate in their own important festivals. For example, the Chief of the Labour Bureau went to join the Muslim Festival in 2001, and asked the employers to respect and accept the religious freedom of migrant workers. He also pointed out that the understanding of

⁵⁸ Chiou, Shwu-wen, 'A Study of Ethnic Media for Immigrant Workers: Thai Radio Programme in Taiwan', in *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies*, Vol. 31, September 1998, pp. 180-182. (Chinese)

⁵⁹ Xu, Hong-Yi (2000), p.105.

⁶⁰ I use Taipei as an index since Taipei city council has promoted the culture of migrant workers for two years. Other cities or counties also hold activities for migrant workers, but they are not as well organised in their approach.

Islam was the first step to understanding Indonesian workers, and that in general mutual understanding between employers and migrant workers is essential⁶¹.

Indeed, the final purpose of these activities is to help Taiwanese and migrant workers to understand and respect each other in such a way that the conflicts between them can be minimised. Qong, You-qian asserts that the most common problems dealt with by the counselling centre are not labour problems but racial problems. Taiwanese people should have more tolerance of cultural difference so that the cultural rights of migrant workers can be protected and improved⁶².

This new construction of cultural policy highlights changing attitudes to multicultural policy and citizenship. Migrant workers do not have 'citizen' status, however, their rights should be protected, based on 'universal human rights'. With the experience of migrant workers in Taiwan, it seems that multicultural policy and citizenship have expanded 'from national boundaries to beyond national boundaries'. In other words, there is a new possibility of moving towards 'global citizenship' in Taiwan society in the future.

Conclusion

Under the influence of globalisation, multiculturalism seems to be developing toward a 'post-national' citizenship and universal human rights, especially cultural rights. Multiculturalism is concerned with not only the cultural rights of citizens, but also the rights of people without citizenship, such as new immigrants or migrant workers. In European countries, these issues have been discussed for a long time. But in Taiwan the phenomenon of migrant workers is still fairly new, and hence the experience of multicultural policy is also limited. Thus migrant workers are not really viewed as a part of 'multicultural Taiwan'. They are constructed as a new 'otherness', and their cultural rights are generally ignored by the government. The issue of migrant worker is also viewed as 'the business of employers', and not taken on as an issue for the state.

However, the new views of 'post-national' citizenship and universal human rights are increasingly valued by NGOs in Taiwan. Under the influence of NGOs, the government has also begun to express concern about the problems of migrant workers' rights and cultures. For example, the Taipei City government provides many services and

⁶¹ Qong, Zhao-Jian, 'Muslim Holiday: The Benefits for Indonesian Workers', in China Times, 3 June 2001. (Chinese)

⁶² Interview with Qong, You-Qian.

opportunities for migrant workers to access their cultures. The new cultural policy of migrant workers can be viewed as an expansion of citizenship, towards 'global citizenship'.

From the three case studies, we can see the various problems and challenges in the discourse of 'multicultural Taiwan' and the practice of multicultural citizenship.

The case study of Taiwanese aborigines shows the tension between ethnic identity and national identity. 'Multicultural Taiwan' tries to integrate the various ethnic groups as one new national identity, however, the ethnic identities of Taiwanese aborigines develop towards 'separation' from national identity. In other words, ethnic identities are not really integrated into and used as the base for national identity.

Furthermore, the Hakka's case reveals a new problem in multicultural policy--cultural identity, ethnic identity and national identity are heterogeneous, ambiguous, fuzzy and shifting. These new hybrid cultures and multiple identities challenge the view of multiculturalism in Taiwan. Again, it shows how difficult it is to construct national identity based on ethnic identities.

However, the case of migrant workers raises another question: whether multiculturalism should be based on national boundaries? Migrant workers are excluded from 'multicultural Taiwan' since its main aim is to construct a new national identity. This exclusion has provoked many critiques from the perspective of universal human rights, and reveals the tension between multicultural citizenship and national identity.

Therefore, 'multicultural Taiwan' and cultural policy face many challenges. The emphasis on integration, homogeneity and national boundaries limits the development of multicultural citizenship. Some revisions are needed in order to practice multiculturalism. Firstly, national identity should be considered from the standpoint of citizenship and civic identity, but not ethnic identity alone. Multicultural citizenship can offer a new balance between national identity and cultural differences. Secondly, ethnic cultural differences, identities and the shifting relationship between them should be viewed from more heterogeneous perspectives. Thirdly, multiculturalism should be discussed within a global view, not only based on national boundaries.

Chapter 10: Conclusion

In 1996, the Taiwan government abolished the limitations on 'foreign brides', who enter Taiwan from Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines. In September 2002, their children began to go to primary schools. This new group -- whose fathers are Taiwanese and mothers are Indonesians, Thais, Vietnamese and Filipinos -- has attracted much attention in Taiwanese society. The government faces the difficulty of how to educate them, since they were born into, and live with, two cultures. In other words, how can the government educate these children to live in Taiwanese society while still allowing them to retain their own indigenous mother cultures?

A similar new problem is that many Taiwanese businessmen and businesswomen work in mainland China, and their children also stay there for education. Many people worry about how these children will identify themselves in the future -- as Taiwanese or Chinese? Potentially this taps into what remains a deep-rooted identity crisis in Taiwan. The number of marriages between Taiwanese and Chinese is also increasing. Will their children be Chinese or Taiwanese?

The new problem -- what Taiwanese identity and Taiwanese culture will be in the future -- challenges the whole society. The boundaries between nation and nation, between Taiwan and China, and between various cultures will be shifted, blurred and unstable. Everyone will live with more diverse and overlapping cultures. However, can Taiwan's official multicultural policy deal with these hybrid cultures and multiple identities beyond national boundaries?

In this dissertation, I have presented various case studies and described the development, challenges, tensions and contradictions of multiculturalism in Taiwan, focusing on national identity, ethnic reconstruction, Community Renaissance, aboriginal rights, Hakka policy and migrant workers. In this conclusion, first of all I seek to determine whether Taiwan is a multicultural country based on identity, policy and citizenship. I will then reconsider some of the challenges of multiculturalism in Taiwan, as highlighted in the introduction. Finally, I will return to the concept of multicultural policy in Taiwan from the perspective of western theory and Taiwan's actual experience.

10.1 Is Taiwan a Multicultural Society?

The 1997 Constitution of the ROC claimed that Taiwan is a multicultural country, and subsequently the government began to formulate a multicultural policy. In this study, I have explored the representation, development and practice of multiculturalism from various perspectives, using case studies of Taiwanese aborigines, the Hakkas and migrant workers. However, after five years, can we say that Taiwan has developed into a multicultural country?

There are many ways to consider multiculturalism in western and eastern societies. Multiculturalism can be viewed as a social phenomenon, political ideology, public policy and a new concept of citizenship. Parekh defines 'multicultural society' with reference to five sets of measures which together combine the various perspectives on multiculturalism. First, such a society should not subject its cultural communities to intended or unintended discrimination; it should show them equal respect and give them equal opportunity to flourish. Secondly, a multicultural society should ensure social justice and equal access to political power for its minority communities, and encourage inter-ethnic and inter-religious cooperation in all areas of life, especially the political. Thirdly, the institutions of the state, especially the civil service, the army, the police and the judiciary, should be completely impartial and insulated against ethnic and religious pressure. Fourthly, a multicultural society should encourage its members to take an open-minded and expansive view of their cultural identity, so that they not only cease to feel threatened by, but positively cherish, cultural difference. Finally, it should evolve a national identity which does not exclude or delegitimize any of its communities. Wherever possible, national symbols, rituals and events should reflect the multicultural character of the society. The society should be so defined that it belongs to all its citizens and not to its dominant ethnic or religious group¹.

Using Parekh's views as a framework, let us consider whether Taiwan is a multicultural society. I shall do so by examining three perspectives on multiculturalism: multiculturalism as cultural identity, multiculturalism as public policy, and multiculturalism as a new practice of citizenship. I shall argue that Taiwan is indeed developing towards a multicultural society.

10.1.1 The Development of Multicultural Identity in Taiwan

¹ Bhikhu Parekh, 'A Commitment to Cultural Pluralism', at web site <http://www.unesco.sweden.org/conference/Papers/Paper1.htm>.

In Taiwan, the issue of multiculturalism is always related to identity. From the standpoint of identity, there are four phases in the rise of multicultural identity since 1949. The initial phase was from 1949 to the 1970s, which was a time 'without cultural difference'. Everyone was viewed as Chinese. In the context of strong Chinese nationalism, the cultural differences of gender, class and ethnic groups were ignored, oppressed and destroyed. In this phase, many traditional cultures were lost.

In the second phase, from the 1970s to the 1980s, 'Taiwanese consciousness' began to challenge Chinese culture, and to present itself as the 'alternative' national culture in Taiwan. Politically, Taiwanese consciousness rejected Chinese nationalism; culturally, it influenced the development of literature, theatre, dance, film, music and painting. In a short time, Taiwanese consciousness was viewed as one of the major cultures and identities.

The next phase was from the 1980s to the middle of the 1990s. The aboriginal and Hakka movements challenged both Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese consciousness, which was viewed as a kind of 'Fulocentrism'. At this stage, multicultural identity was promoted to defend minority rights and social justice in the late 1980s. Afterwards, the constructions of 'Four Ethnic Groups' and 'multicultural Taiwan' proceeded. Until the 1990s, 'multicultural Taiwan' was viewed as a new common identity in Taiwan.

However, 'multicultural Taiwan' still faces challenges and difficulties. For example, postmodern theory rejects a homogeneous ethnic culture and national culture, and uses hybrid cultures and multiple identities to challenge the discourses of 'multicultural Taiwan' and 'Four Ethnic Groups'. Feminists and the gay/lesbian movements also present a challenge, since they are excluded from the current concept of multiculturalism based on ethnic and national definitions of culture. In addition, the issues of migrant workers and foreign brides present further difficulties, since multicultural Taiwan is based on the concept of a self-contained national identity inside Taiwan's borders. Therefore, the rise of multicultural identity marked a fourth phase from the late 1990s. In this phase, multicultural identity was expected to accommodate new forms of cultural difference, hybrid culture, and multiple identities beyond national boundaries.

The development of multicultural identity in Taiwan shows a trend towards heterogeneous, disunited and multiple identities in Taiwan. At the same time, cultural identity and cultural diversity are not static and change both in degree and form in relation

to religion, social class, region, gender, sexuality, languages and dialects. However, is this new trend reflected in cultural policy or not? Can cultural policy deal with this new aspect of multicultural identity? To answer these questions, we need to consider the development of multicultural policy in Taiwan.

10.1.2 The Development of Multicultural Policy in Taiwan

Multiculturalism is also viewed as public policy in Taiwan, even if the term 'multicultural policy' is recent. Until 2000, the new ruling party – the DPP -- used this term in its cultural policy. However, the sponsorships and subsidies from the Information Bureau² and the Committee of Cultural Affairs (CCA) to support the cultural activities and mass media of minority groups should also be viewed as multicultural policy. In other words, multicultural policy developed from the late 1980s, when the KMT government was forced to respond to the demands of ethnic movements.

As explained in Chapters 7 and 8, multicultural policy was dominated by the CCA in its early stage -- what I have called the CCA model. This model concentrated on the subsidy of cultural activities in order to integrate the aboriginal cultures and the Hakka culture into a new national culture. This was the first phase of multicultural policy.

With their establishment, the Committee of Aboriginal Affairs (CAA) and the Committee of the Hakkas (CH) began to dominate multicultural policy. Their policies are quite different from the CCA model. Taking the CAA as an example, its cultural policy not only sponsors aboriginal activities but is also concerned with the development of aborigines, the construction of aboriginal identity, and the protection of aboriginal rights (see Chapter 7). From the CCA to the CAA we can identify new trends in the multicultural policy of Taiwan:

First, the importance of political integration is replaced by a recognition of separate ethnic identities in multicultural policy, reflected in the development of separate 'ethnic' political bodies such as the CAA and the CH.

Secondly, the aims of multicultural policy are expanded from arts affairs, such as

² This is the highest department for managing the affairs of the mass media in the central government in Taiwan.

traditional cultural heritage or arts, to the construction of new rights, such as the right to cultural identity, and the right to participate in cultural life.

Thirdly, many new policies are created in the name of multicultural policy, such as aboriginal cultural policy, Hakka policy, and migrant workers' cultural policy. Multicultural policy is increasingly more diverse in order to accommodate more cultural differences.

These trends indicate that more cultural differences are now considered in the public sphere. However, some non-ethnic cultural differences are still ignored. While cultural differences in the public sphere are now supported by new forms of public policy and resources, there is also an expansion in the concept of citizenship.

10.1.3 The Practice of Multicultural Citizenship in Taiwan

Many new rights have been recognised based on multiculturalism in Taiwan. They can be viewed as indicative of the trend towards multicultural citizenship.

The development of multicultural citizenship has also gone through several phases. Prior to 1986, in the first phase, people did not share basic civil rights, such as freedom of opinion, assembly or political participation, because Taiwan was still governed under a form of martial law. In other words, people were not really 'citizens', because they did not enjoy the rights of citizenship. In the second phase, from 1986 to 1997, civil rights and political rights were put into effect with the transformation of the democratic system. However, the main problem in the second phase was lack of equality. As Iris Young points out, 'universal citizenship' does not protect equality, since it ignores 'the politics of difference'. Inequalities between genders, ethnic groups and classes cause 'unequal citizenship'. In the third phase, after 1997, collective difference and collective rights began to be considered by the Constitution. For example, it began to recognise aboriginal rights. This phase marks the beginning of multicultural citizenship. Collective rights and cultural rights have now been recognised in the practice of aboriginal rights.

As explained in Chapter 3, there are three trends in the construction of multicultural citizenship. First, the recognition of 'collective rights' in citizenship seems to present itself as a new common consciousness for the various positions in the debate, such as Young's 'differentiated citizenship' and Kymlicka's 'multicultural citizenship'. Secondly, after civil rights, political rights, social rights and economic rights in the concept of citizenship,

cultural rights have become an important factor in 'multicultural citizenship'. Thirdly, the shift from 'national' citizenship to 'global' citizenship has also become a new issue of citizenship. According to these three trends, the government in Taiwan presently recognises collective rights and cultural rights, but ignores the development of global influences in its concept of citizenship.

On the basis of the evidence regarding the development of multicultural identity, policy and citizenship, I wish to argue that Taiwan is developing towards a multicultural society according to Parekh's views³. The new policy, systems and laws are constructed to provide more equal opportunities for cultural diversity. However, according to the three perspectives on multiculturalism presented in this thesis (identity, policy and citizenship), what are the overall trends in the development of multiculturalism in Taiwan?

First, we can identify a link between these three perspectives on multiculturalism. Multicultural identity developed earlier and faster, pushing the progress of multicultural policy. Subsequently, multicultural citizenship also expanded through multicultural policy.

Secondly, the three perspectives on multiculturalism also represent a trend from a stable, united, centrally controlled and homogeneous approach towards an unstable, disunited, heterogeneous and decentralised approach.

However, there are also some differences between the three perspectives on multiculturalism. For example, multicultural identity in Taiwan has developed towards a postmodern approach, stressing hybrid cultures and multiple identities. However, this trend is still beyond the development of multicultural policy and multicultural citizenship in Taiwan. The differences among the three perspectives lead to more challenges and inter-conflicts in the development of multiculturalism in Taiwanese society.

³ Bhikhu Parekh,, 'A Commitment to Cultural Pluralism', at web site <http://www.unesco.sweden.org/conference/Papers/Paper1.htm>.

10.2 The Challenges of Multiculturalism in Taiwan

Multiculturalism is viewed in terms of identity, public policy and citizenship. However, its development has also created some challenges and tensions in Taiwanese society. In this section, I will summarise the key challenges to national identity, cultural policy and citizenship based on the three case studies presented in this thesis: Taiwanese aborigines, the Hakkas and migrant workers.

10.2.1 The Challenge to National Identity

An identity crisis is a serious problem in Taiwan. From the 1990s, the discourses of multicultural Taiwan and 'Four Ethnic Groups' represented an attempt to construct a common identity. In other words, based on the identities of four ethnic groups, the government hopes to develop a new national identity -- multicultural Taiwan -- which accommodates more cultural diversity. However, multiculturalism also challenges this 'multicultural' model of multicultural Taiwan.

The first challenge comes from the development of aboriginal identity. In the name of multicultural Taiwan, the government provides public resources to support aboriginal cultures and identities. At the same time, aboriginal rights are also recognised by the whole society based on multicultural Taiwan. However, aboriginal identities have developed separately from the whole national identity, and because of this distinctive 'separate' status, there is a growing challenge to a unified national identity. In addition, some aboriginal rights, such as self-determination, self-government or land rights, also challenge the sovereignty of the country. As discussed in Chapter 7, the claims of aborigines challenge two fundamental statist notions -- that of territorial sovereignty and that of a unified 'nationality' administered by government organs. For example, the aboriginal movement defines the relationship between Taiwanese aborigines and the Taiwan government as 'partner and partner'. In other words, the Taiwan government cannot claim to rule over Taiwanese aborigines. In addition, most Taiwanese aborigines have set up their own assemblies to decide their political and social systems. This trend is a further challenge to the concept of unified national identity in Taiwan.

The second challenge is that it is now more difficult to construct a homogeneous ethnic culture and identity, and this influences the stability of the new national identity -- multicultural Taiwan. The Hakkas' experience provides a good example of this. From the late 1980s, through the constructions of 'Taiwanese Hakkas' and 'New Hakkas', the Hakka peoples sought to take their place in multicultural Taiwan. However, 'Hakka' is not a stable

identity, since it has several mixed cultures and multiple identities between Taiwan, China and other countries. There are multiple identities in Hakka consciousness, including global Hakkas and Chinese Hakkas. Thus, the rise of Hakka consciousness is not really of benefit to a pure, unified national identity. On the contrary, the development of Hakka identity leads to more diversity in national identity.

In fact, most of the ethnic cultures, such as the Fulo and mainlander cultures, face the same process — hybridity and fusion. This shows that it is more difficult to define a homogeneous culture in Taiwan, whether this refers to the culture of a specific ethnic group or to national culture.

The third challenge is related to the influence of globalisation. The experience of migrant workers provides an example. Multiculturalism, which is based on universal human rights and the recognition of cultural difference, should not be limited by national boundaries. Multiculturalism should consider everyone's rights irrespective of one's particular nationality. Under the influences of civil society and NGOs, a view of multiculturalism beyond national boundaries is becoming increasingly important, and in Taiwan this also challenges national identity.

10.2.2 The Challenge to Cultural Policy

The second aspect of society to be challenged by multiculturalism is cultural policy. The tensions between multiculturalism and cultural policy are reflected in various dimensions.

The first dimension is related to cultural policy and multicultural identity. The problem is whether cultural policy can actively contribute to multicultural identity. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the cultural identity of Taiwan tends to reflect the postmodern condition -- hybrid cultures and shifting, multiple identities. But Taiwan's multicultural policy is officially based on 'four ethnic groups' -- homogeneous, unified ethnic cultures. In addition, multicultural identity tends to be disunited and separate, but the aim of cultural policy in Taiwan is to achieve integration. Multicultural identity tends to change and shift in its forms and degrees, but cultural policy tends to be defined in fixed ways by the central government. Moreover, multicultural identity is related to many issues, such as gender, class, sexuality, and so on, but cultural policy in Taiwan only refers to ethnic difference. The tensions between cultural policy and multicultural identity in Taiwan show that there are major limitations in seeking to improve multicultural identity through cultural policy.

The second issue is whether multicultural citizenship can be practised within the multicultural policy of Taiwan. In Chapters 7, 8 and 9 I evaluated the practice of multicultural citizenship in three minority groups, and concluded that those groups' citizenship and multicultural rights are still underdeveloped. The case studies of Taiwanese aborigines, the Hakkas and migrant workers support this argument. The multicultural rights of aborigines have been given more attention since the establishment of the CAA, but most aborigines are still a long way from actually achieving those rights in practice. The government has introduced several policies to protect the right to cultural identity, for example through the renaming of 'Taiwanese aborigines', re-identifying 'who aborigines are', and recovering aborigines' traditional names. However, aboriginal cultural identity still faces many challenges for the young generation, and it needs more support from the government. The right to participate in cultural life, in either the majority or minority culture, is still underdeveloped in Taiwan. Modernisation will bring about the most difficult challenge to the future of aboriginal culture. In terms of the minority's right to be 'represented' in the public sphere, the majority society still has some negative impressions of aborigines.

For the Hakkas, their collective rights have expanded the concept of citizenship in Taiwan. However, their rights are limited, since the Hakka policy developed quite late. In addition, it is clear that a truly multicultural policy is not applied to migrant workers in Taiwan. In other words, 'multicultural Taiwan' only applies to Taiwanese citizens, and there is no concern with universal human rights across national boundaries.

The case studies show that much of multicultural policy is aimed at national construction, but this does not mean that Taiwanese people really hold multicultural attitudes to other cultural differences. As Parekh points out, 'multicultural society' should encourage an open-minded and expansive view of cultural identity, and people should cherish cultural difference. However, the right to cultural identity for Taiwanese aborigines, the Hakkas and migrant workers cannot yet be practised, since these groups are still discriminated against by the mainstream of Taiwanese society. Accordingly, I conclude that multicultural policy should be aimed not only at minority groups but also at the majority group in order to achieve an open-minded attitude to cultural differences.

10.2.3 The Challenge to Citizenship

Three important trends in the construction of multicultural citizenship -- collective rights, cultural rights, and global citizenship -- challenge the traditional views of

citizenship in Taiwan. At the same time, these new rights also force us to formulate a new model of what citizenship means.

The concepts of collective rights and cultural rights have made significant progress in the area of citizenship. They are accepted and implemented in the Constitution, laws and policy since 1997. Many laws are made based on collective rights and cultural rights, such as the Law of Aboriginal Development, and the Law of Aboriginal Autonomy. Collective rights and cultural rights are viewed as a new part of citizenship in Taiwan today.

However, global citizenship begins to challenge the concept of 'Taiwanese' citizenship, which is based on national boundaries. Many concepts are constructed based on the trend of global citizenship. As Christian Joppke shows, contemporary immigration, with its dual implications of post-national membership and multicultural identity politics, represents a profound challenge to every component of the classical model of citizenship⁴. Joppke distinguishes between the challenge to citizenship as a legal status, which is associated with the rise of *post-national membership*, and the challenge to citizenship as an identity, which is associated with multicultural identity politics⁵.

The Taiwan government, as a nation-state, also faces similar challenges. Through the issues of migrant workers, foreign brides and Chinese brides, the government is confronted by many demands from the NGOs to protect their multicultural citizenship. However, until now the government has not changed its 'national citizenship', but has begun to protect some multicultural rights in the name of universal human rights.

From the three challenges of multiculturalism, we can identify some major problems in the development of multiculturalism in Taiwan. Multiculturalism can be seen as a progressive movement towards ever greater diversity. However, it also drives the institutional framework into a position of chaos and illegitimacy. In other words, even the government tries to use multiculturalism to justify itself, but in the end multiculturalism challenges the government's legitimacy, especially through concepts of national identity and citizenship.

⁴ Christian Joppke (1998), p. 23.

⁵ *ibid.*, p.24.

In addition, multiculturalism emphasises collective rights, but the problem is that different forms of collectivity and different 'levels' of rights impinge upon each other. To succeed, there needs to be a more or less 'rational' framework, but multiculturalism subverts such a framework.

The development of multiculturalism highlights the complexity in the relationship between identity, cultural differences, citizenship and cultural policy. Multicultural policy tries to strengthen multiculturalism, but the components of multiculturalism clash with each other. A major concern is that multiculturalism will destroy itself at some levels in Taiwan in the future.

The author is not in fact pessimistic about the development of multiculturalism in Taiwan, even if the many conflicts among multicultural identity, policy and citizenship seem insoluble. The development of multicultural citizenship is a very promising approach to dealing with these problems effectively.

10.3 Multiculturalism and Cultural Policy in Taiwan's Experience

In this section I seek to provide basic comparisons between some western theories and Taiwan's experience of the development of multiculturalism.

10.3.1 Western Theory and Experience in Taiwan's Context

In western theory there are various definitions of multiculturalism, as discussed in Chapter 2. Multiculturalism can be viewed as a social phenomenon, political ideology, public policy and new citizenship. In Taiwan multiculturalism tends to be considered as identity and policy but not as citizenship. For this reason, the development of multicultural citizenship is very limited.

Furthermore, there are various phases in the consideration of cultural difference in policy: from cultural pluralism to multiculturalism to cultural diversity. In the earlier stage, the pillarisation of the Netherlands and some education policies in the United States represented the influences of cultural pluralism. From the 1970s, the Canadian and Australian governments began to develop multicultural policies, emphasising the importance of cultural differences. During the late 1990s, 'cultural diversity' reflected new thinking in British cultural policy, which defined cultural difference in broader, hybrid ways. (Chapter 2)

The Taiwanese experienced a long history of assimilation policy practised from the time of Japanese rule to that of the KMT government. Cultural differences were ignored or repressed by the governments. Taiwan developed multicultural policy until the late 1990s, and this seemed to be a mix between cultural pluralism and multiculturalism, according to the western experience. The government has tended to set up committees for the various ethnic groups, and these committees make their 'multicultural policy'. The committees attempt to establish their TV channels, universities and schools, and this is close to the view of cultural pluralism. At the same time, Taiwan's multicultural policy also demands more new rights, public resources and empowerment, which is close to the view of multiculturalism in western society.

There are two major trends in the theory of multiculturalism in western society: liberal multiculturalism and postmodern multiculturalism. In the case of liberal multiculturalism, Kymlicka explains that a liberal conception of multiculturalism requires that membership of these groups must not be imposed by the state, but rather be a matter of self-identity; that individual members must be free to question and reject any inherited or previously adopted identity, if they so choose, *and have an effective right of exit from any identity groups*; that these groups must not violate the basic civil or political rights of their members; and that multicultural accommodations must seek to reduce inequalities in power between groups, rather than allowing one group to exercise dominance over other groups⁶.

Postmodern multiculturalism points in another direction. For example, Werbner argues that multiculturalism is not a matter of theory but of real politics. It is related to different levels - the local, the national, the supranational - and to different domains -- from the orientalist construction of Eastern Europe to racism, migration, ethnicity, hyphenated identities, religion, local politics, education, affirmative action, and citizenship⁷. A theory of 'deep diversity' is needed as a basis for further exploration of what is happening to identity in postmodern society during the global age.

These two trends influence the development of multiculturalism and also lead to some tensions. Liberal multiculturalism argues that the political system and citizenship can protect cultural difference. For example, Habermas, points out that political culture must serve as the common denominator for a constitutional patriotism which simultaneously

⁶ Will Kymlicka, (2001), p.42.

⁷ Pina Werbner (1997), p.264.

sharpens an awareness of the multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life which coexist in a multicultural society. In a future Federal Republic of European States, the same legal principles would also have to be interpreted from the vantage point of different national traditions and histories. However, postmodern multiculturalism argues that it is impossible to set up a common, supranationally shared political culture, since everything is different in postmodern culture.

These two positions also appear in Taiwan's multiculturalism. Liberalism plays an important role in the cultural policy of Taiwan. For example, Community Renaissance tries to set up a civil identity and a common culture as a basis of national identity. However, postmodern hybrid cultures and multiple identities are supported in Taiwan. The cultural policies of the various ethnic committees tend towards the view of a 'politics of difference' and a 'politics of recognition' based on postmodernism. Most of their policies aim to make the public sphere more 'diverse'. A recent example of postmodern influence is that the Committee of the Hakkas holds the cultural festival of 'the Fulo-Hakkas'. The 'Fulo-Hakka' is viewed as a hybrid between the Fulos and the Hakkas. This development perhaps reflects a 'postmodern' view of cultural difference in Taiwan, although it stops short of the relativism and hybridity of 'postmodern multiculturalism'.

10.3.2 Rethinking the Problems of Multiculturalism and Cultural Policy in Taiwan

I will now provide some conclusions on multiculturalism in Taiwan. Firstly, the development of multiculturalism shows the strong tension in Taiwanese society between 'diversity'—(respect for cultural differences), and 'unity'—(construction of national identity). From Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese consciousness to the construction of 'multicultural Taiwan', the tension cannot really be solved. Multiculturalism is still struggling between 'diversity' and 'unity', 'separation' and 'integration' in Taiwan.

Secondly, from the analysis in this dissertation we can see that 'multicultural Taiwan' refers to ethnic cultures, Taiwanese and Chinese cultures, regional/communal cultures, and local/native cultures, but it does not include gender, class or gay/lesbian cultures. It is clear that 'multicultural Taiwan' is based on the need for national identity. Gender or gay/lesbian cultures are not used to draw up national boundaries; thus they are excluded from 'multicultural Taiwan'. Many cultural differences are excluded if they are not based on ethnic differences or extend beyond national boundaries. However, I believe that multiculturalism will be expanded in the future by meeting the challenges of gender, the gay/lesbian movement, migrant workers and marriage to non-Taiwanese nationals.

Thirdly, the multicultural policy of Taiwan is developing towards 'separation', meaning that each ethnic group will make its own multicultural policy. The advantage of this trend is that the various groups can make policy according to their special needs and development. It will be of benefit to the cultural development of the whole ethnic group, and to the protection of their rights. The disadvantage is that multicultural policy is always viewed as the minority groups' business. The majority feels isolated from multicultural policy and other cultural differences. Multicultural policy does not improve the mutual understanding between the various ethnic groups, nor encourage an open-minded attitude to cultural differences.

Fourthly, multicultural citizenship is seen as a significant new balance between 'unity' and 'diversity' in the development of multiculturalism in Taiwan. On the one hand, multicultural citizenship is related to the construction of a common public sphere and nation; on the other hand, it also relates to respect for cultural diversity and special communities. In addition, two kinds of rights are needed to practice multicultural citizenship. One is 'basic' rights for *all groups and individuals*, the other is '*group-specific*' rights.

Fifthly, many tensions and contradictions in the problem of multicultural citizenship and identity were noted in the three case studies--Taiwanese aborigines, the Hakkas and migrant workers. They demonstrate the tension between 'separation' and 'integration', 'hybridity' and 'homogeneity', and 'nation' and 'globalisation' in 'multicultural Taiwan' and cultural policy. Facing these tensions, multicultural policy should prepare to concede special collective rights to minorities and excluded groups while at the same time attempting to maintain a unifying framework--a national public sphere. The practice of multicultural citizenship should provide such a unifying framework based on a common public culture and equality, while at the same time it creates the space to develop special collective rights and minority rights.

However, multicultural citizenship is still underdeveloped in Taiwan. Our case studies of Taiwanese aborigines, the Hakkas and migrant workers show that multicultural citizenship and cultural rights are not really considered in cultural policy. This is related to the rethinking of cultural policy in Taiwan. What are the aims or purposes of cultural policy? Can cultural policy be considered without cultural rights? What is the role of cultural policy in the whole society and country? How can the relationship between cultural policy and multiculturalism be defined? We need to reconsider these questions in

the context of the overall role of cultural policy in Taiwan.

Without the support of cultural rights, Taiwan's cultural policy always concentrates on arts and cultural activities and developments. Therefore, most people feel that only artists and cultural organisations need to be concerned about cultural policy. In other words, Taiwan's cultural policy is sometimes viewed narrowly as 'arts policy'. But this is not sufficient. Cultural policy should be considered in terms of both cultural rights and cultural citizenship, which are related to the link between people and the state. Cultural policy should really protect cultural rights and strengthen the relationship between people's everyday experience and cultural policy. In this way cultural policy can contribute to the development of a multicultural society.

Furthermore, cultural policy frameworks should be balanced between three considerations. First, social justice principles involving the recognition of common cultural rights for all members of society should be considered. The second need is to recognise the distinctive *claims to difference of the immigrant, indigenous and various ethnic communities*. Finally, all groups need to be integrated into a common national culture.

In addition, cultural policy should be subject to further elaboration and development based on the principle of cultural citizenship. According to Tony Bennett, basic principles of citizenship should be considered in cultural policy. The first principle consists in the entitlement to equal opportunity to participate in the full range of activities that constitute the field of culture in the society in question. The second principle consists in the entitlement of all members of society to be provided with the cultural means of functioning effectively within that society without being required to change their cultural allegiance, affiliations or identity. The third principle consists in the obligation of governments and other authorities to nurture the sources of diversity through imaginative mechanisms, arrived at through consultation, for sustaining and developing the different cultures that are active within the populations for which they are responsible. The fourth principle concerns the obligation for the promotion of diversity to aim at establishing interactions between differentiated cultures, rather than their development as separated enclaves⁸.

⁸ Tony Bennett, *Differing Diversities: Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2001), p.61.

Finally, cultural policy should consider that cultural difference and cultural diversity are not static but changeable, both in degree and form. This is an important aspect of cultural policy. In fact, many researchers in cultural policy studies prefer to use 'cultural diversity' instead of 'multiculturalism' in order to emphasise the changing, dynamic nature of cultural differences and diversities. For example, Tony Bennett shows that cultural diversity policy is a further stage after multiculturalism:

In the current moment of cultural diversity, it is the intersections and intermixing of, and crossovers between, different cultural perspectives and traditions that produce the social dynamics of forms of cultural diversity that constantly interpenetrate one another with new and unpredictable consequences. It is this dynamic for diversity that cultural policies -- while still pursuing aspects of the earlier phases -- are now, in responding to the new conceptual context, seeking both to accommodate and to promote⁹.

10.4 Epilogue

In this study I explore what 'multiculturalism' means in Taiwan. This issue is integrated with the relationship between multiculturalism and national identity, cultural policy and citizenship. In the course of our analysis I have discussed many problems, such as the place of multiculturalism in national discourse, the influences of multiculturalism in the reconstruction of ethnicity in Taiwan, and the role of cultural policy in the practice of multiculturalism. In these discussions, I have analysed the many challenges and tensions in the development of multiculturalism in Taiwan.

The key contributions of the present study may be summarised as follows:

First, this study presents the difficulty of constructing a national identity in Taiwan. The conflicts between Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese consciousness have still to be resolved. The new discourses of 'multicultural Taiwan' and 'Four Ethnic Groups' also face many challenges. Civil society and multicultural citizenship are viewed as a new way to construct national identity in Taiwan. However, there remains a long way to go.

Secondly, I consider the issue of multiculturalism based on Taiwan's special historical background, cultural differences, and fractured national identity, and the concept of citizenship as it has emerged in Taiwan's cultural policy in order to reflect the special experience of Taiwan. At the same time, I have also examined whether the theories of

⁹ Ibid., p. 59.

multiculturalism from western societies can be applied to Taiwan's case. Our study shows that both liberal multiculturalism and postmodern multiculturalism can be integrated into cultural policy at the same time. From the viewpoints of liberalism and postmodernism, we can identify two major suggestions for cultural policy: thinking about cultural difference should be more flexible and fluid, and there should be 'deep diversity' in policy; and the problems of equality, rights and citizenship should be taken into account in cultural policy.

In addition, I have tried to redefine the view of cultural policy in Taiwan through a discussion of multiculturalism, and have emphasised that cultural policy should be based on cultural rights and cultural citizenship. The issue of cultural citizenship is now beginning to be emphasised in western cultural policy studies, although it remains at an early stage. However, cultural citizenship is almost completely ignored by cultural policy studies and practices in Taiwan. I hope that the present study can provide a new basis for considering the importance of cultural citizenship in cultural policy and multiculturalism in Taiwan.

I also wish to provide some suggestions for further research:

Multicultural policy was first developed in Taiwan from the late 1980s. Five years ago, the government claimed to be moving towards multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is still in its early stage. Its influences and effects are not yet fully apparent. More time is therefore needed for the continuing discussion and analysis of multiculturalism.

Secondly, some cultural differences could not be discussed in this study. Taiwanese cultural policy defines 'multicultural' in a narrow way, based only on ethnic differences. In fact, the formation of women's culture and gay/lesbian culture has influenced many cultural practices, such as literature, music, painting, theatre, film and popular culture. At the same time, the cultural rights of these groups are also beginning to be considered in academic circles and social movements. I suggest that cultural policy should consider these cultural rights in the future.

The theory of cultural rights and cultural citizenship is now developing rapidly. However, it deserves more attention in discussions of cultural policy. In my opinion, cultural rights and cultural citizenship should be viewed as the basis of cultural policy. Moreover, at the theoretical level, the conception of cultural rights is also an underdeveloped branch of human rights. This is due mainly to the difficulties of identifying the scope of these rights and the corresponding obligations, which are themselves linked to the problems of definition, particularly of the term 'culture'. Many

theorists try to define what cultural rights are. For example, Prott states that cultural rights have been present implicitly in thinking about human rights from the start. Freedom to express one's view, freedom to adhere to one's religion, and freedom to associate with others for peaceful purposes are all essential to the maintenance and development of any culture¹⁰. But now, cultural rights are extended from the individual, or specified minorities protected by detailed and concrete treaty provisions, to a broad general formulation as 'rights of peoples'. The combination between cultural rights and peoples' rights provides a new interpretation of cultural rights. Moreover, Rosaldo points out that the new social movements stress the 'politics of difference' and take gender, class, ethnicity, ecology, sexuality and age into consideration when formulating rights of citizenship. But this is only a quantitative shift in citizenship. He then uses a new 'qualitative influence' -- cultural rights -- to explain the importance of the redistribution of resources, and the change of recognition and responsiveness in citizenship¹¹. Inequality and social position are critical to studies of cultural rights and cultural citizenship. These issues are very important in cultural policy and multiculturalism.

Fourthly, we need to consider the specificity of multiculturalism in the global age. With the increase of diasporas and transnational populations, all societies are 'multicultural'. As Grant H Cornwell and Eve Walsh Stoddard point out, 'multicultural states' are a nexus of temporal and spatial phenomena. On the one hand, to appreciate the extent to which all societies are 'multicultural'; it is necessary to understand historically how peoples have shifted around the globe such that their self-identified cultural borders bear little relation to the state borders. On the other hand, a spatial analysis of societies is also crucial to recognising the multicultural composition of most states. For example, a spatial analysis emphasises the arrangements by which people living in a particular place seek to balance their current citizenship with their hereditary identities, characterised sometimes by ethnicity or religion, sometimes by race, and often by political and economic inequality¹².

With the influence of globalisation, multiculturalism has a close relationship to the interactions of diverse cultures across national boundaries. The discussion of the relationship between national boundaries and transnational multiculturalism should be

¹⁰ Lyndel V. Prott, (1992), p.95.

¹¹ Renato Rosaldo, (1999), pp.251-61.

¹² Grant H Cornwell and Eve Walsh Stoddard, 'Introduction: National Boundaries/Transnational Identities', in Grant H Cornwell and Eve Walsh Stoddard (eds.), *Global Multiculturalism: Comparative Perspectives on Ethnicity, Race and Nation* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), p.2.

developed in the future.

Finally, postmodern culture, identity and citizenship should be considered seriously in cultural policy studies. The influence of postmodernism, as expressed in hybrid culture, multiple identities, and shifting citizenship, is bound to become increasingly significant in the future. In Taiwan, postmodernism is emphasised in academic circles, but it has not been considered seriously by public policy-makers and government. I recommend, on the basis of the present study, that postmodern cultural policy should be given greater prominence in cultural policy studies and practice.

Appendix 1

The Chronology of cultural policy

Year	The events
1945	Taiwan was handed over to the KMT government in mainland China by Japan.
1947	The Event of 'Two Two Eight', a serious conflict between Taiwanese people and the KMT government.
1949	The KMT lost the regime of mainland China and moved the government to Taiwan.
1951	'The Administrative Programme of the Mountainous Region' was announced, which was to dominate aboriginal policy for over thirty years.
1950	The establishment of the 'Chinese Literary funding': it became the major non-government cultural organisation but was controlled by the state.
1954	'The movement of cleaning culture' was held by the state to eliminate unfavorable opinions of the state.
1956	The 'Combative Literature' was promoted by the state. The purpose of this literature was anti-communist.
1967	'The Chinese Cultural Revivalism' was held to resist the Cultural Revolution in mainland China.
1971	Taiwan withdrew from the United Nations. The KMT government in power faced huge challenges from Taiwanese society.
1976	The argument of 'Native Literature' sprang up, and the voice of 'localisation' was becoming strong.
1977	Each county set up a local arts center to develop local culture and promote participation in the arts.
1978	The Committee of Cultural Affairs, the highest administration of culture, was set up in charge of promoting and supporting cultures and art.
1983	ATA (Association of Taiwanese Aborigines) was set up to promote the rights of Mountainous peoples (aborigines). This was the first time the term 'Taiwanese aborigines' was used.
1986	The government abolished Martial Law. The new opposition party--DPP was set up. The limitation on mass media was also abolished, and cultural exchange between Taiwan and mainland China was opened after forty years.
1988	The first Hakka movement and demonstration was held in Taipei.
1990	'The sadness of the city' was awarded a top prize in Berlin Film Festival. The Taiwanese colonial experience and the Event of 'Two Two Eight' became an important issue in society.
1992	The DPP party pointed out the term of 'Four Ethnic Groups'.
1994	Community Renaissance becomes the major cultural policy to build up the native and cultural identity.
1995	'Mountainous Peoples' were renamed as 'Taiwanese aborigines'.

1996	The first Presidential election announces the independent sovereignty of Taiwan. President Lee of the KMT won the election.
1996	The Committee of Aboriginal Affairs was set up.
1997	The Constitution claims that Taiwan is a country that supports 'Multiculturalism'. The term of 'Multicultural Taiwan' was used afterwards.
1999	The Earthquake of 921 (21 September 1999) destroyed many aboriginal tribes and Hakka villages.
2000	The DPP became the ruling power, Chen, Shu-Ban became the first president of the DPP.
2001	The Committee of the Hakkas was set up.

Appendix 2

The List of Interviewees and Dates

Government

General Cultural Policy

Chen, Qi-Nan (30/06/2001) and
(15/05/2002)

(Committee Member in Administrative Yuan for cultural policy, 2002--)

(Vice Chief of Committee of Cultural Affairs, 1993--1998)

Huang, Su-Juan (the person in charge of multicultural policy in CCA)
(28/08/2001)

Aboriginal Issue

Sun, Da-Chuan

(Vice Chief of CAA, 1997--2000) (12/02/2001)

Pu, Zhong-Cheng

(Vice Chief of CAA, 2002--) (05/02/2001)

Lin, Jiang-Yi

(Director of Cultural and Educational Department of CAA)

(20/02/2001) and (16/05/2002)

Kong, Wen-Ji

(Chief of Taipei Committee of Aboriginal Affairs, 1998--) (22/02/2001)

Huang, Lin-hua

(Assistant of Aboriginal Legislator) (09/03/2001)

Hakka Issue

Xu, Zheng-Guang

(Chief of Preparatory Committee of the Hakkas, 2000-2002) (04/03/2001)

Yuang, Zhang-Zen

(Adviser of Committee of the Hakkas, 2002--) (26/02/2001) and (03/05/2002)

Migrant Worker Issue

Gong, Yu-Qian

(Chief of the Consulting Centre of Migrant Workers in Taipei) (11/08/2001)

Non-Government

General Cultural Policy

Chen, ban

(Hakka movement, community worker) (25/02/2001) and (29/06/2001)

Aboriginal Issue

Sinaiyuang (Dancer) (20/02/2001)

Lin, Yi-miao (Aboriginal Magazine) (07/02/2001)

Alice (Multicultural art Group) (17/02/2001)

Lin, Wei-Cheng (Shun-Yi Aboriginal Museum) (19/02/2001)

Chen, Zheng-Rui(sculptor) (11/02/2001)

Banai, Mulu (musician) (13/02/2001)

Wadan (Dancer, Popular Music Singer) (08/02/2001)

Zhang, Jun-Jie (aboriginal left movement) (12/02/2001)

Yuang, Zhi-Wei (tribal worker) (22/08/2001)

Wang, Ying-Tang (tribal worker) (13/08/2001)

Hakka Issue

Zhong,Tie-Min (writer) (02/03/2001)

Zheng, Rong-Xing (Hakka traditional drama) (05/03/2001)

Zeng, Cai-Jin (historian) (02/03/2001)

Zeng, Nian-Yu (community worker) (06/06/2001)

Wu, Ming-Zhong (Community worker) (09/06/2001)

Wen, Chong-Liang (community worker) (20/06/2001)

Lin,Xiao-Fang (photographer) (20/06/2001)

Huang, Zi-Yai (Hakka Radio) (07/06/2001)

Gu, Xiu-Ru and Chen, Yong-Tao (musicians) (01/03/2001)

Gu, Xiu-Fei (Hakka cultural Committee) (21/02/2001)

Huang, Quan-Bo (community worker) (16/06/2001)

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